# KASHMIRIS FIGHT—FOR FREEDOM

## Volume II

## (1947—1978)

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(Chief Justice, A. K. High Court)

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To
my wife
BANO
who suffered
long, lonely hours
while I worked on the book

For the 1948 fighting, I have largely relied upon the (restricted) GHQ publication, the Kashmir Campaign, 1947-48. I am grateful to General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, for permission to quote from the said book as well as for making a copy available to me.

# PREFACE

I am thankful to God Who made it possible to place the second volume in the hands of the readers. When the first volume was still under print, I came face to face with a grim reality—that to say the least of deriving any profit, even the realisation of self-borne costs of bringing out a book of reasonable get-up in our country, is like asking for the moon. To meet the enhanced cost of even the first volume, there was a short-fall of funds to the extent of Rs. 22,000/-. The Printers turned down our offer that they treat the paltry amount—paltry for a printing concern of the dimensions of Ferozsons—as first charge on sale-proceeds. Their contention was that their Printing Branch was independent of their Sale Branch and that the books could not, therefore, be moved to the latter branch until the dues of the former were first cleared. This, however, proved a blessing in disguise because it also brought me face to face with the uglier reality that the hope of financing the printing of the 2nd volume, from the sale proceeds of the first one, was even more unreal than an illusion.

Fortunately, the Banking Council of Pakistan again came to our rescue. It was then headed by Mr. Mushtaq Yusufi, himself a known man of letters and essentially a gentleman. Both he as well as Presidents of the Scheduled Banks, forming the Council, had well-received the first volume and were kind to say that their donation had financed "a pioneering work of research". They, therefore, agreed, kindly, to make a further donation of rupees one lakh. That there was an interval of hardly 24 hours between my request and their decision, represented not only the measure of confidence reposed which, thank God, is vindicated by the publication of the 2nd volume but more so, their own goodness to be helpful—uprightly.

Needless to say, how grateful I am to them all, Mr. Mushtaq Yusufi, Mr. S. M. Abdullah then President of the Habib Bank, Mr. Jamil Nishtar then President of the National Bank, Kh. Ziaudin, President of the United Bank, Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Garda, then President of the Muslim Commercial Bank and last but not the least, to my esteemed friend Mr. Ajmal Khaleel, President of the Allied Bank.

The 1st volume has, on the whole, been well received. The Quaid-e-Azam Academy, Karachi, set up by the Government of Pakistan, adjudged it as the 2nd best book in English on topics connected with Quaid-e-Azam or freedom struggles by Muslims, published during 1975—77. As far as I am concerned, this Award is the best reward that I could have wished for.

As the reader will find, the narrative remains incomplete. Controversial political developments from 1971 onwards, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and its after-effects, the formation and growth of the Liberation League and the Peoples Party, some important though unpleasant matters and questions from 1949 onwards and some historical anecdotes, revealing the character of individuals who shaped the history of these times, have not been included in this volume. This will make, perhaps, about 400 pages in print. Only about 150 pages have so far come under dictation.


This volume contains a separate chapter, comprising my letter to Earl Louis Mountbatten of Burma, his reply, my 2200 word questionnaire on what we in Pakistan believe his pro-Hindu role in matters pertaining to partition and his 3100 word reply. I am grateful to his Lordship for his important decision, deserving of a man of his greatness, to comment on my questions as well as his equally important comments. I have no doubt that it will greatly facilitate the task of uninvolved successive generations to judge us—all of us—fairly, impartially and objectively.

Muzaffarabad.
1-4-1979.

MUHAMMAD YUSUF SARAF
High Court,
Muzaffarabad,
A. K.

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## Muslim Conference Leaders' Dilemma

The statement, as could be expected, invited unpleasant reaction from Muslim circles all over the State. However, the Muslim Conference leaders remained unmoved and summoned, at Srinagar, a meeting of the Working Committee on the 18th of July and a Convention of party workers on the 19th of July, 1947. This writer was not a member of the Working Committee, having proceeded to Aligarh immediately after the July, 1946 Convention. I returned to Baramula towards the middle of June as the University closed for summer vacations. No formal invitations were issued for the Convention; instead, an announcement was published in the press requesting all workers to treat it as an invitation. On 18th evening, the Working Committee endorsed the statement referred to above and unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the Maharaja to declare Independence and assured him of the Party's whole-hearted support and co-operation. When news of the passage of the resolution became known, a number of younger delegates, including this writer, began canvassing against its endorsement in the Convention. Sensing strong opposition, a restricted meeting of about eight to ten persons was held next morning, before calling the Convention to session, at the residence of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Bar-at-Law, Chief Whip of the Party's Assembly group who was practising law at Srinagar. It was attended by senior most members of the Working Committee and a few Assembly members. This writer was also invited, perhaps, as the vocal opponent of the official resolution. While Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan tried to persuade us to allow the passage of the Working Committee resolution in the interests of party discipline, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmad Jeweller, Deputy Leader of the Assembly Party, and this writer gave our objections against its adoption. *Other members of the Working Committee present in the meeting took no direct part but were behind their President.* At last, Chaudhry Hameed Ullah Khan disclosed that this line had been taken on the directions of the Muslim League High Command! Upon this Mr. Jeweller suggested that both he and the Acting President fly to Delhi at his expense to seek confirmation of his claim from the Quaid-e-Azam, so that if it was really so, the resolution could be unanimously adopted. This was not acceptable to Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan who said that as Acting President, he was entitled to be believed.

This was no doubt true, so far as the theory is concerned but there were circumstances which were weighing in our minds against taking him at his word. The principal reason was that Chaudhry Niaz Ahmed, a very close relative of Chaudhry Hameed Ullah, was then Chief Secretary

of the Government. His son Chaudhry Khurshid Ahmed who had successfully contested election to the sitting Assembly as an independent, on a purely sectarian, Jat-Gujar platform, against the Party candidate, Raja Muhammad Yaqub Khan, sat on the treasury benches. It was only natural that this close relationship should have put us on the alert as a matter of abundant caution because the stake involved was so great that nothing could be left to chance. No agreement could be arrived at in the meeting and the Convention was, therefore, called to session. The attendance was not more than a hundred and the majority came from Kashmir Province.

As soon as the Convention assembled, at the same place, the Working Committee resolution in favour of an independent Kashmir was introduced. I do not now recollect exactly as to who moved it. Unfortunately, nobody has the courage of conviction to come forward and shoulder the responsibility. After all, it is human to err. On the other hand, the same members of the Working Committee who had passed it in the Working Committee meeting and were bound to support it in the Convention, and who in fact did so, are now coming forward to take credit for its failure in the Convention! These include 'Beras' and back-benchers who cannot, even now, that a further period of 31 years has been added to their political experience, even ill-draft the resolution in question and whose role, inside the parties commanding their allegiance from time to time, has been merely that of the Boss's yesmen.

The factual position is that immediately after the introduction of the official resolution, this writer stood up and moved a hastily-drafted and pencil-written counter-resolution congratulating the Quaid-e-Azam on the creation of Pakistan and demanding accession of the State to it. Immediately after I finished reading the text and before I could speak, Khawaja Inayatullah Kakroo M.L.A. my townsman, desired, in his capacity *as an elected member of the Assembly*, that the resolution be treated as having been moved by him. He then spoke in favour of the resolution. He was followed by me and in my speech I explained the reasons as to why the Muslim Conference which had been politically linked with the All India Muslim League right from its revival should take a clear and categorical stand in favour of Pakistan. I also explained that the resolution was likely to be used against our interests by the essentially pro-Congress Dogra House. I was followed by a dozen speakers who included, as far as I remember, Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Tranbu, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, and others whose names I don't recollect. The enthusiasm generated by the speeches was so over-whelming that no member of the Working Committee had the courage to oppose the counter resolution. When put to vote, only a few dissenting hands of the Working Committee members rose

against it. Next day the daily Hamdard carried a brief news of the proceedings which stated that the resolution was moved by Khawaja Inayatullah Kakroo and seconded by this writer. A group of workers from the rival Muslim Conference led by Khawaja Abdus Salam Dalal and Mir Abdul Aziz, now of weekly "Insaf", staged a demonstration outside, raising slogans in favour of accession to Pakistan. Given below is the text of the historic resolution:—

"This Convention of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference expresses its jubilation and great satisfaction at the coming into being of Pakistan and offers its congratulations to the Quaid-e-Azam.

The inhabitants of the Princely States of the sub-continent had hoped that they would achieve the objectives of national freedom shoulder to shoulder with the inhabitants of British India but unfortunately, whereas the inhabitants of British India achieved freedom with the partition of the sub-continent, the third June Plan has strengthened the hands of the rulers of these States; so long as these autocratic rulers do not bow before the demands of time, the future of the inhabitants of Indian States will remain bleak. Under these circumstances only three alternatives are open to the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir State, namely, accession to India or (2) accession to Pakistan or (3) the establishment of a free and independent State.

After carefully considering the position, this Convention of the Muslim Conference has arrived at the conclusion that accession of the State to Pakistan is absolutely necessary in view of the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious considerations because Muslims constitute eighty percent of the State's population, all major rivers of Pakistan have their source in the State and the inhabiatnts of the State are strongly connected with the people of Pakistan through religious, cultural and economic relations.

It is, therefore, necessary that the State must accede to Pakistan.

The Convention strongly demands of the Maharaja that the people of Kashmir should be given complete internal autonomy and the Maharaja should treat himself as constitutional Head of the State and set up a representative Legislative Assembly while handing over the portfolios of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

The Convention wishes to proclaim that if the Kashmir Government did not accept the demands of the Muslim Conference or did not act upon the advice so tendered, on account of any internal or external pressure and instead brings about accession of the State to the Constituent Assembly of India, the people of Kashmir will stand as one man against such a decision and launch a struggle with all the power at their command."

What was the background of the stand taken by Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan? I have throughout the narrative tried my utmost to avoid attributing motives to anyone and I must record it in fairness to the departed leader, that he was as staunch a Pakistani as anyone else and for that reason and in pursuit of it, lost his eldest son and a daughter during the massacre of Jammu Muslims in November, 1947. He was not free from weaknesses but then who else in politics can be said to be free of them? Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan told this writer that Chaudhry Hameedullah showed them, in the Working Committee meeting, an unsigned note from Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan scribbled from Jail on a writing pad in which the Acting President had been advised to demand independence for the State.

Chaudhry Sahib was in jail since October 1946 and had no first-hand knowledge of the political drama being enacted in the sub-continent. Even his worst critics have not attributed any wavering or weakening in his loyalty to the Muslim League ideals. This note must have therefore been the outcome of some information transmitted from outside—and information which must have been considered by him as reliable. What then was the source of his information and what the information itself was? His autobiography is absolutely silent on the point. Unfortunately, this point did not strike my mind when we were together in jail in 1958, first at Montgomery and then at Ghoragali.

Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan and Professor Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi met the Quaid-e-Azam in New Delhi on 11th July 1947. In a press statement issued by the Quaid-e-Azam on the same day, subsequent to the meeting, he stated that the Maharaja had three options open to him; Accession to Pakistan, Accession to India or Independence. *He did not call for accession to Pakistan.*[1] Professor Ishaque claims:

"In this meeting we got the impression that the Quaid-e-Azam was in touch with the Maharaja through some source (probably the Nawab of Bhopal) and that he had, to a great extent, made him agree to acceding to Pakistan. The Quaid-e-Azam told us that the

1. **Speeches and Statements of Q.A. (1911-34 and 1947-48) Page 419.**

Hindu Congress and Gandhijee were doing their utmost that the State should accede to India and for that end, were frightening him away from the Muslims as well as Pakistan. Therefore, at this stage, I think it advisable that the Muslims of Kashmir should make no such move which may strengthen the Congress goals and disturb the Maharaja. He should be given an opportunity to think it over in a proper mental equilibrium. Therefore, *for the time being*, you people should demand that the State should remain independent of the two Dominions."[1]

The possibility of some indirect contact between the Quaid-e-Azam and the Maharaja cannot be ruled out but it needs to be emphasised that long before this meeting, Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan had already publicly demanded of the Maharaja to declare independence.

There is no evidence in existence to prove that the Leading Hotel statement, already referred to, was the result of any advice from the Quaid-e-Azam. The claim that the Maharaja had already largely agreed to accede to Pakistan through the efforts of any intermediary, is, at best, a very bold statement which would least impress any student of recent Kashmir history. This question wiil be discussed when the accession issue comes up for narration.

It is also claimed that Mr. K.H. Khurshid wrote a letter to Agha Shaukat Ali through Hakim Muhammad Aslam Pleader Reasi, now practising law at Sheikhupura, which was smuggled into jail by Malik Abdul Rashid, then employed in the Forest Department and later Director, Local Government and People's Works, Muzaffarabad. He claims to have read the letter which according to him contained the following sentences :—

> "The Quaid-e-Azam has told me to tell Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas that he should not worry about Kashmir. Kashmir is in my pocket."

In the letter Mr. Khurshid is alleged to have advised Shaukat that *for the time-being*, they may not demand accession to Pakistan but may instead urge upon the Maharaja to remain independent.

Mr. Shaukat posted this letter, through the courtesy of Mr. Malik, to Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan along with a letter of his own. In the secret

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1. Weekly Chattan, 3rd September, 1973.

meeting referred to above, held at the residence of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, neither of the two letters was mentioned by anyone. The question that therefore arises is as to whether such a letter was in fact written and if it was, what were its contents? There are three circumstances which can help in the determination of the question. The first is the fact that the Quaid-e-Azam refused to grant an interview to Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan at Lahore in September, 1947 despite the fact that Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Central Minister incharge of Refugees and Mian Amir-ud-Din, the Mayor of Lahore also tried to bring about an interview. Mr. Khurshid was at the time on duty with the Quaid-e-Azam but it is impossible that he could have manipulated the refusal especially when powerful men like Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Mian Amir-ud-Din were, as per disclosure made to me by Sardar Sahib himself, doing their best to bring about a meeting. The Quaid-e-Azam was very careful in dealing with his personal staff and I have been told by Mr. Khurshid that occasionally he kept an eye on their contacts as well as correspondence. The second circumstance is that the alleged letter of Mr. Khurshid was not mentioned in the W.C. meeting, much less to have been shown to the members. I see no particular reason why such a vital and decisive communication could not have been disclosed. If a note from Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan could be shown in order to get endorsement of the Leading Hotel stand, a letter from the Quaid-e-Azam's Secretary would have clinched the matter. The third circumstance is Mr. Khurshid's great dedication to Quaid-e-Azam and his zealous work for the Pakistan Movement both as a student leader as well as Joint Editor of weekly "Javaid".

Mr. Khurshid strenuously denies the contents of the letter, especially the words, "Kashmir is in my pocket". Hakim Muhammad Aslam, in a written communication, in answer to my letter, has substantially supported the assertion of Malik Abdul Rashid but has made no mention of the above sentence. I have known Mr. Rashid since about 30 years and my impression is that he is a gentleman. I think it is only fair to assume that there is some mistake somewhere. I have known Mr. Khurshid from very close quarters since more than 20 years and have had the frequent opportunity of spending hours together, and despite the acute differences that developed between us years ago, I must record it in fairness to him that anti-Pakistan sentiment cannot and could not be attributed to him. His patriotism is second to none.

However, the refusal of the Quaid-e-Azam to meet Sardar Ibrahim in September 1947, rumours current then in Lahore that he had also refused to grant an interview to Ch. Hameedullah Khan, the jail note for

independence from a seasoned politician like Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan and the Quaid-e-Azam's meaningful 11th July statement, acknowledging, without at the same time demanding accession to Pakistan, the right of Maharaja Hari Singh to become independent, do go to strengthen the claim made by Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan in the secret meeting referred to above that the call to Maharaja to become independent may have been made on the directions of the League High Command.

According to the information furnished to this writer by Chaudhry Niaz Ahmad, apart from the Maharaja of Patiala, the Hill State Rajas from East Punjab were frequent visitors at the palace. They aimed at the creation, within the Indian Union, of a separate province comprising their States and Kashmir. The Congress had, by the end of July 1947, so much influenced the Maharaja through his wife that he himself asked Mahatma Gandhi to send any person of his choice as Prime Minister in place of Ram Chandra Kak who was, ironically, over-optimistic about his future and over-confident about his relations with the Maharaja while the Mahasabha element was openly predicting his imminent fall. In a written note Kak advised the Maharaja to remain independent at least for one year and then take an appropriate decision in the light of developments and requirements. He had also consulted Mr. Shuaib Qureshi, then Prime Minister of Bhopal. Kak had a meeting with the Quaid-e-Azam in Delhi on 19th July, 1947 and according to what he told Mr. Niaz Ahmad, the latter had not shown any displeasure about the Kak plan. Unfortunately, the Mahasabha element dinned into the ears of the Maharaja that Kak had formulated his proposal at the instance of the Quaid-e-Azam. Kak tried to get popular support for his plan. He first contacted his brother, Pandit Amar Nath Kak, a leading lawyer and an influential member of the Yovak Sabha which, instead, passed a resolution in favour of accession to India. He then contacted his friends in the Mahajan Sabha but here also a resolution demanding accession to India was passed. Thereupon, several resolutions were passed by Panchayats at his instance, demanding that the State should, for the time being, accede neither to India nor Pakistan. These were forwarded to the Maharaja by Pandit Kak but it had a contrary effect because the pro-India elements, who had a decidedly upper hand, told him that this was being done in furtherance of the plan chalked out at the instance of the Quaid-e-Azam.

As unfortunately those having inside knowledge are either dead or tight-lipped, one can only surmise from the circumstantial evidence that after all, Pandit Ram Chandra Kak may have been in touch with the Muslim League High Command and he may have suggested this course, perhaps to

distract the attention of the Congress, or to maintain balance of emotions in the State or even as an indirect public assurance to the Maharaja that in case of accession to Pakistan, his interests were safe.

The resolution was widely acclaimed throughout the State not only by followers of the Muslim Conference but also by Muslims not subscribing to the Party. That this demand was just and in keeping with the interests of all concerned is proved from the fact that even the Working Committee of the non-communal All Jammu and Kashmir Kisan Mazdoor Conference headed by a far-sighted patriot like Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz supported the demand for the State's accession to Pakistan in a resolution passed on 5th September, 1947. The resolution, after detailing the circumstances of the partition, said:—

> "The Working Committee of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference has fully and carefully considered the developments of the last five months. It has also consulted the majority of the members of the General Council of the Conference. The Committee is of the opinion that there is now no alternative before the State but to join Pakistan. If she does not do so, the country and its people shall have to face immense trials and tribulations.
>
> If the Maharaja entertains any doubts about the obvious public opinion that the State should accede to Pakistan, then he should order a referendum in which all adults should have the right to vote on the issue whether the State should accede to India or to Pakistan.
>
> The Working Committee hopes that people from all parts of the State will support this democratic method of solution so that peace is maintained and the country can progress."

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## THE PRINCELY STATES

# CHAPTER XIX

## The Princely States

There were five hundred sixty two Princely States at the time of partition with a population of about ten crores, and an area equal to two-fifths of the entire sub-continent. They ranged, in size, from Hyderabad with a population of one crore sixty lakhs and an annual revenue of rupees 26 crores to nominal chieftains in West India with one hundred souls and less than one square mile of land. As many as 454 had collectively an area of less than 1000 sq miles; 452 had a population of less than ten lakhs and only about 30 possessed an area, population and resources of an average British Indian district. There were as many as 15 States with territories under a square mile each. Three of these had a population of less than 100 persons. As many as 202 States had an area of less than 10 square miles each. As many as 19 States had an annual revenue of Rs. 1 crore or more; 7 had revenue ranging between 50 lakhs to one crore; the figure descended gradually till it showed a revenue approximating to an artisan's average wages. According to pre-1947 figures of the total population of Hindus and Muslims inhabiting the sub-continent, 27 and 26 percent respectively lived in the Princely States.[1]

They were bound with Britain through treaties which, allowing them a completely free hand in the suppression of their subjects, imposed British Crown as the Paramount power, whose functions were performed by the Viceroy. When the East India Company strengthened its hold in Southern India and Bengal, it embarked upon a deliberate policy of conquest. The Central Authority at Delhi having become weak and ineffective, hundreds of adventurers, Subedars and hereditary princes established themselves as independent rulers. Before 1857, the policy of the East India Company, to annex to its directly administered territory as much area as possible, was ruthlessly implemented by Wellesley and Dalhousie. The

1. R. L. Handa, p. 14

former introduced the Subsidiary System which required the acceding States to undertake, neither to make war nor enter into negotiations with any State, without the Company Sarkar's consent. The bigger States were further required to maintain sizable forces officered by Company-nominated Britishers, ostensibly "for the preservation of the public peace" but actually to keep them in readiness for advancing British expansionism; the rulers were also required to transfer to the Company such of its areas as the latter deemed sufficient for the upkeep of such forces; the smaller States paid a fixed tribute. Political representatives designated as Residents were also installed in most of the States. In return, the Company undertook to protect them against external attack and internal rebellion. Lord Wellesley succeeded in bringing even important States like Hyderabad, Travancore, Gwalior, Baroda and Mysore under the system. Among those who helped in making this forward policy such a success was his younger brother, the Duke of Wellington, then Arthur Wellesley, who later commanded the Allied forces against Napolean at Waterloo.

Twenty-five years later, came Lord Dalhouise who introduced the Doctrine of Lapse which provided for the annexation of a State, on the failure of a male heir. Among the States thus annexed were Satara, Nagpur, Sambalpur, Bhagat, and Jhansi. He conquered Punjab and annexed Oudh. He resorted to the Doctrine even to take away titles and pensions of deposed rulers. How helpless these Princes were may be judged from the following incidents: A certain Colonel Macaulay informing the Maharaja of Cochin about the impending arrival of a Resident, advised: "the Resident will be glad to learn that on his arrival near Cochin, the Raja will find it convenient to wait on him." One Henry Mead, a journalist, who spent twenty-five years in India before 1857 has left the following account:

> "The sovereigns of what are called independent States live in a state of abject dependence upon the will of the British agency at their various Courts. The whole functions of Government are in most cases exercised by the Resident, in fact, if not in appearance; and the titular monarch sighs in vain for the personal freedom enjoyed by his subjects. To know the character of his rule and seeming tendencies of his disposition, it is sufficient to have a knowledge of the capacity and likings of the British Representative. Thus General Cullen is a savant and the Rajah of Travancore builds an observatory and maintains men of science; the Resident of Indore is a person of elegant taste and the Maharajah surrounds himself with articles of vertu. The Durbar Surgeon at the Mysore Court, who fulfils the duties of a Government agent, is passiona-

tely fond of the sports of the turf and the Rajah keeps a large stud of horses, gives gold cups and heavy purses at races, wears topboots and has pictures of the 'great events' of past and present days."[1]

This policy of annexation was opposed by two leading colonialists, Sir John Malcolm and Elphinstone. Malcolm said as early as 1825:

> "I am decidedly of the opinion that the tranquillity, not to say security, of our vast oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of native principalities which are dependent on us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides other and great benefits we derive from their alliance, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost."[2]

Elphinstone said:

> "We must have some sink to receive all the corrupt matter that abounds in India, unless we are willing to taint our own system by stopping the discharge of it."[3]

These States proved of immeasurable assistance during the 1857 War of Liberation; but for their assistance in men and material as well as their failure to fall in line with the national movement, the British rule would have doubtlessly ended. It was not without reason that Lord Canning gratefully acknowledged their role as "break-waters in the storm which would have swept over us in one great wave". "Where should we have been", enquired Elphinstone, "if Scindia, the Nizam and the Sikh Chiefs etc. had been annexed, the subordinate Presidencies abolished, the whole army thrown into one and the revenue system brought into one mould?" It was this realization that brought a radical change in the policy of the British Government which found expression in Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 as quoted below:

> "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they as well as our own subjects should enjoy that prosperity and social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good Government."[4]

1&2. Menon, pp. 7&8. 3&4. Menon, pp. 8&9.

The proclamation was followed by what is known as "The Act for the Better Government of India, 1858"; the last clause of which provided that "all treaties made by the Company shall be binding upon Her Majesty", with the result that the policy of annexation was now substituted by the policy of their perpetuation. Consequently, the Rulers, on failure of natural heirs, were authorised to adopt their successors according to their laws and customs. In this connection, the Sanads issued, stated that they were intended "to reassure and knit the native sovereigns to the Paramount power". A Political Department was set up under the direct charge of the Governor-General. It was manned by officers recruited both from the Army and the Civil Service. Constitutionally, the States were not a part of British India nor were inhabitants of these States, British subjects. The British Parliament also had no power to legislate for them. The relations of the Crown were conducted by the Governor-General in Council. The political Department had wide authority and acted as a super Government in each State. It was impossible for any Prince to disregard its advice. Although from time to time, the Viceroys spoke eloquently about the importance of improving the lot of the people inhabiting the States, they did practically nothing to achieve this end, especially so, after the partition of Bengal by which time the Hindu middle class had become vocal through the Indian National Congress and looked upon Indian princes, who were mostly Hindus, as entitled to be maintained in their positions of power, irrespective of their anti-people policies. What the British professions were, is illustrated from the following beautiful speech delivered by Lord Curzon at the installation of the Ruler of Bahawalpur:—

> "He must be the servant as well as master of his people. He must learn that his revenues are not secured to him for his own selfish gratification but for the good of his subjects; that his internal administration is only exempt from correction in proportion as it is honest; and that his gaddi is not intended to be a divan of indulgence but the stern seat of duty. His figure should not be merely known on the play-ground or on the race course or in the European hotel. His real work, his princely duty, lies among his own people. By this standard shall I, at any rate, judge him. By this test will he, in the long run, as a political institution, perish or survive."[1]

## THE CHAMBER OF PRINCES

During the Great war (1914—1919), the policy of perpetuation proved its wisdom. During this period they met almost annually in connection

1. R. L. Handa, p. 10.

with the intensification of war efforts. After the war, when Edwin Samuel Montagu, the Secretary of State, came to India, he had several discussions with the Princes with regard to their future. A conference of the ruling Princes appointed a Committee which submitted a memorandum. In their joint report on constitutional reforms, Montagu and Chelmsford paid warm tributes to the Princes for their help in the war; referring to the treaties, it stated:

> "It would be well to review the situation, of course, only by consent of parties, not necessarily with a view to any change of policy but in order to simplify, standardize and codify existing practice for the future. The rulers should be assured in the fullest and freest manner that no constitutional changes that might take place would impair the rights, dignity and privileges secured to them by treaties, sanads and engagements or by established practice."[1]

The idea of forming some sort of an Association of the Princes on permanent lines was first mooted by Lord Lytton but for one reason or other, it fell through due to the opposition of the British Government and some of the Indian princes themselves. The proposal was revived in the Montagu Chelmsford Report. Ultimately, the Chamber of Princes came into being by a Royal proclamation on 8th February, 1921. It was inaugurated by the Duke of Cannaught in the Diwan-e-Aam of the Red Fort, Delhi. The Chamber was to be merely a deliberative, consultative and advisory body, with the Viceroy as its President while the members were to elect a Chancellor and a pro-Chancellor from among themselves. In the first place, 108 rulers became its members in their own right as they were enjoying permanent dynastic salute of 11 guns or over. Twelve members were elected by 127 non-salute States. The admission of other members was to be determined by the Viceroy. The States of Hyderabad and Mysore kept out of the Chamber.

In May, 1927, a conference of the rulers, convened at Simla by the Viceroy, demanded an impartial enquiry into their relationship with the Paramount Power. On 16th December 1927, the Secretary of State Lord Birkenhead appointed a three-member committee consisting of Sir Harcourt Butler as Chairman and Professor W.S. Holdsworth and the Hon'ble S.C. Peel as members to go into the matter and suggest means for the more satisfactory adjustment of their existing economic relations with British India. The Committee toured India but held its sittings in camera. It declined to examine the representations made by the inhabitants of

1. Menon, p. 15.

the States, ostensibly on the ground that it was outside its terms of reference. However, it accepted a memorandum submitted by the All India States People's Conference demanding "responsible Government for the people in the States through representative institutions under the aegis of their Rulers". The Rulers' point of view was placed before it by a galaxy of leading British constitutional lawyers, headed by Sir Leslie Scott K.C. The contention of the States was that they possessed all original sovereign powers except those which had been transferred with their consent to the Crown. Sir Scott argued that the paramount power was the British Crown and no one else and that it was to it that the States had entrusted their foreign relations and internal and external security and, therefore, the States could not be compelled to transfer to a third party the loyalty they owed to the British Crown. The Committee disagreed with Sir Scott on the question of the limitation of paramountcy. It held that the relationship of the Paramount power with the States was not merely contractual, resting on treaties but that it was a living, growing relationship shared by circumstances and policy, resting on a mixture of history, theory and modern fact. However, the Committee stated:

> "If any Government in the nature of a Dominion Government should be constituted in British India, such a Government would clearly be a new Government resting on a new and written constitution. The contingency has not arisen. We feel bound, however, to draw attention to the really grave apprehension of the Princes on this score and to record our strong opinion that, in view of the fact of the historical nature of the relationship between the Paramount power and the Princes, the latter should not be transferred without their agreement to a relationship with a new Government in British India responsible to an Indian legislature."[1]

## ACCESSION MECHANICS UNDER 1935 ACT

In 1935 was passed the Government of India Act which envisaged a constitutional relationship between the Indian States and British India on a federal basis. A special feature of the scheme was that whereas in the case of provinces, accession to the Federation was to be automatic, in the case of Princely States, it was to be voluntary. The Joint Select Committee gave the following reasons for the departure:

> "The main difficulties are two: that the Indian States are wholly different in status and character from the provinces of British India, and that they are not prepared to federate on the same terms

1. Menon, p. 23.

as it is proposed to apply to the Provinces. On the first point, the Indian States, unlike the British Indian provinces, possess sovereignty in various degrees and they are, broadly speaking, under a system of personal Government. *Their accession to a Federation cannot therefore take place otherwise than by the voluntary act of the Ruler of each State, and after accession, the representatives of the acceding State in the Federal Legislature will be nominated by the Ruler and its subjects will continue to owe allegiance to him.* On the second point, the Rulers have made it clear that while they are willing to consider Federation now with the Provinces of British India on certain terms, they could not, as sovereign States, agree to the exercise by a Federal Government, in relation to them, of a range of powers identical in all respects with those which that Government will exercise in relation to the Provinces on whom autonomy has yet to be conferred."

*The most unfortunate aspect of the Act was that the right of accession was placed entirely in the hands of the concerned Rulers and it was to be his personal decision.* Section 6 of the Act which deals with the accession of the States to the Federation is reproduced below:—

"6. (1) A State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Federation after His Majesty has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof, whereby the Ruler for himself, his heirs and successors

(a) declares that he accedes to the Federation as established under this Act, with the intent that His Majesty the King, the Governor-General of India, the Federal Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Federal authority established for the purposes of the Federation shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Federation, exercise in relation to his State, such functions as may be vested in them by or under this Act; and

(b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given within his State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of his Instrument of Accession:

Provided that an Instrument of Accession may be executed conditionally on the establishment of the Federation on or before a specified date, and in that case the State shall not be deemed to have acceded to the Federation if the Federation is not established until after that date.

(2) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature may make laws for his State, and the limitations if any, to which the power of the Federal Legislature to make laws for his State, and the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation in his State, are respectively to be subject.

(3) A Ruler may, by a supplementary Instrument executed by him and accepted by His Majesty, vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by extending the functions which by virtue of that Instrument are exercisable by His Majesty or any Federal Authority in relation to his State.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed *as requiring His Majesty to accept any Instrument of Accession or supplementary Instrument unless he considers it proper so to do, or as empowering His Majesty to accept any such Instrument if it appears to him that the terms thereof are inconsistent with the scheme of Federation embodied* in this Act.

(6) An Instrument of Accession or supplementary Instrument shall not be valid unless it is executed by the Ruler himself, but, subject as aforesaid, reference in this Act to the Ruler of a State include references to any persons for the time being exercising the powers of the Ruler of the State, whether by reason of the Ruler's minority or for any other reason."

In the Council of States (the Upper Chamber), the States were allotted 104 members as against 156 provided for British India. In the Lower House, British India had a representation of 250 members while the States were to nominate 125 members. This would show that although the population of Indian States was at that time only seven crore eighty-nine lakhs eighty thousand nine hundred twelve (7,89,80,912) which was roughly equal to one-fourth of the total population, in the Upper House they received forty per cent representation whereas in the lower House, it was one-third. The Act also provided that unless the number of States acceding to the Federation made up fifty-two in the Upper House and the population of such States was atleast half the total population of all the States, the All India Federation was not to come into being. The Act also provided a Crown representative in addition to the Governor-General for safeguarding the relations between the Rulers and the Paramount Power; this relationship was to be dealt with by the Crown Representative.

The Government of India Act came into force on 1st April, 1937 and efforts were started in right earnest to persuade the States to accede to the Federation. Linlithgow, who succeeded Willingdon as Viceroy in 1936, had been the Chairman of the Parliament's Joint Select Commitee on the Government of India Act. Very keen therefore to float the Federation, he sent round Sir Courtenay Latiner, Sir Francis Wylie and Sir Arthur Lothian of the Political Service to persuade or pressurize the Princes to join the Federation. However, they were in no hurry to oblige. They had their doubts, the principal one being that once they entered the Federation, there could be no retreat and a popularly elected Federal Parliament was bound to bring pressure for the democratisation of administration and ultimately limit their prerogatives and privileges, if not abolish them altogether. The result was that negotiations between the Viceroy and the Princes did not succeed. After the Bombay Conference of the Rulers and their Ministers held in November, 1938, the Diwan of a prominent State reportedly told the Political Adviser of the Viceroy that in case a guarantee was available in respect of the custom rights of Kashmir, Baroda and the States of Kathiawar, they were willing to join the Federation. It may be pointed out here that about one-third of Kashmir's revenue was then derived from custom duty. The Viceroy was keen to seize upon the opportunity in the hope that if the deadlock was broken by bringing in these States, the resistance by other States would weaken but the Secretary of State opposed the measure on the ground that if weakness was shown by granting concessions to some States, it would not be possible to resist the demand for similar or other concessions by other States. With the outbreak of the World war in 1939, the efforts thus initiated for a Federation received a most serious blow and with the demand for Pakistan officially voiced by the All India Muslim League on 23rd March, 1940, the chances of an All India Federation coming into being, became remoter.

## THE CRIPPS' PROPOSALS

Congress Ministries resigned soon after the out-break of the war. The Indian Rulers again pledged full support in war efforts and in return Lord Linlithgow under-took to honour, in full, the treaty obligations of His Majesty's Government. With the entry of Japan into War and the initial success achieved by her in South East Asia, the British Government felt compelled to seek the active co-operation of Political parties, particularly the Muslim League and the Congress. Consequently, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India in March, 1942 and revealed his proposals at a press conference on 29th March. The long term plan provided for

the setting up, at the end of the war, of a Constitution-making body to frame a constitution for an Indian Union on the basis of full status of a Dominion with the power to secede from the Commonwealth. It was to be elected by members of the lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures for which fresh elections were to be held. The British Government undertook, in advance, to implement the Constitution so framed. Any Province or Provinces which, however, were not prepared to accept the new Constitution, were given the right to frame a Constitution of their own. So far as the Indian States were concerned, Sir Cripps declared:

> "Whether or not an individual State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation."

In case the States decided to join the Federation, they were to appoint representatives to the Constitution-making body in proportion to their total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole.

The Cripps' proposals were rejected by both the Muslim League as well as Congress on 10th April, 1942. The Congress wanted immediate transfer of power; besides, it was also against the right of the Provinces to secede from the Centre; this provision had been incorporated to attract the Muslim League which had by then stood committed to the creation of Pakistan. The Muslim League rejected the proposal largely because it did not clearly and unequivocally concede Pakistan. The Princes were largely happy over the failure of the Mission.

## THE CABINET MISSION PLAN

After the war, the Labour Party came into power in July, 1945. It had, since late twenties, developed a pro-Congress bias largely due to the efforts of Pandit Nehru, Krishna Menon and their British friends who represented Congress to British Socialists as a secular, non-communal and socialist Party as against the so-called reactionary and feudalistic character of the Muslim League. It caused great damage to Muslims at the time of partition. The Labour Government first sent a Parliamentary delegation which was followed by a Cabinet Mission consisting of A.V. Alexander, Lord Pethic Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps. The Mission arrived in Delhi on 24th March 1946. Asked at a press Conference on 25th March, 1946, whether the representatives of the States would be nominated by the Rulers or elected by the State inhabitants, Cripps said "we cannot create new structures. We have to take the position as we find it". It was thus clear that the pattern for deciding the destiny of the

inhabitants of the States was to be the same as provided in the Government of India Act, 1935. Meetings were held between Members of the Commission and some Indian Princes as also with representatives of the Chamber of Princes.

The Cabinet Mission proposals which were announced on 16th May, 1946 envisaged creation of three groups; one consisting of Bengal and Assam; the second one comprising Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. and the third group comprised the rest of British India. It envisaged a Centre for all the three but, at the same time, each group's right to secede from the Centre was also recognized. So far as the States were concerned, Sir Cripps, in his broadcast, made only a casual reference to them. It was, however, conceded that paramountcy could not be handed over to any one and must necessarily lapse. The future relationship between the States and British India was left to negotiations. The Chamber of Princes was not happy with the trend of negotiations as it was becoming clear that the British Government was not going to support their efforts to regain their independence. After the failure of the Cabinet Mission plan which resulted from Congress President Pandit Nehru's public repudiation of his Party's commitments resulting from the acceptance of the plan, the Muslim League reconsidered its position and revoked its acceptance. Pandit Nehru was then invited to form a Government which he did on the 2nd of September but because of Muslim resentment against the deliberate and manipulated exclusion of the Muslim League and the state of civil war that was emerging in the Sub-Continent, the League was invited to join the Interim Government which it did on the 15th of October 1946. Nehru convened the Constituent Assembly on the 9th of December. The Muslim League boycotted the meeting but the Congress, after electing Rajendra Prasad as President, unilaterally began the task of drafting a Constitution. It was, however, soon realized that no Constitution could be forced down the throats of Muslims and that any effort to transfer power to the Congress, without meeting the demand for Pakistan, was bound to plunge the Sub-Continent into a civil war. It was this realization that compelled both the Labour Government and the Congress to agree to partition as the only solution available at the time. The British Government, therefore, invited League-Congress leaders for a conference. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru consequently flew to London with Lord Wavell.

The Congress secured an invitation for Sardar Baldev Singh as a representative of the Sikhs, whom she used not only to strengthen her bargaining position but also to bring about the partition of Punjab and consequently also of Bengal. That Sikh leaders Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh allowed themselves to be used in the Congress game shall always

remain a dark chapter in the history of the Sikhs because not only did they damage Muslim interests but by so doing, irretrievably damaged their own community.

A leading Sikh intellectual with whom I had an opportunity of discussing the partition of Punjab and its adverse effects on Sikhs, in London, stared into my eyes when I lamented the lack of vision in the Sikh leadership of the day and erupted:

> "Which leadership?.........we had no leadership at all.........why don't you talk of that buffoon, Baldev Singh whose only job was to say: I agree with Pandit Nehru."

As a result of these discussions, Prime Minister Attlee made a declaration in the House of Commons on 20th February, 1947 committing the withdrawal of Britain not later than June 1948. It was also announced that Wavell was to be replaced by Viscount Mountbatten of Burma. So far as the Indian States were concerned, the announcement said:

> "As was explicitly stated by the Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand over their powers and obligation under paramountcy to any Government of British India. It is not intended to bring paramountcy, as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period, the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted by agreement."

The Chamber of Princes in a meeting held in Bombay on 29th January, 1947, passed a resolution demanding that the entry of the States into the Union should be on the basis of negotiations and that the final decision should rest with each State. It also said that their participation in the Constitutional discussions in the meantime would not involve any commitment in regard to their ultimate decision and that they would retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded by them to the Union. They also stressed the lapse of paramountcy. It also said that territorial integrity and the succession of the reigning dynasty should not be interfered with nor should their existing boundaries be altered except by their free consent; the Constituent Assembly was not to deal with questions affecting the internal administration or Constitution of the States. The Chamber had already set up a Negotiating Committee. The policy of Indian States was one of wait and see though the great majority of them desired either to declare themselves independent on the lapse of paramountcy or to form into regional Unions for the same purpose. The Nawab of Bhopal, as Chancellor of the Chamber, did his utmost to safeguard the larger

interests of the Princes. However, the announcement of the June 3rd Plan and Mountbatten's statement on the 4th of June hinting that the transfer of power was to take place not later than the 15th of August, 1947, introduced a new element of urgency. The 3rd June Plan also did not say much about the States except the following:

> "His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the decisions announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards the Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May, 1946, remains unchanged."

The Congress was able to use the Maharajas of Bikaneer, Patiala and Cochin to frustrate the efforts of Nawab Sir Hameedulla Khan of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Baroda to use the Chamber of Princes paltform as a bargaining lever for the protection and perpetuation of the Princely order. Consequently with the entry into the Constituent Assembly of some of these States, the Chamber was reduced to a weak position. The Nawab then tendered his resignation from its Chancellorship.

I have earlier quoted in detail from the Government of India Act, 1935, because the position of Indian States as enunciated in that Act, also governed the accession of the Princely States to either of the two Dominions under the Indian Independence Act. After the lapse of paramountcy on the 14th of August, the States had three alternatives before them; namely, 'declare independence', 'accession to India' or 'accession to Pakistan'. The Congress was opposed to the States assuming independence and not only Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel but even Mahatma Gandhi made no secret of it. On the other hand, the Quaid-e-Azam was clearly of the view that the Indian States were constitutionally entitled to resume their independence after the lapse of paramountcy. Lord Mountbatten in his address to the Chamber of Princes on July 25, 1947, conceded that the States could technically and legally claim independence but made it plain that this would not be allowed. Addressing the Chamber he said:

> "Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obligations to the Crown. The States will have complete freedom; technically and legally they become independent. Presently I will discuss the degree of independence which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States. But there has grown up during the period of British administration, owing to the fact that the Crown Representative and the Viceroy are one and the same person, a system of co-ordinate administration on

all matters of common concern which meant that the subcontinent of India acted as an economic entity. That link is now to be broken. If nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result, and that chaos, I submit, will hurt the States first; the bigger the States, the less the hurt and the longer it will take to feel it but even the biggest of the States will feel the hurt just the same as any small State."

The Indian Independence Act contained the following provision with regard to the Princely States:—

(I) As from the appointed day:—

(*a*)

(*b*) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and

(c)

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (*b*) or paragraph (*c*) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which related to customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE ACCESSION CONSPIRACY

# *CHAPTER XX*

# The Accession Conspiracy

The most tragic part of the partition plan is the manner in which nine crore inhabitants of Indian States were ignored and contemptuously bypassed by a Parliament sitting thousands of miles away. While in British India, the electorate had before it the issue of partition and even afterwards, Muslim members of the Majority provinces were given the right to choose between the two Dominions and so was the non-Muslim minority invested with a veto to force a partition of the Punjab and Bengal, the inhabitants of the Princely States were treated like a herd of dumb driven cattle who had no voice in deciding the question of accession to either of the two Dominions. Even their representatives to either of the Constituent Assemblies were to be nominated by the Rulers. What makes it all the more regrettable is that the Congress and the Muslim League should have fatalistically accepted it. The Muslim League probably thought that the investment of the right in the Ruler, would enable a number of States such as Hyderabad, Bhopal, Barodah, Travancore and Jodhpur to declare themselves independent while the Congress was confident that except for Kashmir, all other States mentioned above, being surrounded by Indian territory and having overwhelming Hindu majorities, could not eventually preserve their independence and were bound to fall into the lap of Hindu India like a ripe fruit. Therefore, it had everything to gain by confining the right of accession to the Rulers because it had its eyes fixed on Kashmir where a Hindu Ruler could be trusted to fall in line with the interests of Hindu India whereas its overwhelming Muslim majority could not be so trusted.

From its very inception, the Muslim League was the preserve of Nawabs or titleholders who were themselves either Nawabs or under their influence, enjoyed as they did, their patronage. As a whole, the Princes had no sympathy at all with the political aspirations of the Indian people. In fact,

it was the perpetuation of the status quo that suited them. While Hindu princes financed the Congress and occasionally journeyed to Sabarmati and Wardha for Gandhi-yatras, the Muslim princes supported the Muslim League. Whether it was by design or accident, the fact remains that while one section took care of the Congress, the other ruled the Muslim League till its leadership passed into the hands of the Quaid-e-Azam. Both the Parties adopted and pursued a policy of non-intervention in their affairs. I see no reason why Kashmir State was not included in the 23rd March 1940 resolution or why its inclusion was not demanded even afterwards when the Cabinet mission came to India. I see no other reason than to keep the option of independence open and available to Hyderabad, Bhopal etc. etc. We forgot that a bird in hand was worth many in the bush. If it was a game of power-politics, then it must be conceded that we were out-manoeuvred by the Congress with the assistance of Mountbatten. We have no quarrel with the Congress because of its anti-Muslim orientation but the Muslims of Kashmir certainly regret the short-sighted policy pursued by the All India Muslim League. Out of a total Muslim population of ten crores, more than 2½ crore lived in the Princely States.

It is possible that the policy of non-intervention was necessitated by their desire not to attract the hostility of the Princes while they were engaged in an epic battle against the British as also against each other; perhaps, they thought the opening of a third front, against the Princes, as unwise; it is also possible that they thought that with the exit of the British, it would not be possible for the States to resist a revolutionary change for the better but, all the same, when the change came in the wake of the Indian Independence Act which left the inhabitants of these States at the mercy of the wolves that the Princes were, both Congress and Muslim League did nothing to persuade the British that the question of accession to either Dominion should be decided in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants concerned.

The Labour Government was keen to preserve the so-called geographic unity of the sub-continent, partly because of its pro-Congress and anti-Muslim League leanings but largely because of the imperialistic notions about the myth of a United India. Says Lord Ismay:—

> "At the start, the Viceroy tried out every conceivable arrangement which could possibly preserve the unity of India, but it was not long before we were forced to realise that the Muslim League would not agree to any plan which did not provide for the creation of Pakistan as an independent sovereign State."[1]

1. Memoirs, p. 419.

There can be no better proof of British opposition to partition than the following admission of Mr. Gandhi:

> "The British Government is not responsible for the partition. The Viceroy had no hand in it. In fact he is opposed to division as Congress itself, but if both of us, Hindus and Muslims, cannot agree on anything else, then the Viceroy is left with no choice."[1]

Mr. Attlee wrote to Mountbatten:—

> "It is the definite object of His Majesty's Government to obtain a unitary Government of India within the British Commonwealth; through the medium of a Constituent Assembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan, and you should do the utmost in your power to persuade all parties to work together to this end and advise His Majesty's Government in the light of developments, as to the steps that will have to be taken."[2]

## NEHRU BEHIND MOUNTBATTEN'S APPOINTMENT

A great-grandson of Queen Victoria, Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on 22nd March and took over from Lord Wavell the next day, being observed by Muslims with unprecedented enthusiasm as 'Pakistan Day'. The choice was unfortunate and ill-conceived because:—

(1) Mountbatten and Nehru were already on friendly terms. In 1944 when Mountbatten was Supreme Allied Commander on the Burma Front, he paid a visit to troops at Ahmednagar where Nehru was detained in the fort. Mountbatten made an effort to meet Mr. Nehru in jail but permission was refused.[3]

A year or two later when Nehru visited Singapore at the invitation of an Indian Association, Mountbatten went out of the way to cultivate his friendship. When Mountbatten decided to "ride through Singapore's streets in his open car with Nehru at his side," his Advisers warned that his action would only dignify an anti-British rebel but the 'Supreme' Commander exclaimed:

> "Dignify him? It is *he* who will dignify *me*.
> One day this man will be Prime Minister of India."[4]

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1. Mrs. Satya M. Rai Mehta, p. 48.
2. Leonard Mosley, p. 97.
3. Freedom at Midnight, p. 84.
4. *ibid*, p. 84.

It was therefore quite understandable that Mountbatten, hoping to be dignified by the future Prime Minister of India, "delighted in Nehru's charm, his culture, his quick humour."[1] It was there that the foundation of a lasting friendship which proved of decisive help to the Congress was laid. The posterity shouldn't be surprised if evidence is unearthed to show that the invitation itself was inspired by Mountbatten with an eye on the top-post in India.

(2) Actually Sir Stafford Cripps wanted to come to India as Viceroy. His wife, while on her way back home from China on 5th December 1946 (she stayed as Nehru's guest from 5th to 16th) asked Sudhir Ghosh to sound Indian (Congress) leaders whether they would "like the idea". Gandhi was in Bengal. So Sudhir consulted Rajaji who advised against it "in the interests of Cripps."

Says the author:

"I conveyed it to Sir Stafford in a letter which Lady Cripps carried to London. Sir Stafford acted accordingly and found Lord Mountbatten. Mr. Nehru and Lord Mountbatten got on magnificently from the moment they were brought together by Cripps at a private (secret: author) dinner in London."[2]

Says he again:

"When Quaid-e-Azam and Mr. Nehru accompanied Wavell to London in December 1946 and were there for consultations, Cripps, the brain behind all that the Labour Government was doing regarding India, realised that it was no longer possible for Nehru to work with Wavell; they had become completely incompatible with each other. It was during this visit to London that Cripps brought together Mr. Nehru and Viscount Mountbatten, a relation of the royal family, who had a distinguished career as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of the South East Asia Command, *and Cripps told Nehru that if he felt that he and Mountbatten could work together, then he would do his best to get Mountbatten appointed as viceroy in* Wavell's place."[3]

It has now come to light—29 years later—that Krishna Menon, a confident of Nehru, suggested to Cripps the appointment of Mountbatten as Viceroy as "he was held in the highest regard by Nehru." The authors reveal:

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1. Freedom at Midnight, p. 84.
2. Sudhir Ghosh, p. 45.
3. *Ibid*, p. 44.

"Aware that Mountbatten's usefulness would be destroyed if India's Moslem leaders learned of the genesis of his appointment, the two men had agreed to reveal the details of their talk to no one."[1] Menon revealed the details of his conversation with Cripps in a series of conversations with one of the authors in New Delhi in February 1973, a year before his death.

A man like Mountbatten who according to Ian Stephens had "top-level eyes", could not but have felt grateful for the great job *made possible by Nehru's yes*. Ever afterwards, he tried faithfully to repay the debt but at our cost. Incidentally, this fateful meeting and its background is, to my knowledge, mentioned nowhere else".

(3) Mr. V. P. Menon, the Viceroy's Constitutional Adviser known as the Reforms Commissioner who started his career as a clerk in 1914 had, due to his sharp intellect and mental resourcefulness, completely won the confidence of Mountbatten. One reason probably was that both were pro-Congress and their thinking was identical. Menon took the fullest advantage of his official position to advance Congress interests which meant damaging Muslim interests.

(4) Menon was close to Sardar Patel, who had by the beginning of 1947, as a hard realist, come to the conclusion that partition was inevitable and provided the only solution, at the moment, to the Indian problem. Menon appeared at this stage as a link between the British Government through Lord Mountbatten and the Congress High Command through Sardar Patel whose anti-Muslim policies are too notorious to be gone into but let me confine myself to what Mr. C. S. Venkatachar, who was, at one time, a successor of Mr. V. P. Menon as Secretary of the Ministry of States, says:

"He was a man of few words, never articulate. *He held in his hands all the levers of the party machinery. He was anti-Muslim. He had his own estimate of Jinnah's strength which, pitted against the Congress, appeared to him weak. Patel thought there was no point in paying a high price to a weak opponent............He watched with satisfaction the militant mood of the Hindus in the Congress as well as in such organizations outside the Congress as the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S. He had nothing but contempt for the nationalist*

1. Freedom at Midnight, p. 8.

*Muslims of Azad, reluctantly remitting them money, while being sarcastic about their dubious loyalty.* K. M. Munshi's campaign for Akhand Hindustan, in answer to Jinnah's Pakistan, had Patel's tacit support.........He honestly believed that Jinnah had not the quality in him to lead a mass movement nor the nerve to send people to destruction. But when Jinnah did produce the joker from the pack, by calling out the Muslim mob and commencing civil war, Patel took due notice. And when the Leaguers joined the Central Government in October 1946 and split the Government into two hostile factions, he made up his mind that partition was inevitable, if the British were to be got out. He accepted early in 1947 V.P. Menon's formula of two dominions for demission of power by Britain. *Behind the scene he arranged the steps towards partition—the details of* which may never be known."[1]

Speaking of his role as a go-between, Mr. Menon admits:

"I reminded him (Sardar Patel) that ever since I had met him for the first time on 21 August 1946, I had made it my purpose to consult him as far as possible on important developments in the constitutional field, and I particularly added that it had been his powerful support that made possible the transfer of power. We had indeed got on well together, resolving occasional differences of opinion by mutual and amicable discussion. *The position at that time was that though I consulted Sardar, the final responsibility for whatever advice I gave to the Governor-General,* was mine."[2]

It now appears that as a result of the secret British-Congress understanding, the Congress undertook:

(1) To keep India in the British Commonwealth; and

(2) To have Mountbatten as its first Governor-General.

Lord Mountbatten undertook:—

(1) Earlier transfer of power in August, 1947, as against the already stipulated June, 1948;

(2) Partition of Punjab and Bengal and a promise to transfer Calcutta to India.

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1. Partition of India, Philips & Mary Doreen.
2. Partition of India, p. 474-475.

## PARTITION PLAN MODIFIED AT NEHRU'S WILL

According to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten and his Advisers prepared a partition plan and sent it to London through him. The British Cabinet made certain changes and sent back the revised plan to Delhi. What happened next is described by Lord Mountbatten himself:—

> "I was in Simla, taking a short rest though in fact the most important single piece of business of all happened there. Nehru was staying with me when the British Government's amended version of our plan arrived. I decided to back a lunch; since Nehru was there with me I would show it straight away to him in confidence. Of course, I could never have thought of such a thing, if we already had not been such good friends. This was something I could not possibly have done except on some complete mutual trust. Nehru turned the new draft down flat. He said it would lead to the Balkanization of India and he could have nothing to do with it. And he doubted if any party would.........V.P. Menon was with me in Simla and he came to the rescue again. *We, all of us, worked at full pressure to find a new formula............It was the third June Plan.*"[1]

Lord Ismay has clearly stated that the partition plan which he took to London had shown Calcutta as having been awarded to India.[2] This is important because the future of Calcutta had to be decided by the Boundary Commission which had yet to come into being as the plan had not been announced as yet. Lord Mountbatten took the revised plan to London on the 19th of May and it is obvious that he must have told the British Government of the understandings reached between him and the Congress High Command.

## JOINT GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP EPISODE and THE PARTITION OF GURDASPUR

In the Partition Plan as announced on 3rd June, Gurdaspur district, which had 51.14 per cent Muslim majority, was shown as part of Pakistan. On 4th June when Mountbatten was questioned at a press conference convened to explain the plan, as to why he had stated in his broadcast the previous evening that:

1. John Terraine, p. 153-154.
2. Memoirs, p. 499.

"the ultimate boundaries will be settled by a Boundary Commission and *will almost certainly not be identical with those which had* been provisionally adopted."[1]

He replied:

"I put that in for the simple reason that in the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab, the population is 50.4 per cent Muslims, I think, and 49.6% non-Muslims. With a difference of 0.8 percent, you will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will throw the whole of the district into the Muslim majority areas."[2]

This clearly betrays a guilty mind. The following questions naturally present themselves:

(1) Why did not Mountbatten mention any other area either in Bengal or Punjab and just confined himself to Gurdaspur?

(2) After all, why had he studied the population figures of this district in such minute detail?

(3) Even before the Boundary Commission was set up, how and why did he commit himself publicly to the partition of the district by emphatically saying that it was unlikely for the Commission to throw the whole of the district into Pakistan, let alone the use of the unfortunate word "throw" and its implications?

(4) Did he also, by being deliberately so indiscreet, intend to give a public assurance to Maharaja Hari Singh that the district of Gurdaspur was going to be partitioned in a way as to provide him with a direct and easy access to the Union of India?

OR

(5) Was this statement intended as a threat or a bargaining lever to secure Muslim League's agreement to his appointment as Joint Governor-General?

Gurdaspur, it may be recalled, had four tehsils, Pathankot, Batala, Gurdaspur and Shakargarh. Pathankot alone was a Hindu majority tehsil. Batala had an over-all Muslim majority of 31,000.[3]

Unfortunately another incident of far reaching consequences happened at the time. It was Mountbatten's maddening desire to be the Governor-

1&2. Mohammad Ali, p. 215.
3. Mrs. Satya Rai Mehta, p. 52.

General of both India and Pakistan. Vanity was his greatest weakness; he wanted to go down in history, not so much as the man who presided over the liquidation of Her Majesty's Inidan Empire but as such a great statesman who, despite the deep mutual distrust of Hindus and Muslims, had so won their confidence as to have been requested by both to be gracious enough to Head their countries after attainment of freedom. The Muslim League High Command was not prepared to do so. It had its own reasons for it; firstly, because it was already regretfully aware of Mountbatten's pro-Congress leanings and secondly, a British Governor-General may have provoked criticism in the country. Whatever the position, it is now a historically proved fact that it hurt his pride and also embarrassed his position at home because he may have perhaps already conveyed that both the countries were likely to have him as their Governor-General. The depth of his anger and disappointment may be judged from the following accounts:

After he learnt of the M. L. decision, he gate-crashed into the room of the Quaid-e-Azam in the viceregal lodge and earnestly took up the matter again. Here is their conversation:

| | |
|---|---|
| Mountbatten: | "Do you realise what this will cost you?" |
| Quaid-e-Azam: | "It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets." |
| Mountbatten: | "It may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan."[1] |

Says Ch. Muhammad Ali :

> "He belaboured the Quaid-e-Azam with arguments and appeals and bluster. He maintained that the proposal for a common Governor-General was inspired by the highest motives and was in the interests of Pakistan. Without him as common Governor-General, Pakistan would put itself at the gravest disadvantage. It was with the greatest difficulty that he was securing for Pakistan what was due to her and, unless it was known that he would continue in this position even after partition, his power to help Pakistan would rapidly diminish. *The responsibility for the immeasurable loss to Pakistan would* rest on the shoulders of Jinnah."[2]

Ian Stephens, then Editor of the Statesman and a British journalist of great repute and known-impartiality, has said:

> "Lord Mountbatten himself seemed personally riled by it. Those brought in touch with him would doubtless agree that his weakness,

1. Hodson, p. 331.
2. Mohammad Ali, p. 1877.

perhaps the only one, was a curiously sensitive kind of vanity. Murphy's biography confirms this. That someone of his superb gifts should have had such a characteristic is odd; but evidently it was so. And it seemed noticeable at an Editors' conference arranged the afternoon before Mr. Jinnah's decision was announced. Several of us inferred that the decision had not merely caused him political worry, but had hurt him. Perhaps he had set his heart on becoming dual Governor-General; the rebuff knocked against his most vulnerable point, his pride."[1]

And again, he says:

"His weak point, some said, was vanity. At his talks with journalists in July, when Mr. Jinnah's decision to become Pakistan's first Governor-General was disclosed, his pride had seemed hurt, though we thought needlessly. For how could anyone, however able, function effectively as Governor-General of both the Dominions? Perhaps however, his dislike of Mr. Jinnah, now so clear, dated from then. The implications were unpleasant.

But I guess too at something deeper; himself a hustler, "dynamic", it was a word often on his lips and Pandit Nehru's—had he let himself be hustled into an over-simplified interpretation of Indo-Pakistani facts? Had his left leanings misled him? The Congress party had friendly associations with British leftists, with Labour. Perhaps to eyes such as his—necessarily top level eyes, because in his job he had little time for any but the top men—the Congress with its sophisticated charming leaders was a progressive, dynamic party and therefore congenial; the Muslim League, by contrast, reactionary."[2]

The result of the Muslim League decision not to have him as Governor General of Pakistan embittered him to the extent of totally forgetting the imperative demand of his office as Crown Representative to act impartially towards both the parties. He was now openly pro-Hindu and anti-Pakistan and only too eager to be available to damage Pakistan's interests as much as lay within his power. As all that happened behind the scenes has not been made public as yet, it is too early to say whether it was Hindu's superb and imaginative diplomacy that largely cast him into his anti-Pakistan role or it was something deeper.

1. Ian Stephens, p. 112.
2. Ian Stephens, p. 113.

Was the Muslim League decision to reject Mountbatten's proposal to have him as joint Governor-General, correct? In Pakistan, the public opinion generally supports it, not necessarily because of any critical appraisal but because the Father-Figure of the Quaid-e-Azam whose superb handling of Muslim politics and whose strategy against the formidable Anglo-Hindu axis, proved its worth in almost every situation, has quite naturally, given his decisions a sanctity, unique in the annals of the British Sub-continental politics. The decision is justified on several counts. For instance, late Maulana Zaffar Ali Khan told Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan in my presence in his office in 1948 that the Quaid-e-Azam had decided to become the Governor General himself because it had been already decided to appaint Britishers as Governors in four out of the five provinces as well as to the three top posts in the Army, Air Force and Navy, and the appointment of Mountbatten as Governor General might have created an adverse popular reaction for having the Britishers on all the top posts. This is what the Quaid-e-Azam also told Mountbatten.[1] However, the argument commonly advanced by intellectuals, such as Mr. A.K. Brohi or researcher-*cum*-patriots like Burque, is that it was constitutionally practically impossible to have a common Governor General presiding over two antagonistic cabinets.

The main argument advanced by Mr. A. K Brohi is:

> "It was impossible in principle to have two sovereign Dominions sharing one and the same Governor-General specially one who in his capacity as the constitutional head of the two Dominions nevertheless would receive conflicting advice from the two dominion cabinets concerning the way the problems of partition had to be solved, and it required to be no prophet to see that if the constitutional head had to act with reference to the conflicting advice he received, as he was bound to receive from the Congress and the Muslim League, he could not have solved any problem."

Those who take a different view and who are at present in a small minority, answer this argument by saying that it was then primarily for Mountbatten to decide whether he could function as common Governor-General of the two countries. As he was not only prepared for it but had set his heart upon it, he should have been put to test. His being the common Governor-General, did not bind us to any particular course of action, nor was his advice binding upon us. If it was found that our interests were not served, what could have prevented us from putting an

1. Hodson, p. 330.

end to the arrangement? It is also claimed that as he would have naturally lived in Delhi for a longer period, his thinking was bound to be oriented by our enemy Nehru but why suppose it would have been so? His longer presence in Delhi could, conversely, they argue, also be an asset for us because he would have been there to influence New Delhi thinking on Pakistan.

After all, the minority argues, each cabinet was to administer its own country. Even without Mountbatten as joint-Governor-General, the two countries did NOT go to war. If despite Anglo-Hindu efforts to the contrary, a united India had to be partitioned even with Mountbatten as the authoritarian Governor-General, simply because we demanded partition, how could it have been reunited after partition, if Mountbatten was saddled as common Governor-General ? If he could not prevent partition with all the imperial power as his feet, how could he bring about re-unification in his capacity as a ceremonial Governor-General? With the Quaid-e-Azam as Prime Minister, how could he damage our interests or bring about a reunification? It is an altogether different matter if we say that it was as a reprisal for his pro-Nehru role that we did not accept him as a common Governor-General, but there seems to be no force in the claim that he could or would have damaged our interests if he had been appointed common Governor-General. No decision-making power vested in him. In his own interests, he may have proved a bridge-head.

It seems that his statement about Gurdaspur on 4th June may have been intended as a threat to secure Muslim League agreement to his appointment to a post, he had unfortunately set his heart at. He it was who used his skill and charm as well as his royal prestige in pushing hundreds of unwilling princes into the Indian Union; he it was whose very presence and tact prevented the Balkanisation of India as was not only foreseen before independence but to which end certain powerful elements opposed to Congress were working for; he it was who was instrumental in the allotment of Muslim tehsils of Gurdaspur, Batala, Zira and Freozepur to India; he it was who took responsibility for the accession of Kashmir and assumed operational command in the Kashmir fighting. It is an instance how Hindu foresight had better of our principles. The subtle working of Hindu mind may be judged from the following extract:

> "Incidentally I proposed that the active co-operation of Lord Mountbatten should be secured. Apart from his position, his grace and his gifts, his relationship with the Royal family was bound

to influence the rulers. Sardar whole-heartedly agreed and asked me to approach him without delay.

A day or two later, I met Lord Mountbatten and mentioned to him my talk with Sardar and our tentative plan. I asked for his help in getting the States to accede on three subjects. I pointed out that they would not be losing anything in the result *and suggested that it would be a great act of statesmanship on his part if he could bring it about. I felt that he was deeply touched by my remark that the wounds of partition might to some extent be healed by the States entering into relationship with the Government of India and that he would be earning the gratitude of generations of Indians if he could assist in achieving the basic unity of the country.*[1]"

That is why some people hold the view that the decision not to accept him as common Governor-General, though legally and morally unexceptionable, was, nevertheless, politically inexpedient. He was, no doubt, pro-Nehru but it was after we rejected his proposal, that he became vindictive and revengeful in the extreme. That does him no credit; the question, however, is not what was creditable or discreditable on his part, but whether it was not a tactical mistake to have pushed him deeper into the enemy camp when even Pakistan had NOT taken shape and the States, in and around the geographic entity of Pakistan, had yet to make a decision on accession.

This is, at best, what the microscopic minority of critics of the decision say. I think the future generations would be in a better position to decide it for themselves.

According to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Justice Din Muhammad informed the Pakistan Government that when the question of the allocation of the tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira came up for final consideration before the Commission, Radcliffe told them (Muslim members) that it was unnecessary to argue so obvious a point. On the 9th of August Chaudhri Muhammad Ali went to Delhi to convey to Lord Ismay the disturbing reports received by the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan about the likely decision on the Punjab boundary, particularly in the Gurdaspur district. On reaching the Viceregal Lodge, he was told that Lord Ismay was closeted with Radcliffe. After about an hour, when he was ushered in, he conveyed these apprehensions to Lord Ismay who professed ignorance. A map of the Punjab was hanging on a wall and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali led Lord Ismay to the map to explain his point. States Chaudhri Muhammad Ali:

"When I plied Ismay with details of what had been reported to us, he said he could not follow me. There was a map hanging in the

1. Menon, p. 98

room and I beckoned him to the map so that I could explain the position to him with its help. *There was a pencil line drawn across the map of the Punjab. The line followed the boundary that had been reported to the Quaid-e-Azam.* I said that it was unnecessary for me to explain further since the line already drawn on the map, indicated the boundary I had been talking about. Ismay turned pale and asked in confusion who had been fooling with this map. This line differed from the final boundary in only one respect: the Muslim majority tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira in the Ferozepur district were still on the side of Pakistan as in the sketch-map."[1]

Another piece of evidence is a map abandoned, hastily, or due to carelessness, by Governor Jenkins which fell into the hands of Sir Francis Mudie who forwarded it to the Quaid-e-Azam. Jenkins had requested George Abell, Private Secretary to Lord Mountbatten to inform him about the main outlines of the Punjab Boundary Award in order to make necessary administrative and security arrangements. Abell contacted Secretary to Radcliffe *and on the basis of the information thus furnished,* he conveyed to Jenkins on 8th August a sketch map which showed Gurdaspur as having been partitioned on the lines later confirmed but the tehsils of Zira and Ferozepur were still forming part of Pakistan.

Wrote Abbel :

"I *enclose a map* showing roughly the boundary which *Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes* to demarcate in his award and a note by Christopher Beaumont (Private Secretary to Radcliffe) describing it. *There will not be any great change from the boundary, but it will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and zail boundaries* in the Lahore district.

The award itself is expected within the next 48 hours and I will let you know later about the probable time of announcement."[2]

It is inconceivable that Beaumont could have supplied the map and the explanatory note which seems missing, without prior clearance from Sir Radcliffe. The words of Sir Abbel that "there will not be any great change from the boundary (conveyed)" except accurate demarcation with reference to village and zail (a term used for a group of villages in the Punjab, headed by a hereditary man of influence known as Zaildar, just

1. Emergence of Pakistan, p. 218.
2. Hodson, p. 352.

as each village had a Lambardar) and the further information that it was expected to be announced within 48 hours, leaves no doubt that it was already ready—in so far as Radcliffe was concerned.

It came to light for the first time in 1969 that on the 9th of August Lord Mountbatten had a disastrous meeting with Radcliffe, also attended by Lord Ismay, at the latter's house.[1] *It was at Ismay's house on the same day that Ch. Muhammad Ali met him and saw a map with a pencil line showing Gurdaspur and Batala as part of India.* Caught red-handed, under his own roof, Ismay turned pale and could only say:"Who has been fooling with this map?" Chief Justice Munir, a member of the Boundary Commission, calls it a childish reply.[2]

Mountbatten had arranged for Radcliffe's stay in Delhi in a house of the Viceregal estate. Campbell Johnson who has recorded in minute details the day-to-day activities of Lord Mountbatten has, for obvious reasons, thought it expedient to keep silent about this important and decisive meeting Radcliffe had with Mountbatten on 9th August. The award must have been ready before the 8th—the date when Abell informed Jenkins about its details. Lord Ismay who was present in the meeting has also maintained complete silence about it. However, as the truth must always in the end prevail, Mr. Hodson who was Reforms Commissioner before Mr. V. P. Menon and who was persuaded by Lord Mountbatten to write an account of the partition of India and has done so largely as a Mountbatten fan, has disclosed that apart from having met Radcliffe soon after his arrival, Mountbatten also had a meeting with him on or about the 9th of August in the Viceregal Lodge and the only other person present was Lord Ismay. No records are obviously available as to what happened in the meeting. It needs to be emphasised that the Viceroy did not summon him to his quarters but chose Ismay's house as its venue. Was the intention to keep it secret? The absence of any record of the talks held, the fact that the information about the meeting was withheld from the press and the Muslim League, and the further fact that it remained a secret for over twenty years, when read and considered in the light of Mountbatten's role as a promoter of Hindu interests at the cost of Pakistan and the evidence—unimpeachable by itself—of surrounding circumstances showing that there was variation in the award after Radcliffe left Lahore and before it was announced, and again, after Abell communicated the partition map to Jenkins, leave no room for doubt that Lord Mountbatten used all his power and prestige to persuade Radcliffe to change his award in favour of India. That there was a change is also borne out from the following account left by Sir Firoze Khan Noon:

1. Hodson, p. 354. 2. Pakistan Times, 14th August, 1978.

"My opportunity (to ask Radcliffe) came in the autumn of 1956 when Mr. Eustace Salignan asked me to lunch in New York and Lord Radcliffe was a fellow guest. It was only after the luncheon was finished that I felt that I could now ask the question. I said to Lord Radcliffe, "do you mind if I ask you a question?" He said "No" and smiled a little, perhaps he guessed what was coming. "Why did you change your Award regarding Gurdaspur district on reaching Delhi?" His answer was: "because I felt that the river would be a better boundary".[1]

What is important to point out is that Sir Firoze Khan Noon had directly accused Radcliffe, in his face, of having *changed* the Award regaring Gurdaspur after he had left Lahore and the important fact that Radcliffe did not deny the allegation of having changed it. Radcliffe left for Delhi on 7th.

Mr. Hodson has no effective, convincing answer to this incriminating evidence. He has merely tried to beat about the bush. Sir Radcliffe's admission to Sir Firoze Khan Noon that the Award with regard to Gurdaspur *was changed* after he went to India, the meeting in the said house, probably in the same room, on 9th August between Radcliffe and Mountbatten and an unscheduled call by Ch. Muhammad Ali while the incriminating map was still there, immediately after the Viceroy and Radcliffe left or retired to some other room, leaves no doubt that the pencil lining was the outcome of their meetings. It also means that the change of the allocation of the tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira was effected, even subsequent to this meeting.

Radcliffe did not follow a uniform rule. Despite being convinced of the logic of Muslim claim to Calcutta, he awarded it to India on the strength of the city's Hindu majority but in total disregard of the same rule, he deprived Pakistan of the Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur, Batala, Zira and Ferozepur. The French authors have commented:

"Unintentionally, *almost inadvertently*, Radcliffe's scalpel had offered India the hope of claiming Kashmir."[2]

The Award was to be announced before the 15th of August but it was actually announced on 17th after Radcliffe passed through Karachi on his way back home. The reason for this delay was the fear of a deadlock before the transfer of power on the 14th of August as well as the fear of hostile demonstrations against Lord Mountbatten in Karachi. He was

1. From Memory, p. 217.
2. Freedom at Midnight, p. 281.

well aware of the implications of what he was doing and the depth of feelings that it was bound to arouse in Pakistan. He was not wrong because even years later when Pakistan was ruled by the authoritarian Ghulam Muhammad, the feelings in the country were so intense that the Government of Pakistan had to request the British Government to cancel his scheduled visit to Karachi which he was undertaking as the First Lord of Admirality. It was reported in the world press at the time that the officer-in-charge of the flight tower Karachi had refused permission for his plane to fly over Pakistan.

Mr. Hodson has said that the Muslim League had demanded the appointment of three Lords of the British High Court, London to constitute the tribunal but that the British Government could not spare their services, one of the reasons being their advanced age and the warm climate of the plains. It was unfortunate that the choice then fell on Sir Cyril Radcliffe, then a leading member of the British Bar, and perhaps a Jew.

Reacting against criticism of partiality voiced both in Pakistan as well as India where it was directed against the award of Budhist-majority Chittagong hill-tracts to Pakistan, Radcliffe declined £2,000 which he was to receive as his fee.[1]

Commenting on the Award, the Quaid-e-Azam said in a broadcast:

> "The division of India is now finally and irrevocably effected. No doubt we feel that the carving out of this great independent Muslim State has suffered injustices. We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible, and the latest blow that we have received was the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse; and it may not be a political award, but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honourable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune but we must bear this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope."[2]

Dawn captioned its editorial as "Territorial Murder" and said that "Pakistan had been cheated by an unjust award, a biased decision, an act of shameful partiality by one who had been trusted to be fair because he was neutral."[3]

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1. Ibid, p. 281.
2. Mohammad Ali, p. 221.
3. Mrs. Satya Rai, p. 58.

Referring to Muslim majority areas which Radcliffe awarded to East Punjab, Sir Zafrullah Khan, later President of the International Court at the Hague, told the Security Council:

> "These were areas of Muslim majority which contrary to his instructions and his terms of reference, Sir Cyril Radcliffe most unjustly, most unfairly and most inequitably had assigned to East Punjab."[1]

## HARI SINGH'S HESITATION

For any student of Kashmir's Dogra history, it was inconceivable that the Maharaja would accede to Pakistan or even remain independent. Kashmir State always commanded special respect and attention of Hindu India. To the Upper and Middle class Hindus, freedom also meant a thousand-year old longing to rule over the Muslims who had ruled the sub-continent ever since some of their ancestors set their feet on its soil. In Kashmir, there was a Muslim majority already ruled by a bigoted Hindu dynasty and that is why, whenever there was any danger to the Dogra ruling family, Hindu India rallied to its support. We have already seen how in 1889 when the British Government wanted to oust Pratap Singh and annex the State to British India, the so-called nationalist press headed by Amrita Bazar Patrika, led a violent campaign against it and how Hindus succeeded in stealing secret official documents and published them in the columns of the Patrika to forestall any action against the Dogra ruler. It was because of this invaluable support that the Dogra dynasty was saved from an impending doom and the Muslims of Kashmir had to continue to suffer under its misrule. The Dogras could never forget this decisive support and it was apparent to them that their security as a ruling family lay in forging still closer links with Hindu India. It may be recalled here that it was Maharaja Ranbir Singh who can claim the distinction of being the first Hindu in the sub-continent to have started a campaign for conversion of Muslims and others to Hindu faith. After all, Hari Singh was his grandson. The reader will also recall how Pratap Singh and his family raised a donation of 5½ lakh rupees at the time of setting up of the Banaras Hindu University. The reader will also recall that in 1931 when the Muslims of the State supported by Muslims from the sub-continent and particularly Punjab, launched their first Civil Disobedience movement against inequality, discrimination and a hundred other injustices, it was Hindu India which came to the succour of the Dogra dynasty, the details of which have already been enumerated in the first volume. Again, the reader is aware how in

1. Security Council Reports 1951, S. 226-260, p. 47-48.

1940, the Dogra Government started foisting Hindi upon unwilling Muslims. In 1946 when Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah started his Quit Kashmir Movement, it was Hindu India which rallied to Hari Singh's support except, of course, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru who had larger Hindu interests in view. Under these circumstances, it was nothing short of wishful thinking to have expected Maharaja Hari Singh to either accede to Pakistan or remain independent.

The Maharaja had two difficulties confronting him: the foremost was his estrangement with Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. It was now apparent to every one that Nehru was going to be not only the first Prime Minister of free India but also a very powerful one. With all his greatness and qualities of head and heart, it remains a fact that he was not much large-hearted and did not forgive those at whose hands he suffered either a political reverse or a personal injury. Testifies the knowledgeable Emissary of the Mahatma: "He was a very magnanimous man, who, on occasions, would act like an elephant *which did not forget*,"[1] It is also confirmed by his Private Secretary Mathai who was Nehru's most important confident for nearly 14 years. Having been imprisoned in June 1946 by Hari Singh's Government, was more than enough to have injured his personal vanity and to have made him a confirmed and inveterate enemy of Hari Singh. The latter was acutely conscious of the same and therefore, had fears that by acceding to India, he might be placing his own death warrant in the hands of Pandit Nehru. Within less than two years of "accession", Hari Singh had to abdicate and leave the State in disgrace, never to return again. Surely, the Elephant did not forget.

The next problem, was his intense hatred for Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. He was rightly afraid that with the accession of the State to India, it would be impossible to resist the demand to democratize the administration which meant the handing over of real power to his confirmed enemy. The demand was imperative, not because New Delhi had any compassion for the State's Muslim majority but for reason of international window-dressing.

While these considerations were still weighing in his mind, resulting in a policy of wait and see, he was also being advised to remain independent. This proposition which was being pursued by the State's Prime Minister, Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, had the support of an influential Dogra faction.

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1. Gandhi's Emissary, p. 260.

The one immediate advantage of such a course of action, as it might have been dinned into his ears, was that it could enable him to prevent Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah from coming into power. Another advantage was that the State, surrounded as it is on many sides by Pakistan and having then, with the latter, its only means of communications, could have prevented a blockade or the prospects of retaliation by Pakistan in case of accession to India. But as Hari Singh even personally preferred accession to India to any other available course, therefore, despite his personal difficulties, at least as he envisaged them, Kak's efforts did not bring about any change in his dominant preference for India.

## CONGRESS MOUNTS PRESSURE

In his immediate family he had three staunch supporters for accession to India. The first was an old royal priest, better known as Raj Guru who usually resided at Chashma Shahi during summer. An extremely bigoted Hindu who had been Raj Guru also to Pratap Singh, his hatred of Muslims was as deep and as total as that of any other Hindu anywhere. Then there was Maharani Tara Devi who originally hailed from Kangra where she had some landed property and a host of relations. It was only natural that she must have yearned for accession to India. Her son Yuraj Karan Singh, then a lad of 17 years, was naturally behind his mother and the trio, when acting in unison, commanded almost total influence over the Maharaja. They were all resolutely opposed to accession to Pakistan or independence.

The Congress High Command was not sitting idle. The full story is still not known and may perhaps never be known but certain important links have already seen the light of day and pieced together, do unfold the Congress conspiracy to annex the Muslim majority State.

With Tara Devi, Karan Singh and Raj Guru already firmly committed to India, the first effort seems to have been directed to the removal of Pandit Ram Chandra Kak. Consequently, Tara Devi and Karan Singh visited Lahore in May 1947 and, one afternoon, invited Mehr Chand Mahajan, then a Judge of the Lahore High Court, to tea at the Falettis Hotel. Bakhshi Sir Tek Chand, an ex-Judge of the Lahore High Court, who was described by Chief Justice Sir John Douglas Young in his private papers as "a communal-minded Judge" was also present. It is not unlikely that Tek Chand who had some property in Kangra and Gurdaspur was acting as one of the emissaries between the Congress High Command and

the Dogra House. Mehr Chand Mahajan's wife hailed from Mirpur in the Kashmir State; her father Lala Bindra Ban was Tehsildar in the State service and her brother, Deputy Commissioner Askardu. It was in this meeting that the Maharani suggested to Mr. Mahajan to take up service in the State as Prime Minister and invited him to Srinagar to have a meeting with His Highness. What discussion took place at the meeting is not known and it is obvious that Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan must have deliberately chosen to leave it unsaid. It is also obvious that Mr. Mahajan must have been selected as Head of the administration to smoothen the execution of the conspiracy to bring about its accession to India. It may be noted here that Mr. Mahajan was unable to take up the assignment immediately because of his nomination as a member of the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Congress High Command.

The next step was to clear the doubts entertained by Hari Singh of possible injury at the hands of Pandit Nehru and to assure him that his interests would be safe. Consequently we find that a few days later, Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President, went to Srinagar on 17th May 1947. To divert attention from his mission, he also met the pro-Congress leaders, the Kashmiri Pandit representatives, the Dogra aristrocracy and Maharani Tara Devi before meeting the Maharaja, with whom he had a long meeting on 24th May at his Srinagar palace. Again, details of the talks are not available and may never be known for obvious reasons. It was Mr. Kripalani's first-ever visit to the State and at a time of such historic significance when momentous decisions were being taken in Delhi where, as Congress President, his presence was all the more necessary, what else, one may ask, took him to Srinagar, except to advance the conspiracy to deprive Pakistan of the State? It seems to have been decided at the Falettis' meeting to ask the Congress High Command to despatch its official spokesman to Srinagar to assure Maharaja Hari Singh that he need not fear injury at the hands of a free India on account of his personal estrangement with Pandit Nehru. Kripalani must have done his best but it seems he was unequal to the task. A close associate of Gandhi and author of a book on Gandhism, he could not deliver the goods because Hari Singh, or for that matter anybody else, could not take seriously a guarantee given by him about the ultimate conduct and attitude of the comparatively more important and at the same time unpredictable, Pandit Nehru. Such an assurance, if it was to carry weight, could come only from Mahatma Gandhi or Pandit Nehru himself. Therefore, although Kripalani may have been able to clear part

of the mist, he was clearly unable to win his complete confidence. Sardar Patel, on his own, sent Lt. General Kaul for parleys with Hari Singh. Then a Lt. Col., he too was unable to secure a definite commitment.[1]

The Congress High Command then chose to use the power and influence of the Viceroy. Mountbatten and Hari Singh had both been on the staff of the Prince of Wales as A.D.Cs when he paid a visit to the subcontinent in 1921. According to Mr. V.P. Menon, Mountbatten availed a "long standing invitation" from the Maharaja to visit Kashmir.[2] There is no evidence that the Maharaja and Mountbatten ever met between 1921 and 1947. So it is curious that Mountbatten should have been reminded of an invitation extended as far back as 1921 and should have been good and gracious enough to avail of it after nearly 25 years! It was peculiar of Anglo-Hindu conspiracy in Kashmir that when Gandhi visited Srinagar on 1st August, 1947, he also said that he had come in response to an invitation by Maharaja Pratap Singh extended on the occasion of Khumb Mela in 1919; Gandhiji availed of the invitation only 22 years *after the death of Pratap Singh*!

## MOUNTBATTEN ON CONGRESS MISSION TO SRINAGAR

There is considerable evidence to show that Mountbatten had gone to Srinagar after consultations with Congress leaders and in pursuance of their common policy to prevent the State's accession to Pakistan and to secure its accession to India. What Mountbatten did in Srinagar is contained in at least three authentic though pro-Mountbatten accounts.

Campbell Johnson giving the background of the visit says:

> "Mountbatten has also seen for himself the paralysis of Princely uncertainty during his visit to Kashmir, from which he has only just returned today. Both Nehru and Gandhi have been very anxious that the Maharaja of Kashmir should make no declaration of independence. And Nehru, himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins, has been pressing to visit the State himself to seek the release from prison of his friend Sheikh Abdullah, now President of the State's Congress. Last year when Nehru visited the State he was himself placed under arrest by the Kashmir Government. Gandhi's view was that he himself ought to prepare the way for Nehru. The Maharaja has made it very clear that he does not wel-

1. The Untold Story, p. 83.
2. Menon, p. 393.

come a visit from either. Mountbatten succeeded in deferring both visits by saying he himself had a longstanding invitation from the Maharaja and would like to see him first.

When he got there he found the Maharaja politically very elusive, and the only conversations that took place were during their various car drives together. Mountbatten on these occasions urged him and his Prime Minister, Pandit Kak, *not to make any declaration of independence, but to find out in one way or another, the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible and to announce their intention by 14th August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other.* He told them that the newly created States Department was prepared to give an assurance that if Kashmir went to Pakistan this would not be regarded as unfriendly act by the Government of India. He went on to stress *the dangerous situation in which Kashmir would find itself if it lacked the support of one of the two Dominions by the date of the transfer of power. His intention was to give this advice privately to the Maharaja alone,* and then to repeat it in the presence of his Prime Minister with George Abell and the Resident, Colonel Webb, in attendance, at a small meeting where minutes could be kept."

This book was published in 1951. In a subsequent book first published in 1969, Mr. Hodson has given the following account of what happened in Srinagar:—

"There is a full and circumstantial record of interview which Pandit Nehru had with Lord Mountbatten on 24th June 1947, shortly after the latter had returned from his visit to Kashmir. The Viceroy recounted that the advice he had given to the Maharaja and his Prime Minister covered five points:

1. *That Kashmir should not decide about joining any Constituent Assembly until the Pakistan Assembly had been set up and the situation was clearer;*

2. That meanwhile they should make no statement about independence or their intentions;

3. That they should enter into 'stand-still' and other agreements with both India and Pakistan;

4. That eventually they should send representatives to one

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1. Campbell Johnson, p. 224.

Constituent Assembly and join one of the two States, at least for the three central subjects;

5. That so far as possible they should consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought best for the State.

The Viceroy had the impression that both the Maharaja and Pandit Kak had separately agreed that this was sound advice; but both had stated that *on account of the balance of population and Kashmir's geographical position any premature decision might have a serious effect on their internal stability.* Lord Mountbatten's note of the conversation, dictated immediately afterwards, continues:

> "Pandit Nehru agreed that my advice was sound and unexceptionable."

The Prime Minister then asked what luck the Viceroy had had with Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir Muslim Nationalist leader, who was incommunicado in gaol, and Lord Mountbatten explained how accidents had prevented the talk between his wife and Begum Sheikh Abdullah which had been hoped for as a diplomatic liaison. Nehru insisted that the problem of Kashmir would not be solved until the Sheikh was released and the people's rights restored. He felt himself called upon to devote himself to this end, he said, and he would soon have to go to Kashmir to take up the cudgels on behalf of his friend and for the freedom of the people."[1]

New evidence has come to light with the publication of the well-known book, Freedom at Midnight, with whose authors Mountbatten sat for several days alongwith his personal papers. According to these authors, when Mountbatten told Hari Singh that *if he wanted* to join Pakistan, Patel (who had been already hunting him through Kripalani, Kaul and others to join India) had undertaken not to raise any objection, the Maharaja replied emphatically, "I do not want to accede to Pakistan on any account". Mountbatten then not only commanded categorically that "he must (then) join India" but also offered to send immediately an Infantry Division "to preserve the integrity of your boundaries".[2] The authors confirm that Hari Singh was advised to take a decision before the 14th of August, i.e. the birth of Pakistan. Mountbatten suggested a meeting on the third and last day of his visit for a final decision but as Hari Singh, though categorically opposed to acceding to Pakistan, was, at the same time, hesitant in acceding to Nehru's India, he not only excused his presence but did not even see off the Viceroy, pleading an upset stomach which Mountbatten dismissed as "absolute boloney."[3]

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1. Hodson, p. 441-442.
2. Freedom at Midnight, p. 205.
3. *Ibid*, p. 205.

Three points warrant attention in this connection:

The first one is that the Muslim League High Command was kept in complete dark both about the purpose of Mountbatten's visit as well as the talks he had with Hari Singh. Mountbatten was at this time Governor-General of the whole of India as power had not been transferred to the two countries as yet. It may, therefore, be asked as to why was the Muslim League High Command kept ignorant about this important visit and why after all did Mountbatten prefer to go himself instead of Pandit Nehru or Mahatma Gandhi? Is it not evident that this was done because Nehru's visit would have put the Muslim League on the alert and besides, he may not himself have been that successful with Hari Singh because of their mutual bitterness? Besides, Mountbatten, as a relative of the King Emperor, could have a special appeal to Maharaja Hari Singh and could as well pose as a neutral while tendering advice that the Maharaja should accede to India.

The second point that needs consideration is the understanding thus revealed between Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru that the former will meet Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah or contact Begum Abdullah. Why did Lady Mountbatten try to meet Begum Abdullah? Was Mountbatten intending to bring about a compromise between Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah? Or did he intend to assure Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah through their wives that in case he decided to support the State's accession to India, the administration of the State was going to be handed over to him? After all, why did not Mountbatten meet any other popular leader not only in Kashmir but anywhere else in the sub-continent which had 562 Princely States? Why did not Lady Mountbatten try to set up a "diplomatic liaison" with the wife of any other political leader anywhere else in the country?

The third point to be considered is that *while according to Johnson, and the French authors, Mountbatten advised Hari Singh to take a decision before 15th August which means before Pakistan came into being, according to Mr. Hodson, he advised him not to take a decision till the Pakistan Constituent Assembly came into being and the situation was clearer.* This is mutually exclusive. There is no explanation about the two irreconcilable positions. Revival of a position 27 years after it was first taken in 1949 and in repudiation of a contrary position taken in 1966, apart

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1. Hodson, p. 442.

from throwing open to doubt the claim that the visit had no link with the State's accession to India,—he is the lonely as well as original source of both the conflicting statements—leaves one surmising as to what actually passed between him and Hari Singh who died long ago. In any case, the very suggestion that a decision must be taken before Pakistan formally came into being, meant accession to India.

Mountbatten, who was subsequent to the visit, instrumental in the award of Muslim tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala to India, in flagrant disregard of the fundamentals of partition, to facilitate Kashmir's occupation by India, could have hardly sincerely desired its accession to Pakistan. He may also be presumed to have known that Hari Singh would never accede to Muslim Pakistan. Therefore, even if we accept his claim that to begin with, he told Hari Singh that *if he wanted*[1] (very interesting and meaningful words) to accede to Pakistan, on account of its geographic placement, Patel had undertaken not to raise any objection, he must have done so, merely to put up a posture of neutrality and to keep it handy for use in defending his questionable conduct in the matter of Kashmir. A man, born great and endowed with extra-ordinary abilities, it is sad that over-ambition blinded him to the extent of besmearing his own name in the very region where he was called upon to play the greatest role of his life. India and Pakistan were no equals in size, resources, population or technical know-how in any sphere; Pakistan was a still-born baby deserving of compassion but great Queen Victoria's great grandson, to say the least of having acted with compassion, did not even act justly or equitably but threw in his tremendous weight in favour of the strong and against the weak. He became an instrument of injustice, oppression and intrigue in the hands of Hindus. He has done irreparable disservice to his nation because his partial and questionable conduct is always brought up, whenever, thousands of men and women in Pakistan, like this writer, praise Englishmen and women for their personal character.

Again, what was the fault of the poor Kashmiri Muslims whose abject slavery and deprivation under a century-long Hindu rule is witnessed by the poignant narration of his own countrymen and women, if he could not realise his heart's desire to become the joint Governor-General? Kashmiris were not responsible for it. Why did he punish them for it?

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1. Freedom at Midnight, p. 206.

Leonard Mosley, commenting upon his visit, has something very interesting to say:

> "He accordingly set off for Kashmir on 21 June 1947 and stayed with the Maharaja in Srinagar. He took George Abell with him and, in the next forty-eight hours, for a negotiator who could be a typhoon of energy when he wished, he accomplished extraordinarily little. What is remarkable about this episode is Mountbatten's fatalistic acceptance of the Maharaja of Kashmir's evasions and subterfuges. One could understand if Nehru or Gandhi had accepted his prevarication, they had everything to gain by it. Time was on their side. At any moment the Maharaja might be persuaded, or panicked, into releasing from jail Kashmir's most influential political leader Sheikh Abdullah, who was pro-Congress in spite of being a Muslim and could, as a close friend of Nehru, be trusted to campaign for accession to the Union of India.
>
> But why did the Viceroy so meekly accept the Maharaja's excuses? Here was a State whose future was more likely than any other to cause friction between the two new Dominions if its destiny was not decided. It not only shared its frontiers with both of the new Dominions, Pakistan and India but also with Tibet, China, Russia and Afghanistan. It was essential that, for the sake of world peace as well as local harmony, its fate should not be left hanging in the air. Aside from its importance to the Indian sub-continent, Mountbatten as a soldier might have been expected to recognise its geopolitical significance. Here was an opportunity to do a service, not only to the two new Dominions but also to stability in Asia. Any strategist could have told him (if he really needed to be told) that it was from this quarter of the world that all the threats to India's safety and security had hitherto come. He might have been forgiven for saying 'All right, let India take it over. They will guard its frontiers better, even if its people are Muslims'. Or 'Give it to Pakistan. It is Muslim territory. As a consolidated Muslim block, Kashmir will help to protect the Northern frontiers of India against outside invasion'. What is surprising is that he not only said neither, but he also did not bounce into the Maharaja's bed room and declare, with typical Mountbatten boldness 'Look, I know you are trying to get out of a difficult decision. You want, to be independent and you know you can't be. As a Hindu, your

inclination, if you have to accede to someone, is to opt for India. But you know your people won't like it. You know they would rather favour Pakistan. It's a problem, I admit. But for God's sake, man, make up your mind. And if you don't make up your mind before I leave for Delhi in two hours' time, I shall make up your mind for you and announce it to your people'.

It would have been no bolder a gesture than many others he had made during the negotiations for the transfer of power, against opponents much more powerful than the effete, ineffective and miserable Maharaja of Kashmir.

Why did he not do it? Why did his flair disappear on this all-important occasion?

Can it be that, exhausted by his constant worry over the problem of the Governor Generalship of Pakistan, allergic for the moment to the Muslims, he was suffering from a diplomatic colic too?"[1]

## ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF AWARD

Why Mountbatten tried to persuade Hari Singh not to be in a hurry in the matter of accession and why he also advised him to consult public opinion *in any manner he thought fit*, incidentally, the only ruler in whose case the Governor-General gave the ruler the right to choose for himself the method of ascertaining the popular will, are quite meaningful. On 24th July after the decision NOT to have him as Governor-General of Pakistan, had been finally and irrevocably, made known, Mountbatten convened a meeting of the high-powered Partition Council and secured signatures of its members who included the Quaid-e-Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, to a joint statement pledging *advance acceptance of the Boundary Commission's award, whatever form it might take*. According to Campbell Johnson, Mountbatten regarded it as a personal triumph and was greatly elated and excited over this coup.[2]

It was by itself a suspicious move because if the Award was to be bonafide, such an undertaking in advance, was wholly unnecessary. This move by him brings out clearly that by this date he was fully aware that the award would attract *legitimate* criticism. Presumably this argument may have been advanced by Radcliffe to Viceroy's suggestion (if not demand) to fashion it according to his wishes, or did he want to

1. The last days of the British Raj. p. 188
2. Abdul Hamid. p. 243.

strengthen his own hands in "dealing" with Radcliffe? The decision of the Boundary Commission being in the nature of an arbitration award, was even otherwise binding on the parties. Why then did he resort to this device? Did he have a guilty conscience? On the eve of his departure from India in June 1948, Pandit Nehru said:

> "Earl Mountbatten has acted in India's interests as zealously as any Indian could have done. Lord Mountbatten has held India's honour high. When he left, Indians felt the same regret as when a brother went."[1]

As the author rightly points out, these eloquent words could not have been used for a person who may have acted as a neutral in the decisive developments of 1947.

## GANDHI'S KASHMIR 'YATRA'

Sometime in July, Pandit Nehru again became restive and desired to visit Srinagar, possibly to convince Hari Singh that he had no ill-will against him and that his interests would be safeguarded and also try to bring about an understanding between him and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah which was essential for the latter's support to the State's accession to India. Mountbatten as well as Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel seem to have thought that Pandit Nehru's visit may not prove fruitful. Kripalani can be presumed to have informed them about the talks he had with Hari Singh and the fears expressed by the latter. A meeting was, therefore, held, on 29th July at the Birla House, again a secret one, attended by Pandit Mountbatten, Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel. It was decided that instead of Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi should visit Srinagar.[2] *This fact came to light for the first time in* 1969. The partition was yet to take place and yet, Mountbatten had by now so completely identified himself with Congress objectives that he attended secret meetings that planned Congress strategy in Kashmir in order to prevent its accession to Pakistan.

Commenting on Gandhi's visit to Srinagar, Ian Stephens has said:

> "Mahatma Gandhi was one of the world's most ingenious politicians and it was hard to think what could have drawn him, as a saint, to Srinagar at that time."[3]

1. *Ibid*, p. 245.
2. Hodson, p. 443.
3. Horned Moon, p. 107.

Mr. Gandhi travelled from Rawalpindi to Srinagar by car. He arrived in Srinagar on Ist August. There were several demonstrations against him, the noisest one at Baramula. I was at Wanigham, a village ten miles from the town when I received a message from Chaudhri Faizullah Khan, the local S.D.M. to return atonce. On meeting him, I was informed that according to the official programme conveyed to him, Gandhi was to pass through the town on Ist August; we then discussed what steps could be taken to stage a pro-Pakistan demonstration. Mr. Faizullah was the elder brother of our Party Chief, Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan. Together with Doctor Muzaffar Shah, now a practising physician at Lahore, we arranged a demonstration by local Muslims. A day or two later, a deputation of Hindus, some of whom had come from Srinagar, met the S.D.M. and demanded stern action against us. I was summoned again and, in their presence, "warned" of "serious consequences" if there was any demonstration against "our Bapu." Naturally I told him that we were not going to abandon the proposed demonstration but assured him that it was going to be very peaceful. He then told the deputationists to go out so that he could speak to me privately. After they left, he wanted to know the progress of the preparations and after a brief discussion of the strategy to be adopted, I came out.

## "BETI: JIS RAJA KI PRAJA DUKHEE HO, GANDHI USKA DOODH NAHIN PEETA."

On Ist August, about half an hour before Mr. Gandhi passed through the town, Maharaj Kishan Dhar, Governor of the province ordered a lathi charge. Some of us were actually beaten but the idea seems to have been not so much to flatten us as to clear the vantage point we were occupying. Being pushed back, we hurried to the alternate place already in our plan which was a small lane connecting the Muslim Conference meeting ground with the J.V. road. The problem here was that a few constables could effectively prevent us even from seeing Mr. Gandhi's car until it was actually in front of us. Mr. Faizullah realised our problem, came there and kept standing, ostensibly pretending to guard the vulnerable outlet for the demonstrators. The police had blocked our entry to the road. When Mr. Gandhi's car was spotted by Mr. Faizullah, approximately from a distance of three to four hundred yards, he waived his hands from behind his back to the Muslim police-men behind him who were holding us back, signalling them to allow us a passage to the road. This done, he disappeared in the crowd while the demonstrators, several hundred strong, rushed towards Mr. Gandhi's car with black flags and handkerchiefs raising slogans of 'Pakistan Zindabad' and 'Gandhi Murdabad'. The elaborate arrangements made by

the Hindu minority for his reception were completely disrupted. Many a ceremonial gate were pulled down. A group of demonstrators, led by Mr.Wali Mohammad alias Kawa, now an artist in Trarkhel station of the Azad Kashmir Radio, ran after Mr. Gandhi's car, raising pro-Pakistan slogans. A few hundred yards away, the driver, presumably on advice from the Mahatma, slowed down the car; Mr. Gandhi then asked them as to what they wanted? Upon this, a demonstrator told him "Hum Pakistan chahte hein" Replied Mr. Gandhi: "Pakistan to ban gaya hai". Upon this, another demonstrator retorted: "Hum Yahan Pakistan Mangta hai". Mr. Gandhi did not reply and the driver sped away the car. He tried to be a bit rash where upon some one from amongst the demonstrators hurled a pebble breaking one of its glass panes. There was also a demonstration at Sangrama and yet another one, on the out-skirts of Srinagar city.

A special Ashram had been constructed in Srinagar. An hour or so after his arrival in the city, Maharani Tara Devi came by car and alighting at a respectable distance walked bare-footed, holding a milk-ful golden cup in a tray, perhaps also of gold. Bowing reverently, she presented the cup of milk to Gandhi who asked,without touching it, as to what it was? The Maharani replied that there existed a custom that whenever a Rishi came here, the Rani went bare-footed to present him a cup of milk. Struck the hard bargainer: "Beti. Jis Raja ki praja dukhee ho, Gandhi uska doodh nahin peeta." Translation: Gandhi does not drink the milk of a Ruler whose people were unhappy. The Rani had to return with the milk.[1]

## THE MAHATMA SUCCEEDS

He had meetings first with that arch enemy of Muslims, the Raj Guru, followed by those with Maharani Tara Devi, Prince Karan Singh, Ram Chandra Kak and last of all, with Maharaja Hari Singh. He also met important Dogras, Pandit leaders and Begum Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad whose entry had been banned, accompanied him upto Rawalpindi and met him again at Suchetgarh border. Gandhi returned on 4th August via Jammu where he stayed for a night. It seems his visit had a three-fold aim:

1. Immediate removal of Ram Chandra Kak and his replacement by a dependable pro-India man;

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1. As told to this writer by Agha Shorish Kashmiri who was present.

2. Release of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah or at least prepare ground for eventual co-operation between him and Hari Singh; and

3. To assure Hari Singh that he need have no fear from Pandit Nehru and that his interests would be safe and fully protected after accession to India.

There should have been no doubt at all about the success of his mission. More than a prophet for Hindus, he had begun to be worshipped in his life-time. This writer has not come across any Hindu home he visited which did not have Gandhi's photograph, irrespective of the fact whether the owner was a Congressite or a fanatic Hindu Mahasabhite. Such was his name and fame and so great was the magic of his personality for the Hindus that it was impossible for any one to resist his wishes or disobey his commands. Raj Guru, Tara Devi, Karan Singh and, even for that matter, Hari Singh himself, were no exception and this writer can never imagine that any one could have harboured in their minds even the remotest idea of a faint resistance to his over-powering wishes.

Informing Pandit Nehru of the result of his mission, from the Lahore residence of Rameshwari Nehru, Gandhi wrote:

> "During the two interviews with the Prime Minister I told him about his unpopularity among the people. He wrote to the Maharaja that on a sign from him he would resign. The Maharaja and Maharani were *anxious* to see me. I met them; the heir apparent with his leg in plaster was also present. Both admitted that with the lapse of British paramountcy, the true paramountcy of the people of Kashmir would commence. *However much they might wish to join the Union (India)*, they would have to make the choice in accordance with the wishes of the people. *How they could be determined, was not discussed at that interview.*
>
> Bakhshi (Ghulam Muhammad) was most sanguine that the result of the free vote of the people, whether on the adult franchise or on the existing register would be in favour of Kashmir joining the Union provided, of course, that Sheikh Abdullah and his coprisoners were released, all bans were removed and the present Prime Minister was not in power. Probably he echoed the general sentiment. I studied the Amritsar treaty properly called sale-deed. I presume it lapses on the 15th. To whom does the State revert? Does it not go to the people"?[1]

1. Mahatma Gandhi—the last phase, p. 357-358.

On account of the greater trust that he had come to place upon Sardar Patel which his assassination ultimately proved to have been misplaced, he wrote :

> "Kak had written to the Maharaja. He will send you a copy. He showed it to me. *He has sweet tongue..* I had an hour with the Maharaja and the Maharani. He agreed that he must follow the will of the people but he did not come to the point. So he sent me his Special Secretary to express regrets. He wishes to remove Kak. He is only wondering how. It is almost decided to have Sir Jailal. You have evidently something to do about this. *In my view the Kashmir situation* can be improved."[1]

## THE RAJ GURU

According to information furnished to this writer by Chaudhri Niaz Ahmad, a retired Chief Secretary of the Maharaja's Government, the real name of Raj Guru was Swami Sant Deo. He was not a citizen of Jammu and Kashmir State and probably came from Punjab. Shapely in appearance, he first attracted attention in Srinagar during the last years of Maharaja Pratap Singh. He used to dress himself in costly silk and was given to extensive use of perfumes. According to Mr. Nizami, he hailed from Mathura, and could speak English and German, besides Sanskrit, Hindi and Urdu. According to Fauq, he was conversant with Persian and frequently recited verses from Mathnavi Maulana Rum. He spent a few years at Gurukal in Kangrah with the Arya Samajists who conferred upon him the title of Swami. He met Pratap Singh on one of his visits to Hardwar and this is how he got into Kashmir.[2] He took up his residence in a government bungalow near Chashma Shahi, though for some time he also resided at the Mughal-built Bara-Darri at Achha-bal. He built a hut in the nearby forest which he used to visit in the afternoon. Almost all Maharanis from the plains who visited Srinagar during summer called on the Swami for the Hindu custom of "Darshan" and gave him large sums of money as offerings. A large quantity of fruit and sweets which he received in offerings was regularly distributed among the officials with whom he had to deal for one reason or another. These Maharanis even used to visit him at Achha-bal ostensibly for purposes of benediction. An English lady, Mrs. Brooke who lived in the vicinity of his Chashma-Shahi residence alongwith her unmarried daughter complained to Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed that the Swami was a "bad fellow."

1. Freedom Struggle, p. 274.
2. Weekly Karzar, 28-8-1972.

He had tried to encroach upon their honour. In the second instance, his intimacy with a female inmate of the palace during the last days of Pratap Singh somehow gained notoriety and annoyed Hari Singh who was then Commander-in-Chief.

With the accession of Hari Singh, the extreme fanaticism that prevailed in the Durbar came to an end and the Swami was banished from the court. Hari Singh, it may be said to his credit, was a liberal-minded ruler when he ascended the throne and remained so till 1931 when to his great misfortune, the political awakening among Muslims touched great heights and led to the demand for responsible government which obviously meant the end of his personal rule. Hari Singh was prepared to be liberal; he was prepared to give better treatment to his Muslim subjects than they had received before but he was not prepared for radical political reforms.

It seems that the Swami spent most of his time at Batote or Lahore without being taken notice of by the Durbar until the last years of Hari Singh's rule when he was somehow able to bring the Maharani under his hypnotic influence. How it happened is not known but the fact remains that she did come under his evil influence. There have been State-wide rumours that Hari Singh and Tara Devi were not carrying on well for a number of years. Whatever the position, there is no doubt that by 1945, Sant Deo had become known as Raj Guru and commanded almost total influence in the palace through the Maharani and her son. An extremely bigoted Hindu, he was naturally able to mould the thinking of the Maharani on Hindu-Muslim questions according to his own lights. According to Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed, the Maharani had no say, whatsoever, in matters of State until early forties when she began exercising influence on the Maharaja for the first time in her married life. This influence increased day by day till it reached a point in 1947 when the Maharaja was totally dependent upon her and did whatever she asked him to do. It could not be the instance of an old husband playing into the hands of his young wife. May be the neglect she had suffered all through her youth at the hands of Hari Singh had at last tormented the heart of the husband and by way of atonement, brought him so close to his consort; may be it was the natural human characteristic of love and dependence between the spouses increasing in old age or may be the Maharani was able to use her position as the mother of his only child. Whatever the position, the fact remains that she exercised complete control over her husband by the beginning of 1947. The first time her influence was discovered publicly was the retirement of the Maharaja's Minister-in-waiting, an Englishman, and appointment in his place of Mr. Batra, a retired officer

from the Punjab Civil Service and a highly fanatic Hindu. Similarly, another Englishman who was the tutor of Karan Singh was also relieved of his duties and Pandit Brij Kishan, Principal S.P. College Srinagar was appointed in his place.

## DISMISSAL OF KAK

On 11th August, a week after Mr. Gandhi's departure, while Prime Minister Kak was in his office in the Secretariat at Srinagar, an A.D.C. came with a sealed envelope, straight from a Shikargah of the Maharaja where he was staying at the time, conveying the Ruler's decision of his removal from the post of Prime Minister. Mr. Kak had been ordered to vacate his office immediately. Janak Singh stepped into his shoes. The removal of the moderate Kak and that also so soon after the departure of Mahatma Gandhi and only three days before Pakistan was to come into existence, sent a deep wave of apprehension among Muslims as it left no doubt that the Maharaja had finally come over his personal doubts and resolved to throw the State into India. Commenting on this situation, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz has said:

> "With the appointment of Janak Singh, the uncertainty about the future of the State was removed and it became clear that the Maharaja and his Government, no less than the National Conference, had lined up with the Congress. This caused grave tension in the State, particularly in the Valley. The Muslims were deeply enraged at the turn the events had taken. Clashes between the followers of the Muslim Conference and the National Conference started almost immediately.
>
> This was the state of affairs in Kashmir on the eve of 14th August 1947. The subcontinent was making grand preparations for the Day of Independence but the people of the State were rapidly heading for a catastrophe."[1]

## STAND-STILL AGREEMENT

On 12th August 1947, the Maharaja's government entered into a Stand-still agreement with the Government of Pakistan. The agreement is contained in two telegrams exchanged between the two Governments which are reproduced below:

Telegram of the Prime Minister of Kashmir addressed to the States Relations Department, Government of Pakistan, 12 August 1947:

1. Freedom Struggle, Bazaz, p. 275.

"Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Stand-still Agreements with Pakistan on all matters on which these exist at present moment with outgoing British India Government. It is suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreements."

Telegram of the Foreign Secretary, Government of Pakistan, addressed to the Prime Minister of Kashmir, 15th August 1947:

"Your telegram of the 12th. The Government of Pakistan agree to have a Standstill Agreement with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir for the continuance of the existing arrangements pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreements."[1]

On 14th August, the birth of Pakistan was celebrated with great enthusiasm. Of course, the gloom cast by the State's impending accession to India was writ large on every face. Processions were taken out and public meetings held to celebrate the Day. The Kashmir State having entered into a Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government on 12th August, under which the Post and Telegraph Offices were operated by the latter, Pakistan flag was hoisted on most of the Post offices but when the news reached the Durbar, Janak Singh ordered their immediate removal. This was a crude demonstration of the Dogra Government's hatred against Pakistan. Baramula, where this writer had the honour of leading the procession and addressing it after it terminated at Masjid-i-Amir Shah, has the unique distinction of being the only place where Pakistan flag continued to fly over the Post office building till dusk, partly due to the courageous attitude displayed by its Muslim Postmaster in ignoring the Kashmir Government's order but largely because Mr. Faizullah, the S.D.M., had the courage to risk displeasure of the Government by not using force to bring down the flag. It was a spectacle to watch streams of people from all directions in the town and its suburbs swarming towards the Post office in order to have a glimpse of the Flag of their hopes and dreams. A group of volunteers took an all-day vigil near the building and many a men and women who visited the spot, burst into tears at its very sight. For a people who had been under tyrannical Hindu-Sikh rule for nearly one hundred and thirty years and had tasted its bitterness and experienced the discrimination, inequality, suppression and what not, were, of course, the best judges to visualise how bleak their future was if the State acceded to Hindu India.

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1. Courtesy, Aftab Ahmed Khan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On 12th August when newspapers brought the news of Kak's dismissal and his replacement by Janak Singh, I went to Father G. Shanks, Principal St. Joseph's College Baramula, which was run by the well-known Mission Mill-Hill, Fathers, London. I had been a student of the College for four years and knew him to be basically an admirer of the Quaid-e-Azam and an ardent supporter of Pakistan. I asked him whether he had any inside information? He promised to go to Srinagar the same afternoon to ascertain from the English Residency which was still functioning and had to close down on the 14th. Next day when I again called on him, after his return from Srinagar, Father Shanks told me that the Maharaja had finally decided to accede to India but that the decision was not going to be announced for some months.

In September, the supply of petrol, wheat, salt and other daily necessities which were always imported into Kashmir valley from Rawalpindi stopped arriving. The Maharaja was particularly worried about the stoppage of petrol. Since west Punjab was already a part of Pakistan, it was decided to utilize the services of the Chief Secretary who apart from being a Muslim, hailed from Gujrat, in the Punjab. Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed was therefore sent to persuade the authorities in Rawalpindi to resume the supply of these articles. On reaching Rawalpindi, he found that the District Magistrate Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq, C.S.P., who later rose to be the Chief Justice of Pakistan, had, by order, stopped the movement of essential supplies from the district. This had been done because of the uncertain conditions then prevailing everywhere. When Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed reached Rawalpindi, Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq was away at Lahore to arrange for the supply of wheat to his district which is deficit in food grains. He met the Commissioner, Khawaja Abdur Rahim and learnt that the resumption of supplies was a rather impossible job. The petrol-dealer Luqmanji was ready to send petrol provided it was escorted by the military because there was a danger of its being looted on the way. Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed contacted the G.H.Q. but was told that such an order could not be passed without the consent of the Quaid-e-Azam, perhaps because the State was not a part of Pakistan and the question involved foreign relations. Since the Assembly was to meet soon, Chaudhri Niaz Ahmed returned to Srinagar. When Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq returned to Rawalpindi, he was acquainted with the mission of the Kashmir Chief Secretary by his Commissioner whereupon he left for Srinagar alongwith Dr. Muhammad Din Taseer, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din and Mr. Taj-ud-Din of the A.P.P. Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq met Mr. Batra whereas the other members of the party had several meetings with popular leaders including Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah.

## MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN AS PREMIER

Mahajan was free from the Boundary Commission in the first week of August and seems to have left for Dharamsala. It seems that Maharani Tara Devi had telegraphically requested him to reach Srinagar immediately but the telegram was misplaced. On 25th August he received the following letter from the Maharani:

> "I hope you remember the discussions we had in the Flatti's at Lahore in May last. In view of the conclusion arrived then, a telegram was sent to you which owing to disturbed conditions may or may not have reached you. I am therefore sending this letter through a special messanger, Captain Harnam Singh. On receipt of this, you should kindly come here immediately for interview with His Highness so that after the same you may be able to take the necessary action for implementing the discussion we had and to which you agreed. Kindly intimate through the bearer the date and time of your arrival at Jammu so that conveyance may be sent for your journey up. With best wishes."[1]

On 7th September, he received the following letter from her:

> "I am glad to get your letter of 1st September and to learn that you are prepared to honour your promise. I am also glad to know that you are willing to come here immediately for interviewing His Highness. The bearer of your letter has seen with his own eyes and experienced the dangers and difficulties which beset the journey from Pathankot to our border but it is undertstood from reliable official information which is received from Governor Jammu that the situation is easing rapidly now. All the same I am sending Captain Harnam Singh again with necessary escort and a military car to bring you here. I hope you will be able to start immediately on receipt of this letter."[2]

It may be mentioned here that as a member of the Boundary Commission, Mahajan employed all his powers of persuation, logic, great legal knowledge etc. to persuade Radcliffe to make Ravi the boundary-line between India and Pakistan so as to deprive the latter not only of a large area but also of Lahore, the heart of the Pakistan Movement, whereupon Radcliffe could not suppress his indignation and retorted back "How can you have both Calcutta and Lahore?" He reached Srinagar on 13th September and was immediately taken to Hari Singh. Tara Devi

1. Mahajan, p. 123-124.
2. *Ibid*, p. 124.

was also present. Orders of his appointment as Prime Minister at rupees five thousand per month for a period of five years were issued on 18th September. The order also stipulated that in case of earlier release, he was to be paid his salary for the rest of the period. On the same day he left for Delhi and on 19th September met Sardar Patel. Let him now narrate himself as to what happened next:

> "He not only encouraged me but practically ordered me to accept the offer and asked me to proceed to Srinagar at once. He said he would grant me eight months leave due to me. I was also given permission to take up service in the Kashmir State which he thought was in the interest of India in the circumstances that had arisen.
>
> I also met Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India *and I told him the terms on which the Maharaja wanted me to negotiate with India. The Maharaja was willing to accede to India and also to introduce necessary reforms in the administration of the State. He, however, wanted the question of administrative reforms taken up later on.* Pandit Ji wanted an immediate change in the internal administration of the State and he felt somewhat annoyed when I conveyed to him the Maharaja's views. Pandit Nehru also asked me to see that Sheikh Abdullah was set free.
>
> I was advised to see Mahatma Gandhi and I went to pay my respects to him. I had an hour's talk with him. *He said he had no desire to liquidate the Maharaja or to do any harm to him and that if possible this State should accede to India* and that the administration should have a democratic set up. I conveyed to the Maharaja the wishes of Pandit Nehru and also the discussions I had with the Indian leaders."[1]

It seems that the only hurdle that now remained to over-come was Nehru's insistence to release Sheikh Abdullah and associate him with the Administration. This he must have conveyed to Hari Singh who sent the following instructions in reply:

> "The one thing which is vital from the point of the immediate necessity of the State is the ability of the Government to choose its own time for the orientation and association of the people for their own betterment, security of life and property and full development. You should be able to convince the persons concerned about this aspect of the case before you arrive here. A visit to Delhi will of course be necessary."[2]

1. Mahajan, p. 124-126.
2. Mahajan, p. 127.

Mahajan had eight months leave due, so he sent an application to the East Punjab Governor Sir Chandu Lal Trevedi for grant of leave. As the stakes involved were not disclosed, the application did not receive urgent consideration. On 10th October at midnight, Patel phoned Mahajan to proceed to Kashmir immediately and told that the Governor had not released him, he gave him a ring and again at 1 a.m. asked Mahajan to reach Delhi next morning in the plane of Lady Mountbatten. This he did and met Sardar Patel, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Gandhi who granted him a private interview and when asked as to whether he should persuade and advise the Maharaja to accede to India, the astute Mahatma advised: "there is no hurry: study the situation and give him the advice you think best". Only an idiot could have ever expected Mahajan to advise the Maharaja anything short of outright accession to India. A shrewd man, wanting to oblige every-body expressly, with an eye on his own future, Mahajan also asked for the advice of Mountbatten who told him that "as Governor-General of India he would be very happy if he advised the Maharaja to accede to India". That Mahajan's appointment at Srinagar was an important link in the Indian conspiracy to usurp Kashmir is also evident from a letter Sardar Patel wrote two years later to the Maharaja of Bikaneer declining the latter's request for an extension in his services in his State. Sardar Patel wrote:

> "I am doubtful that they (East Punjab Government) would take kindly to this suggestion now. Moreover he was released for Kashmir for strategic and tactical reasons and therefore the ordinary rule and practices had to be set aside."[1]

## PREPARING THE GROUND

That Hari Singh was already in league with Congress leaders and had decided to accede to India is also proved from the writings of impartial observers.

According to Mr. Wilfred Russell, a British business-magnate in India, Mr. Veisca Stubbs, a foreign pilot of an Indian airline operating from Bombay "told me that during the last three weeks (September 1947) he has carried several State officials to and fro between Kashmir and New Delhi".[2]

It is admitted by Mahajan that before he came to Srinagar and assumed the charge of Prime Minister, he had been assured by India of military aid "whenever I wanted it". This is at least five weeks before the entry of tribesmen into Muzaffarabad.

1. Mahajan, p. 188.
2. Indian Summer, p. 144.

Mr. Wilfred Russell, writes:

"It seemed that Hari Singh was already negotiating with two minor Sikh princes, whose territories lay among the difficult and mountainous districts to the east of his borders and through which there had hitherto been no communications of any kind. He was planning, it seemed, to build a road through these hills, which would debouch into India beyond the likely alignment of the new Indo-Pakistan border (before 17th August).

He quotes the Resident:

"Kashmir won't be such easy meat for Jinnah, as he thinks. I'm not much in their (Dogras) confidence now, I'm afraid, but I do know that H. H. is very much under the influence of an old Brahmin priest and the court is trying all it can to stop him from joining up with Pakistan... .. .. .. .. ....."

Russell continues:

"From the carpet shop I called on General Paddy Wilson, who was President of the Gulmarg Club and who knew much about the State and its ruler. He, too, had heard that Hari Singh, under the influence of his Brahmin priests, was negotiating with the Indian Government .. .. .."[1]

Mr. Ian Stephens says:

"From early July rumours had begun to reach us of the sort since put forth in a book by Wilfred Russell that Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir although the over-whelming majority of his subjects were Muslims, was privately seeking pretexes for acceding to India. Of their accuracy it was impossible to judge. Contrary rumours that he was in a state of feeble indecision might be truer. Nevertheless, those of the first sort were too many to be ignored."[2]

And this is what Lord Mountbatten himself says:

"All the Indian princes whose whole way of life, their power, their status, their fortunes, their traditions were at stake, had to make a difficult decision. Most of them had made their adjustments. *But it was predictable* that there was going to be a tragedy in Kashmir.

1. Indian Summer, p. 102, 105, 149 & 142.
2. Horned Moon, p. 107.

> Kashmir was a predominently Muslim State with a Hindu ruler who simply could not make up his mind how to act. He did not want to subject himself to Muslim Pakistan but he was afraid of loosing his ruling powers in democratic India. So despite my repeated urgings, he let things slide."[1]

Efforts for a compromise between the Maharaja and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who was undergoing a three-year sentence since about a year for treasonable speeches in connection with the Quit Kashmir Movement and was lodged in the Bhadarwah jail, were also going on. As a first step he was removed to Badami Bagh cantonment Srinagar. Mr. V. P. Menon of the Indian States Ministry paid a secret visit to Srinagar, perhaps one of several such visits, and in course of a meeting, gave him a message from Pandit Nehru that he should come out and that the question of accession will be decided in accordance with popular will. It is possible, rather very likely, that he may have been also informed of the efforts, afoot, to persuade the Maharaja to associate the National Conference with the State administration. In the cantonment, Thakar Janak Singh, Premier, and Rai Bahadur Shyam Sunder Lal Dhar, a Kashmiri Pandit with no personal hostility against Sheikh Abdullah, also had several meetings with him.

At last, largely due to the pressure exerted by Nehru in the larger interests of India, he was released on 29th September. On 15th or 16th October, after Mehr Chand Mahajan had taken over, he had a meeting with the Maharaja. He was accompanied by his wife. Sheikh Abdullah, according to Mahajan, told Hari Singh that there was no need to have an outsider as Prime Minister; that power ought to be transferred to popular representatives and that if he did so, he had no cause to fear them. After the meeting, Sheikh Abdullah left for Delhi in response to an invitation from Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru.

In September, another important development took place, which clearly showed that the preliminaries had been settled and that the State's accession to India was now only a matter of opportune time. It was the appointment of the known pro-Congress I.C.S. officer Sir Gopala Swami Ayyangar, as Minister without portfolio in Mr. Nehru's popular Government. Ayyangar was not a member of Parliament and his is perhaps the only instance in Free India when a civil servant walked straight from his chair to that of a Minister in a popular Government. It was not due to the outstanding ability of the man because there were scores of civil servants intellectually far superior to him, such as Mr. Girja Shankar

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1. John Terraine, p. 161.

Bajpai, Mr. V.P. Menon, Mr. Patel and Mr. Kaul etc. The reasons are not far to seek. Mr. Ayyangar was the only person with the special qualification of having been Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State from 1937 to 1943 and thus fully posted with the politics and personalities of the State. Commenting on his appointment as Minister without portfolio, Mr. Ian Stephens says:

> "I said to our editorial conference in Calcutta: "that really does look as if India is upto something at Srinagar" and our correspondents were told to watch for news."[1]

## WHY ACCESSION ANNOUNCEMENT DELAYED?

It may now be asked why the announcement of accession to India was delayed? I have already covered some of these reasons but let me now briefly enumerate them as follows:

(1) There was a breach, a serious one, between Hari Singh and Nehru partly because of the latter's understandable support to Abdullah but largely because of his own detention in the State on 19th of June, 1946. In a letter written to an English friend, Mr. Victor, during the Quit Kashmir Movement, a photostat copy of which was published in Blitz Bombay, Hari Singh had dubbed Nehru as "Sheikh Abdullah's Guru". He wrote:

> "At the time of his arrest Abdullah was apparently on his way to see his GURU Jawahar Lal and so Jawahar Lal's personal vanity was greatly injured by the fact that his lieutenant was arrested when on his way to take sanctuary with him. Being what he is, Jawahar Lal has completely gone off the deep end".

Hari Singh was, therefore, genuinely afraid of accession to India with Nehru as Premier. After accession, Mr. Mahajan took the earliest opportunity of bringing the two, face to face for a heart to heart talk. It was in this meeting that Nehru must have assured him of his personal regards. It is another thing that Nehru's promises were like those of the proverbial beloved in the persian poetry, never meant to be fulfilled because less than two years later, Hari Singh had to abdicate and leave the State in disgrace, never to return again. In accordance with his will, his ashes were released from a plane over Jammu city.

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1. Horned Moon, p. 107.

This fear of Nehru was played upon by Kak who equally disliked Nehru and at the same time, had the vision to foresee that accession to Pakistan was also in the larger interests of the State. It was impossible to suggest even to Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan; so Kak toyed with the idea of an independent Kashmir. Dogras were divided into three factions. Some Elders, like General Khajoor Singh, Brigadier Ghansara Singh and Wazir Tej Ram, reportedly considered accession to Pakistan as realistic; a few like Thakar Baldev Singh Pathania, were, half-heartedly in favour of independence but the new generation of youth was wholly pro-India; they included Tara Devi and her son Karan Singh.

2. Hyderabad and Junagarh were heavily weighing upon Congress minds. If the Maharaja's accession was immediately accepted, it meant acceptance of the principle that even a Ruler who professed a faith, different from the majority of his people, had the sole authority to determine the issue of accession. The Congress High Command was afraid that it would provide their rulers with a precedent to accede to Pakistan. So they wanted the Maharaja to defer a formal request till India had taken over Hyderabad and Junagarh. Hyderabad had an area of eighty two thousand square miles, a population of one crore sixty lakhs and an annual income of rupees twenty six crores as against Kashmir's population of forty lakhs and an income of rupees five crores. Junagarh housed the famous Somnath temple, the destruction of which by Mahmud of Gaznah nine hundred years ago, not only ushered in the dawn of Muslim ascendency to power but symbolised, more than anything else, the Hindu-Muslim confrontation in the sub-continent. For Hindus, a free India without Somnath, was naturally, unthinkable.

3. The division of Punjab, already announced, had given Gurdaspur to Pakistan. True, Bhadarwah was contiguous with Kulu and Chamba but there was no vehicular road; there were two rivers to cross, Ravi and Ujh, and both without bridges; no means thus to maintain communications with India. Accession before the announcement of the Boundary Award which had secretly settled the award of the tehsils of Pathankot and the Muslim majority tehsils of Batala and Gurdaspur to India, would have clearly unmasked the Anglo-Hindu conspiracy to give these tehsils to India and publicly exposed Mountbatten and his partisan role.

4. There was no vehicular communication link between India and Kashmir. All vehicular roads linked it with Pakistan. Its only rail track also linked it with Pakistan. There was no bridge over Ravi which separated Pathankot from Kathua. The road between Jammu and Pathankot, apart from being separated by Ravi, was very rough and unmetalled.

Thus accession even after the Award was announced, was impracticable until a bridge was built on the Ravi which task was taken up in hand immediately after 15th August. Mehr Chand Mahajan testifies to have personally visited it several times to speed up its completion.

5. Hindu leadership fondly but seriously believed that Pakistan would collapse within a few months of its inception. That is why they stopped the share of our joint assets; pushed nearly ten million refugees into West Pakistan alone and prompted the migration of non-Muslims from West Pakistan.[1] In this background, with Hari Singh in their pocket, Kak removed from office and such arch anti-Muslims as Mahajan, Janak Singh and Ram Lal Batra manning the administration, they were in no hurry, especially with Hyderabad still resisting pressures and overtures.

6. Again, with an eye on Hyderabad and Junagarh, it was in India's interest to talk of popular support on the question of accession. This was their trump card and the last resort in the case of the two Muslim-ruled Hindu majority States. That is why they were keen to hustle the National Conference into the accession train so that they could not only claim popular backing for accession to India but more important, reinforce their claims to Hyderabad and Junagarh, The rift between Hari Singh and Abdullah was very great. Hari Singh was all for India but not for Abdullah who despite his misgivings at the time about an insecure personal future in Pakistan, must have, nevertheless, demanded power as the price for supporting accession to India. It was this triangle which was also delaying the accession and India was trying to iron it out when the liberation force got an upper hand.

7. The 8985 feet high Banihal Pass, remained snow-decked for nearly five months and traffic between Kashmir valley and Jammu province remained suspended for about three to four months in winter. In Kashmir valley, Muslims numbered 94% of the population. Kashmiris were no longer the "Hatos" of the pre-1931 era. They were politically wide awake and thousands had seen active service during the World war. The Government was afraid of the result of the suspension of traffic for so long, if Pakistan and Muslims were provoked as they would have been provoked by accession to India. A road linking Jammu province with Kashmir province via Poonch (Uri) was already under construction. It was expected to be completed in a few months time.

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1. Penderal Moon, p. 122.

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1. Mahajan/Menon, p. 132

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE DOGRA PLANS

## CHAPTER XXI

# The Dogra Plans

### THE MAHARAJA IN RAWALAKOTE

In March, 1947, Hindu Muslim disturbances engulfed the whole of Punjab. The Akalis, who had, in consultation with the Sikh Chieftains of Punjab, prepared a secret plan for the extermination of Muslims and had, for that end, armed thousands of Sikhs with all sorts of deadly weapons and incendiary material, attacked Muslim localities in Amritsar, Ludhiana, Gurgaon, Jullundhur and other places in East Punjab with the result that rioting spread to the northern parts of Punjab and the N.W.F.P. As a result of these events, thousands of non-Muslims including R.S.S. volunteers and armed Akalis from the border districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore, Gujrat, Rawalpindi, Campbellpur and Hazara crossed into the State. Most of them took up residence in Muzaffarabad, Baramula town and its suburbs, Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and Batote. The Maharaja's Government gave them every possible facility and provided, as far as possible, accommodation, food and clothing. That was quite commendable but the trouble was that they spread false or exaggerated stories of persecution at the hands of Punjab and Frontier Muslims, thereby further heightening the local Hindu-Muslim tension. Strengthened by the die-hard and militant incomers, the local R.S.S. and Akali gangs became more aggressive and plans began to be chalked out for a Muslim massacre.

It was in this background that Maharaja Hari Singh undertook a tour of the Jammu province. He visited Kathua, Sambha, Udhampur, Dodah, Poonch, Dewa Vatala and Bhimber. It is not unusual or uncommon for a Head of the State to tour border areas under the circumstances which then existed and the tour would have been perfectly normal and valid but for the fact that no Muslim officer was included in the entourage. Among

officers accompanying him, were Col. Hira Nand, Lt. Col. Dherak Ram (retired), Thakar Kartar Singh (retired) and Col. Baldev Singh Pathania. Every-where they remained closeted with Hindu leaders and apart from promising further arms and ammunition, distributed one thousand or so Ferozepuri rifles among the Chibs of Dewa Vatala, 750 among Reasi Hindus and one thousand to those at Udhampur.[1]

On 22nd April, the Maharaja was to visit Rawalakot which was then the headquarter of the tehsil of Sudhnuti, now bifurcated into the tehsils of Rawalakot and Sudhnuti. This area is predominantly inhabited by the martial Sudhan tribe; about thirty thousand Jawans of the tribe saw active service during the 1939—45 World war. The War having ended, most of them had since been discharged and had, therefore, returned to their homes. The most respectable elder of the community then was Col. Muhammad Khan, a recruiting Officer, who is affectionately remembered as Father of the community and who had not only been primarily responsible for such a large enlistment in the army, but had also advanced his community in the field of education and social uplift. He was of the opinion that since the Maharaja was, after all, their Ruler and was, for the first time, visiting the town and that also in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, he was entitled to a befitting reception; he, therefore, proposed that all available ex-servicemen assemble in the parade ground in their uniforms and medals and present a salute to their Ruler. Political workers such as Sardar Muhammad Sharif, now Judge High Court, Sardar Mukhtar Khan and Sardar Behram Khan pleader were not agreeable; they thought it impolitic and inexpedient to parade thousands of ex-servicemen before the Maharaja but, as was natural, the Baba prevailed and it was accordingly decided that the ex-servicemen would report at Rawalakot on the morning of 22nd April, 1947. A detachment of National Guards commanded by Lt. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, was also hastily recruited and drilled up.

The local Hindus abruptly changed their programme and decided to receive the Maharaja, separately, at Dharamsala. It now appears certain that he was told before reaching Rawalakot that the Muslims had arranged a display of their ex-servicemen not as a mark of respect but as a show of strength. The Maharaja was easily taken in, with the result that when he reached the parade ground, he drove straight to the small Dogra contingent and after having a brief chat with them, retired to the Dak bungalow, completely ignoring the presence of a large number of Muslim ex-servicemen. It is claimed by some people that the number of the assembled ex-servicemen was thirty thousand but I think it is a highly exaggerated figure. Probably their number may not

1. Information furnished by Sh. Muhammad Saleem, then S.P. Udhampur.

have been more than three to four thousand or so but even that must have been sufficiently awe-some for a Hindu ruler who was bent upon joining Hindu India against the wishes of his Muslim subjects, and who, having in mind the extermination of the latter, as far as possible, hadn't more than thirteen thousand soldiers at his command. He was naturally aware that the number of ex-servicemen in the district alone was about four times the total strength of his army, leave alone thousands others who had been recruited from the tehsil of Bhimber, also a traditional area for army recruitment and other parts of the State. Col. Muhammad Khan met Major General Scott, Chief of the General Staff, who persuaded the Maharaja to return to the parade ground to take the salute of the Muslim ex-servicemen; the Maharaja did at last oblige but obviously he must have, on second thought, realized that it was highly impolitic to openly offend and provoke such a large number of ex-soldiers. He, therefore, appeared before them to receive their ovation but those present on the spot are unanimously of the opinion that he was feeling extremely uneasy. The ex-servicemen were commanded by Atta Muhammad Khan.[1]

## COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY

The composition of the thirteen Battalion Kashmir Army and their location at the time was as follows:

| Unit | | Composition | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Ist Kashmir Infantry | ... | Hindus and Dogras | Srinagar. |
| (2) IInd J&K Rifles | ... | Gurkhas & Muslims in equal numbers. | Nowshehra. |
| (3) IIIrd J&K Rifles | ... | Hindus & Gurkhas | Mirpur. |
| (4) IVth J&K Rifles | ... | Dogras & Muslims | Muzaffarabad. |
| (5) Vth J&K Infantry | ... | Hindus & Dogras ... | Askardu. |
| (6) VIth J&K Infantry | ... | Dogras & Muslims in equal numbers. | Gilgit. |
| (7) VIIth J&K Infantry | ... | Sikhs ... | Nowshehra and Poonch. |
| (8) VIIIth J&K Infantry | ... | Sikhs & Dogras ... | Jammu district |
| (9) IXth J&K Infantry | ... | Hindus & Dogras ... | Poonch district |

1. Arif Sadauzai, p. 112.

(10) Xth J&K Infantry ... Hindus & Dogras ... Jammu.

(11) XIth J&K Infantry ... Hindus & Dogras ... Srinagar.[1]

The remaining units consisting of Mechanical transport, A. Transport, Medical Core, Veterinary and Remount were stationed mostly in Srinagar but a large part of the A. Transport was shifted to Poonch soon after the Maharaja's return from tour. These figures would show that Muslims constituted hardly one and a half battalion.[2]

On, his return from Rawalakot, the Maharaja raised a few new Units. Only a few Muslims were recruited and they too from amongst Chibs, who were considered traditionally loyal. Most of the new Units consisted of Dogras and Hindu Rajputs from Jammu, Chamba and Kangra, the parental home of Maharani Tara Devi. While most of the new recruits were stationed in Srinagar, Jammu and such other places which were considered comparatively safe from the military point of view, the old Units were mostly deployed in areas like Poonch, Dewa Vatala, Bhimber and Muzaffarabad. The idea probably was to prevent Muslims living across the border in West Pakistan to render any assistance to Muslims on this side of the border to whom, apart from religious attachment, they were, since centuries, also bound by marriages and trade. It was considered necessary because the plan of genocide that the Dogra Government had prepared, was bound to cause grave repercussions in the border areas of Pakistan.

Since the plans had to be kept secret from the Muslims, the charge of Adj. Qtr. Master General was transferred to Col. Hiranand from Col. Adalat Khan who was put in charge of the procurement of Shali; Col. Khuda Bakhsh Offg. as Brigadier Jammu, was detailed for the recruitment of Muslims from Kathua. Maharaja Hari Singh, personally but farcically, asked some loyalist Muslims from Bhimber to recruit their tribesmen in the army. He had been constantly told by Hindus, during his tour, that every Muslim was a Pakistani and that unless they were done away with, they were likely to over-throw him.

Militia companies consisting of ex-military and I.N.A. personnel were raised under the command of Col. Dherak Ram. These were later utilised

1&2. Mahmud Azad, p. 809

for assisting the R.S.S. and for relieving troops for operational duties in Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad. A large number of Sikhs were kept armed in the Nalochi Gurdawara, Muzaffarabad. Special recruitment parties were despatched to Gorakhpur and Kangra. Wazir Ganga Ram, Home Minister and the District Magistrate Jammu undertook frequent tours to advise Hindus to keep themselves fully armed and await further instructions. Orders were issued to the P.W D. to construct Naushehra Thanna (Rajauri) and Rajauri-Budhal roads within the shortest possible time to facilitate quick troop movements. Naushehra was declared a cantonment and the garrisons at Mirpur, Rajauri and Poonch were placed under independant commands.

On completion of these arrangements, it was thought advisable to replace Muslims from key posts. The essentially civilian job of the Governor of Kashmir was given to Maj. Pritam Singh. The post of Inspector General of Police was split into two; Brig. Udhey Chand was posted at Jammu and Rattan Singh Jamwal who had been sent on forced leave by Mr. Powell, I. G.P., was appointed I.G.P. Kashmir. Col. Baldev Singh Samyal was appointed I.G. Customs, Th. Harnam Singh as Chief Conservator of Forests, Col. Baldev Singh Pathania as Revenue Minister and incharge of Mirpur, Poonch and Rajauri. They all came from the Dogra clan. In the Jammu province, tehsildars Zulfikar Ali Naeem, Mufti Rashid-ud-Din and Shamas Din from Udhampur, Ramban and Kishtwar, respectively, Abdul Latif, Naib Tehsildar, Arnas, Abdul Azim, Naib Tehsildar, Udhampur, Muhammad Ismail, Bhadarwah and Sh. Niamat Ullah from Reasi were withdrawn and posted out. This process was completed before the 5th of October, 1947.[1] Hindu Sub Inspectors were posted in almost all border police stations and Muslim Moharrirs were assigned the duties of field investigation so that they didn't have access to the arms depots and malkhanas.

The D.M. and the I.G.P. issued direct instructions to the subordinate Hindu officials, by-passing their senior Muslim officers. It became a general tendency to accuse Muslims of cow-slaughter and of holding secret meetings to overthrow the Government. About a dozen cases of the alleged desecration of temples or gurdawaras were reported to the police in Mirpur, Reasi and Udhampur. The bones of bovine animal were thrown over idols; filth was found inside the places of worship and all this was done by the R.S.S. to arouse the feelings of Hindus against Muslims; the Hindu press published these news conspicuously and made highly inflammatory comments against Muslims and Pakistan.

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1. Information supplied by Sh. Saleem.

## MUSLIMS REACT

It has been already stated that after the return of Hari Singh from Rawalakot, the Dogra army was sent in strength to Poonch; it was posted at several important places such as Bagh, Mung, Chirrala, Azad Pattan, Pallandari and Hajira. This unprecedented posting in the interior of the district and the frequent patrolling undertaken by them was bound to invite repercussions, especially in areas with a large number of ex-soldiers. The situation was aggravated by the close contact that the Dogra soldiers established with the local non-Muslims who were thereby emboldened in their nefarious activities. Many a non-Muslim were money-lenders who are even otherwise unpopular with the peasantry anywhere in the world. They tried to use the soldiers for their oppressive commercial ends. On their part, the soldiers forced the local Muslims to provide free labour to carry their supplies. Conscious of being in the nature of an occupation force, they compelled the Muslims to supply them fowl, eggs, butter and other articles of daily use, first at concessional rates and, gradually, free of any cost. This naturally led to great resentment and the situation became quite desperate by the time the Dominions of India and Pakistan came into being. Section 144 Cr. P.C. was promulgated in the tehsils of Bagh and Sudhnuti by the end of May. On the 30th of May, a group of Dogra soldiers assisted by local Hindus, vainly raided the house of Hassan Khan in Dhamni suspecting the presence of suspicious persons from across the border. Towards the end of June, a ban was imposed on the entry of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan into Poonch city when he was on a whirlwind political tour of the district.

## FIRST MUSLIM CASUALTY

On 22nd June, Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan visited Rawalakot and held a secret meeting in the house of Maulvi Iqbal Khan with some of the Party workers and ex-servicemen at village Pothi Makwalan. Presided over by Sardar Muhammad Sharif Khan, now a Judge of the High Court, it was also attended by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan. They took stock of the situation and decided to organize, of course secretly, the district ex-servicemen for an eventual confrontation with the Dogras. Chaudhri Hameedullah accompanied by Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, district Party Chief also toured some parts of the district and held consultations with Party workers. The blacksmiths were particularly hunted out for oppression because their small workshops were turning out a large number of spears, hatchets and knives. In course of a search, one Maqbul Hussain s/o Sharaf Din caste Qureshi r/o Bani Pissari wounded a Dogra soldier. On 26th May, his brother, Sulaiman was arrested and a few hours later, shot dead at Bani Pissari. His was the first Muslim casualty in the Movement.

Subsequently the Muslims were ordered to deposit all their arms in their respective Police Stations. It was obvious that the Government was most worried about the district of Poonch on account of the presence of a large number of ex-servicemen. On 11th August, a public meeting was held in Rawalakot town in defiance of section 144. It was addressed, among others, by Sardar Mukhtar Khan, now Pleader and Sardar Khan etc. On the next day, several arrests were made in the tehsils of Bagh and Sudhnuti and among those arrested were Sardar Mukhtar Khan, Latif Khan, Habib Khan, late Khan Bahadur Khan from Rawalakot and Hassan Shah, Muhammad Sher, Muhammad Akram, Dost Muhammad, Behram Khan Pleader, Yaqub Khan and Abdul Aziz from Bagh. Sardar Muhammad Sharif Khan, Pleader and Khawaja Ghulam Ahmed, later, Reader of the High Court were interned within the town limits of Poonch. On the same day, a secret meeting of some ex-servicemen was held at Rawalakot and it was decided to organize village committees.

## MISS NASIRA SIDIQI

Meanwhile the situation in Kashmir valley was extremely tense and uncertain. Very few visitors had entered the Valley on account of the Hindu-Muslim riots in the plains and the uncertainty hanging over the fate and future of Kashmir. The Hindu visitors established close liaison with the local non-Muslims while Muslim visitors remained in close contact with Muslims. Among them was the Sultan of Boi, a petty Jagirdar in the Hazara district, whose fore-fathers had migrated from Muzaffarabad. Though Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's personality still held magic for Muslim masses in the Valley, the issue of the State's future affiliation had clearly become a Hindu-Muslim question, with the result that every Kashmiri Mussalman felt insecure. The Muslim Conference was practically non-existent except in a small-pocket in Srinagar city. The result was that the Muslims were not able to get the desired lead at this critical juncture of their history. The failure of the Muslim Conference High Command to build a Kashmiri-speaking leader was having its most telling effects. It is bitter to record the truth but it must be recorded in absolute honesty to history that the Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, despite their yearning for accession to Pakistan and their infinite capacity for sacrifices to that end, were like a vast multitude of shepherdless cattle, scattered and frightened, not knowing what to do.

At this stage appeared in Srinagar city, a highly intelligent Pakistani lady, Miss Nasira Sidiqi, now Mrs. M. Z. Kiani of the (INA) fame. Born into a Nawab family in Meerut, she had jumped into politics at an early age and done commendable work during and after the 1946 elections, particularly during the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by the

Punjab League against the Khizar Ministry. She came to Srinagar in early August and contacted the city leaders of the Muslim Conference. She was soon able to establish contact with Muslim Officers in the Civil and Military wings of the Government. Gradually, she began addressing, first workers meetings and then larger public meetings in Srinagar city. Whether she had been sent by anyone or she came out of her own intuition is not clear but it must be recorded in all fairness to her that her very presence in such a distressing situation had an electrifying effect on public morale. She displayed inexhaustible capacity for hard work. For an outsider and that too, for a delicately-built lady, to provide direction and lead and her capacity to attract vast crowds right under the nose of the autocratic Maharaja and his Gestapo, will always remain a shining example of the indissoluble links that bind the Muslims of Kashmir and Pakistan. Perhaps only a Kashmiri can appreciate the importance and impact of her appearance at a time when they were so desperately in need of words of courage and hope. I attended one of these meetings and vividly remember a white dove, pouring forth brimstone and fire, to the thunderous applause of a vast multitude. She was ultimately externed from the State but continued to work for its liberation. She received a bullet injury at the Pattan front on 27th October 1947 and had to be hospitalised for a month.

Meanwhile, workers of the Muslim Conference in Srinagar city, notably Khawaja Abdus Salam Dalal and Mir Abdul Aziz were making efforts to set up an underground organization of dependable workers. On 21st August, a secret meeting was held at Eidgah, Mohallah Wanganpura which was attended among others by Mir Abdul Aziz, Mr. Ahmed Shamim, later Director of Information, Azad Kashmir, Mr. Saeed Nasim now in A.K. Radio, Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Mattu, Mr. Mohammad Amin Haider, and Mr. Jalal-ud-Din Shah now a Scientist working in the United States. It set up a "War Council" and began publishing hand-written posters. The first one, captioned "Declaration of War", was found pasted at different places in the city. They were doing it on their own initiative.[1]

## THE INITIAL PLANS

After the celebration of the Pakistan Day in Baramula, this writer went to Srinagar and met Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan. Chaudhri Sahib told me that sympathetic people in Frontier and Punjab should create trouble on the State borders adjacent to their areas to attract the Dogra army in bulk so that the Poonch ex-servicemen get an opportunity of advancing upon Srinagar. Whose plan it was or what were its details,

1. Weekly Insaf dated 2-9-1971.

I do not know. He gave me a letter of introduction in his own handwriting for Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and asked me to go to Peshawar and request him to do the needful. While in Srinagar, I learnt that a warrant for my arrest had been issued in connection with the demonstration against Mr. Gandhi. I, therefore, came down to Muzaffarabad incognito along with Mr. Muhammad Amin Haider and went to Garhi Habibullah, a distance of thirteen hilly miles, on foot, to escape any possible detection at the border. In Peshawar, I met Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan in his office and gave him the letter from my Party Chief. The Khan originally hails from village Wanigam, in Baramula district. He has some landed property and a house in the village as well as a house in Baramula town. The encounter with the great Khan was interesting. "You can have as many rifles and as much ammunition as you can manage to carry." "But who will use it?" I asked? "Well, we are ready to open Training Centres in Hazara. Send your volunteers who will receive training and then return back with arms." "Under the existing circumstances, it is impracticable", I stated. Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan then lost temper and thumping the table said, "Do you think that if we create trouble on your borders, attracting the Dogra army in size, India would allow you to begin an advance from Poonch and will not immediately intervene with all its strength? It is a foolish plan. Return back and ask Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan to come personally so that we devise some better plan" We then went back to Srinagar again in the same manner and I spoke with Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan as to what Khan Sahib had said and again came to Garhi Habibullah. Twenty two years later, in September, 1969, a few months after my elevation to the Bench, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan visited Muzaffarabad in connection with the marriage of a daughter of his younger brother, Khan Abdul Hameed Khan, then President of the Azad Kashmir Government. I had the honour of presiding over a function arranged in his honour at the Government Guest House by a semi-official literary society, "Majlis-e-Fikr-o-Danish". In my speech, I recounted the above facts and paid a humble tribute for his role in the liberation of Kashmir.[1]

Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Advocate, President of the District Muslim Conference, Poonch, hoisted the Pakistan flag on the Post office on 14th August, 1947. Soon afterwards, he slipped out of the town and kept secretly moving about in the tehsil of Mendhar, organizing workers and preparing them for the coming eventuality. Towards the end of September, he left for Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, Agha Shaukat Ali, the imprisoned General Secretary of the Muslim Conference had been released on parole. Consultations now began in Srinagar between Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and Agha Shaukat Ali. Mr. Faiz

1. **Pakistan Times, 30th September, 1969.**

Ahmed Faiz, Mr. B.A. Hashmi of the Lahore Training College and Major Allah Dad Khan, later a Commissioner in Pakistan, were staying in Gulmarg. In a meeting with Sardar Ibrahim, Shaukat and the latter's wife, Musarrat Begum, it was decided that Sardar Ibrahim and Agha Shaukat should leave the State at once. On 22nd August, Sardar Ibrahim left his home in Abi Guzar, entrusting his wife and minor children to the care of Allah and went to pick up Shaukat to spend the night at a pre-arranged hide-out but was surprised to find that the State police had already surrounded his house. Shaukat was rearrested the same night and removed to the Central Jail. Sardar Ibrahim stayed for the night in the house-boat of the Sultan of Boi and at dawn left for Abbottabad in a taxi provided by Raja Abdul Hamid Khan, later a Minister in the Azad Kashmir Government. After a few days, Sardar Ibrahim went to Lahore and did his best to meet the Quaid-e-Azam. Even Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, then a Central Minister, and Khawaja Amir-ud-Din, the celebrated pre-partition Mayor of Lahore tried to arrange a meeting, but in vain. He was naturally disappointed, but luckily, before returning to Rawalpindi, quite accidentally came across Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din while passing through Anarkali and informed him of his predicament. Mian Sahib invited him to Murree for a meeting in a few days time. There he also met Col. Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army. Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot, and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan were also there, though for their own reasons. It seems that Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din spoke to them about Sardar Ibrahim, but as the latter was unknown outside the State, the two Chief Ministers requested Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din to check his credentials before any serious discussion could take place. It is claimed by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan that Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din then paid a visit to Srinagar to ascertain his credentials.

Meanwhile, the insecurity of Muslims was increasing. Two Sikhs, Nikkah Singh lorry agent and Sant Singh Baghi of Daska delivered highly inflammatory speeches at a non-Muslim rally at Batote; they were externed from the district by the local S.D.M. Raja Sarwar Khan but the Governor of Jammu Mr. Chet Ram Chopra cancelled the order on telephone. Towards the beginning of October, about three thousand Muslim refugees from Chambah entered the adjoining Muslim-majority district of Bhadarwah under the personal supervision of their Hindu Ruler who told Akali and Sangh leaders publicly that being his subjects, it was his responsibility to ensure that they did not come to any harm in his territory. Hats off to the Ruler who personally bade them good-bye at the border. Far from providing any assistance, and despite repeated efforts by the local Muslims to keep them in Bhadarwah, the Revenue Minister and the

Governor sent orders from Jammu requiring them to move at once towards Pakistan via Bani Kathua which was a purely Hindu illaqa; they could be sent via Batote. As a result, most of them were killed in the way because large scale arson, plunder and killing had already been started by the Dogra Government by that time in such areas of Jammu province where Muslims were in a minority. The reader may well be reminded that the same government had extended all facilities to incoming non-Muslim refugees and arranged for their stay. Obviously the treatment meted out to the Muslim refugees from Chambah exposed the falsity of its trumpeted claim that it had welcomed and maintained the non-muslim refugees not for political reasons but out of humanitarian considerations.

Sheikh Muhammad Saleem, who was then Superintendent of Police Udhampur received the following telegrams which show the state of Muslim persecution and genocide in the district and can give an insight into what must have been happening in other parts of Jammu province:

> "No. 19 From Ramnagar (Jammu) dated 6-7-04 (October 22, 1947) Dispol Udhampur. Amar Singh Zaildar, Tehsil Samba, Dhani Ram, Ghalli Zaildar of Pemasata, Tehsil Ramnagar accompanied by one thousand Hindu Jatha are looting and turning out Muslims. Reached Ramnagar after great hardships. Intervene at once. Muslim refugees of Pemasata through Abdul Rashid."

> "No. 21 From Ramnagar (Jammu) dated 6-7-04 (October 22, 1947) Dispol Udhampur. Muslim refugees from Pemasata disclose that Hindu Goondas are looting in jathas. Muslim minority of village Rajban, Tehsil Ramnagar in danger. Intervene at once. Muslim".

> "No. 23, From Ramnagar dated 6-7-04 (October 22, 1947) Dispol Udhampur. We Muslims of village Bherohal Tehsil Ramnagar are in danger. Jathas of Hindu goondas are approaching after looting illaqa Pemasata. Arrangements be made at once. Muslims of Bherohal through Hadi Hussain".

## ATTACKS ON MUSLIMS BEGIN

When the S.D.M. and S.P. contacted the Hindu Governor at Jammu, he refused to believe them and terming the reports as false, shame-facedly asked them rather to take care of Hindus in Banihal, who according to the Governor's imaginary information, were being molested.

Maharaja Hari Singh undertook another tour of Jammu district, Kathua, Udhampur, Kotli and Bhimber in the third week of October,

During this tour, he is alleged to have supervised the distribution of arms and ammunition among non-muslims on a large scale. On 20th October, he visited Bhimber and after remaining closeted with Mr. Narindar Nath Rampal, Tehsildar, for sometime, returned to Jammu. What transpired in the meeting is not known but it may be judged from the order issued on the following day by the Tehsildar to the lambardars of Kohal, Maryal, Panjeri, Ghazi Gorah, Ali Beg Gujran and Mohrah Chhini, through their zaildar:

> "Zaildar Panjeri: Under the existing circumstances the following villages which fall within three miles radius of the border, have to be evacuated as it has become imperative. You are, therefore, ordered to direct the lambardars of these villages that they should get them immediately evacuated. There should be no delay. Compliance report should be sent immediately."[1]

Towards early May, 1947, more troops were sent to Mirpur and new military posts were established at Sheikhupura, Chechian, Sukhchainpur, Hill, Bela Bahadur Shah, Lachmanpattan etc. The Mangla fort was repaired as was done in 1931. About ten thousand non-muslim refugees from Punjab were living in Mirpur town; they included the parents and other relatives of Mr. Ram Lal Batra, recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister. Toward, the end of September, Dogra soldiers began harassing Muslims. Attaullah from village Sehota was severely beaten while returning from the town. Mohammad Sharif who was going to Mirpur on a bicycle was way-laid and severely beaten. Maulvi Abdul Aziz of Dangalian and Noor Ahmed were beaten; complaints lodged with the local administration went unheeded. Gradually, the Sanghis and Akalis became more aggressive and started parades and public meetings to provoke Hindu-Muslim clashes but as the latter were unarmed and in a minority, they exercised restraint. When the harassment increased and it became quite clear that the Government was bent upon mischief, Muslims started moving towards Pakistan. It was a tragic spectacle to watch an unending stream of men, women and children, carrying their small earthly belongings on their heads and leaving their hearths and homes with tears in their eyes, walking towards an unknown land of promise and safety—Pakistan. A few Muslims who still chose to bank upon the so-called good-will of their Hindu neighbours and stayed behind, were subsequently killed. Raja Iqbal Khan, a retired Police Inspector and a Municipal Commissioner, Mian Nizam-ud-Din tailor-master and his father-in-law Khalifa Allah Ditta, a blind beggar and a son of one Sain Imam Din, were brutally killed,

1. Bhatti, p. 117.

the shops and houses of Haji Abdul Karim, Major Manga Khan, Mian Mohammad Din tailor-master, Chaudhri Mohammad Yusuf M.L.A., Haji Wahab Din and several others were ransacked. A number of Muslim-owned houses were burnt down. Buses of Muslim transporters, Syed Zaman Shah, Khan Mohammad Ismail Khan and Mian Mohammad Shafi were taken away. The town's only Ice factory, recently installed by Khan Mohammad Ismail Khan was burnt down. Even his Sikh chowkidar Hasba Singh could not be spared and was fatally injured. The Dogra army, in unison with the Sanghis and the Akalis, then looted the suburban villages of Jhang, Judhal, Naloi, Kunjri, Bharmat and Ara. Bahadur son of Noor, resident of Naloi and aged about a hundred years, was shot dead while tending to his sheep. Fateh Mohammad, aged 80 years, was killed while harvesting barley; Bagga, son of Nabah, aged 70 years, was killed while having hukah on a cot and an old woman, Kaloo, aged 70 years who had, out of fright, secreted herself in her house, was shot dead. Similarly, the mother of Chaudhri Muhammad Shafi, Headmaster Lidder School, was killed. In Kunjri, Ghulam Mohammad Khan and Eidoo Khan were killed while in Ara, one Ghulam Mohammad was shot dead. In Domal, two elderly Muslims were shot dead. Three members of a single family, Mistri Abdullah and his sons Mohammad Latif and Ghulam Nabi from Bandral, a prosperous village about two miles from Mirpur, were killed at the same time.[1]

In Bhimber tehsil, the genocide of Muslims started from 19th October, 1947 when Raja Shahwali Khan, Veterinary Assistant from Lidder, Sheikh Ghulam Muhammad Inspector, alongwith his family, Master Jalal Din, Master Muhammad Sadiq, Master Fazal Karim, Chaudhri Raj Din and Chaudhri Allah Dad Safaidposh along with their families were killed by a gang of Dogra soldiers and Sanghis. Eye witnesses interviewed by this writer, stated that it was under the influence of officially-supplied alcohol that gangsters were let loose even on children and women, lest the man in them may revolt against the killing of helpless fellow beings and almost invariably the attacks started with the slogan of "Jai Maharaj." In Bhimber town proper, after some Muslims had been killed, about two dozen or so took refuge in the house of Chaudhri Bagga Khan, President Anjuman-i-Islamia. It was surrounded by Dogra soldiers and Sanghis and set on fire; all the poor inmates were burnt to death in a most tragic manner. One Mst. Bi Begum, the daughter-in-law of Mian Abdullah tailor-master, was nailed to a wall and killed in a most brutal manner.[2] The attack on Manawar was perhaps a signal for similar groups elsewhere because simultaneously about four dozen

1. Bhatti, p. 140.
2. Interview with Elders of the town on 9th February, 1978.

villages were attacked, killing numerous persons and destroying their houses, apart from looting their belongings. In Banyan, first they killed Khan Mallak in the presence of his father and then his father Chaudhri Rehmat Khan Zaildar, a highly respected man in the locality. Similarly, a number of villages in Kotli met the same fate.

## SHEIKH MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH RELEASED

It is claimed that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah wrote a letter to an unnamed friend in Jammu from Bhadarwah Sub-Jail that the Maharaja should not declare independence but should accede to India. A report to that effect was published in the Congress Daily, 'The Hindustan Times' on 7th June, 1947.[1] The alleged letter has not been published anywhere nor is the name of the addressee known. Nevertheless, it is clear that while relations between him and Pandit Nehru had been cemented by the latter's help and intervention in the Quit Kashmir Movement, relations between him and the Quaid-e-Azam were intensely cold. While at the time of the latter's last days in Srinagar in July, 1944 he had used unbecoming and vituperative language and threatened to "expose" him, the latter had, in a parting statement from Srinagar, condemned him as a goonda. On the personal plane, therefore, he must have assumed that in case of accession to Pakistan, he had no chance of coming into power. Through the intervention of Gandhi which was necessitated not by the Mahatma's love for Abdullah but to secure and facilitate the forcible acquisition of Kashmir by and for Hindu India, the Maharaja's infinite hatred of him may have been superficially, slightly softened. Meanwhile many an emissary had been running to and fro between Bhadarwah, New Delhi and Srinagar, and perhaps also between Bhadarwah and Srinagar, as a result of which Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was transferred, in early September, to Badami Bagh Cantonment Srinagar. Until his release on 29th September, the negotiations were conducted on behalf of the Kashmir Government, mainly by Thakar Janak Singh and Rai Bahadur Shyam Sunder Lal Dhar. Sheikh Abdullah appears to have been offered a limited participation in the Government on the condition of supporting the State's accession to India and the Maharaja's advisers also seem to have insisted on his tendering an apology for the Quit Kashmir Movement. By that time, Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan had taken over as Prime Minister. According to Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Kashafi who was then Editor of the National Conference Organ, daily 'Khidmat', Sheikh Abdullah finally told them that "nothing except full responsible government and the end of Dogra absolutism could satisfy him" and that when this message was passed on to

1. Freedom Struggle, 318.

Pandit Nehru, he sent Mr.V.P. Menon with a special message to the Kashmir Leader to the effect that he should immediately and unconditionally come out of jail; that he would fulfil his conditions and that Kashmir would be free and handed over to the Kashmiri people."[1] Mr. Mahajan has confirmed that the Maharaja's advisers wanted a letter of apology from Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah before he could be released but he (Mahajan) told them that if a political leader was to be freed, it should be done without imposing any conditions, whatsoever. That the release was unconditional is also borne out by the statement made in the State Legislature on Ist October, 1947 that "Sheikh Abdullah was releasd as an act of royal clemency, the Maharaja having pardoned the unexpired period of his imprisonment".[2]

The release of Sheikh Abdullah had been expected ever since the Congress and League had agreed to the 3rd June plan. What is, therefore, surprising is not that he was released before the expiry of his sentence, but that it should have come so late. That Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah may have been prepared to support the State's accession to India may well be presumed, but it seems that as a politician it must have entered his mind that he was in a good bargaining position to secure power. True, he was wedded to secular politics as theoretically represented by the Congress but as I have shown in other pages, Pandit Nehru was the only Congress Leader whom he not only adored, but whom alone he considered dependable so far as he and his party were concerned This writer can say from personal knowledge that he had no misconception about the fanaticism and narrow-mindedness of a large section of the Congress Hindu leaders. Therefore, as a shrewd politician, he must have realised that the iron being hot at the time, it was his opportunity since 1931 to strike while it was still hot and acquire power. On the other hand the Maharaja may have been ready for anything so far as the larger interests of Hindu India were concerned, but the one thing which he could not easily agree to and the one bitter pill that he could not swallow was to hand over actual power to Sheikh Abdullah and this is how the triangle was shaped at the time of his release.

## ABDULLAH CONFOUNDED BY MASS UPSURGE FOR PAKISTAN

On the very day of his release, he addressed, at Hazuri Bagh, undoubtedly, one of the biggest public meetings in the history of the State. The political situation was very confused. The National Conference was officially committed to a secular course which meant partnership with

1. Kashafi, p. 235.
2. Freedom Struggle, p. 320.

India, but the dictates of time and the interests of Muslims ran in a diametrically opposite direction. Muslims, especially those of the Valley, welcomed their leader with mixed feelings of hope and fear, expectancy as well as agony. They loved him no doubt, and this love was still deep-rooted and sentimental because he it was who had fathered their political awakening and lifted them up from the despised and degrading depths of a dumb-driven people but at the same time, each one of them, whether a peasant or an urbanite, literate or illiterate and whether rich or poor, saw the reality of the situation, namely, that Kashmir not only belongs to Pakistan as of right, not only that its economic prosperity was dependent upon its continued links with Pakistan, but what is more important, that the very security and honour of its Muslim inhabitants depended upon the State joining Pakistan. That is why the hundreds of small processions that were seen wending their way towards Hazuri Bagh from all parts of the city and its suburbs were heard enthusiastically shouting slogans of 'Pakistan Zindabad'. Even in the public meeting, apart from the slogan of wishing a long life to their Leader, the only slogan that was almost on the tip of each tongue, so far as Muslims were concerned, and which dominated the proceedings of the meeting to the annoyance of pro-India elements was 'Pakistan Zindabad'. According to Mr. Kashafi, Sheikh Abdullah told the meeting:

> "I do not know why I was arrested and why I have been released. We are fighting for the freedom of our country and stand today at the same pole where we stood 16 months ago when we launched the Quit Kashmir Movement. Our first and foremost objective is to free ourselves from Dogra subjugation and it is only after we secure freedom, that we shall be able to decide the question of accession through a free vote. If the people of the State want to link their future with Pakistan, I will be the first person who will willingly bow before this decision".[1]

In his speech, however, Sheikh Abdullah opposed the Muslim League and the two-Nation theory and praised the "secularism" of Congress and the leadership of Pandit Nehru, but it is, of course, correct that he did not commit himself on the question of the State's accession to either Dominion; he took special care to emphasise that he was keeping the question open and promised to consult his people in due course of time.

Sheikh Abdullah, it will be recalled, was arrested in May, 1946, and the country-wide Hindu-Muslim civil war which ultimately left lakhs of people murdered and more than 1½ crore uprooted from their homes, began months later. It is admitted on all hands that Muslims were the

1. Kashafi, p. 236.

worst sufferers. It is no secret that Sardar Patel was not only behind the massacre of Muslims in Delhi towards the close of 1947, but had always been in close touch with R.S.S. leaders, Golwalker and Savarkar. Thousands of Kashmiri Muslims were working in Simla, Bombay, Calcutta, Amritsar, Ludhiana and other parts of north India. These labourers, petty-traders and pheriwalas etc. had a grim experience during the riots. A large number of those who were in areas outside Pakistan were killed and those who escaped death, lost all their belongings and reached their homes half-naked and in tears. It may also be recalled here that among the Muslim inhabitants of the important towns of East Punjab such as Amritsar and Ludhiana, a large number consisted of the descendants of those Kashmiris who bade good-bye to their homes a hundred years ago to seek safety, honour and a better living in the plains of the Punjab. They were among the worst sufferers in the riots. While Sheikh Abdullah was in jail, these happenings had a tremendous impact in Kashmir and especially so when thousands of Kashmiri-speaking Muslims flocked home with eye-witness accounts of unheard of brutalities and destruction of fellow Muslims at the hands of Hindu and Sikh mobs. That is why by the time Sheikh Sahib was released, Muslim public opinion in the Valley had become emotionally tuned towards Pakistan and that is also why against his own expectations, he heard full throated slogans of Pakistan Zindabad, spontaneously rising from all directions in the sea of humanity that the Hazuri Bagh presented on the 29th of September. That may also be a reason why he did not think it expedient to commit himself to accession to India, a course that he must have detected, clearly went against the stream-line of public opinion. After his return home from the meeting, he had really no respite, because right until his departure for Delhi, nearly three weeks later, deputation after deputation of Muslims from all walks of life, government servants, political workers, students, women, labourers and peasants and from all over the State especially the Kashmiri-speaking Valley waited upon him, in an unending stream, all with one demand—that he must support the State's accession to Pakistan. In the beginning, he tried to argue, he tried to impress upon the deputationists the need to make a "cool appraisal" and asked them to wait for some time and see whether Pakistan was really able to survive but it was a vain effort because the deputationists had no political axe to grind; they had not been prompted by any one but had, through their own bitter experience, come to the conclusion that accession to Pakistan provided them the only guarantee for security, honour and prosperity.

## MIAN IFTIKHAR-UD-DIN AND OTHERS MEET ABDULLAH

Sheikh Abdullah could not resist so many people. He must have realised, at least in the heart of his hearts, that so many people could not

be wrong; he could not have missed the fact that most of the deputationists were his most loyal supporters; how could he escape the impact of the sincerity of those who streamed to him with tearsome eyes, some of whom even broke down under the weight of emotions while beseeching him not to support the State's accession to India. Resultantly, he began having second thoughts about the consequences of the State's accession to India. It was at this stage that three important Pakistanis from Lahore, each one of whom had personal relations with him, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Doctor Muhammad Din Taseer and Malik Taj-ud-Din, then Manager of the Associated Press of Pakistan, went to Srinagar with the blessings of the then Punjab Government. They remained in Srinagar for two to three days and had extensive discussions with him. They did their best to persuade him to see the writing on the wall and support the State's accession to Pakistan in the larger interests of the very people whom he had served since 1931. They tried to assure him that Pakistan Government would be fair and generous to the National Conference Leadership, *but whether they had the authority to make such a commitment from those who really mattered, is quite doubtful. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, it appears, was not by now averse to the State's accession to Pakistan, but he did entertain serious misgivings about the role that the largely feudalistic leadership of Pakistan might play in the State after its accession. He also feared that the hostility against him at the top of the Muslim League as well as that of the Dogra dynasty may have serious consequences for him and his party. Besides, he was determined that the State's internal autonomy be guaranteed and that its accession be limited to defence, foreign affairs, communications and currency. At long last, it seems to have been agreed that on their return, they should place these matters before the Pakistan Government for its consideration and that he would send Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq to Lahore to continue the talks so that the ground was prepared for his visit to Karachi to discuss the matter with the Quaid-e-Azam.* He told them that he had been invited by Pandit Nehru to visit him at Delhi and that after his visit to the Indian capital was completed, he would directly fly to Karachi. He also told them that so long as he did not come to Karachi, the situation should not be precipitated. Mr. Justice Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haque, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who accompanied the delegation to Srinagar confirmed to this writer on 28th July, 1974 while on a visit to Muzaffarabad in the company of Mr. Hamood-ur-Rehman Chief Justice, that it had been agreed that Sheikh Abdullah would visit Karachi after his visit to Delhi for talks with the Pakistan Government. The three Pakistani leaders then returned to Lahore.

A week or so later, he went to Delhi and began talks with Pandit Nehru and other Indian leaders. A shrewd Brahmin, Pandit Nehru discarded protocol and personally welcomed him at the airport at the

head of a large crowd, a galaxy of Indian leaders, and considerable fan fire— a Muslim weakness. No Government functionary, he was presented with a guard of honour. However, an insight into the working of Sheikh Abdullah's mind at the time is provided by what he said in New Delhi on 21st October, 1947 in course of a speech:

> "The present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of Kashmir, were caused by the unwise policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal. Kashmir State sent its troops, and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch were ex-servicemen in the Indian Army with close connections with the people of Jhelum and Rawalpindi (in Pakistan). They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas".

Making a Poignant but meaningful reference to the Muslim-majority State of Kapurthala in East Punjab, he continued:

> "Not a single Muslim would be found in that State now. The same fate has been meted out to them in Alwar and Bharatpur, where the Muslim population has either been killed or expelled, and obviously the fear was that the same thing might be enacted in Kashmir."[1]

According to 'Naya Daur' Delhi, he also said:

> "Whatever is happening in Poonch is the natural result of the Maharaja's oppression and excesses. The movement launched by the people of Poonch against him is their birth right. Nobody can deprive them of this right. The Maharaja's army cannot suppress their urge for freedom".[2]

*It needs to be emphasised that this statement represents our version of the origin of Kashmir revolt; it negatives the stand of the Indian Government that even the "trouble" in Poonch was Pakistan's doing. It was quoted by Sir Zafrullah in the Security Council, incidentally, in the presence of Sh. Abdullah and had a telling effect on the Council members about the truth of our stand. It is obvious that a man of Sheikh Abdullah's experience could not have taken such a line in Delhi as late as 21st October, 1947, if he were already committed*

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1. K. Sarwar Hassan, p. 96.
2. Mannan, p. 41.

*to a pro-India and anti-Pakistan line? It not only represented a softening of his attitude but amounted to a discreet public assurance to Pakistan.*

*While he was still in Srinagar, he deputed Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq to Lahore to continue the dialogue with the Pakistan leaders. Of course, he was supposed to talk to those in authority in Pakistan. It seems that nothing concrete came out of these talks. The highest official, Mr. Sadiq was honoured to meet, was the Nawab of Mamdot.*[1] *Obviously, he could not speak with authority.*

ببیں تفاوت راہ از کجا تا بہ کجا است

Quoted below is a passage from an article written by Mr. Abdul Majid Qarshi of Jammu, one of the earliest political workers in the State, published in the Weekly Azad Kashmir dated the 4th of November, 1959 and quoted in Mr. Kalim Akhtar's book:

> "On the 18th of October, 1947, I received a message from Maulvi Muhammad Saeed Masudi at Amira Kadal Srinagar that Sh. Muhammad Abdullah had ordered me to leave for Lahore immediately in order to take part in the negotiations that were already going on there between Kh. Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and the Muslim League Government. I was also told that Sh. Muhammad Abdullah wanted me to ensure that the talks were not broken under any circumstances."

He reached Sialkot on 20th October to make arrangements for his family. He then proceeds:

> "I spent the 21st of October in taking stock of the situation and on the 22nd when I was preparing to leave for Lahore, news came that tribesmen were about to enter Muzaffarabad in aid of the Muslims of Kashmir. I reached Lahore on the 22nd October but an hour before my arrival, Kh. Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and his companions had, on hearing of the tribesmen's entry, flown to Delhi."[1]

The following quotations from a booklet by Mr. Mannan are also worth quoting:

Dr. M.D. Taseer said:

> "I went to Delhi a third time to see Muhammad Ali Jinnah. I talked to him about Kashmir. I was not satisfied with his handling of Kashmir affairs and I thought it was not tactful."

1. Sher-i-Kashmir, p. 56.

Maulana Abdul Majid Salik later said:

> "Dr. Taseer rendered valuable service to Kashmir cause. If his advice had been acted upon, there would have been no Kashmir problem".[1]

*One thing is now clearly established that Sheikh Abdullah's representative was still holding negotiations with the Pakistan Government on the Pakistan soil and the idea was to pave the way for his leaders' visit to Karachi when tribesmen entered the State.* Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues unfortunately and rashly jumped to the conclusion that the negotiations were a ruse; that the Pakistan Government was hostile to the N.C. leadership and would not allow them power. That the conclusions were unjust and hasty, are beyond any doubt. The entry of tribesmen was by itself a separate story, as will be found in the coming pages. Had Sheikh Abdullah been a Garibaldi, the entry of tribesmen should have made no difference to him, because the end to be achieved was the same—accession of the State to Pakistan, but unfortunately he was not; he was a fleshy, power-hungry politician like many a Muslim politician of his age anywhere in the world. He, therefore, chose to throw in his lot with India, a tragic blunder for which both he and his people have since been paying very dearly.

## THE BUREAUCRATIC APPROACH

The Pakistan Government had at the same time sent one of its most inapt bureaucrats, Major A.S.B. Shah to Srinagar to persuade the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan! True it is said that there is no dearth of simple folk in positions of power. It reminds one of the French queen who, when told that people were protesting against the scarcity of bread, innocently asked: But why dont they eat cakes? A junior officer who may have perhaps successfully served in the tribal area where gold and guns were the modus operandi those days, he was definitely too unequal to the job. He was as ignorant of Kashmir's political scene and its intricacies as anyone could be. To have expected of him to deliver the goods in a situation which was being handled on the Indian side by intellectual giants like Mehr Chand Mahajan, V.P. Menon and Gopalaswami Ayyanger, was to have well asked for the Moon. Perhaps, to have sent such a man was natural for a Government which in its infinite simplicity considered Kashmir's accession a foregone conclusion. Mr. Mahajan is on record about his visit. Says he:

> "Major Shah, son-in-law of my erstwhile Chief Justice in Lahore, who was one of the important Secretaries of the Pak Government,

1. Mannan, p. 41.

was in Srinagar with a whip in one hand and a letter of accession in the other. He had been trying to persuade General Janak Singh and Mr. Batra to advise the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. He had had not much success so far. Neither of the two administrators had given him any satisfactory reply. On hearing that I had taken over, he insisted on seeing me. I had it conveyed to him that I was as yet new to the State and had no knowledge of its politics and that I could not have any useful discussion on accession with him at this time but he said he could not wait. I then granted him an interview which lasted for two hours. He was keen to have an assurance of the State's accession to Pakistan or in the alternative, a negative assurance that I would not advise the Maharaja to accede to India. I told him that I could not give any positive reply without discussing the matter with my Cabinet and the leading men of the State and then with His Highness and that this would take some time. But he was not prepared to wait. When I found that he had come there almost with an ultimatum, I said, "If you raise the blockade and allow food and cloth and petrol to enter the State, I will discuss the matter in detail with you". He agreed to persuade Mr. Jinnah to remove the blockade and sent a telegram to him at Lahore, but got no favourable reply. He then saw me again and said, "Mr. Jinnah invites you to Lahore. Go there and have a talk with him".

I was in no mood to present myself at Mr. Jinnah's Darbar, fall in Pakistani hands and meet my doom. I declined the invitation, as the object was to coerce me into securing the State's accession to Pakistan. When Major Shah failed in his efforts, he sweetly departed, but with a parting shot, declaring that His Highness would soon come to grief and realise his folly. I retorted bluntly that the result of such an action on the part of Pakistan would be to forcibly throw the State in the lap of India, no matter what the result. I assured him that we could not be coerced by such tactics to sign an agreement of accession of the State to Pakistan".[1]

1. Looking Back, p. 269.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## PLANNED MASSACRE OF MUSLIMS IN JAMMU

*CHAPTER XXII*

# Planned Massacre of Muslims in Jammu

We have already noticed that thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab and Hazara entered the State; most of them had taken up temporary abode in Jammu province. We have also noticed the distribution of arms and ammunition among the non-Muslims of Jammu province. The incoming refugees included a large number of Sanghis and Akalis. The situation was already explosive as the local Hindus, especially the Dogras and Mahajans, were eager to exterminate Muslims and convert the State into a Hindu-inhabited territory. The incoming refugees added fuel to fire by giving partly imaginary and partly highly exaggerated accounts of their sufferings. The result was that together, they chalked out plans for the extermination of Muslims.

Sometime after the March riots in Punjab, the Sikh Maharajas of Patiala and Kapurthala visited the State as guests of the Dogra Maharaja. During their stay of several days they remained confined to his palace. Obviously, one of the purposes of their visit was to discuss the extension to Kashmir State of what has notoriously come to be known as the "Sikh Plan" which aimed at the genocide of Muslims in East Punjab and which was put into effect on the eve of partition. That even in the mid-twentieth century, killing of innocent men, women and children and on such an extensive scale, should have been planned in advance and at such a high level, lamentably brings to mind how humanity in them was dead and how savage at heart these western-dressed and seemingly civilised rulers were. That they should have begun these dastardly massacres from their own States, by killing the very people over whom God had made them Rulers and for no fault of theirs, was all the more lamentable. Judges are under oath and by law duty-bound to award death sentences to criminals on strict proof and yet as a humble member of the service I know how tormented one feels and how considerate one has got to be in awarding such a perfectly

deserved legal punishment. That Rulers of territories should so shamelessly plan the massacre of the innocent, entrusted to their care by Providence, makes me tremble; but it was not perhaps unexpected of a Ruler like the Maharaja of Patiala whose father maintained a Harem of 232 women, originating from all parts of the globe, including Cyprus; who used to keep scores of naked girls around him and who is said to have been in the habit of descending and ascending the stairs of his palaces by taking support of the breasts of naked girls, waiting for the 'sarkar' on the stairs. It was a fitting divine punishment for all the three Maharajas that they died under terrible pain, away from their ancestral homes and stripped of their kalgis.

We have already seen that the plan was put into operation on 19th October, 1947 in the district of Mirpur and we shall now see how it spread to other parts of Jammu province like a bush-fire. I will first take up the district of Udhampur where Sh. Muhammad Saleem who later retired as Inspector General of Police, Azad Kashmir, was posted as the Superintendent of Police.

**Udhampur Tehsil District Headquarters**

A vigorous drive was going on here for the organisation of the Sangh. Dev Raj Dogra, Tehsildar, Lachman Dass former Superintendent of Police and Chaman Lal, S.I. were the official organisers of the camps etc. and Dhera Mal, Jagan Nath, Amar Nath Sharma and Om Prakash, its leaders. Hari Ram Vaid and Bawa Ravi Nath were the main figures who were preparing the ground for this bloody drama. Ram Singh, Tehsildar and Om Parakash, Naib Tehsildar's posting gave them further strength. On 23rd October, the Sangh party along with a Militia company left for Udhampur and on their way, detailed different parties in different directions. The advance party reached Udhampur the same day. People from the neighbouring illaqas naturally gathered in the Udhampur town and occupied the houses of Col: Abdur Rehman who held for three days when the Hindus sent a "peace mission" and succeeded in getting them out. Col. Abdur Rehman and Sub. Noor Muhammad who suffered sword injuries, succeeded in escaping alive. Male members were brutally murdered and children were killed before the very eyes of their mothers. The flesh and blood was then cooked with rice and mothers were forced to eat the same. Some Muslims viz. the Chandals and Badhans from Hartaryan and Gangera, Ghulam Muhammad barber of Udhampur and several others were forcibly converted to Hinduism. The whole of Katra Waziran was reduced to ashes. The house of Col: Abdur Rehman was smashed with mortar firing. Col. Dherak Ram and Col. Kirpal Singh were in charge of this firing party.

Young girls were abducted and most of them were removed to India. Muslim employees of the P.W.D. were killed by the Hindu staff including the D.E. and the Assistant Engineer. 18 police employees were killed in the thana. Raja Sarwar Khan, S.D.M. was also shot dead.

At Batote, Nikka Singh, Thakkar Dass of Pirhi, Dhani Ram Shah, shopkeeper, Ruldu Zaildar Tringla, Ch. Nathu and Amir Chand Baigra were the main culprits. Ghulam Ghaus, Assistant Inspector, Customs was forcibly converted along with his family. Karam Elahi constable's family was killed in the police station and Nizam Din, tailor and his son Ghulam Nabi were shot dead in the bazar. The house of Hassan Din was burnt and houses of the rest of Muslims were robbed away.

**Ramnagar Tehsil (District Udhampur).**

This place is 25 miles from Udhampur and its boundaries meet Sambha and Kathua tehsils; the depredations were started in the Paimasta illaqa. Th. Chander Uhdey Singh was appointed tehsildar and Darshan Singh Sub Inspector put in charge of thana. Rugnath Singh ,Retd. tehsildar was permanently staying there to direct the activities of the Sangh in collaboration with Mankameshwar Vakil and Ram Chand Shah. Twice they made false reports that thousands of Muslims were collecting in the illaqa and that breach of peace was apprehended. They also made false reports against the Basantgarh Muslims. The tehsildar being related to the Maharani proudly informed her that not a single Muslim could now be found in his illaqa. Thakar Dhaneter Singh, M.L.A. formed a gang and advanced towards Bhadarwah but did not succeed in this area although he was responsible for the murder of a large number of Muslims in the Ramnagar tehsil. The Raja of Ramkot was specially summoned to Jammu and given instructions to start genocide in his illaqa.

**Kishtwar Tehsil (Udhampur District)**

Kishtwar is 69 miles from Batote and the illaqa is mostly inhabited by Muslims except the Paddar valley of Hindu Thakars. The Muslim population was not more than 300/400. The place being very far off, it was affected last of all when the Bhadarwahis infiltrated there and caused disturbances in the Nunjwah area, as a result of which some villages were destroyed and all the Muslim police men posted at the Paddar mines were done to death. Some locals from Paddar ran to Kishtwar and were saved. Bodh Raj Bali, Sub Inspector Police, Kali Dass Zaildar, Paddar, and the Hindu Nafri at Paddar was mainly responsible for this tragedy.

Tek Chand Munsiff headed the raids. He was assisted by Shiv Dass Mengi, Divisional Forest Officer, and the local Mehtas. Although the Muslims had caught Hindu boys carrying swords, no action was taken by the tehsildar. The tehsildar did not take any interest in the supply of rice or maize to the Muslims as the tehsil is deficient in foodgrains and depends mainly upon Bhadarwah (Bhales illaqa) on one side and Anantnag tehsil (Kashmir) on the other.

**The Massacre at Reasi**

Reasi is 45 miles from Jammu. Chenab flows on three sides of the town. The left bank illaqa of the tehsil has a Hindu majority and Katra is a well-known town at the foot of the Vaishnu Devi hill. Reasi, Katra, Manthal and Tikri had been the main centres of Sangh activities. Kali Dass, Rikhi Kesh, Shubh Dutt, Dina Nath, retired Ranger, Shambu Nath son of Ganga Ram, Minister, were its main pillars at Katra. Govardhan Singh, Wazir-i-Wazarat, Jia Lal Darbari A.S.P. and Manohar Lal S.I. Police played an active role in organising a militia company headed by Capt. Kishan Singh, Capt. Omkar Singh of Bijepur and retired Zaildar of Biddha. The Sangh at Katra was assisted by the party of Inder Singh Namdar of the Militia company. Reasi sustained the highest percentage of loss of life. The illaqa towards the right bank of the Chenab was somehow saved because Muslims received timely information and the Arnas people ran up towards the Gool side, some of whom made their way towards Rajauri and then to Pakistan and some slipped away towards the adjoining Kashmir territory. All the Government employees were killed. Permanand Naib tehsildar Arnas (Gool) was instrumental in blocking the roads leading to Gool. Pauni town was also raided and the Sanghis went up to Paurakotla.

On 4th November, 1947, a lorryload of Dogra troops from Jammu alighted near a nullah about one and a half mile from Reasi town. Some Muslim passers-by brought the information to the town. The news was disquieting because it was already known that the Dogra army was engaged in the killing of Muslims in other areas. A Peace Committee consisting of Hindus and Muslims had been set up a few days earlier to maintain what was termed as "communal harmony". So, Khawaja Amkalla, Rais and Khawaja Aziz Din, better known as Chaudhri Aziz Din, the most respected leaders of their community in the town, went to the residence of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thakar Govardan Singh, a Dogra, to enquire as to why had the Army been sent for, when a Peace Committee was already working effectively and no untoward incident had taken place. As soon as the two elders entered the main gate of the Magistrate's

residence, their heads were most brutally chopped off. The news spread panic in the town. At 2.30 P.M. the Dogra troops who had, meanwhile, taken up positions in Hindu houses, started indiscriminate firing. Most of the Muslims thereupon took refuge in the Haveli of Mian Nizam-ud-Din. Sultan Muzaffar-ud-Din, Sub-Judge, who went to see them was killed by R.S.S volunteers. It was a signal for a general attack by the Sanghis led by the Dogra garrison. This happened on the 5th and continued upto the 6th of November. Many Muslims including women and children were killed and young Muslim women abducted. Some Muslims were taken to the Court premises—*the place where Maharaja Pratap Singh was born and where a plaque had been installed to commemorate the event.* Most of them were killed over there. The daughter-in-law of Maulvi Ghulam Haider Khan, father-in-law of Mr. Abdul Aziz Salehria, later Director Education, Azad Kashmir, was found murdered in her house along with her dead infant child, lying on her breast. Khawaja Ghulam Ali, P.S.I. who belonged to Bhadarwah and was posted here, succeeded in escaping from the clutches of the murderous gangs and reached the Police Station, only to be handed back by his colleagues and subordinates to the R.S.S. goondas, who killed him by inches by cutting a limb and after enjoying the spectacle of his pain and agony for sometime, then proceeded to chop off another limb and so on. According to Malik Abdur Rashid, a resident of the town, and Director Village Aid Azad Kashmir who furnished these facts to me, about three to four thousand Muslims were killed in the district. Thakar Govardan Singh was later arrested under orders of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and put in Jammu Jail. It is not known what happened to him later. He was the son-in-law of General Janak Singh.

Rajauri is about 70 miles from Reasi. The Hindus who were mostly money-lenders had removed most of their valuables. This being a Muslim majority area, the Government had already detailed a company to Rajauri proper. With the start of the genocide, one more company was sent from Reasi to first "clear" the Pauni Bharakh illaqa and, after passing through Dharamsal Sialsui, reach Rajauri but it was through sheer good-luck that the Wazir ordered them to proceed to Arnas in Gool illaqa and it was after the fall of Rajauri that the mistake came to light. The tehsildar, Harjilal, ran away to Jammu along with some military personnel. Things would have been quite bad if the above reinforcement had arrived there.

## MUSLIMS OF BHADARWAH RISE TO THE OCCASION

Bhadarwah is more or less a Muslim tehsil except a few villages of Kallar illaqa where Thakars are in a majority. The Bhales illaqa, was,

largely, Muslim-inhabited and the boundaries of the tehsil touch Chambah on the east and Ramnagar on the west. This was the private Jagir of the Maharaja and the major part of the most fertile lands in the adjoining villages were possessed by the well-known Wazir, Kotwal and Thakar families. Swami Raj and Shiv Lal Vakils were the leading Sanghis. They were guided by Thakar Dass, tehsildar and a Brahmin Naib tehsildar. Naunihal, Court Sub-Inspector was their right hand man and before the start of disturbances, the charge of the thana was handed over to Naunihal, relieving Ghulam Mustafa, Sub-Inspector. As the Muslims displayed some courage, they escaped any big loss of life in the town, but in the muffasil areas, the loss of life was heavy. Faqir Chand Gupta, Divisional Forest Officer, an ex-Captain, was leading the Sanghi gangs. He realised thousands of rupees from Bakarwals as grazing tax, got some of them imprisoned and seized several cattle. Though legally they had a right to stay in the illaqa after they had paid the tax, they were then forced to leave the tehsil. Several houses were searched by the police and innocent persons were taken into custody. False cases under the Explosive Substances Act were registered against Ghulam Muhammad, Abdur Rehman etc. After plundering the whole illaqa, Surjan Singh, the Sub Judge and Faqir Chand D.F.O., quietly slipped away to India. A group of soldiers was sent to Bhadarwah but it being a distant place, 126 miles from Jammu and 50 miles from Batote, they could not reach in time and in the meanwhile a detachment of the National Guards arrived on a goodwill mission and helped save the lives of Muslims.[1]

According to informations furnished to this Writer by Professor Samad of the Government College, Muzaffarabad and a refugee from Bhadarwah, R. S. S. gangs assisted by Dogra soldiers, after finishing their job in Udhampur district, went to Bhadarwah and from there had to move to Dodah and other places. Some armed R. S. S. volunteers and Akalis were housed on that side of the nullah which was inhabited by Hindus. A nullah passes through the town of Bhadarwah which is inhabited on one side by Muslims and on the other, by Hindus. It is known as Nagar. A Muslim girl, daughter of one Aziz Joo, whose brother Doctor Ghulam Nabi is now practising medicine at Karachi, saw some of these armed non-Muslims and this is how Muslims came to know about their presence. Having already come to know of the fate of their co-religionists in other parts of the province and also emboldened by the fact that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had been installed in power, these Kashmiri-speaking Muslims of the town, decided to attack the Hindu area rather than be surprised by them. They had been able to arrange some topidar rifles which some of them had managed to hide and which had not been deposited in the thana as required by the Government because these

1. Sh. Saleem.

were unlicensed. The attack was led by Khawaja Ahmed Khwanche and Khawaja Abdul Aziz Butt. As a result, the non-Muslim intruders as well as the Sanghis and Akalis were driven out of the town. By the time the non-Muslims could have been able to get support from their rear, a band of Sheikh Abdullah's hastily raised National Guards, led by a Kashmiri-Pandit, Maharaj Kishen and composed of Kashmiri-speaking Muslims and Pandits arrived on the scene. The Dogras and local Hindus did their utmost to seduce Kishen but did not succeed. He told them that the Militia would use its arms in performance of its duty. It is said that the Militia group was providentially in time. It reached in the evening while the Dogras were expected to launch their attack after dusk. A few days later Col. Adalat Khan was on the spot, on orders from Sheikh Abdullah and assumed control of the area as Administrator. With the support of the small detachment of National Guards, he was able not only to protect the Muslim population of the tehsil from the onslaught of Hindu armed bands but also trained some local Muslims in the use of fire-arms. The situation however, remained tense for about six months especially in the important villages, Mullanu and Chile known as illaqa Balesa. Several sporadic encounters took place, but the loss on both sides was negligible. In this area, a member of the Gujar tribe whose name could not be traced and who is credited with a progeny of about fifty sons and grandsons, played a notable role in the resistance.

In the district of Jammu, Rajkumar Shiv Dev Singh accompanied by Sant Pindi Das S.P. and aided by Kailash Nath Bhakhri A.S.P., Col. Sansar Singh of Agour, Haqiqat Singh (retd.) Conservator, Prem Nath Dogra, ang Jaggi son of Rattan Singh, S.D.M. Mirpur, General Secretary of the Sangh, caused great damage. Similarly Bharat Bhushen, tehsildar Ranbirsinghpura, Dhan Raj, Sub Inspector and Major Datta were responsible for a general massacre in the Ranbirsinghpura tehsil.[1]

## CARNAGE IN THE DISTRICTS OF JAMMU AND KATHUA

The situation in Jammu city and its surroundings was extremely precarious, even by the middle of August. On my visit to Srinagar from Peshawar, I left via Banihal, but had to return back from Batote as I learnt from Muslims coming from the city that it was absolutely unsafe to leave for Pakistan *via* Suchetgarh. The influx of non-muslim refugees in Jammu city increased after the 14th of August. The Committee officially entrusted with the task of making arrangements for their stay was headed by Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, a retired SDM who will figure prominently in some of the later events. By that time, harassment of

1. Sh. Saleem.

Muslims had already begun, especially in the border areas, with the result that two thousand Muslims had, by the 10th of October, already migrated to Sialkot. The border had been sealed and no Muslim was allowed entry into the State. In order to ascertain the condition of Muslims in the area and check their influx into Pakistan, Brigadier Collier, an English officer, Commanding Sialkot Sector, contacted Brigadier Rawat, his counter-part in Jammu on the suggestion of Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, then Minister for Rehabilitation West Punjab Government, for permission to visit Jammu, which was refused.[1]

In Jammu city itself, centres for the training of Hindus in the use of fire-arms were set up in Vaid Mandir, Raghu Nath Mandir, Talab Rani, Pacca Danga and Gurdawara Pacci Dhakki which were manned by retired Military officers. It is heartening to note that there were still some good-natured Hindus like Bankay Behari, Nand Lal Pawa, Chattru Das and Dr. Sethi who cautioned their Muslim friends, like Ch. Allah Ditta and Dr. Abdul Karim, of the grim shape of things to come. All ex-soldiers and other trained personnel were issued each, a 303 rifle with 50 rounds of ammunition. The border with Pakistan was sealed. The massacre was then begun from Samba and Kathua. The technique was identical which showed their common origin. It was to surround a particular village near the border, start firing and killing at random to terrify its Muslim inhabitants who were compelled to flee towards Jammu city. The primary aim was to finish the youth of the community. A number of women were always abducted and property looted away. While on their way to Jammu city, the process of killing, plunder and abduction was repeated at several points. It is claimed that Hari Singh himself initiated these killings at Deva Vatala which had a large population of Dogras. This is what Dr. Abdul Karim states in his note:

> "At Deva-Vatala where Dogras predominated, the Maharaja actually started the killing of Muslims with his own hand by initiating the shooting. One of my trustworthy friends Akbar Ali Haidri narrated to me, the shooting of three gujjars on the road-side by the ruler himself. He was an eye-witness to this brutal killing. It happened near Misriwala bridge; Akbar Ali alongwith Wazir Ali happened to be near that bridge. They managed to hide themselves in thick bushes at some distance from the road. After some time some jeeps arrived near the bridge; three gujjars, two of them fairly young, were coming on the road from the opposite direction. The jeeps halted. They saw Maharaja Hari Singh wearing a white suit coming out of the jeep; then came out Thakar Philail Singh and Th. Faqir Singh. The Maharaja pulled out his

1. Bhatti, P. 167.

revolver and shot at the gujjars. Two of them fell down while the third one tried to run away but a shot in his back finished him as well. The party then drove away towards Vatala."

The roads and foot paths leading to the city were strewn with dead bodies. The scene was so ghastly that someone told Dr. Abdul Karim that he had seen a small child sucking the breast of his mother near Tavi; the mother, slain days ago, was lying naked on sand near Pir-Khoh. According to Dr. Abdul Karim, the Muslims living in Mohalla Ustad and the surrounding villages in Jammu escaped the on-slaught owing to the foresight and wise handling of the situation by Col. Pir Muhammad Khan, a resident of the Mohalla who was a Muslim Conference leader and later became a Minister in the first cabinet formed by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. The Dogra army and the Patiala soldiers set up their posts at the Residency road, tehsil buildings, Dhakki Qabristan, Urdu Bazar and in the houses of Lahoru Shah and Mian Punjab Singh in Mohalla Mastgarh. Any Muslim getting astray from the refugee camp was invariably killed. Day by day, they narrowed down the ring around Muslims which made the latter panicky. In the camp were also Capt. Mian Nasir-ud-Din and Ch. Mohammad Sharif (Belchawala). They organised Muslims and put up as strong a resistance as was possible under the circumstances. Available to them were some Muzzle-loading guns, a few licenced or unlicenced rifles, spear heads, axes and topes of ordinary pipes. These were distributed among the able bodied persons who were divided into various groups, headed each, by Mr. Muhammad Amin and Mr. Habib sons of Ch. Feroze Din Salaria, D. F. O., Abdul Ghafur son of Faiz Lohar, Muhammad Tufail (Chumta), Mushtaq Shah, Abdul Majid, a brother of Dr. Abdul Karim, Fazal Rehman, Aijaz Butt, Ghazi Abdul Hamid, Faizi Pehlwan, Muhammad Din son of Sharaf Din, Ghulam Rasul Butt, Mehraj Din, Saleem Khan, Umra Khan etc. etc. Sons of Sh. Jan Muhammad supplied rations from their own stocks as well as from some shops from Urdu Bazar. On the 1st or 2nd of November, the military attacked the 300 refugees encamped in the house of Baboo Abdul Hamid Overseer. It is claimed that all the male inmates except Gujar who was wounded on the right shoulder were killed, and the women abducted. Within a few days, Mohallas Dal Pattian, Mastgarh, Talab Khatikan and Bazar Qasaban had been cleared of the Muslims. The house of Sardar Akram Khan was occupied and a large number of wounded men, women and children who had taken shelter there, were also brutally murdered.[1]

On 14th October, the R. S. S. and Akalis attacked the villages of Amrey Chak, Atmapur and Kochpura in police station Bishna, district Jammu and after killing a few Muslims and looting their movables, set

1. Dr. Abdul Karim.

their houses on fire. Mian Said Ali, District Inspector of Police, who was known for his examplary honesty, was at the time in the area and was able to arrest thirty Hindu dacoits along with the stolen property which was being carried on camel and horses. According to information furnished by him to Mr. Bhatti, he stayed for the night at police station Bishna on 16th October and heard hue and cry coming from various directions as a result of Sanghis' attacks. Meanwhile, some Muslims from Naindhar came to the police for protection. On the next day Pandit Kailash Nath Bhakri A.S.P. arrived with a group of police constables as well as an official photographer, Chitro Ram. They were going to some border post from where news had been received of a clash between Pakistanis and Sanghis. He took Mian Said Ali with him. While on their way to the border, they saw smoke rising from several villages which had been set on fire by the Akali R.S.S. gangs. On return to Jammu, Mr. Said Ali informed the I. G. P. of the incidents but was brushed aside and no action was taken. He was later told by his orderly Said Mohammad that about 2/3rd of those who had taken refuge in the police station had been mercilessly killed. On the 19th of October, the Hindus attacked Mohalla Ustad in Jammu city.[1] It may be recalled that it was on the same day that Muslims were attacked en masse in Manawar on the other end of Jammu province. The device adopted was that thousands of Hindus surrounded the Mohallah at night raising slogans of Islam Zindabad and Allah-o-Akbar. The Muslims thought that Muslim refugees had come from outside the city and, therefore, some of them did come out of their houses to receive them but found that they were Sanghis who had adopted this device to deceive them and bring them out. Some of them were killed or wounded. It is important to point out that Maharaja Hari Singh was present in the city. As a result of the incident, Muslims started moving to Urdu bazar and Mohallah Qassaban which were considered comparatively safe, from their point of view.

From the 19th of October Sangh-Akali gangs in collaboration with Dogra soldiers had been on a general rampage in all parts of Jammu and Kathua. The pattern was the same; Muslim women used to be abducted wherever possible and Muslims used to be asked to vacate their houses and leave for Pakistan It is natural that in some cases people might have refused to oblige, but on the whole they had no alternative. The gangsters would then joyfully molest a female or kill a child or shoot a young man or an elder or set fire to a house which was a signal for others to quench their thirst for blood and their greed for women, cattle or movable property.

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1. Bhatti, p. 171.

On 20th October, about fifteen thousand Muslims from Akhnoor and its adjoining areas on being forced to leave for Pakistan, gathered in the vicinity of the town and were led towards the Akhnoor bridge where Dogra soldiers opened fire, killing a large number. It is claimed that the killing was so extensive that blood actually flowed on the bridge. On the same day several attacks were launched on Muslims in Kathua district resulting in considerable deaths. On 23rd October, Dogra soldiers and Sanghis opened fire on a large crowd of Muslims, several thousand strong, in Miran Sahib Jammu. On the 21st of October, a large crowd of Rajputs, some of whom were armed with deadly weapons, were waiting at Rajpura which is midway between Jammu and Kathua to receive the Maharaja who was on tour, personally watching the execution of the genocide plan and lending encouragement to armed gangs engaged in the task and also providing arms and ammunition wherever needed. He was accompanied among others by his Prime Minister Mr. Justice Mahajan.[1] As a humble member of the judicial service, I have to hang my head in shame to record that a Judge of Mr. Mahajan's abilities should have participated in the genocide of people and helped not only in its planning but also its execution. While the crowd was still waiting, the armed among them had been formed into three lines, the front one consisted of those having rifles while in the second row were those who had other deadly weapons. Among the officers on the spot were an A.S.P., an Assistant Engineer, a Telegraph Supervisor and the S.D.M. There were also several Army officers of lesser rank. Before the Maharaja's arrival, a convoy of Muslim refugees which had come from the interior of Kathua and had swelled into numbers while advancing towards the borders reached there. The army compelled them to pass through the Hindu mob; on reaching there, one of the officers ordered the mob to "send them to Pakistan". Upon this, the Dogra soldiers and armed goondas attacked them amidst the Dogra war cry of 'Maharaja Bahadur Ki Jai'. It is claimed that not many were able to escape alive. On the next day, the Maharaja and the Prime Minister visited the town and congratulated their followers for their "performance". Another convoy of nearly twelve thousand Muslims left Kathua for Pakistan after their failure to secure protection. Two miles from Pakistan border at village Khasyal a mob comprising Dogra soldiers and Sanghis fell upon them with rifles and swords. Similarly, a convoy of two thousand Muslims which left village Bandore was attacked at Chhati Khoi, about three miles from the Pakistan border. A convoy of about 7000 Muslims left Chani Rodoon for Pakistan; it was attacked at Heera Nágar. A convoy of 500 Muslims left Kohatah, none of whom is claimed to have been able to enter Pakistan. A convoy of 3000 Muslims from Budhi and Tala Mola which left for Pakistan, was attacked

1. Nusrat, p. 117.

at Mahi Chak. A convoy of about six thousand Muslims left Nagri, Runb and Chhatta villages for Pakistan, but was attacked at Khikhiyan. Muslims from villages Sallni, Hiranagar, Candi etc. gathered at Hiranagar and left for Pakistan. They were stopped by the army at some distance and told to hand over their cash and ornaments in exchange for a guarantee to be escorted to Pakistan borders. After receiving a large number of ornaments and cash, the convoy was allowed to proceed and an escort was also provided, but when they reached Chhati Khoi, a soldier opened fire and instantly Sanghis who had already taken positions before their arrival as they seemed to have been briefed in advance, attacked the convoy. These goondas also had a brengun. A convoy of two thousand Muslims from Rajpura and Kagowal left for Pakistan, but was attacked in the way. In Samba town, about ten thousand Muslims from the town and its suburbs collected for migration to Pakistan. Most of the male were invited to the town-pond on the pretext of forming a Peace Committee, but there they were surrounded by armed bands and in their absence, young girls from their homes were abducted. There is no doubt that a large number of Muslims, men, women and children were killed each time.

## MASS ABDUCTION OF WOMEN

It goes without saying that thousands of Muslim women were abducted from various parts of Jammu province, especially in the distircts of Jammu, Kathua, Reasi and Udhampur. On the higher side, their number is estimated at twenty five thousand, but that, in my opinion, is a liberal estimate. Among the girls abducted was also the minor daughter of Chaudhri Hameedullah Khan, who has perhaps remained untraced so far. The fate meted out to Muslim women may be judged from the following account given by an abductee. The pattern was the same everywhere.

> "...... ..I was married to Sultan Ali in the month of Har last. After a sojourn of about five or six days at my parental home, my husband returned to his village Nikkian Akalian in tehsil Akhnoor, Jammu State. After about six months of my wedding, a few days before Id-uz-Zuha (25-10-1947), the State Dogra troops and Hindu Chib Rajputs armed with rifles, swords and spears, attacked our village killing about 600 men, women and children. Some of the inhabitants made good their escape to various villages in Pakistan. My parents and brothers were all killed. My cousin Mst. Rehmat daughter of Bagga and I were captured by the hooligans and marched to village Chhamb, whence we were confined in the house of Mehr Din, Lohar. We found 18 other girls already confined there. The house was under a military guard. Mehr Din had strict instructions not to let any girl out of the house, failing which

he and his family were threatened with extinction. He was promised that expenses incurred by him for the maintenance of the girls would be paid by the State. Mehr Din had a young daughter named Aisha and being desperate to preserve her virtue and the lives of his family, he danced to the tune of the Dogra soldiers. On the night following the 8th day of our confinement there, a Dogra Subedar named Amru arrived in company with 20 other Dogras. It was a moon-lit night. Amru had us brought in the open and asked his companions to select a girl a piece. Every one of them got hold of a girl of his fancy. I was taken away by a Dogra named Gian. Mehr Din was a silent spectator to this distribution and did not utter a word for fear of his own daughter and family. Gian raped me and kept me in his house for 22 days. My refusal to submit to his carnal desires was punished with a severe beating. He had a mother and six brothers of whom Daya Ram's wife kept a watch over me. Every morning Gian and his brothers used to go out with a Jatha for the murder of Muslims and plunder and used to return by dusk with a booty of clothes, ornaments, utensils etc, and related their horrible doings of the day to instil terror into my heart. They also boasted of having attacked villages Mattianwala, Dakhuna and Najjan in the Pakistan territory. For the first two days of my captivity in Gian's house, I refused food and water but then for fear of his thrashings I started eating. I was made to drink water with cupped hands and food was also placed on my hands. Gian was constantly bullying me to become a convert to Hinduism but I persistently refused. Gian and his two brothers, Daya Ram and Munshi possessed rifles and the other three were armed with spears etc. After about a month of my captivity, the Pathans attacked Deva Batala causing the inhabitants of Chhamb to evacuate to Jaurian and the next day to Akhnoor. After a three day halt, we crossed the Akhnoor bridge and stayed there for four days on the out-skirts of the town. Mehr Din and his family were also there. The 20 girls were not allowed to meet, but I did sometimes catch a glimpse of my cousin Mst. Rehmat. Then we moved to Jammu where Muslims of other villages had taken refuge. After four days, the refugees were ordered to return to their respective villages. The inhabitants of Chhamb took the route via Bern and Panitoot and after a halt of about four days at each place reached Sarkampore where the stay was extended to three months. At Panjtoot, as a result of consultation between themselves, Gian and his brothers agreed that Chhamb being not safe till then, it was advisable to take up temporary quarters at Planwala, a sizable village."[1]

1. Inside Kashmir Pamphlet, P. 13.

On the 22nd of October, a large number of Musilms were able to escape from the area where the notorious Bahu fort is situate. The military opened fire, resulting in certain deaths. However, some Muslims succeeded in entering Jammu city and went straight to Mian Abdur Rashid, the Senior Superintendent of Police, requesting him for protection against military encirclement. He deputed Raja Sohbat Ali Khan, Sub Inspector Police and a resident of Bhimber for necessary help but as soon as he reached the spot, he was subjected to a barrage of fire. A bullet struck his eye, two entered his right thigh and left leg; he fell down and died instantaneously. His corpse was stripped of the uniform and three of his fingers were cut off to easily remove the gold rings he wore. After great difficulty, Mian Said Ali succeeded in getting his dead body for a burial. On the 23rd of October, Thakar Natha Singh Sub Inspector of police who was a friend of Raja Sohbat Ali was killed by the Sanghis because he had the courage to condemn them not only for the dastardly murder of his friend but also for killing innocent Muslims. On the same day, Mian Abdur Rashid was put under arrest. The Bakr Eid fell on the 25th of October. The Hindu-Sikh goondas had been active since the 19th of October and by that time, several Muslims had been killed and a number of women abducted. On the morning of Eid, one Atta Muhammad, a Mistri by profession and a resident of Mohalla Mastgarh, Jammu city convinced that Hindu goondas were determined to carry off his three daughters, aged 19, 16 and 14 years, himself killed them to protect their honour. It is claimed that his minor son soaked a piece of cloth in their blood and wrote "Pakistan Zindabad" on a wall of his house.[1]

## HUNDREDS KILLED AT SAMBA AND JAMMU CANAL

Muslim elements in the police had been disarmed and Muslim officers of the force, Syed Sultan Ali Shah, Sheikh Fazal Alam, Mr. Durrani and Mian Said Ali had been confined to the police lines. About two hundred Muslims, including women, took refuge in the Khanqah of Baba Jeevan Shah in the city which was also frequented by Hindus and Sikhs, but all are reported to have been killed or abducted by Hindu goondas. On 28th October, a proclamation was read out in the city on behalf of the Maharaja ordering Muslims to deposit their arms without delay. In a meeting, attended by leading Muslims, a resolution, reiterating their loyalty to the Maharaja, was passed but there was no end to the intermittent firing going on in the city. On the 30th of October, Mr. Muhammad Yahya Qarshi, SP Mirpur, was replaced by Sardar Isher Singh, and Sheikh Muhammad Saleem, SP Udhampur was replaced by Sant Pindi Das. By that time, not a single Muslim gazetted officer remained posted in the five districts of Jammu province. By 3rd November, fresh elements of the

1. Bhatti, p. 176-177.

Patiala army entered the State. On 4th November, Maharaja Patiala, Sardar Baldev Singh, Indian Defence Minister and Sardar Patel, paid a visit to Jammu and had prolonged consultations with Hari Singh. On 5th November, Muslims were required to present themselves immediately in the Police lines so that they may be sent to Pakistan. Within a few hours, the premises was over-crowded. At about 12 O' Clock, 36 trucks were brought in and as many Muslims as could set their feet on them, waited to be taken to Sialkot. It is estimated that about fifty to sixty persons excluding, of course, the infants, boarded each truck. One may imagine the stampede because the trucks were supposed to take them to safety in Pakistan. What happened to them is reproduced below in the words of the Second master of the Samba High School who was one of the passengers:

> "Among them were my old parents, three brothers, two sons and two daughters. The trucks started at 2 p.m. At Satwari Cantonment we found Hindus and Sikhs assembled on both sides of the road and armed to the teeth. Muslims got extremely worried and each one of us thought that we were no longer safe. Some youth tried to save themselves by jumping down from the trucks but where could they go? They were killed on the spot. The drivers then diverted the trucks towards Kathua road and accelerated the speed. This increased our worries. We also found that the Dogra soldiers were moving about in the area in jeeps; so we asked the driver as to where they were taking us because the road that leads to Pakistan goes in a different direction. He told us that that road was closed and that we will be taken to Pakistan through a different route. He also told us that we need have no worry because if the intention had been to kill us, we would have been handed over to Jathas in the cantonment. It is difficult to describe the condition of the passengers. Out of fear they had lost even the power to make any movement; the women were weeping bitterly. At that time four or five trucks were stopped in the way on the excuse of either the petrol having exhausted or some other mechanical defect having creeped in. I have hardly been able to meet anyone from this group. It was time for evening prayers when four trucks were stopped near the town of Samba. As soon as we came down, we were surrounded and taken to a ground where we were made to sit. First of all, women were separated from us. On two sides of the ground stood a hill, on the third side were the trucks, while only one side was open, but on this side we found soldiers with fixed machine-guns; so there was no side left for us to run away. The assailants had been divided into six or seven groups.

> Those who had surrounded us were armed with rifles, spears, swords and birchas. Those who snatched away ornaments, money, beddings and other property, consisted mostly of Achhuts; a third group was taking possession of women and in overall charge were officers who issued orders. The Satanic arrangements were so complete and the workers so trained which left no doubt that they had been trained over a considerable period of time. The victims were then removed to the butchery in a group of six persons each. I put off my shoes and ran away and though fired at, was able to save my life but my old parents, brothers, sons and daughters who had boarded the trucks with myself, I have not heard of them since then."[1]

Survivors who were able to reach Pakistan reported that in some cases the goondas killed breast-fed infants in the laps of their mothers and told them, "Well, this is your Pakistan". It was also stated that in some cases, victims were made to take off their clothes as they were told that it was the Maharaja's property. The other trucks were stopped at Mawa which is in the neighbourhood of the Pakistan border. Here also almost the same story was repeated. It is claimed that only nine hundred survivors were able to reach Sialkot. Among them was Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, M.L.A. whose wife, son and sister were killed. It was also from this group that the daughter of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan was abducted. She was recovered years later from India through the personal efforts of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah.

When Sanghis started dragging away girls and young married ladies, the Muslims tried to put up resistance which though itself ineffective on account of the absence of arms, did help create some confusion. A Sikh tried to drag away the newly-wed wife of one Havildar Abdullah by one arm; her husband held the other arm of the lady whereupon a Jan Sanghi cut it off with the swift blow of a sword; other blows followed on neck and head and the man died on the spot. It was already getting dark and the confusion created by the savagery of the attackers went on till it was completely dark. This helped most of the Muslims to run away from the ghastly scene. A few strayed back into the State territory, but the main body moved in the right direction. In the way they found an old abandoned brick kiln in which many of them took shelter. The pursuers retreated after some distance because they must have been anxious to share the already collected loot. At dawn, the refugees heard Azan from the mosques in Pakistan area and must have heaved a sigh of relief.

1. Nusrat.

It was Zaffarwal area where Muslims received them with their traditional fraternity and gave them food and shelter.

What happened to this convoy was not known at the police lines; so on 6th November another convoy of about 25 trucks and lorries left, ostensibly, for Pakistan. Most of its passengers were educated people. Among them was a good number of gazetted officers. This time the trucks were diverted towards the Jammu canal and stopped on the bank of the canal at a short distance. Armed Dogras were lying in wait which showed that it was a pre-arranged plan like that of the previous day. Some of them were killed and some women abducted while a large number received injuries. It is said that quite a number of women jumped into the canal and committed suicide. Those who escaped death, returned back to their camp in the city which was not too far away. Among them was Dr. Abdul Karim who gives below a graphic eye-witness account of what happened to the unfortunate members of the convoy:

> "On the next day i.e. on 6th November 1947 about 25 trucks and lorries were brought into the police lines and were atonce filled in by the anxiously waiting Muslims. Even the roofs were fully packed. Myself and the remaining members of my family succeeded in getting seats in one of the lorries. This time instead of posting a military man with a stengun in each lorry, there were jeeps full of military men and officers in the front and the rear of the convoy. Instead of going towards Suchet-garh, they took the road going to Samba. A little ahead of Satwari Cantt, the convoy was halted along the canal side. No body was allowed to come out of the lorries. On making enquiry the military men told us that the Suchet-garh road was not safe and it was on that account that they were taking us to Pakistan via Samba-Kathua road. When asked as to why then had they halted, we were told that even this road was not as yet safe and that they were clearing it. Hindus armed with swords, spears, kulharies and guns were seen in large numbers hurrying in the direction, the convoy was to move. As was learnt later, the convoy was halted to complete the arrangements for the preplanned attack on us. The convoy now restarted and we were taken near the 'Leper Asylum" where it was immediately surrounded by gangs of armed Hindus. Probably it was an improvement on the previous days performance when some of the Muslims had succeeded in crossing the border. A few gun fires were heard probably to show that the military was trying to keep off the attackers but in reality it was a signal to start the attack. All the lorries and trucks were surrounded. Military men were keeping a general watch and directing the attack. They

fired wherever they noticed resistance. The technique of the attack was well planned. Those with spears started spearing the inmates through windows, and those possessing swords, daggers and hatchets stood at the back and exit of the lorries; as soon as one bent his head a little to come out, a number of swords and daggers came shinning over his head and neck, and he lay prostrated. Simultaneously all our belongings were looted. Twenty-six members of my family were killed on the spot. My two brothers were killed outright, many members were lying in severely wounded condition who died afterwards. My daughter Naeema was abducted; I myself received eleven wounds on my body. The grievous wounds on my head and neck made me unconscious for a considerable time so much so that when I recovered consciousness, it was almost dark. My wife was also wounded but her wounds were minor. While my daughter was being dragged by a Sikh, she and my younger son Imtinan-Elahi tried to hold her on. In doing so my son received grievous wounds over his head, neck and right hand; these were sword cuts. He had been apparently finished but luckily he survived. A large number of dead and wounded were scattered all over.

My younger brother Abdul Majid and my elder son, a college student, had already been killed on the previous day i.e. on 5th of November, 1947; the rest of the family was killed on 6th November; I saw one of my uncles Abdus Subhan lying prostrate with his throat cut widely; he was breathing heavily through his cut wind-pipe. Nearby was lying the dead body of my aunt. A daughter of one of my aunts who was in the last month of pregnancy, was lying dead, her belly having been cut open with a sword blow. There were many who were severely wounded but still alive. The attackers lurking around on the ensuing night would have easily caused their death but somehow this did not happen. It was learnt later that Brigadier Usman of the Indian Army had taken charge and while at Satwari he heard firing going on nearby, he reached the site in a jeep with some military men and halted the attack on the Muslims. He even kept off a fresh party of Jan-Sanghis and Sikhs from Samba side. In fact they were waiting for the convoy, this time fully prepared but the Jammu parties of these gangsters wanted the attack to be nearer the city in order to get their share of the loot. As already stated, all the cash, ornaments, gold and precious articles were with the Muslims in their small suit-cases and beddings. The Brigadier at the same time made arrangements to send the wounded to the hospital. Myself with a few remaining wounded members were also taken to the civil

hospital. Under the express orders of Governor Chet Ram Chopra, no Muslim was to be admitted into the hospital but Dr. Pratap Singh Superintendent of the Hospital admitted me and a few wounded members of my family as a special case. All the other wounded and survivors were sent to Dagiana camp. It was learnt later that an explanation was called from Dr. Pratap Singh. In the hospital also, where we had been given a special room, we were not safe. Gangs were roaming about and even entering the hospital rooms. Dr. Pratap Singh succeeded in posting a military guard outside our room as a precautionary measure. The Matron and many kind hearted Hindu and Sikh colleagues and friends helped us in many ways. Even Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah accompanied by Shrimati Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, came to see us and enquire about our health.

I alongwith a few wounded members of my family remained in the hospital till the end of November. In the hospital some other seriously wounded had been admitted on the orders of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Muslims besieged in Mohalla Ustad were now able to come out of their mohalla; some of them used to visit us in the hospital."[1]

Before the arrival of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in Jammu, the Muslims, who had been wounded or were otherwise ill, had no one officially to look after them. So an improvised hospital was set up at the initiative as well as under the care of Dr. Abdul Karim and late Dr. Rehmatullah in the Haveli of Sardar Muhammad Akram Khan at Talab Khatikan; among the compounders who assisted were Muhammad Ismail and Fazl-ur-Rehman. The number of the wounded was increasing every day and the wounds were mostly on heads, necks, shoulders and hands. Some women had their breasts wholly cut off with swords. There was no regular dressing material or anti-septic medicine. The requisite material available from the chemist shops of Fazl-ur-Rehman and Ali Muhammad, was utilized for some time. Water was boiled in big cooking pots; acriflamine or mercurochrone was added as anti-septic. Ordinary soft cloth was cut into small pieces which were boiled in this solution and these pads were used for dressing all sorts of wounds. Turbans and dopattas were cut lengthwise and used as bandages.

At one stage when the stock of bandages thus raised was also about to exhaust, Dr. Rehmatullah sent his "Salam" to Dr. Pratap Singh through a Harijan sweeper. The kind-hearted Doctor understood the

1. From a note sent at my request.

message and sent a large number of bandages and First-aid medicines through the messanger who managed to smuggle it out of the hospital in his tokra. It is incidents like these that revive one's faith in humanity.

A few tubes of catguts were used for ligaturing bleeding vessels. Some amputations had also to be performed with ordinary scalpels and scissors. Both the doctors rendered very valuable services and hundreds of the sick and wounded of both sexes are grateful to them for their dedicated care. Dr. Abdul Karim later migrated to Sialkot and has since set up a flourishing practice. He is known for his honesty and philanthropy. Having always kept himself aloof from politics, he has an unbiased appreciation of what happened. I have extensively quoted him because of his personal reliability. Dr. Rehmatullah later joined the Azad Kashmir Medical Services and died an untimely death while a District Medical Officer. A deeply religious man, he was unbelievably simple of habits and honest in his profession. It is really hard, if not impossible, to come across a Doctor like him during these times of greed and commercialization for whom profession only meant service to the suffering humanity. I know countless instances where he paid from his own pocket for the tonga he hired to attend to sick people in Mirpur town. I have not known or heard of even a single instance when he may have accepted any fee for the treatment of patients even when he visited them at their homes.

After the fate of the convoy, that left on 6th November, became known, Muslims refused to leave the camp They had been making frantic efforts to contact Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah or Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad in Srinagar, but as the administration in Jammu was entirely manned by Hindus and the telegraph and telephone lines were also in their hands, the efforts could not succeed. On the 4th of November a deputation met Mr. Justice Kanwar Dalip Singh who was then posted as Agent of the Indian government at Jammu. He told them that Muslims must go to Pakistan as it was not possible to guarantee their safety. The deputationists resisted the suggestion and told him that they were loyal to the Maharaja and did not want to leave their homes and jobs for an unknown future to which he replied that he saw no way out. Upon this, the deputationists requested for facilities to contact Sheikh Abdullah or Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad even on telephone, but they were given the stock-reply that they were too pre-occupied and could not be contacted. Kanwar Dalip Singh, however, promised to pass on the gist of their representation to either of them.

Mr. G. K. Reddy, a Madrasi journalist who edited for several years the Srinagar English Weekly "Kashmir Times" owned by a Congressite from Bombay, was externed from Kashmir for advocating accession

to Pakistan. While on his way from Srinagar to Pakistan, Mr. Reddy was detained at Domel for ten days. He was then removed to Kathua on the Indian border where he was set free.

Revealing his experiences in the disturbed areas of Jammu, Mr. Reddy said in an interview in Lahore:

> "The mad orgy of Dogra violence against unarmed Muslims should put any self-respecting human being to shame. I saw armed bands of ruffians and soldiers shooting down and hacking to pieces helpless Muslim refugees heading towards Pakistan. My pain and agony was heightened by what I saw at the village of Rajpura where the State officials and military officers were directing a huge armed mob against a Muslim refugee convoy and got it hacked to pieces. I saw en route State officials freely distributing arms and ammunition among the Dogras. From the hotel room where I was detained in Jammu I counted as many as 24 villages burning one night and all through the night rattling fire of automatic weapons could be heard from the surrounding refugee camps."[1]

The Pakistan Government could not be a silent spectator to the tragedy being enacted in the State. Consequently the following telegram was addressed by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to Mr. Mahajan, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir:

> "We are astonished at the contents and tone of your telegram dated October 15. Instead of taking immediate and effective action in regard to specific complaints made by us in our telegram dated October 12, you have put forward vague allegations of infiltration by people of Pakistan into Kashmir and have accused the border people of manufacturing bad relations. We emphatically and categorically deny the allegations and accusations.
>
> "People travel, to and from, between Kashmir and Pakistan in the normal course of business but the allegations regarding the free distribution of arms and ammunition to Pakistan areas adjoining the State borders and the infiltration of armed men into State territory is incorrect.
>
> "On the other hand, there is mounting evidence of ruthless oppression of Muslims in Kashmir State and of raids into Pakistan territory by armed Dogra gangs and non-Muslim refugees from the

1. Imrany, p. 39.

Punjab. The most recent report is that of an attack on Chamma Khurd village by Dogra Army personnel where they exchanged fire with the police, killing the Head Constable.


"Large number of armed Sikhs as well as Hindus belonging to the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh have gone to Kashmir with the object of repeating the tactics they followed in East Punjab to kill, terrorise and drive out Muslims. In fact, exodus of Muslims from the State has already started. The Pakistan Government takes a most serious view of the state of affairs in which the Muslims of Kashmir are being suppressed and forcibly driven out of Kashmir.

"We are astonished to hear your threat "to ask for assistance" presumably meaning thereby assistance from an outside power. The only object of this intervention by an outside Power secured by you would be to complete the process of suppressing the Muslims to enable you to join the Indian Dominion as coup d'etat against the declared and well known will of the Muslims and others, who form 85 per cent of the population of your State.

"We must earnestly draw your attention to the fact that if this policy is not changed and the preparations and active measures that you are now taking in implementing this policy are not stopped, the gravest consequences will follow for which you alone will be responsible.

"As regards the alleged action of the West Punjab Government in blocking the passage of petrol, cloth and food and stoppage of transport, we have already informed you that the West Punjab Government have been asked to provide you with all reasonable assistance in these matters. It is entirely wrong to attribute difficulties in transport which have arisen owing to circumstances beyond the control of the West Punjab Government to the unfriendly intentions of that Government or to regard it as an act of coercion of the State. We have already sent a special officer to discuss with you the problems arising in respect of these matters and to settle ways and means of adjusting the difficulties.


"Having regard to the gravity of the situation we have carefully considered your suggestion to 'have an impartial inquiry made into the whole affair'. We appreciate the suggestion and ask you immediately to nominate your representative without delay so that the Committee can proceed at once with a thorough inquiry




On the 26th and 27th January, 1949, the Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan visited the Azad Kashmir front. Major-General Nazir Ahmed with Brigadier Akbar Khan presents the officers of 101 Brigade to the Prime Minister



Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, in Azad Kashmir (January 1949)



Col. Rehmatullah Khan (Poonch Sector)



Major Khurshid Anwar



Commander Khawaja Ahmed Khan, Liberator of Sharda (1947-48)




Major-General M. Z. Kiani, C-in-C Azad Kashmir Regular Forces (1947-1951), inspecting one of the very few service facilities

into the whole matter. In the meantime we hope that every effort will be made on both sides to restore cordial relations between us."

## DID LIGHT BEGIN TO DAWN ON ABDULLAH?

Some critics have ignorantly laid vicarious responsibility on the shoulders of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah on the ground that as Head of the administration he ought to share part of the blame. He was sworn in as Head of the Emergency Administration on 30th October 1947. Hari Singh had agreed, as a condition precedent to the acceptance of accession by India, that Sheikh Abdullah would be associated with the administration but it was done, even according to Mr. Mahajan, only after the military situation had eased for India. Till then, Mr. Mahajan carried on the administration in Jammu while his deputy Mr. Batra did so in Srinagar—if at all any administration was functioning at the time.

When Col. Baldev Singh withdrew from Kotli with his troops, they had about 60 to 70 Muslim soldiers of the State army with them. On reaching Naushehra they were killed in cold-blood. Says Mr. Mahajan:

> "The Sheikh accused me of being a party to the shooting of some Muslim personnel of the State forces who were being evacuated by the Indian army from Kotli. They were rebels and had been disarmed. Some of them misbehaved while coming to Jammu under military escort and naturally there was some shooting. I had no knowledge of the incident till the Sheikh told me about it.
>
> Though the Sheikh boasted that he was a nationalist, really he had a communal outlook on things. Any harm done to the Hindu population or their property did not affect him at all, but the slightest injury to a Muslim touched the very core of his heart. He complained against me to the Prime Minister on this score. The matter however concerned the army and as the Commander had already appointed a court of enquiry, nothing more could be said about it."

Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah had his own forebodings about the fate of Muslims in Jammu. This writer was told by Chaudhry Niaz Ahmad that as soon as Sheikh Abdullah took over as Head of the Emergency Administration, he sent for some Punjabi-speaking senior Muslim officers such as Chaudhry Niaz Ahmad, then Chief Secretary, Malik Mohammad Maqbool Registrar Co-operatives, Syed Nisar Hussain Shah,

Food Controller and Wazir Muhammad Khan, S.S.P. and told them that he was anxious to send them to Jammu to take up administrative duties so that something could be done to help save the local Muslim population but in the situation prevailing there, none of them was willing to undertake the job as they could not, they told the Sheikh, trust Dogra soldiers for their own safety. They offered to go if any Muslim soldiers were placed at their disposal, but admittedly there were none. The attitude of these officers was quite understandable. Of what help could they be to the Muslims of Jammu if they had no dependable force at their command to protect them against armed bands of Hindus and Sikhs? What guarantee there was that their own Hindu guards may not kill them as the situation was extremely confused and unpredictable? What was now happening in Jammu and what happened to the convoys on the 5th and 6th could not, however, have remained unknown in Srinagar. There are always men and women of good-will in every community whose hearts do bleed for human sufferings, regardless of creed or colour and certainly as we have seen in the case of Thakar Natha Singh, there was no dearth of such men even among the Dogras. Therefore, it can be presumed that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah came to know of the true position at least before the 9th of November and he did intervene as effectively as he could in the circumstances because the next convoy that left on the 9th in 30 trucks was escorted by Indian soldiers and crossed Suchetgarh safely though seven women and a part of luggage is claimed to have been lost in the way.[1] The influx of refugees then gained momentum and the great bulk of two to three lakhs who migrated to Pakistan, left the State after this date and although Muslims in the muffasils still suffered in life, property and honour, at the hands of armed bands for sometime more until Sheikh Abdullah was able to place his trusted men at the district headquarters, there were no incidents either in the city or in the refugee camps at Jammu. Engineer Malik Aftab Ahmad, brother-in-law of Mr. Allah Rakha Saghar, who was in Jammu, has said:

> "It is possible that Sher-i-Kashmir did not know of the happenings in Jammu because when he came there at the fag end and found badly-infested wounds of what remained of the Muslims of Jammu, in the camps, he wept for a long time."[2]

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah also appears to have been contacted by certain Muslims notably Mr. Nazir Samdani, a National Conference worker who later became a member of the Indian Parliament. Thereupon he flew to Jammu alongwith Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad by the first

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1. Monthly Nusrat, p. 117.
2. Weekly Riasat, dated 11-11-1968.

available flight. What he saw was more horrible than what he may have heard at Srinagar. Unfortunately for him the provincial administration was entirely manned by Dogras, Rajputs and a few Kashmiri Pandits. Dogras hated him like anything. The fact that he supported the State's accession to India made no difference because their mutual hatred was too deep-rooted to be easily overcome. Another difficulty with him was that his party had never been effective in the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and Reasi. The Muslim population being culturally part of Punjab, speaking the same language, wearing the same clothes, having the same customs and even used to the same food habits, had come under the influence of the Pakistan Movement years before partition while the Hindus of the province owed their first loyalty to the Dogra dynasty though in all-India matters, they followed Gandhi. Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, convened a conference of the State and Indian officials present in Jammu and fully unburdened himself of his anger and shock. He even told them that if they did not call an immediate halt to their activities, he would not only not be able to protect more than a lakh or so non-Muslims who were living peacefully in Kashmir valley but that it would, at the same time, be impossible for him to persuade Muslims of the Valley to support his party's pro-India stand. It is also likely that he may have spoken to Pandit Nehru on telephone and the latter may have impressed upon Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan the absolute necessity of calling a halt to the killings. It may be said to the credit of Pandit Nehru that he could not be even otherwise a party to such a plan. Sheikh Abdullah also met not only the leaders of the Muslims of Jammu who were at the time either in camps or in Muslim localities of the city but also visited their camps and discussed the situation with them so as to devise ways and means for their safety. He addressed at least three public meetings in Jammu city which were attended by a large section of Dogras. Alluding to the Hindu version that Jammu city Muslims were aggressively pro-Pakistan and hence the justification for the 'reprisals', Sheikh Abdullah tauntingly reminded the "chivalrous Rajputs," in one of these meetings:—

> "But you murdered innocent barbers and washermen who knew nothing about politics. How unjust it was to kill children and women who did not even know the Muslim League and Pakistan."[1]

## WHERE WAS THE MUSLIM CONFERENCE LEADERSHIP?

One has to record with sorrow that Muslim Conference leadership, as it existed in the province of Jammu, miserably failed their people on their very first real test and vainly have I tried to find out if even a few

1. Freedom Struggle, p. 332.

of this large crowd who had been verbally dying for their Cause and some of whom have since grown fat on their miseries, had given a lead to their people or organised any resistance. All their efforts were directed towards their own safety and those of their dependants and relatives. If the Muslims of Bhadarwah who were in a more precarious position because they were out of the way both from Jammu and Srinagar, could, with a few topidar rifles, home-made axes, spears and sotis, not only successfully defend themselves but also drive away few thousand Hindus from the district and push them into Chambah in East Punjab, I see no reason why organised resistance by the Muslims of the remaining part of Jammu province could not safeguard their honour and person or at least considerably reduce their losses. In the four districts of Jammu, Kathua, Reasi and Udhampur, the non-Muslims numbered 6,41,285 while Muslims were 5,49,869. In Reasi district, the Muslims were in a majority of 2 : 1. The Muslim Conference leadership could have read the writing on the wall; it did not need any great intelligence. They had been watching the organisation of the R.S.S. since so long and had also been abreast of its menacing posture. It is never impossible to purchase arms or stock home-made axes and spears etc. or even to manufacture hand-grenades and to successfully hide them, as was done by the Muslims of Bhadarwah. The Muslim population was very large and they must have been co-operative because it was not merely a political Cause but a question of their very physical survival. The fault did not lie with the general mass of people but with the leadership whose duty it was to guide them and to channelize their resources and energy. The Muslim Conference provided leadership from the city of Jammu but with the imprisonment of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Mr. Saghar and the over-all pre-occupations of Chaudhary Hameedullah Khan which of necessity took him to Pakistan, the party structure quickly collapsed. Much has been written about the genocide in Jammu but lamentably one does not come across a single instance in the writings of responsible persons where any effort may have been made by M.C. leaders to arrange for the collection of funds, stocking of arms, raising of a volunteer corps or to have taken courage in their hands and organised resistance when R.S.S. gangs were let loose upon them. Most of them had either safely slipped into Pakistan or Srinagar or barricaded themselves in Mohallah Ustad etc within the walls of Jammu city. Muslims of Jammu province are, as compared to their brethren in the Valley, of a more martial background. They make fine soldiers. One of them won the Sword of Honour at Kakul in 1972. Recruitment to the State army was open to them, unlike the Valley Muslims, though the scope was limited. To have utilised such a fine mass of men and women—so totally dedicated to Islam and Pakistan and as intensely attached to their faith as anyone anywhere

in the world, was not, after-all, an impossible task. True it has been said of mankind that it is the leadership that makes or mars a community.

One has again to record with great sorrow that according to no less a person than Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, some arms and ammunition was diverted by him and his colleagues for use inside Jammu province, but as he also said, it never reached those people.[1] Thus it is clear that the so-called leadership of the Muslim Conference must share its blame for the unpreparedness of the Muslims of Jammu province and the way they were so easily killed, abducted and forced to migrate to Pakistan. I have not come across even a single instance when any member of the R.S.S. or Dogra gangs who operated in these districts during these terrible days may have been killed or even wounded. It however, goes to the lasting credit of some Muslim officers who had nothing to do with politics, men like Mian Nasir-ud-Din, Dr. Abdul Karim, and Dr. Rehmatullah who not only took charge of the refugee camps and Mohallas in Jammu city but also came forward to provide leadership and in co-operation with Sheikh Abdullah's administration, arranged their safe journey to Pakistan. Commenting on this aspect, Dr. Abdul Karim, the leading Physician from Jammu who lost in the massacre, 36 members of his family, including a son and one of whose daughters was abducted, says in a written note to this writer:

> "At the very outset it may be pointed out that the only political party of Muslims, at least in Jammu province, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, was not as efficient and active as it should have been and a little wisdom and foresight on the part of its leaders would have saved the situation or at least mitigated the huge loss of life, honour and property sustained by the Muslims of Jammu province. Working of this body was far from being satisfactory; its organisational structure was merely a paper work. No serious effort had ever been made to arouse political consciousness specially in rural areas. Most of them did not know the course of events rapidly taking place in Pakistan nor realise its grave implications for the State. There were no well-organised branches, or active members in the far flung areas of the province, not even in the suburban parts of Jammu proper. This can easily be judged from the fact that while the Muslims in one town or village were being annihilated, those in the adjoining town or village remained quite unaware of the happenings. There was no communication between the various so-called branches of the organisation. Even the centre was so un-organised that when

1. Kashmir Saga, p. 47.

the hour of trial came, there was no-body worth the name at the centre. The Head of the organisation in accordance with his past practice to boycott or go behind the bars, had this time also, without caring a little for the Muslims in Jammu province, who were in a grave danger, easily found asylum in a jail. His only valient lieutenant Mr. A. R. Saghar, who would have proved of real service to the Muslims of Jammu at this critical juncture was also asked to follow suit. Other top workers of this "august political body", Chaudhary Hameed-Ullah Khan, Mr. Shahab-ud-Din etc. also went to Pakistan for finding help and arranging arms from across the border. Unfortunately, *the besieged Muslims in Jammu who fought a life and death struggle never received any help whatsoever from across the border.*"

## COLONEL ADALAT KHAN'S TESTIMONY

An outspoken man, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad severely reprimanded the local administrators. It was peculiar of him that in course of an address to a huge mass meeting of Hindus and Sikhs in the city, he spoke in such a harsh and indignant tone which gripped even the Muslim officials accompanying him with fear lest the mob should stand up and tear him into pieces. They say, he almost abused them for the killing of Muslims and the abduction of women and at the height of emotion, with tears flowing in a stream, jumped from the stage in the midst of his Dogra audience, asking them to shoot him as well. He asked them whether it was the famed Dogra chivalry of which they boasted that they drenched their hands in the blood of their innocent neighbours and whether this was the way they had chosen to reward the National Conference for its pro-India and anti-Pakistan stand? While I am writing these lines (24th of July 1972), Bakhshi Sahib is no more in this world. It is remembered by concerned people that it was Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad who ruthlessly unearthed the Muslim abducted women and for weeks, personally directed the operation. Thousands of them owe their reunion with their families to him. Those who were orphans or unclaimed, were not sent to Pakistan but were married to willing Muslims in the State through the efforts of Begum Abdullah, who discarded burqah those very days. Maharani Tara Devi attended some of these marriages personally and awarded a part of the dowry in each case from her own pocket.

This is what Lt. Col. Adalat Khan, one-time A.D.C. to Maharaja Hari Singh who was then in Srinagar and later held important posts in Azad Kashmir administration, has to say about Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Jammu:

"This situation would have melted the heart of even a stone-hearted person. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was deeply touched by the situation. He left his Deputy Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad with orders to restore the situation to normalcy and save the remnants of the Muslim population. I must say to the credit of Bakhshi that he worked like a tiger during that crucial period. He would personally enter into the houses of the Hindu Rajputs and recover abducted Muslim girls and arrange their safe despatch to Pakistan to join their kith and kin. The remnants of Muslim population did recover their morale on account of his daring actions.

The Sheikh returned to Srinagar by the middle of November, 1947. I was once again summoned by him. Qazi Masud a Judge of the High Court was sitting with him. There were also a few more Muslim officers. The Sheikh started weeping like a child. This affected each one of us and tears started flowing from all eyes. There was complete silence......... The Sheikh said that he was weeping not only for the Muslims of Jammu, but he was also weeping for one thing more. The Muslim population of Bhadarwah and Kishtwar was intact by and large so far but it was in great danger of liquidation by the troops and the Sanghis. He said that he had already tried two Hindu officers but they had failed to maintain law and order and had run away and that since two days he had been trying to persuade senior Muslim officers to go there and help the Muslim population; that he had already contacted about twelve of them but they had refused to go there. He also informed us that some disturbances had already taken place in that area resulting in the dislocation of some population, and then suddenly came up with the suggestion that he wanted me to go there and help save its Muslim inhabitants. Without waiting for a moment, I accepted the offer."[1]

Addressing a public meeting at Panthal on the occasion of the inauguration of a canal in April, 1951, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah said:

"I want to tell those people who are anxious to bring back the Maharaja that Hari Singh will never return to the State. He has massacred the Muslims of this place. His wife also was his accomplice in these nefarious actions. There is no room for any murderer in this State."[2]

Sheikh Abdullah founded a Kashmir Volunteers Corps to enable Kashmiris to learn the use of fire-arms; the Prime Minister of India sent,

1. From a note given to this writer by Col. Adalat Khan.
2. Freedom struggle, p.335.

through the local Indian Commander, some 303-rifles for it but on orders from Mehr Chand Mahajan, their delivery was withheld. It was widely rumoured in Srinagar that they had instead been supplied to the R.S.S. Mr. Mahajan has denied the allegation of their delivery to the R.S.S. but admitted that he had "warned the Commander that these arms should not be handed over to the volunteers without his being satisfied that they would be able to use them and take care of them". Dealing with the accusation of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, he says:

> "The Sheikh took this opportunity to complain to Pandit Nehru and told him that the arms that had been sent for the use of the National Conference Volunteers had been given by me to *its rivals*, the Rashtarya Swayamsevak Sangh. He further added that they were using these arms for killing Muslims in Jammu. The complaint was not only false but malicious. Without any enquiry Pandit Nehru took the words of Sheikh Abdullah as gospel and wrote a very nasty letter to the Maharaja against me.
>
> His Highness gave the letter to me for reply. I wrote to Pandit Nehru that I had not received a single rifle from him; the rifles sent were in the possession of the Officer Commanding the Indian Forces in the State who had not given a single rifle to the R.S.S. I challenged the Sheikh to prove his allegations. Pandit Nehru promptly withdrew the allegations. He expressed regret and said he was sorry to learn that he had been misinformed.[1]

Surely Pandit Nehru wouldn't have ordered a counting of the stock to find out conclusively whether the allegation was really incorrect, especially because it involved the risk of letting a watchful world know that a Hindu Judge was directly involved in the killing of innocent people. The moralist Nehru who had already assumed the self-assumed role of telling other countries what was right and what was not right, could hardly afford such an exposure. That is why he promptly withdrew the allegation. It may also be recalled that the senior most Indian Military officers in Jammu then was Major General Kulwant Singh, who was as much an accomplice in the Muslim genocide as anyone else.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah also spoke to Mahatma Gandhi of the condemnable role played by the Maharaja, and Mr. Mahajan. Mr. Gandhi told a prayer meeting in Delhi as reported in the 'Hindustan Times' of 27th December, 1947:

> "He (Mahatmaji) had heard of murders of numberless Muslims and abduction of Muslim girls in Jammu. The Maharaja must hold the

1. Mahajan, p., 176.

responsibility for this. The Dogra State forces were under his direct control. He had not yet become the mere constitutional head and, therefore, he must be held responsible for all the acts, good or bad, of people under his rule. Sheikh Abdullah had been to Jammu and had tried to allay passions......*Gandhiji would advise the Maharaja to step aside alongwith his Minister in view of what had taken place in Jammu* and give the fullest opportunity to Sheikh Abdullah and the people of Kashmir to deal with the situation'."[1]

Says Mr. Mahajan:

"The Sheikh also made an attempt to poison the mind of Mahatma Gandhi against me. He wrote to the Mahatma that Muslims were being killed in Jammu at the instigation of His Highness and myself. Mahatmaji, without even asking me, charged us with these killings, in one of his post-prayer speeches."[2]

Writing to Mr. Gandhi in protest against his prarthana speech, the talented but, unfortunately, a die-hard fanatic Hindu, Mr. Justice Mahajan wrote as under:

"It is undoubtedly true that a very large number of Hindus and Sikhs were killed and their women abducted. It is also true that a considerable number of Muslims were killed and a number of their women were abducted......... After 30th October......... killing continued. Since then the Muslims suffered the most in parts of Udhampur and Reasi Districts and in parts of Kathua and Jammu Districts...... The Muslim population in a part of the Reasi District on the side of the Chenab, in Bhadarwah and Kishtwar and in the Rajauri areas became very aggressive after 30th October. In these parts the Hindu and Sikh population has been practically wiped out and a very large number of their women have been abducted and are in the possession of the local Muslim population ............ In the circumstances stated above, all that can be said is that on the reasoning employed by you, whatever communal trouble took place between the 15th to 30th October, the responsibility for it, in the absence of the extenuating circumstances, is on the then Government of His Highness. After the 30th October up to date whatever has happened or is happening and whatever loss, whether of life, property or abduction, the responsibility is on the Dictator and his Government as he has been in complete control of administration. However, so far as I can see neither the Government of His Highness before the 30th nor that

1 & 2. Mahajan, p. 158-159.

of the Dictator subsequent to that date can be made responsible for any happenings as in the circumstances in which the Government was placed whether before or after the 30th, it was humanly impossible to stop all that took place when men had become insane and started behaving like jungle animals. In view of the extent of the territory no effective steps could be taken to completely stop the mutual killing."[1]

I have quoted rather extensively Mr. Mahajan's letter to show not only an admission on his part that a great number of Muslims had in fact been killed and a large number of their females abducted, apart from the fact of their property having been destroyed or looted away, in order to convince an impartial reader who has no personal knowledge of these events that it was not propaganda, but also to show that when we read Mr. Mahajan's version in between the lines, it becomes clear that the impression which he has sought to convey is that the killing of Muslims, the burning of their houses, the looting of their property and the abduction of their women was justified by way of reprisal as the same fate had been meted out to Hindus and Sikhs. Apart from the fact that the very claim that Muslims were the first to kill and kidnap, with Dogra army being all around and thousands of Dogras and Hindu Rajputs being armed to the teeth and the State administration being practically manned by Hindus, is a totally false and fantastic claim which existed only in the imagination of Mr. Mahajan and gets no support from the recorded events of those days anywhere, the very thought that a Judge should have thought it worth-while and honourable to justify the organised killing of admittedly innocent thousands and the abduction of equally helpless and innocent women, because some non-Muslims had suffered the same fate in some other districts, must shock even a man of mean intelligence and normal conscience. It is really sad that a man like Mr. Mahajan could not rise even to the level of the Police Sub Inspector, Mr. Natha Singh. There is no denying of the fact that non-Muslims were killed, their houses burnt, their property looted away and a good number of their females abducted by Muslims with which I shall deal at an appropriate stage, but what I want to emphasise here is that it happened in the liberated area *after* it was freed from the Dogras which actually takes us to the last week of October, or mid November. By emphasising this, I should not be understood to be condoning the said actions on the part of Muslims but simply putting the record straight...so far as history is concerned.

After Mr. Mahajan left the State on the persistent demand of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah which again will be dealt with at its proper place, the latter initiated an enquiry against him and the Maharaja and began

1. Mahajan, p. 158-159.

collecting evidence to prove their direct complicity in the genocide but as soon as Pandit Nehru came to know about it, he stopped it.[1]

That the killing of Muslims was preplanned and the purpose was to Hinduise this province, in the first instance, is borne out by the following letters written by Hindus —

1. Translation of a letter dated Jabbulpur (C.P. India) the 9th of November, 1947, from one Subedar Ram Singh, 7/2 Punjab Regiment to Rehru Ram, Village Devaapuran, Post office Dewa, Jammu State:

"My dear father,

Humble respects. I am quite happy and well. Don't worry about us in any way. We tried hard for leave, but leave is stopped. It is, however, hoped that leave will soon be open, especially for Jammu State, and then we shall come. Don't worry. When you send letter, write in detail about the condition of the country. We daily listen to radio and our home is (perhaps) still intact, but do write in detail please. We sent many letters to you but it is not known whether you have received them or not. We have received no letter from you for the last five months. We received only that chit which was sent by you through Jemadar Mangat Ram who has reached safe and sound. Tell this to his wife. Write to us if it is a fact that the Muslims are becoming Hindus or are going away (to Pakistan). Even if they become Hindus, do not let them stay on. If it is possible, kill them all. Do not spare them on any account. Never take pity on them. We are fully aware of the situation. Mangat Ram has told me that there are some Chibs (Hindus) who say that there is no harm in keeping them. Such a blunder should never be made. As far as possible, destroy them all, otherwise they will deceive you one day. You do not know the instructions that are being given to us here. Tell the entire village on our behalf that they should carry on the campaign whole-heartedly and relentlessly. We have to exterminate this nation. Unless they are finished, we cannot rest or sleep."[2]

2. One Waryam Singh Rajput of Boarding House, Residency, Jammu, wrote to his lambardar of village Potah, P.O.Naushehra, Tehsil Bhimber, on the 14th of October, 1947:

"......You should send Inder Singh or Amar Singh out to the hills

1. Mahajan, p. 177.
2. Inside Kashmir (Pamphlet).

to acquire local made rifles. The licence of the rifle in the house should be made over to Om Parkash, so that he may procure cartridges and send them on to you. If you can obtain cartridges without producing the licence, you should not hesitate to do so.

I will take a licence but you should purchase countrymade rifles from somewhere and the one already in the house should be kept ready for use. You have not been attending to this so far, but if you are negligent any more, you may have to regret it......... I have heard that rifles can be obtained from the hills, as the Government is confiscating those belonging to the Muslims."

3. One Jodh Singh, a Havildar Major writing to Asa Singh Havildar, of Post Office Mannawar on the 17th of October, 1947 states:

"......... You should go, together with the respectables of village Nandpur, to the Tehsildar, with a sketch map showing the localities on either side of your village, and you should represent to him that your village is in danger from the Gujrat district, and therefore a Company of troops should be stationed at Nandpur. The (other) residents of Nandpur should also go. If the tehsildar does not pay heed to you, then you should apply to the Chief Minister. He will help you...... When you ask for military assistance, you must pretend that you are in danger from a certain village with reference to the activities of some important person of Pakistan, e.g. 'In village such and such, Mr. so and so is concentrating Pakistan troops and we have come to know from a reliable source......' My other suggestion is that all the notables and officials should proceed to Jammu and request the Prime Minister that you be provided with countrymade rifles and ammunition. A large number of rifles had been manufactured in Jammu Military stores and these were meant for distribution to the Hindu and Sikh public."[1]

From the figures quoted in Chapter I, I have no doubt that the number of non-Muslims killed, does in no case, exceed a thousand. As regards the number of civilian Muslims killed, the figures are varied but highly exaggerated. In 1941, the Muslim population of such areas in Jammu province which are now in Indian occupation, was about 6,70,000. In 1961 it is shown as 5,98,492. The 10 year national growth rate in India was:

1941 to 1951 = 13.3%
1951 to 1961 = 21.6%
1961 to 1971 = 24.7%

1. Inside Kashmir (Pamphlet).

In Pakistan the growth rate was:

1941 to 1951 = 17.9%
1951 to 1961 = 26.9%
1961 to 1972 = 52.1%[1]

In the 1970 elections for A.K. President as well as the Legislative Assembly, the number of *voters* from Jammu province, residing in Pakistan, was 2,29,152. The population percentage of voters for Pakistan elections which were held in the same year was about 50%. It would take the population figures of Jammu refugees in Pakistan in 1970 to about five lakhs. Thousands of Muslims from the liberated territory also took refuge in Pakistan in 1947; some of them did not return to their homes because of employment; thousands of them were registered as voters but at the same time, a large number of refugees from Indian-occupied Jammu province are also settled in Azad Kashmir; their number does not appear to be less than two lakhs. I think, therefore, that a fair estimate of civilian Muslim deaths in the occupied parts of Jammu province would be between twenty to thirty thousand people.

1. Courtesy, G. Mujtaba Mirza, Director Census Office, Pakistan.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE REVOLT

# CHAPTER XXIII

# The Revolt

## ACCESSION-TERMS SECRETLY UNDERWAY

We have already seen how by the end of August it had become quite evident that Maharaja Hari Singh had almost made up his mind to accede to India. The transfer of the Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala to India by Radcliffe under the influence of Mountbatten, the dismissal of Pandit Ramchandra Kak on 11th August, the removal of the Pakistan flags from the post offices on 14th August, the visit of Mahatma Gandhi and his complete success in winning over the Maharaja's family, the enlistment of fresh troops and the distribution of arms and ammunition among non-Muslims, the reign of terror let loose in the district of Poonch, the harassment and isolated killings of Muslims in the districts of Kathua and Jammu which had sent thousands to Pakistan for shelter, the intriguing visits of Sikh Chieftains from Punjab and the frequency of these visits at a time when East Punjab was in flames and the situation demanded the personal presence of the Rulers on their posts of duty and the increasing traffic of officials between Srinagar and Delhi, left no room for doubt that plans were being secretly finalised for the State's accession to India which meant not only depriving Pakistan of a large territory which belonged to her by right under the fundamentals of partition but which also meant the enslavement of nearly four million State Muslims by Hindu India. As the refugees' influx had already started, there was no guarantee that it would not gain momentum and that Muslims may not be exterminated. The experience in the Muslim majority State of Kapurthala and the Muslim majority tehsils of Batala, Gurdaspur, Ferozepur and Zira had already shown that even Muslim majorities could be totally wiped out. Pakistan therefore could ill-afford to remain a silent spectator.

It was at this time that by a strange coincidence, a document containing the draft agreement for accession fell into the hands of the authorities

at Lahore. It so happened that in the second week of September a plane, on a flight from Srinagar to Delhi, had to make a forced landing at Lahore due to engine trouble. Thousands of refugees from East Punjab were camped at the air-port and finding the plane with Indian markings, a mob was unable to resist the temptation to loot the passengers. The plane was also carrying Thakar Harnam Singh who had recently been appointed Chief Conservator of Forests in place of an Englishman. A relation of the Maharaja, he was the principal Dogra courier between his Ruler and Sardar Patel's Ministry of States. Harnam Singh's brief case which was lost in the mob attack was found to contain top secret documents. The Pakistan Times dated the 28th September, 1947 published the following news, based on a study of these documents:—

> "The Kashmir Government is of the opinion that though the present context of Punjab holocaust, which is monopolising all the public attention in both India and Pakistan, is the most appropriate moment to announce Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union in the hope that it will go comparatively more or less unnoticed, yet it is mortally afraid that so long as a direct communication line has not been built between the Jammu and Kashmir State and the Indian Union through Pathankot, such a declaration might provoke the Pakistan Government into imposing economic sanctions against this State.
>
> So orders have been issued by the Kashmir Government that a temporary boat bridge should be constructed over the Ravi near Pathankote so that through-vehicular traffic could be established between Jammu and the Indian Union. The metalling of the road from Jammu to Kathua is also proceeding at a top speed. The idea is to keep up some sort of communication between the State and the Indian Union, so that essential supplies and troops could be rushed to Kashmir without having to transport through Pakistan territory. These orders were kept top secret lest the Pakistan Government smelt these shady moves. But somehow it leaked out and a local daily paper belonging to the Kashmiri Pandit Sabha published it. When other papers and news agencies tried to copy it, the censor stepped in and prohibited its publication in the State and circulation outside.
>
> The Kashmir Government is also trying to construct an all-weather road linking Kashmir with Jammu *via* Poonch, as in winter the Banihal Pass road is useless as the Banihal Pass (8950 ft. high) gets blocked up between Jammu and Srinagar, so that in winter,

if necessary, troops could be rushed from the Indian Union to the Kashmir State frontiers touching N.W.F.P. and north-west Punjab border. The Government of India has supplied the Kashmir Government with bulldozers for this purpose and expert technical advice is being arranged by the Indian Union through Skoda Engineers.

## THE SECRET TERMS

The terms which the Indian Union offered to Kashmir for accession are:—

(1) The Indian Union will foot the bill for the construction of a permanent bridge over the Ravi near Pathankote and also a railway line from Pathankote to Jammu............Indian Army Engineers are to be used for this purpose.

(Pandit Nehru opened this line and bridge which cost India Rs. 2,50,00,000 (two and a half crores) in July, 1948).

(2) As a special case, Kashmir State will be given an annual subvention of two crores of rupees for strengthening the State armed forces and manning the frontiers.

(3) Indian Army units will be posted at Gilgit and Air Force Units to be stationed at various strategic points, where the Indian Union will construct airfields.

(4) A lump sum of money, probably several crores, will be paid to Kashmir Government to modernise the State's frontier defences, notably on the west and north-west, touching Pakistan borders and Indian Army technical assistance will be made available for this purpose.

(5) The Treaty Road between Srinagar and Ladakh leading to Central Asia, will be jointly managed as was done during the last one hundred years by the British and the State.

(6) Kashmir State will be given the special privilege as under the British rule, to import foreign goods through Indian ports free of custom duty, thereby giving the State the advantage on all the imports into the State, whether from India or abroad.

There are several other minor clauses of a purely administrative nature. But what is most surprising is that Patel inspite of

all his lofty professions of establishing responsible Government in the States has not cared even to advise the Maharaja to establish full responsible Government in this State also. Under the new arrangement, the Maharaja is the undisputed master of 40,00,000 souls of whom over 80 percent are Muslims. He can play duck and drakes with them. Tyrants did not get such dictatorial powers."[1]

A no-tax campaign begun in Bagh and Rawalakot in early July was in full swing by September. A special ordinance empowering army officers, including and above the rank of a Lieutenant, to shoot at sight was issued on 2nd September. On 28th September, the Wazir of Poonch ordered not only the depositing of all kinds of arms in the nearest police stations, but also the surrender of military uniforms. New military posts were set up at Hill, seven miles from Kohala, Dhirkot, 15 miles from Kohala and Chirrala in Bagh tehsil and Tain, Thorar, Mung and Pallandari in Sudhnuti tehsil. A new cantonment was established in Rawalakot town, which was to cover the tehsils of Bagh and Sudhnuti. All boats on the Jhelum river which separates the tehsils of Bagh and Pallandari and the Sudhan-inhabited area of Sehnsa in Kotli tehsil from the tehsils of Murree and Garhi Habibullah in Hazara and Kahuta in Rawalpindi district, were burnt by Dogra soldiers on orders from their superiors. There was no vehicular bridge during those days on river Jhelum in these areas except a foot-bridge at Lachman Pattan; the idea in destroying the boats was to make the crossing of the river impossible at least in groups because these rivers are also crossed on floated skins known as 'Shina' and commonly in use throughout Asia and Africa. All important bridges were guarded by army sentries. The number of political prisoners in Poonch jail alone was more than a hundred.

## THE NEELABUTT MEETING

The vast Bagh tehsil is inhabited by several tribes: Maldayals, Dhoonds, Tezials, Sudhans, Normas, Sayeds etc. The trade and commerce was almost entirely in the hands of Hindu money-lenders. Due to fierce tribalism, no effective leadership, transcending tribal loyalties, could emerge out. In addition to tribal divisions, the tehsil has a geographic division too: Eastern Bagh and Western Bagh which has gone pretty deep into human minds. It has little width but is considerably long. Each tribe owed its first loyalty, to its own Elders, a few of whom, however, lost favour with their tribes on account of their

1. Imrany, p. 24.

pro-Government leanings. These few were confined to pockets like Chamyati, Dhirkot, Peel and Saysar. The Government appointed, in the beginning of 1947, two Zaildars: Sardar Muhammad Yaqub Khan from the Tezial tribe and Sardar Atta Muhammad Khan from the Dhoond tribe.

The Muslim Conference had a branch but as its local leadership was monopolised by Sayeds, it had little appeal. Even otherwise, its leadership was petty-minded and lacked substance. However, a large number of people who were not connected with any political party, were already at work because it was clearly a question of survival. Among them were Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, his younger brother Abdul Ghaffar, Sayed Muzaffar Hussain Nadvi, Muhammad Sanaullah Khan, Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh, Muhammad Ismail, Zabardast Khan, Master Ali Akbar, Kala Lambardar, Inayatullah, Raja Muhammad Siddiq (Now a Lt. Colonel), Raja Latif Khan, Babu Shahzad Khan, Bagha Khan etc., etc. The most promising amongst them, of course, was Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan whose tribe (Dhoonds) is the second largest in the tehsil. An ex-Havildar clerk in the Indian Army, he had been to parts of Africa and was also posted, for sometime, in Palestine where he had the opportunity to watch the growing subjugation of the holy land by Jews. After discharge at the end of the war, he took up service as a clerk in the local office of the Soldiers' Board. A bold, imaginative and dashing youngman, with excellent athletic physique, with his very appearance, he began to exercise wide appeal.

On the 23rd of August, 1947, a public meeting was held at Neelabutt, about three miles from Dhirkot town and at a height of nearly 7000 ft. The gathering must not have been very large because of Government repression and its very location. It was addressed, among others, by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Sadiq Hussain Shah, Shamshad Shah, Muhammad Ismail and Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh. The speakers condemned the army repression and demanded accession to Pakistan. They warned the Maharaja of grave consequences if he acceded to India. It was not the only meeting of its kind. Such meetings were held in hundreds and all over the State. Its unique importance, however, lies in the fact that it was followed by bloodshed which gave the State-wide non-violent movement for accession to Pakistan that was already in full swing, a new dimension in the shape of an armed revolt that eventually led to the liberation of Azad Kashmir and a UN-sponsored cease-fire on the basis of an agreement to hold a plebiscite.

At the close of the meeting, it was spontaneously decided to proceed to Bagh town, about twenty miles away, to stage a peaceful demonstration in support of accession to Pakistan. It was the tehsil headquarter as well as the citadel of the Dogra army in the tehsil. The purpose of the proposed demonstration was that government officers in the town may themselves judge the depth of their feelings and convey it to their higher-ups. The processionists were largely unarmed; all they had were either lathis or ordinary wood-cutting axes or small kitchen-knives. Bagh is a small town which then had a population of hardly three to four thousand with no vehicular road-link with the outside world. The nearest road was provided at Rawalakot which is about 15 miles away and at a height of 5000 ft. The population was 70% Hindu in the town but hardly 2% outside. There was no electricity and not even a telegraph office. The area is hilly and the nearest town, again, was Rawalakot.

That thousands of half-nourished and ill-clad people should have chosen to walk a distance of about 20 miles in order to stage a peaceful demonstration at the tehsil HQ in support of accession to Pakistan, shows the depth of their desire as well as determination to shake off the chains of slavery. We salute them with gratitude.

Some of the participants of the meeting returned to their homes, with the result that not many people joined the procession when it formed at Neelabutt but as the march progressed, it swelled in numbers. The first night was spent in the Arja mosque. As there was very little to eat, a group, headed by Sajawal Khan, broke into the shop of Nanak Chand money-lender and took away flour etc. which went in feeding at least some of the processionists.[1] Next day they reached Bani Pissari and encamped near the house of Lambardar Yaqub Khan. The local administration, headed by Munsif Moti Ram, sent Khawaja Muhammad Akbar and Amir Akbar Khan to inform them that a red line had been drawn somewhere between them and the town precincts and that if they crossed it, the Military would open fire.

## THE ARMED REVOLT BEGINS

It appears that some sort of negotiations went on because on the 25th, Sardar Said Hassan tehsildar, who later retired as Revenue Commissioner, came to repeat the administration decision that they would not be permitted to enter the town. When the people inhabiting the eastern part of the tehsil learnt that a procession from the western part on way to the town to stage a peaceful demonstration in support of accession to

1. As per written notes of Muhammad Sanaullah Khan.

Pakistan, had been blocked entry by the army, they came in two large processions headed each by Pir Ali Asghar Shah and Abdul Aziz Khan, Sudhan, of Malot. On the opposite side at Bani Pissari, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan and Shamshad Hussain Shah, leaving behind some persons in charge of the camp, led the procession through nullah Mahl to Hurabari but before the meeting could be convened, the Government enforced Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, banning the assembly of five or more persons. By now all the three processions had assembled at Hurabari. It was the 26th of August, 1947.[1]

At this stage were sighted, in the rear of the Bani Pissari camp, three Dogra soldiers from the Signal section, coming from Rawalakot with three mare-loads of supplies for the troops at Bagh. They were suddenly but impulsively surprised by a band, including Muhammad Bakhsh, Abdul Rehman, Sajawal Khan and Sabz Ali Khan. Their arms and ammunition were snatched away.

The public meeting at Hurabari was presided over by Asghar Ali Shah.[2] It was addressed by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Khadim Hussain Shah, Muhammad Akhtar of Darra, Mulla Ghulam and Sain Muhammad Akbar. It appears that by now the news of the Bani Pissari incident had reached the Dogra garrison which was about the strength of a Company and it was hurriedly decided to stage a show of force. Consequently, a shower of bullets suddenly rained upon the unarmed and peaceful audience, killing Kabul Khan of Sohawa, Abdul Rehman of Birpani and Khawaja Noor-ud-Din of Sewa on the spot. Some persons were wounded. It also appears that a few soldiers moved towards the Bani Pissari camp. It is claimed that there was an exchange of fire between them and Muhammad Bakhsh and his men. It is quite plausible in view of the above circumstances. No one is claimed to have been hit by Dogra firing at Bani Pissari, but there is a press-note issued by the Maharaja's Government on 12th September 1947 admitting the death of a Naik and the wounding of 2 soldiers on the 26th of August. It speaks of the Army firing on the 27th but that is wrong. The firing seems to have been shifted to the 27th to create an impression that the Army acted with restraint. As admittedly there was no firing from Muslims at Hurabari, the Dogra casualties were suffered as a result of the firing proceeding from Muhammad Bakhsh and his men at Bani Pissari. No arrests were made. The camp had to be abandoned and all, save eight to ten persons, ran away for shelter and safety. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Ali Asghar Shah, Muhammad Bakhsh, Sadiq Hussain Shah, Muhammad Ismail, Muhammad Akbar and others retreated to the nearby forest and sent letters to fellow partisans at Rawalakot, informing them of the happenings. They then dispersed.

1. & 2. Pakistan Monitor, AK Number, Oct. 1971, p. 3.

News of this incident was released to the press by the Maharaja's Government for the first time on 12th September. The press-note is fully covered in Maulana Fazal Din, Advocate's book 'Inquilab-e-Kashmir' published in 1948, and only partly in the American-published book 'Pakistan and the U.N.' by Khawaja Sarwar Hassan. English translation of the former is given below:

> "In early August (1947), some miscreants from tehsil Bagh and the northern areas of Sudhnuti tehsil started an extensive civil disobedience and no-tax agitation against the Government. The Wazir of Poonch did his utmost to make these *rebels* see reason but in vain. On the 24th of August, a highly excited mob armed with axes, spears and other arms collected on the western side of Bagh. On the 26th of August, some of our soldiers had an encounter with some peasants in which one of our soldiers (a Naik) was killed and two others were wounded. On the next day, the 27th of August, this huge assembly attacked Bagh town and laid siege to it. Our army detachment opened fire resulting in many deaths among the besiegers who then dispersed. The rebels then made a fresh attack but meanwhile reinforcements had been rushed from Rawalakot, with the result that Bagh was retrieved and the army took to vigorous patrolling of the area, dispersing the mobs at several places. The situation is now improving and civil administration has been re-established."

The allegation about Bagh having been besieged or attacked is entirely false. The author has spoken to scores of persons who were personally present but not one has confirmed it. There is no doubt therefore, that resort was made to these falsehoods to justify the cold-blooded killing of three persons attending a peaceful meeting.

## THE CONFRONTATION AT DOTHAN

The second and by far the most serious incident took place at Dothan on the 30th of August.[1] The Sudhan ex-servicemen who formed the bulk of the disbanded ex-servicemen in the district had been secretly organising themselves and preparing for what appeared even to a naked eye, a show-down with the Dogra army. The memories of skinning alive of leaders at Mung by Dogras a century earlier had never faded away and the subsequent fate of thousands of compatriots including women, some of whom were sold into slavery like a herd of cattle, was vividly remembered. Partition of the sub-continent into Hindu India and Muslim

1. Master Amir Alam, p. 276.

Pakistan and the Dogra-Congress conspiracy to steal this Muslim-majority State, quite naturally but poignantly revived the grim spectacle of what had happened a century ago. Some had secretly managed to buy darra-made rifles though their number was very small.

On the 30th of August, a band of Dogra soldiers was coming on foot from Hajira to reinforce the Dogra garrison at Rawalakot which was being developed as the second army base in the district, the main base being located at Poonch town, the district Headquarter. It clashed with a group of Sudhan ex-servicemen headed by Captain Muhammad Ashraf at Dothan, about seven miles behind Rawalakot. The exact number of the Dogra soldiers is not known but they may not have been more than a platoon strength. As they had been sent in consequence of the happenings at Bagh, they were fully armed. Captain Ashraf lost five men while several others were injured. The five martyrs in the cause of freedom were: Faqirullah of Namnote, Sahib Din of Kohiyan, Roshan Din of Chhotagalla, Sakhi Muhammad and his son, Atta Muhammad, of Dothan. Among the injured was Subedar Sardar Khan. It is now claimed that 18 Dogra soldiers were killed in the encounter but the claim seems to be untrue because in such an encounter where a fully armed platoon is pitched against an almost unarmed band, and wherein the fatal loss of the latter is only five, it is hard to believe that the Army would have lost 18 persons. Nobody has claimed that the dead were left behind or that anyone had the opportunity of counting them. Master Amir Alam, himself a Sudhan, who wrote the first account of the origin and progress of the war in Poonch in considerable detail and as early as 1948, as well as the author of the book Tarikh-e-Sudhan Qabail, are silent on the point. All this from the pen of involved and knowledgeable tribesmen, no less interested in the good name of their tribe, is a complete refutation of the said claim. However, as the incident was in the nature of an ambush, and Captain Ashraf and his men were occupying vantage points, the Dogras may have suffered casualties.

The third incident of firing took place at Arjah. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, Director Information, has written that it took place, five days after the Hurabari incident. Coming from Baltistan, he had no personal knowledge. It can be therefore presumed that he must have made due enquiries and also consulted Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan who was then President. Even persons who cannot be given greater credence than is due to fans, camp-followers or traditional family bards, do not fix this incident earlier than the 27th of August, so as to detract from the importance of the Dothan incident. From enquiries locally made, the date emerges out to be 16 or 17 of Bhaadoon 2004 of the then official Bikrami calendar while the Neelabutt meeting took

place on 6th Bhaadoon. I think it could not have taken place on the 27th of August because the detachment involved came from Srinagar and was apparently sent in consequence of the happenings on the 26th. From Kohala to Dhirkot, a climb of 15 miles on foot and a further descent of almost equal distance upto Arjah, also on foot, plus the time consumed in the exchange of messages and to make the detachment mobile at Srinaagar, 134 miles from Kohala, precludes the appearance of the detachment at Arjah on the 27th.

From Dhirkot the detachment took Hussain Khan, Lambardar Kanthal and Sher Afzal Khan and Bostan Khan, Lambardars of Makhiala as guides. In the Thob forest which is adjacent to Arjah nullah, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Muhammad Bakhsh, Muhammad Ismail and perhaps a few more opened fire on the detachment. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan told this writer that he alone in the group fired while Sardar Muhammad Sanaullah Khan, a leading member of the Tezial community, who was prominently associated with the political movement in the area even before these happenings, has, in a written note, stated that it was only Muhammad Bakhsh who fired on the Dogras. This incident will come up for a detailed discussion in the third volume.

There is no credible evidence that there were any casualties. When I questioned Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan about it, he told me that although he didn't personally see any, there must have been some casualties among the Dogras .During the last 30 years no reliable evidence at all has come forth in support of any casualties. The encounter however, delayed their movement for 24 hours. They raided the house of Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan, burnt it down as well as a mosque and there is no doubt that henceforth his name was at the top of the wanted people's list. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan then crossed into Pakistan and returned after securing arms and ammunition.

The Dogras then set up military posts at Chirala and Chamankot and embarked upon intense patrolling and resorted to terror and forced exactions. In the last week of September, Pandit Ram Chand Raina, Administrator Poonch, came to Dhirkot and heard details of the earlier incidents and the excesses committed by the Army. It is claimed that he expressed regrets and told the people that the Maharaja had committed a mistake by inducting the Army into the area and that he had thus wronged not only the country but also himself.

## WHO FIRED THE FIRST SHOT?

In August, 1971, when the Qaiyum Government, for the first time, observed the "Neela-Butt Day", several articles were officially contributed to newspapers and some hand-bills also distributed. In none of them was it claimed that any soldier was killed at Hurabari or Bani Pissari. All that has been claimed is that late Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh snatched away the rifle of a sepoy along with three mare-loads of supplies which he was carrying to Bagh. Reference may be made to the issues of Javedan and Nawa-i-Waqt and the Special Azad Kashmir supplement of Mr. Aziz Beg's Pakistan Monitor dated the 22—29 October 1971. Similarly reference may also be made to an equally highly pro-Qaiyum article published in the Nawa-i-Waqt on Ist November, 1970 and another article by one of Sardar Qaiyum's most seasoned pressmen, Mr. Gulzar Ahmed Fida, published in Daily Mashriq Lahore on the 23rd of August, 1970. It seems to be thus established that the first time firing proceeded from the Muslim side is traced to late Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh, Abdur Rehman and their colleagues. The Dogra press-note is a tissue of lies on several important points such as; that Bagh town was attacked and besieged, that after the army opened fire and killed several men, the rebels made a fresh attack and that the town was "retrieved" after reinforcements came from Rawalakot. Not even those who have blown the incident out of all proportions to bask in the resultant glory, have made any such claims so far. Therefore, whether the Arjah encounter took place on the 27th or after the Dothan incident, in view of the apparent firing at Bani Pissari on 26th of August, in which, per Dogra press-note, one Naik was killed and two soldiers injured, the singular honour of using fire-arms against the Dogra Army and also producing casualties, apparently goes to late Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh and his companions.

The legend of Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan being Mujahid-e-Awwal, is traced to an article written by Mr. Richard Symonds, Deputy Director, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of Bengal (1944-45) and a member of the U.N. Kashmir Commission Secretariat (1948-49) who worked with the Friends Relief Service (a foreign organization) on a mercy mission in the strife-torn areas of Punjab. It was published in the Calcutta edition of the Statesman, on 4th February 1948. It said:

> "As August 15 and the partition of India drew near, there were meetings and demonstrations in Poonch in favour of Kashmir joining Pakistan. Martial Law was introduced *and meetings fired on. After one such incident on August 27 in Nila But*, Abdul Qaiyum, a young zamindar, started the revolt with a few friends. Substantial men told

me that they would never have joined such a rash enterprise but for the folly of Dogras who burnt whole villages where only a single family was involved in revolt. Rapidly most of the Muslim ex-servicemen joined Qaiyum and in six weeks the whole district, except for Poonch city itself, was in rebel hands."

This article has been relied upon by Ch. Muhammad Ali, Lord Birdwood, Joseph Korbel and Khawaja Sarwar Hassan.

If I have correctly understood the position taken by Sardar Qaiyum, it is not, as his thoughtless supporters claim, that he fired the first shot, as if there was a sportsmatch which began with a signal shot, or that there was an exchange of fire at Neelabutt on 23rd August which claims are both historically incorrect, but that the Liberation movement started with the public meeting at Neelabutt and its consequent follow up and that all this was the result of his planning and direction.

Many sections of people hotly contest the correctness of this claim. His critics claim that the title of Mujahid-e-Awwal was born out of the dictates of power-politics. WHAT THEN IS THE TRUTH? What part of it is a fact and how much of it is fiction? It makes an interesting story which has been told minutely and impartially in the 3rd volume of this book.

In any case, luck and personal merit has already moved him so ahead of his colleagues-at-start, that he has the distinction of twice having headed the Azad Kashmir Government and of being one of its most domineering, chrismic and successful Presidents. He has already become a part of our history. No doubt he is a controversial figure, inspiring blind loyalty as well as arousing intense hatred but important people are always controversial just as important books or ideas are also always controversial. That is part of the human character and an integral part of this human-ruled habitation. That does not detract from his importance.

On failure to arrest him, the Dogras burnt down his house and removed to the Military barracks at Bagh, his mother, an uncle, aunt and a ten-month old sister who was running high temperature. They were interrogated about his whereabouts. It seems that the simple and forthright manner of replies by his mother who is, on all hands, reported to have been pious and God-fearing, spending most of her time in prayers, impressed the Dogra Captain Khajoora Singh so much that with a little friendly persuasion by Khawaja Amir-ud-Din, Naib Tehsildar, he sent them home on executing bonds making

themselves liable to attend on summons. I have often heard Sardar Qaiyum's personal enemies say that he owes his meteoric rise in life to the prayers of his mother.

## GENERAL M.Z. KIANI

It was in this background that some thinking started in official circles, particularly at Peshawar and Lahore, that something needed urgently to be done to prevent an Indian fait accompli in Kashmir and this introduces us to men who played an important role in the events that followed. Foremost among them are Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Prime Minister N.W.F.P., Nawab of Mamdot, Prime Minister West Punjab, Mian Iftikharud-Din, a leader of the Muslim League and proprietor of the daily 'Pakistan Times', on the civil side and General Mohammad Zaman Kiani, Ex-Major General Akbar Khan (then Col.) Director of Weapons and Equipment G.H.Q. Rawalpindi, and Major Khurshid Anwar, Commander All India Muslim League National Guards. Of these, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, General Kiani, ex-Major General Akbar Khan and Major Khurshid Anwar played a decisive role. Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan was firmly of the view that the liberation of the State through an internal uprising was not possible because even if such an uprising was able to register any substantial initial success, India was not going to remain at the fence and would jump in with all her power and there would then remain no chance of the success of such an uprising. He was, therefore, of the opinion that while an internal revolt was desirable, what really was needed was an organised attack from Pakistan. It seems that he had already established contact with Major Khurshid Anwar and had drawn up a plan for the entry of tribesmen into the State through Muzaffarabad. At the other end, the authorities at Lahore were in contact with Mr. M.Z. Kiani.

Born in Islamabad, he joined the Indian Army in 1927. In 1931 he topped in the entry test for Dehra Dun Military Academy which he joined in 1933 and topped in all papers in 1935. He was awarded the Sword of Honour and a gold medal. He was commissioned as Second Lt. in the first 14th Regiment and had been promoted as Major by the end of 1940. In 1941 he went to Malaya as a Staff Officer for the General Staff but with the fall of the British colony to the Japanese, was taken a prisoner. Subhas Chandra Bose who escaped to Germany via Peshawar where he was received at the railway station incognito, by Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, later A.K. President, founded in 1943, the Indian National Army, comprising prisoners of war and locally recruited persons of the sub continental origin. Mr. Kiani was appointed General of a pick Division which fought at Imphal against General Gracey who later became Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. It was the first I.N.A. Division.

General Kiani was also Secretary of the War Council and according to Mr. Cassell, the author of the 'Springing Tiger', on the 16th August, 1945 before flying to Japan on his fatal trip, Bose left a written note that General Kiani will represent the provisional Azad Hind Government during his absence. After the war ended and I.N.A. personnel was released, an All India I.N.A. Advisery Committee was set up with Mr. Kiani as Chairman. Sardar Patel was keen that the I.N.A. leaders organise Congress volunteers and was prepared to commit, initially, Rs. fifty lakhs for its expenditure but Mr. Kiani and his Muslim colleagues declined to fall in the trap because they apprehended that it may be used against Muslims.

Mr. Kiani was now in touch with the Government leaders at Lahore about the situation in Kashmir. The Government was not prepared to do anything on the official level because of the fear that it may provoke an Indo-Pakistan war. It was therefore considered expedient to use the I.N.A. officers and men as well as ex-servicemen and other volunteers. Mr. Kiani therefore chalked out a plan which was duly handed over to the concerned authorities and was already in their hands when the first high level meeting was held in the Government House, Lahore, on 12th September, 1947.

## GENERAL AKBAR KHAN

Simultaneously, at the other end, but nearer to Kashmir, another plan was being evolved at Murree. Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din visited Murree, perhaps, towards the close of August or early September. He had a meeting with Col. Akbar Khan and as it was upper most in the mind of everyone, they naturally discussed Kashmir. A few days earlier Col. Akbar had a meeting with Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan who had already set up his base at the hill resort. They discussed the situation in detail. Sardar Ibrahim told him that to begin with, they needed five hundred rifles but the problem was from where to get them. Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din told Col. Akbar that something had to be done about Kashmir, that it had to be done unofficially and that the Punjab Government was prepared to commit some funds. Obviously, Mian Sahib was proceeding to Srinagar in furtherance of some discussions held at Lahore.

## THE FATEFUL MEETING

Col. Akbar Khan then came to Pindi and in a few days prepared an outline entitled "Armed Revolt inside Kashmir," a dozen copies of which

were given to Mian Iftikhar ud Din on his return from Srinagar. On 12th September, a preliminary meeting was held at Lahore on the provincial level but the important meeting took place at the Government House at 6 p.m. with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan Prime Minister in the chair. It was attended by Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, then Finance Minister, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Mr. M.Z. Kiani, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, Nawab of Mamdot, Ch. Mohammad Ali, Mr. Khurshid Anwar and Col. Akbar Khan. Professor Muhammad Ishaque claims that he and Ch. Hameedullah Khan were also present; that Ch. Hameedullah was told to inform Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan of the invasion plan and that a Committee comprising himself, Mr. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad with Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din as Chairman, was also appointed to draft a "Declaration of Freedom."[1] Mr. Kiani's was a three-tier plan which envisaged (1) preparation of armed bands in Poonch who were to advance upon Srinagar; (2) a net work of an underground movement was to be organised in the Valley to rise in revolt at an appropriate hour; and (3) in order to prevent any substantial help from reaching the State from India, the Kathua—Jammu road was to be harassed and disturbed. It also contemplated employment of officers and other ranks of the Indian National Army to operate from across the Punjab border. Col. Akbar Khan emphasised the importance of the Kathua road and the absolute necessity of not only disrupting the flow of traffic there but also taking care of the Srinagar air field. *He offered four thousand rifles.* According to Mr. Kiani, as told to this writer, Col. Akbar informed the meeting that according to military intelligence, Indians were already getting ready; that arms and volunteers were pouring into the State; that the R.S.S was also being armed and that any delay in action from this side was likely to defeat the end in view. He therefore advised immediate action.

A sum of Rs. 10,000 was placed at the disposal of Mr. Kiani to get the thing going! It was at his suggestion that Khawaja Abdur Rahim I.C.S. was posted to Rawalpindi as Commissioner in order to have an energetic and dependable officer at hand because the border districts of Gujrat, Jhelum, Rawalpindi and the tehsil of Murree were under the territorial jurisdiction of the Rawalpindi Commissionerate. Col. Akbar was not as yet directly involved and the entire operation was entrusted to Mr. Kiani except the Kohala-Muzaffarabad sector which was to be handled by Mr. Khurshid Anwar who was required to organise an underground movement in the area. It is emphatically stated by both Mr. Akbar Khan as well as Mr. Kiani that the induction of the tribesmen was neither under consideration at the time nor was it a part of the plan as submitted or approved in the meeting. How perfunctory the discussion was and how

1. Weekly Chattan, 10-9-73.

personal rivalries had already raised their ugly heads, unmindful of the stakes involved, may be judged from what Mr. Akbar has recorded:

> "In the atmosphere of cheerfulness and confidence that prevailed, it did not seem right for me to strike too serious a note by drawing attention to even such elementary matters as the need for ammunition and the means of communication for exercising control. The unpleasant truth as I now see it was that there was complete ignorance about the business of anything in the nature of military operations."

According to the same author, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, then Revenue Minister, Punjab Government, who had held the rank of a Captain in the Indian Army, was to be in over-all charge of the operation. However, a very reliable source told this writer that an attack had also to be made from Sialkot and that the task had been entrusted to Shaukat Hayat by the Nawab of Mamdot.

Continues Mr. Akbar Khan:

> "Upon coming out of the conference room, Khurshid Anwar took me aside and told me that he was not going to accept any orders from Shaukat Hayat Khan. I did my best to persuade him to realise that without complete co-operation there would be chaos and therefore he must play the game fairly. He was not convinced. I was just wondering what to do about this when Shaukat Hayat Khan also came and told me that he had absolutely no confidence in Khurshid Anwar. In view of this mutual lack of confidence, I suggested that he should immediately see the Prime Minister and get someone else in place of Khurshid Anwar. But he said Khurshid Anwar was the choice of the authorities concerned and nothing could be done about it at this stage."[1]

It will be noted that no Kashmiri-speaking leader or worker was taken into confidence. Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah, the only pro-Pakistan leader with a personal following among them, was not consulted; no Kashmiri-speaking member of the Assembly was invited or contacted. It is not that Ch. Hameed Ullah Khan was by chance available in Lahore. We have it on the authority of Mr. Ishaque that two Army officers sent from Pakistan contacted them in Srinagar and told them that they were required in Lahore. If only office-bearers of the MC were to be taken into confidence, why not Kh. Ghulam Din Wani, then Acting General Secretary of the Party whose loyalty to Pakistan was as total as

1. Raiders in Kashmir, p. 17.

that of anyone else? Kashmiri-speaking Muslims constitute about 60% of the State's total Muslim population. There is a Kashmiri proverb:

یس کوره خاندر - سو کور لوبرن -
چوبرن کره تو منیزے رات -

Translation: While the would-be bride has been sent to collect cow-dung,
Her suitors have assembled to solemnise her marriage.

Even Sardar Ibrahim, then Chief Whip of the Parliamentary group who was already in Pakistan and whose tribe was unmistakably poised for a leading role, was not invited.

The responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the Muslim Conference leadership whose policy of mistrust of Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, born, either, out of inferiority complex or resulting from Sh. Muhammad Abdullah's dominant role, has ever been the bane of the Party's politics, right from its revival in 1942.

## ARMED RESISTANCE BEGINS

In what now is the liberated Poonch, the tehsils of Pallandari and Rawalakote are overwhelmingly inhabited by the Sudhan tribe. A sizable number of Sudhans also inhabit its other two tehsils of Bagh and Haveli. It thus constitutes the most important tribe in the district. Soldiery being their principal occupation, no government can function really effectively without their willing co-operation. Some of their traits are impressive and commendable. For instance, they are simple in manners, generally truthful, reliable as friends and collaborators; on the whole, honest and hardworking, though there is also no dearth of crooks. It was very seldom that I came across a beggar in that area. They respect their elders and warmly respond to kindness. Although they still have a largely tribal approach and are unduly plagued by a superiority complex and need to look, in their own larger interests, beyond the high mountains they live behind, I think it is also true that they have been defamed and abused, largely by people motivated by malice or jealous of their sheer weight. I came to know them somewhat intimately since 1969 and found them a vastly better people, both individually as well as collectively, than they are represented to be.

For the liberation of what we may call the Sudhan-land, they fought their own battle, shed their own blood, sacrificed the flower of their

community and enacted deeds of valour that can do honour to any community, anywhere in the world.

From amongst them came Hussain Khan, a retired Captain of the Indian Army. Taken a prisoner by the Japanese on the Burma front, he is claimed to have succeeded not only in planning his own escape but also of two senior English Officers. Sometime before the outbreak of the armed resistance, when the Dogras were out on an adventure of plunder and pillage, a band trespassed into his home and carried away one of his sheep; his wife who tried to prevent the robbery, was heckled. On coming home, the Captain was agitated and vowed to take revenge. Consultations now began with ex-servicemen and other youth. Hussain preferred the INA personnel saying that having taken up arms against their British rulers, they were more suitable to fight their Dogra rulers as well. However, not many INA men were available in the area. The enlistment completed, he led some two hundred or so ex-soldiers to a nearby forest and placing a copy of the Holy Quran on the branch of a tree, made them pass beneath it, taking an oath of secrecy and sacrifice.

He had a little saving; he persuaded Col. (Hon.) Khan Muhammad Khan to part with a few thousand rupees of his saving and bought arms and ammunition from the tribal area. Miss Nasira Siddiqi was also helpful in providing some arms and ammunition. Quite naturally, such a man was bound to inspire confidence and command respect.

Meanwhile, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan set up his base at Murree. Many prominent leaders and workers including Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah also came there. In Murree, the local Muslims were of considerable help. Some of them raised money which was given to Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan for the purchase of arms and ammunition, then smuggled into Poonch through the daring efforts of the Satti tribe.

## ATTACK ON DHIRKOTE THANA

Sardar Qaiyum also went to Murree where Mr. Sultan Maqsood, tehsildar, who has been very highly spoken of by all persons then working in the area, for his devotion to the cause of Kashmir's freedom, gave him an assurance of support. At a meeting held at the house of the Pir of Makhad, a sum of Rs.30,000 was raised for the purchase of darra-made rifles; ten were handed over to Sardar Qaiyum who crossed into Poonch and on the 16th of Asuj (28.9.47), led a daring armed attack on the Police Station Dhirkot. Among others, he was accompanied and assisted by Raja Muhammad Siddiq, Muhammad Rashid Khan, Muhammad Latif, Kala Khan, Sohbat Khan, Muhammad Bakhsh, Muhammad

Afzal, Muhammad Akbar, Pahalwan Khan, Dana Khan, Hussain Khan and Muhammad Sanaullah. The SHO was at Arja. Of the fire-arms that fell into their hands, mostly were topidar rifles.[1] The police station was housed in a rented building, belonging to one Ghulam Mustafa. His nephew, Muhammad Siddique, now a Lt. Col. in the AKRF who was also among the attackers, set it on fire. It was a daring expedition and apart from raising the morale of local Muslims, must have, together with the Dothan incident, shaken the morale of the Dogras. There was no Dogra soldier in the thana, and there was no resistance even by the few policemen who may have been there.[2] Complying with his orders to hand over the key of the Mal-Khana, Sardar Qaiyum ordered his men not to molest them.

Sometime later, three hundred rifles, according to Sardar Qaiyum, were made available to them at Murree by Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, out of which a hundred were given to him. By the end of September, the situation was very grim. The position now was that although the Dogra army still remained posted at certain strategic places such as Kohala, Hajira, Mung, Azad Pattan, Poonch town etc., the civil administration had almost collapsed. The taxes were neither paid nor realised. The Court work had practically come to a standstill and non-muslims were abandoning their homes for shelter in Poonch town. A few got killed in the effort.

A Sikh notable from Hajira, Khazan Singh, addressing a public meeting in the town urged upon the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. He was later killed by the Dogras.

Sardar Ibrahim convened a meeting at Dhalkote on the Pakistan side of the river, attended by Subedar Afsar Khan, Subedar Bostan Khan of Nar and Subedar Bostan Khan of Rara, to take stock of the situation in Poonch. A second meeting was held at Murree which was attended among others by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum, Captain Hussain Khan of Rawalakot, Subedar Afsar Khan of Mung, Subedar Bostan Khan of Nar, Subedar Bostan Khan of Rihara, Jemadar Afsar Khan of Thorar, Maulvi Ghulam Haider Jandalvi, Sardar Muhammad Sharif etc. It was the most important meeting held so far. It was decided to raise funds, purchase arms and ammunition, permit personnel of the Pakistan army recruited from Poonch to secure leave and join the war of liberation as repeatedly demanded by them. The meeting also decided upon the routes to be adopted for importing arms and ammunition, the points of delivery, the places where these were to be dumped, the persons who

1. Notes by Muhammad Sanaullah.
2. Weekly Pak Kashmir, 22—29 December, 1976.

were to keep their custody or carry them from Murree to their destination. The meeting divided Poonch into the following sectors:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Sector No. 1 | Bagh | Between river Jhelum and nullah Mahl Poonch. |
| 2. Sector No. 2 | Rawalakot. | |
| 3. Sector No. 3 | Pallandari | |

Sardar Abdul Qaiyum and Pir Ali Asghar Shah were put incharge of Bagh sector; Captain Hussain Khan, Captain Rehmatullah and Subedar Bostan Khan of Rara were put incharge of the Rawalakot sector, while Khan Sahib, Khan Muhammad Khan, Captain Chanu Khan and Captain Hussain Khan Gorah were placed incharge of the Pallandari sector.[1]

## EX-SERVICEMEN FROM POONCH

It was just as could be expected because no self-respecting man, much less a soldier who had fought for other's freedom and equality in the far off lands of Africa, France, Italy and South-east Asia, could have passively accepted the burning of his small possessions, the destruction of his standing crops, the killing of his kith and kin and the violation and abduction of his women. No civilised law requires a man to watch helplessly such acts of wanton aggression and humiliation. Laws of all countries invest a person even with the right of killing such an aggressor and certainly the laws of nations cannot proceed on a different note. After all, of what use to the State Muslims or those of the district of Poonch were the forty thousand or so ex-soldiers and more than a Division still on active service in the Pakistan army? In the second World war, 71,667 men were directly recruited from the State; of these 60,402[2] were Muslims, an overwhelming majority of whom came from Poonch. Mr. Wilfrid Russel says about them even before the entry of tribesmen into the picture:

> "These Muslim mountaineers lived just over the ridge of Apherwat, which towered above us in Gulmarg. They were an independent type of people, who had never loved their ruler and whose inaccessible villages made defiance of his regime a not too difficult task. Even at this moment, I learned that the Maharaja was in the act of sending troops against them and against those Muslims who lived in the only part of Kashmir which was Hindu in character—lowlying province of Jammu, which lay to the south of Himalayas and was

1. Mir Alam, p. 287.
2. Mr. Sarwar Abbasi in Weekly Kashir, October, 1977.

the home-land of the ruling family. From another retired Colonel, with whom I played golf and who had been one of the most experienced recruiting officers of the old Indian army, I heard that Poonch is providing a large proportion of the fighting infantry of the Punjab regiments and that no less than fifteen thousand of them—the equivalent of a division—were serving in the Pakistan Army."[1]

Says another impartial observer of the scene, Mr. Michael Edwards:

"The Muslim inhabitants of the district of Poonch were a martial people who had supplied thousands of hardy soldiers to the old British Indian Army. After partition, former soldiers in Poonch demonstrated in favour of Kashmir acceding to Pakistan. When these demonstrations were fired upon by the Maharaja's Hindu troops, the demonstrators rose in rebellion and put the State forces to flight. The rebellion sparked off further disorder, for the rule of the Maharaja had not been pleasant. The Kashmiri peasant was extremely poor; State taxes were crushing; many Kashmiri homes were without windows because of a special window tax; there was even a tax on hearthstones, wives, animals, on practically everything, in fact. The money went to support a profligate and bigoted ruler and a small minority of Hindu officials."[2]

This is what Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz has to say about it:

"The Poonch, where thousands of demobilised Muslim veterans of the Second World war live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his new administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining areas of Mirpur where, also, war veterans lived in large numbers. Instead of realising what he had done, Maharaja Hari Singh egged on by Congress leaders and the new counsellors, despatched the whole of the Dogra army to quell the disturbances, or as one Rajput Colonel puts it, 'to reconquer the area'. The army perpetrated unheard-of atrocities on the people of Poonch; whole villages were burnt down and innocent people massacred. Reports reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the press, and no official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September and the tribesmen did not enter the State before the 23rd of October, 1947."[3]

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1. Indian Summer, p. 138.
2. The Last Years of British India, p. 201
3. Freedom Struggle, p. 325.

On 5th October, Mr. Jagat Ram, Special Magistrate on duty with the troops was killed by two Sudhan ex-soldiers while negotiating Canchry Gali between Thorar and Mung. The total number of arms available with the ex-servicemen, at Tain, Thorar and Mung was sixty darra-made rifles. According to Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, the attack on the Dhirkot police station on 28th September and the killing of the Magistrate on the 5th was premature because the D-day had been fixed for the 22nd of October. He further claims that these premature incidents put the Dogras to notice that the local ex-servicemen were well-provided with arms and ammunition which not only increased their vigilance but also deprived the liberators of the element of surprise that was intended to be achieved by a simultaneous attack everywhere. Another result was that the Dogras started large scale destruction of crops, largely to ensure safety during its rigorous patrolling which led to the uprising taking place a week earlier.[1] There is no conclusive evidence as to what the D-Day was. In any case, it was due to over-enthusiasm that these incidents took place ahead of the D-day.

## PART OF SUDHNUTI TEHSIL LIBERATED

On the Mung sector, where Subedar Afsar Khan was in overall charge, the Dogra army had set up its camp in the Middle School building and its adjoining houses. On 6th October, at 4.30 a.m. Afsar launched an attack with 30 volunteers. The Dogra soldiers overcame the initial shock and rallied back with a counter-attack. The abundance of arms and ammunition and their location put them, comparatively, in an advantageous position. The Muslims had thirty rifles with 48 rounds of ammunition each. The encounter lasted for two days because while the Dogras were firing from inside the buildings, the Muslims were taking advantage of the protection afforded by trees and rocks. Realising that the engagement was getting prolonged and that reinforcements for the besieged Dogras must already be on their way from Rawalakot, Subedar Afsar Khan, acting in the noblest traditions of war-leadership, unsheathed his sword and accompanied by a few daring colleagues, made a dash for the camp and succeeded in entering the main building. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The gallant Subedar was killed on the spot alongwith six of his colleagues.

بناء کردند خوش رسمے بخاک و خون غلطیدن

While the situation stood thus at Mung, another battle was already raging at Thorar. On the instructions of Subedar Bostan Khan of Hara who was in overall charge of the Mung and Thorar sectors, Subedar

1. Kashmir Saga, p. 72

Bostan Khan of Nar, leading a group of 36 ex-soldiers, attacked the Dogra camp on the same morning at 4 a.m. Thirty were armed with darra-made rifles while the remaining six had swords. The Thorar post was more important than that of Mung because it was also the latter's supply base. Here also the Dogra army had set up its camp in the Middle School building and dug out trenches. Six volunteers armed with swords, made, in the classical tradition, for the building and succeeded in overtaking the Enemy almost by surprise. In the first flush of attack, they were able to kill some Dogras but ultimately four of them got killed on the spot. However, the remaining two returned to their colleagues though with great difficulty. By now the battle had raged for about 24 hours. By this time, a number of Dogra soldiers had been killed at both places and the remainder were finding it difficult to hold on to their positions. It must be said to the credit of Dogras that they are no mean soldiers and can be rightly counted among the finest fighters in the world. Besides, they too had a cause, namely, to uphold the rule of their community and its continued supremacy in all fields of governmental activity. It was, therefore, natural that they should have fought desperately and determinedly.

Presumably, they contacted their Rawalakot HQ by wireless because a detachment was sent for their relief. Rawalakot is 16 miles from Thorar and 23 miles from Mung. The Muslims must have realized that unless they were able to finish their job quickly, the whole attempt was likely to result in their own death and destruction of what remained in the surroundings. The situation called for supreme courage and let it be said to the credit of these ex-servicemen that they were not found wanting; members of a force, which gave a bitter fight to Rommel's storm-troopers in the African Sahara and the Suicide/Squads of the tough Japanese in the epidemic-infested jungles of Burma and Indonesia, they could not be unequal to such a situation. Realizing that the only safe course was to capture the machine-gun, Havildar Qabul Khan, Havildar Ikhtiar Khan and Muhammad Qasim Khan, residents of Nar, volunteered themselves and with lightening speed rushed forward. They were quickly followed by others. All the three were gunned down but the torch of self-sacrifice thus lighted did not extinguish; their comrades were able to capture the post and kill the remnants of the garrison.

During the attack on, and siege of, this post, several women heroically lent a helping hand by preparing rotis and grinding the corn for the fighters. Regardless of personal safety, some of them carried the rotis and water to the fighters on their posts of duty amidst terrific gun-fire. Three of these gallant Sudhan ladies, following in the foot-steps of Fatimah of Tripoli and immortalised by Iqbal, Jabra Begum, Hussain Bibi

and Hassan Bibi were killed by the Enemy. On the Thorar front 26 Muslim soldiers were killed and eleven injured. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition fell into their hands.[1]

When the news of the attack on the two posts reached Rawalakot, Colonel Ram Lal left for their relief at the head of a large column. Upto Brohta, a distance of 8 miles, they caused considerable destruction by firing indiscriminately on unarmed civilians and burning down houses and standing crops. Eight Muslims led by Jemadar Bagga Khan of Hurna Mera armed with darra-made rifles acquired from the guerilla's main-supply depot the same morning ambushed them in the Betrain Jungle, inflicting some losses. The ambush having delayed their advance by several hours, they reached Bosa Gala by 10 p.m. By that time, the Thorar camp had been liquidated.

The Dogra soldiers posted at Tain abandoned the post on the same day on account of increasing harassment at the hands of freedom-fighters and joined Ram Lal's column which found the camp deserted but littered with dead bodies. On 10th October, the column abandoned Thorar and made for Mung. Between Thorar and Mung, there was some sniping by local Muslims which slowed down their march; they covered the short distance in about twelve hours, reaching Mung in the evening. Both at Thorar and Mung, they cremated their dead comrades. After an overnight stay at Mung and after collecting non-Muslims of the area, they withdrew to Rawalakot on 11th October, indulging in indiscriminate firing and the burning down of houses and crops in their way.

A sizable group of Muslims led by Captain Noor Hussain Khan of Hurna Mera with sixty rifles and forty-eight rounds of ammunition, each, engaged the column at Ain Gala, near Khirak. Both sides sustained casualties. The Dogras burnt some houses and killed six unarmed Muslims in their homes.

The Dogra High command was now in a difficult position. It would have been sheer folly to rush all their troops to Poonch and leave the rest of the State undefended. Though Thorar and Mung had been cleared of the Dogras, the Muslims were not in a position to hold them as a base partly because they didn't have a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition but largely because the Dogras were still entrenched at Rawalakot on one side and Pallandari and Lachhman-Pattan on the other. So although it was apparently possible for them to reoccupy the posts at Thorar and Mung and garrison them with larger number of troops and

1. Mir Alam, p. 293.

sufficient provisions, they must have, on a dispassionate analysis, thought it rather an impossible job because the whole area was inhabited by ex-servicemen and it was neither possible to ensure their safety nor to keep the supply line open. The Dogras therefore decided to withdraw from both the posts. It seems that the task given to the column of Colonel Ram Lal was to evacuate the besieged garrisons and the non-Muslim inhabitants of the area to Rawalakot. This withdrawal, as also stated by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, was of great help to the freedom fighters because it placed in their hands a vast territory for use as a base. All efforts were now directed towards the capture of Rawalakot town, the battle for whose liberation was one of the most decisive in the war and the most decisive in the district of Poonch. Col. Ram Lal had earlier earned notoriety in Sind for his anti-Muslim role in the British suppression of Hurs.

## RAWALAKOT LIBERATED

Colonel Ram Lal's column entered Rawalakot on 13th October. Upto 18th October there was no engagement as both sides were preparing for a show-down. On the 18th, a batch of Dogra soldiers attacked village Trar in the vicinity of the town and burnt down crops, fodder, houses as well as house-hold goods. From here they tried to move to another village but were engaged by a group led by Jemadar Allah Ditta Khan of Khirak. There were losses on both sides but the Dogras were compelled to retreat. On 21st October another batch of Dogra soldiers attacked village Barmung and indulged in arson and loot. On 23rd October yet another batch attacked Pothi Makwalan. This time, there was a serious clash because Muslims were now determined not to allow the habitual rampage. Seventeen Dogra soldiers are claimed to have been killed and one soldier was caught alive. The unique importance of the encounter lies in the fact that it was for the first time that a Dogra soldier was taken a prisoner. Three supply-loaded donkeys were also captured. On the 21st and 22nd, two aeroplanes with Maharaja Hari Singh, Prime Minister Mahajan and some army officers on board, made repeated appearance in the area. On 25th October at 4 a.m., a sizable Dogra force again attacked Trar and tried to molest women and manhandle the old and the infirm. Under pressure from the freedom fighters, they were again compelled to retreat. Between 26th and 30th October, there raged an almost continuing battle in the centre of the town resulting in considerable loss to both sides. On the 31st, the Dogras received fresh reinforcements from Poonch. On 4th November, the freedom fighters went quite close to the Dogra trenches and launched an attack, but were repulsed with considerable losses. On 6th November, Muslims made another determined attack

on the town, inflicting considerable losses. A few Muslims who succeeded in penetrating behind the forward defences of the Enemy, did not return back and are presumed to have been killed. On this day Indian planes bombed the area for the first time, but the loss was practically nil.

Captain Hussain Khan who commanded Muslim forces was a tough and daring soldier and showed great qualities as a war-leader. It was his inspiring leadership and the personal example of courage, patience and total dedication, inherent in his character, that not only kept the ill-equipped and half-starving irregulars on their posts of duty during so many tiresome days but also led them to victory in the face of heavy odds.

The Dogras entrenched themselves in the main mosque. They even kept their animal transport there, hoping that Muslims would not attack it. When the siege prolonged, Hussain Khan succeeded in securing a 3" mortar from Rawalpindi. It was brought upto Panjarr in a truck but as there was no vehicular road from here to Rawalakote, a distance of 38 miles, it was tied with wooden poles and carried by jawans on their shoulders. In Rawalakote it was installed on a hillock, to the south. Search now began for a gunner and luckily, one Havildar Sanwala Khan, who had fought against the Japanese, on learning of the call of duty, came running to take charge of the machine. The excitement was great; that a 3" mortar should be in action in their own Cause, made many a people weep. The first out-burst missed the target and people exchanged glances for the loss of precious ammunition but the next one hit the mosque and the third one saw the enemy fleeing. Probably the best mosque of the district, now stands there. The Commander must have also felt that the siege was getting prolonged and that before the enemy was further reinforced, it was essential to make a supreme effort for its liberation. The Dogras fought very well indeed; the fighting continued till the next day when ultimately they were over-powered. Some were killed and the remnants escaped towards Sangula. A considerable quantity of arms, ammunition and supplies fell into Muslims hands. Jemadar Nawab Shah of Androt and Jemadar Sarwar Khan of Hurna-Mera were found dead near the enemy trenches. While the Dogra troops were retreating, Rawalakot was again bombed by Indian planes, which resulted in the death of five Muslims including Jemadar Khan Muhammad Khan of Stone. Among those injured was Lt. Summandar Khan of Lunjgran.

Many an incident of heroism and self-sacrifice came to be enacted. There remained a pocket of resistance in the Civil Hospital. Hussain Khan asked for two volunteers; there was no dearth. Two youth, Akbar

Shah and Painda Khan came forward and successfully crawled to the place. In a lightening move, Akbar caught hold of a Dogra soldier and a hand to hand fight ensued. Another Dogra soldier landed a bullet in his stomach and he fell down in great pain which increased, as he was unable to urinate because of the wound. His companion, in another heroic act, dragged him to the improvised First-aid post. Because of increasing pain, Akbar Shah begged to be shot dead but how could that be done? He died a few hours later.

In another instance, a few days after the liberation of Rawalakot, was found the dead body of another soldier, Pir Muhammad, in the vicinity of the Dogra Camp at Thorar. Two stones were found in his hands and it seemed that after his ammunition got exhausted, he resorted to stone-throwing, either for offence or defence. The maize which his wife had given him to fight hunger, was partly intact in a small bag tied to his waist.

In yet another instance, Khan Bahadur of Pothi Makwalan, the only son of a widow, and in his early youth, was so happy the day he got a rifle, as if he had suddenly become the owner of countless treasures. He died on the third day and when his mother saw his dead body, with the entry wound on his face below left eye, she gently moved her hand on his hair and commented, without any visible emotions:

اپنے ملکے پیچھے لگ گیا۔

Trans: He died for his country.

Hats off to a tribe with such willing warriors and such great mothers.

The liberation of Rawalakot has great importance in the liberation Movement because with the fall of this Dogra strong-hold, they were not able to hold the advance of the liberators anywhere short of Poonch town. It not only meant the liberation of the present tehsils of Pallandari and Rawalakot but also cut off the enemy's forward base for the tehsil of Bagh. This also enabled the Azad Kashmir Government which had by now come into being, to set up a training camp and a forward base at Trar-Khel, which is about 3C miles from Azad Pattan.

After retreating from Rawalakot alongwith the non-Muslim refugees, whose presence, it may be said to the credit of the enemy, must have handicapped them, they withdrew towards Toli Pir. It is one of the highest peaks in Poonch district with a height of nearly 10,000 feet. It was then covered by dense forests but now the trees are very sparse.

The Azad Kashmir Government has constructed a kacha jeepable road linking the peak with Rawalakot, a distance of 19 miles. A small Rest house has also been constructed at a height of nearly 8000 feet. Captain Hussain Khan, the liberator of Rawalakot, relentlessly and ruthlessly pursued the retreating enemy right upto Toli Pir, giving them no respite and frustrating their efforts to regroup or to stop his advance. It was in keeping with the old traditions of war under which an army, if once defeated, is not allowed to regroup but is immediately pursued by the victors and annihilated.

Near Toli Pir, Captain Hussain Khan was struck with a bullet and died on the spot. With his untimely death, we lost one of our ablest Commanders and undoubtedly, the best from the Sudhan tribe. It does seem that but for his untimely death, Poonch town may have been liberated, at the most, in a matter of weeks. While retreating from Rawalakot, the Dogras burnt down several villages. Among those who showed admirable qualities of leadership in the battle for Rawalakot were Subedar Bostan Khan of *Hara*, Captain Rehmat-Ullah Khan of Lunjgran and Subedar Major Hussain Khan. In this sector, Muslim losses were 90 dead and 120 injured.[1] Among those who fought at Mung was Subedar Major Afsar Khan, M.C., O. B. I and an old man Sher Khan who captured a Dogra soldier; Jemadar Pir Muhammad Khan was incapacitated; a grenade disfigured Abdul Aziz, Chhabu Khan lost his eyes, Jemadar Sher Ali lost his legs. Abdul Razaq Shaheed was the only son of his father. Subedar Sayed Nawab Shah, Lt. Shahadam Khan, Lt. Sardar Khan, Subedar Said Muhammad Khan, and Jemadar Fateh Muhammad Khan who were killed in Rawalakot fighting were buried in the town in their blood-drenched uniforms.

## THE LIBERATION OF TEHSIL BAGH

Bagh sector was commanded by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan. He assembled a lashkar comprising men from almost all tribes inhabiting the tehsil, Maldayal, Dhond, Tezial, Syed, Sudhan, Narma, Gakhar, Qureshi, Awan, Kashmiris, Minhas etc., which ultimately formed the nucleus of two Bagh Brigades, one of which was personally commanded by Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan. Batches were posted at several vantage points, so that the Enemy may not be able to regroup and present a sizable formation.

It appears that the military at the Chirala post came to know of the destruction of the Police Station and decided to march upon the small

1. Mir Alam, p. 302.

town to vindicate its supremacy. It does seem that there were some local elements, though small, who were secretly aiding the Dogras because apart from this incident, it is generally believed that Khadim Hussain's hiding place was also betrayed to the Army by fellow-inhabitants. The news of the incoming Dogras was conveyed by Azad Khan of Saysar. When the Dogras were spotted at Kanthal, above Narakot, Muslims raised slogans and simultaneously an exchange of fire began which died down as darkness progressed. The Dogras withdrew a little and the Muslims, headed by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, took position on a hill-top of the Neelabutt range; the distance between the opponents was not every great. At pre-dawn, when a Dogra soldier lighted a cigarette which betrayed his exact location, Raja Muhammad Latif Khan pressed his trigger, but the firing was promptly returned; Latif was fatally hit and while breathing his last, cried out; "I am killed, take care of my rifle."[1] It was a supreme example of dedication and shows that even when dying, the uppermost thought in his mind was that his rifle may arm yet another freedom-fighter. He died on the morning of 17th Asuj 2004 Bikrami which is equivalent to 29.9.1947. The Dogras were driven back to their post at Chirala. Two days later, a group of soldiers from Bagh, accompanied by civil officers as well as guides from the eastern Bagh came to Makhiala at night and set up a camp in the house of one Kala. On the 20th of Asuj when Kala Khan and his two companions, assigned on a patrol duty by the Neelabutt camp, appeared on a hill-top overlooking Makhiala, they were fired at and an exchange of fire took place for some time, resulting in the withdrawal of the Dogras in confusion. Three mare-loads of rations, ammunition and a few arms were captured. The group was pursued upto Harigail. These successes must have naturally emboldened the Muslims and the realization dawned that with a little more effort, Dogras could be thrown out of the area. News of these happenings must have reached their comrades-in-arms in Rawalakot because Captain Hussain Khan sent a letter, offering help, but was informed that the only help needed at the moment was to prevent reinforcements reaching the Dogras from Rawalakot side.

It appears that immediately after the destruction of Dhirkot PS, one Sajawal Khan of Mundri fired at Muhammad Roshan, also of Mundri and both from the Dhond tribe, on account of some personal enmity. The victim had a narrow escape but the incident caused wide-spread anxiety as unity was the supreme need of the hour. Therefore, in a meeting attended by Pir Ali Asghar Shah, Maulvi Muzaffar Hussain Nadvi, Sadiq Hussain Shah and Muhammad Sanaullah Khan, it was resolved to appoint

1. As per notes of Muhammad Sanaullah.

an Imam (Head) whose orders and decisions on all matters were to be binding and who was to lead the struggle for freedom. Pir Sayed Ali Asghar Shah proposed the name of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan and others accepted it.[1] In fairness to Sardar Qaiyum Khan it may be emphasised that no one from his tribe was present. This does show that his qualities of leadership had begun to have their impact and were recognized.

After the Neelabutt encounter, the non-Muslims of village Kotli (tehsil Bagh) who abandoned their village, due to insecurity, and were moving to the Chirala Military camp, under the protection of a few Dogra soldiers, were ambushed at Chamiyati by a group of Muslims led by Mr. Muhammad Saleem Khan, who later retired as a Major from the AKRF. What loss, if any, was suffered by them, I have not come across but one of the attackers, Abdul Aziz Khan, was killed in the mutual firing.

The next post to be attended to, was the one at Hill. The local money-lender, Gokal Chand, a Khatri, was naturally unpopular with the local peasantry. His family had been sucking their blood for generations. An influential man, he had succeeded in persuading the army authorities to set up a small post in his village which now houses a Sanatorium, constructed by the Azad Kashmir Government. The village is situate at a height of nearly 3000 ft. The Dogras abandoned the post and joined their comrades at Chirala. Another money lender, Gopi Shah, and his forefathers had been fleecing the local peasantry since generations. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum who came here at the head of a small band, had an encounter with a batch of Dogra soldiers on the banks of nullah Khapdar. From here they proceeded to the main post and took it under their cover. The siege was brief because Muslims pressed hard their advantage and slowly and steadily made it almost impossible for the garrison to hold on for more than a few days. Therefore the garrison was compelled to retreat to Bagh, suffering some loss on the way.

## DOGRAS' SURPRISE ATTACK AT DANNA GALLI

At the time tribesmen entered Muzaffarabad, there were 175 Dogra soldiers posted between Kohala and Domel, a distance of 22 miles. They were commanded by Lt. Labh Singh. Their location was as follows: Danna 25, Bagla Sikhan 25 out of whom 12 to 15 were posted at Dher, Mushtamba 6, Kohala and Barsala 80, Baglota 25 and Balandkot 14. A three-inch mortar had been fixed on the hill facing Kohala. It was later

1. As per notes of Sanaullah Khan.

shifted to Baglota and installed near the mosque. Barsala is about a mile from Kohala on the main road towards Muzaffarabad.

A group of Muslims led by Muhammad Salim, then a College student, who later retired as Major from the Azad Army, attacked and burnt down the Police post at Danna. From here they moved to Danna galli and divided themselves into three groups; one group was posted at village Durband under Raja Muhammad Akram Khan later Advocate General, AK and a resident of the area; the second group under Subedar Afsar Khan took its position on Jhandi while Salim himself took position at the Galli. Nothing happened during the day time except a few stray bullets fired by Muslims at random. In the later hours of the night, when most of the Muslims were fast asleep, the Dogras and Sikhs suddenly came from Bagla Sikhan and launched a surprise attack. Salim who guarded the most vulnerable outlet, saved himself by running towards Dangakot while Muhammad Afsar was killed on the spot. The Dogras had a mortar and several bren-guns. Muslim losses were 50, three of whom were taken to Pakistan for burial but the rest were buried here. Among them was Muhammad Siddique of Aliot, Ghulam Murtaza son of Jemadar Ghulam Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Zaman of Potha. The Dogras abandoned Bagla Sikhan and Barsala for good.

The Muslim elements at Danna Galli comprised the following:—

1. The Hazara group of 30 jawans under Aziz-ur-Rehman of Mansehra who later retired as a Captain from the Azad army.

2. The Peshawar group of 30 jawans under Muhammad Zaman Khan of Peshawar who also retired later as a Captain from the Azad army.

3. Murree group of nearly 30 jawans under Subedar Afsar Khan of Aliot.

4. Poonch group of 30 jawans under Salim Khan.

5. The local groups of about 50 under Mr. Muhammad Akram Khan, then a College student.

Mr. Latif Afghani was also seen at Danna on the next morning and it seems that he had reached there in the early hours of dawn. The Sikhs had earlier burnt a mosque at Balandkot on 12th October, 15 houses at Hill-Sarung and 5 houses at Dher. An extremist group was responsible

for the out-rage. Their number was about 50 and they were led by Surjeet Singh son of Than Singh Lambardar, Isher Singh, Sundar Singh, Balwant Singh and Mahant Gurbakhsh Singh. They did not intend to remain at Danna and therefore continued their withdrawal towards Bagh. They killed a number of Muslims at Sehotar. Lt. Labh Singh is reported to have safely reached Srinagar. He is still remembered as a brave man whose personal courage and qualities of leadership were responsible for the safety of the men under his command as well as that of the large number of Sikhs and Hindus who evacuated from the area with him. It was possible for the Muslims to avenge their loss but it goes to their credit that not a single civilian was killed, wounded or even deprived of his belongings. The credit for this must primarily go to Muhammad Akram. A kind-hearted, unassuming and well-intentioned man, he rendered valuable services in the liberation Movement, particularly during the 1947-48 war but, as generally happens, has remained unknown and unnoticed.

A contingent of Dogra troops accompanied by a large number of non-Muslim evacuees, some of whom were also armed, had an encounter with Hayat's group at Nanga. While the firing was going on, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum arrived at the head of a group of tribesemen.[1] One Muhammad Yaqub Khan snatched away a sword from a Sikh, after his darra-rifle became ineffective and fell on the enemy but was instantly killed. Jemadar Muhammad Akbar Khan of Baghsar was also killed. Both are reported to have fought valiantly. The Muslim losses were seven dead and several injured. The loss of non-Muslims was considerably higher. A quantity of arms and ammunition was also captured.[2] About a thousand civilian non-Muslims including a Gurkha soldier, a Dogra Head Constable and a Sikh Head Constable were brought to Dhirkote and lodged in a camp as refugees. They were later sent to India. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum was in over-all charge of the camp. He was ably assisted by his younger brother, Mr. Abdul Ghaffar. The enemy now moved towards Bani Pisari. Here, a Hindu Doctor, Dina Nath had already organized local Sikhs and armed them at his own expense. They were pursued by Muslims and after a feeble defence, ran to the Bagh town, the citadel of Dogras in the tehsil, which was quite adjacent. This happened on 6th or 7th of November.

About 60 Muslim political workers stood imprisoned in the fort at Bagh. They had been arrested for their pro-Pakistan leanings sometime after the killing of Syed Khadim Hussain. He had gone underground after the Hurabari meeting but was betrayed to the Enemy by

1. Pak Kashmir, 22/29 December, 1976.
2. Mir Alam, p. 304-305.

Dogra agents. He was subjected to gruesome torture in the local Military camp and ordered to say 'Maharaja Bahadur Ki Jai' and "Jai Hind". With inspiring courage that shall always remain a glorious example of patriotism, Khadim Hussain refused to oblige and instead raised the slogan of 'Pakistan Zindabad'. This enraged his heartless tormentors, one of whom unsheathed a bayonet and taking it close to his neck, again asked him, at pain of death, to say "Jai Hind" and 'Maharaja Bahadur Ki Jai'. With his wide-open eyes gazing in the skies and with contemptuous disregard of the sharp blade of the bayonet touching his throat, Khadim Hussain gave as full-throated a slogan of 'Pakistan Zindabad' as under the circumstances he could, whereupon the enraged Dogra instantly pressed his bayonet and cut off his life-line, leaving him to die in great agony. It was 7th September 1947. It is lamentable that the Government has not done anything so far to enshrine his loving memory though certain steps were taken, for the economic rehabilitation of the family.

With the entry of the Dogra column and armed non-Muslim bands into Bagh, the first thing they did was to empty the fort of its Muslim internees by cruelly putting them to death in a most abhorrent manner. They were not shot dead straight away, perhaps because the Dogras thought that their ammunition was too precious to be wasted on defenceless prisoners; instead, they resorted to swords, spears and long knives to get rid of them. As there were two survivors, Mulla Ghulam and Muhammad Hussain of Dare who somehow, miraculously escaped death, the details of the gruesome tragedy have reached the outside world. They state that the prisoners were killed in groups and in some cases, they were made to lose limb after limb, thus making the whole atmosphere a ghastly spectacle, exceeding the horrors of the Roman Colosseum because there the dirty, callous job was performed by wild beasts while here, their place was taken by bestial human beings. Their names have been inscribed on a plaque installed on the gate of the small fort which now houses the city police station.

When the news of the massacre of prisoners reached Muslims, it created, as could be expected, great commotion. They laid siege to the town under the over-all command of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan. On the same day, for the first time, the Indian planes bombed the town, causing considerable loss. Failing to receive reinforcements from outside and conscious of their weak position, the Dogras evacuated the town along with its non-Muslim inhabitants. They left via Kasi Darman and went to Poonch, pursued by Muslims who inflicted some losses. Among those killed was Moti Ram Munsif who had a double-barrel gun and was making

a free use of the same. The retreating Dogras burnt down a number of villages.

## SAKHI DELAIR: CAPTURE OF AZAD PATTAN.

Before the fall of Rawalakot but after the fall of Mung and Thorar, the Dogras were still entrenched at Azad Pattan and Pallandari. The Azad Pattan post was particularly important because it provided entry from Pakistan through a foot bridge. It is one of the marvellous feats of the Kashmir War that two or three individuals, by sheer dint of courage and reckless contempt for their personal safety, were able to uproot the strongly-defended post and compel the Dogras to take to flight, leaving behind most of their arms, ammunition and supplies. The man who accomplished it, was Sakhi Delair, a Mangral from Sehnsa area in tehsil Kotli. Mangrals are a martial race and have provided a large number of recruits to the army. They are traditionally soldiers by profession. Sakhi Delair was an ex-soldier who had served in the ranks till after the World war. He had also served under Major M.K. Mirza. One day in 1948, some one called at his house in Jhelum in his absence and told his son that Major General Delair had made a courtesy call. Major M.K. Mirza who had been an Instructor for a number of years at the Royal Military School Sara-i-Alamgir, had many a student in the army, some of whom had risen to high ranks. When he came home and was told about the visit of Major General Delair, he was unable to locate the officer but on the next day, they came across each-other in the market place and lo! it was Sakhi Delair who had visited the house and left the message. He had himself assumed the rank of Major General. It is quite usual in such wars. I was told by a senior army officer that in the beginning of 1948 when he was on the Rajauri sector, a soldier in the rear, at a distance of 10 to 15 miles, was supervising the despatch of supplies and sending a signed chit with each supply, detailing the material. In the morning when he sent the first chit, he signed it as a sepoy, but gradually started building up his rank; when the last consignment was received at the other end in the evening, the soldier had signed the chit, as Major.

Major General Akbar Khan also has a similar incident to relate:

> "Around Poonch two rival commanders had set up headquarters, both submitting reports to G.H.Q. Azad, one signing himself as Captain and the other as Major. Then they promoted themselves to Major and Colonel. Then to Colonel and Brigadier and so on, until both of them became Field Marshals. It was perhaps because of this that the Defence Minister seeing no other title left, came to

adopt the German (Spanish: author)[1] rank of Captain General. Sandwiched thus between a Captain General above and a coupe of Field Marshals below, G.H.Q. Azad had to steer its course with considerable skill and it not only did this well enough, it also found time to spare for the conside ration of new ways and means of winning the war for which suggestions were always pouring in".[2]

One of these "Field Marshals" was a retired Subedar-Major of undivided Indian Army, Muhammad Hussain who had been given the Honorary rank of 2nd Lieutenant at the time of retirement. Gifted with the quality of inspiring confidence among his subordinates, the G.H.Q. Azad was anxious to remove him from the post and he was, therefore, called to Rawalpindi. When a senior Army Officer asked him as to what were his qualifications for assuming the rank of a Field Marshal, he is reported to have raised his stick; mistakenly fearing an assault, the Officer ran out of the room. The G. H. Q. Azad gazetted him a Major and posted him to some regiment but being illiterate and, therefore, unable to hold the post in the army hierarchy, he himself applied for demotion and was posted as a Captain. For similar reasons, he later applied for further demotion and was posted as a Lieutenant. He told his friends from whom I got this information that finding himself not only unable to hold the post in a regular army but the story of his demotion from the exalted post of a Field Marshal having naturally travelled fast and made him an object of ridicule and embarrassment, he applied for retirement, telling his superiors that he feared, he might be reduced to the rank of a Subedar-Major again, a rank from which he so meteorically rose to the self-appointed post of a Field Marshal.

Towards the close of August, Sakhi Delair, Munshi Feroze Ali, Maulvi Abdul Aziz Rajaurvi and Major Muhammad Hussain of Kahala held a public meeting at Danna near Trarkhel. They delivered strongly anti-Dogra speeches, demanding accession to Pakistan and threatening a holy war if the Maharaja acceded to India. The theme of the meeting was set by Maulvi Abdul Aziz, then in his early twenties and a fire-brand. After its dispersal, Maulvi Rajaurvi and two other persons whose names could not be ascertained, were arrested and taken to Poonch. Sakhi Delair escaped to Pakistan where he collected some arms and ammunition from several places. Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan gave him 210 rifles.[3] Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif gave him a rifle for his personal use. In Rawalpindi Raja Sarwar Khan of Bhimber who was guard commander at Morgah Ammuni-

1. Spanish Ambassador's letter, in answer to mine.
2. Raiders in Kashmir, p, 94.
3. As per note given to this writer.

tion Depot, gave him some ammunition as well as a stengun. From here Delair and his companions, including Munshi Feroze Ali Khan, one of the leading political leaders among Sudhans, went by truck to Sona Village, about ten miles from Punjarr in tehsil Kahuta (Pakistan), and sent the arms and ammunition across the river to village Pana in the State through local swimmers. During transit ten rifles were lost in the river. The Dogra soldiers posted in the neighbouring Pain fort, learning of suspicious movements in the village, were attracted to the spot but by then the volunteers had disappeared, abandoning some arms and ammunition in the standing maize crop which were later safely buried by the village women.

Delair had not crossed the river as yet and, therefore, alongwith Jemadar Khadim Hussain, walked ten miles to appear at the Lachman Pattan bridge.

They started firing on the Dogras posted at the bridge, with brief intervals. These intervals were utilized for shifting from one place to another; as the Dogras were at a low-lying place, they were not in a position either to ascertain the actual number of the attackers or cause them any harm. So due to the strategy adopted by Sakhi Delair, they got an impression that their opponents were considerable in number. Sensing insecurity, they abandoned the bridge without a fight, after a feeble attempt to blow it off. As soon as they made good their escape, Sakhi Delair and Khadim Hussain rushed to extinguish the fire. The gate was opened by breaking the lock with an axe brought by one Sherbaz, a Satti, who had also come to the scene. Delair crossed the bridge at great peril and switched off the fire-button. The damage suffered was not very extensive and the bridge was soon repaired by local hands. From here he was able to get 13 rifles, one stengun, two 2-inch mortars and some ammunition which the fleeing Dogras had abandoned. There was no fight at Pallandari because the Dogras garrisoned over there were panicked by the confusion created by their comrades who had abandoned the Luchmanpattan bridge; obviously the latter must have given a highly exaggerated account of the attackers' strength. Non-Muslims living in the locality who were already camping in the town also evacuated under the protection of the Dogra arms and went with them to Hajira. An encounter, however, did take place at Baral which has a small fort and is at a distance of 6 miles from Pallandari. Some Dogra soldiers were killed but most of them were able to escape to safety. It is stated that a Hindu girl who belonged to the Maharaja's near relations was found deserted in the fort;

she was returned unmolested and with full protection. Delair pursued them upto Madarpore bridge which was given in charge of ex-Havildar Hidayat Khan of the Indian Army who was to advance towards Mendhar while Delair returned to Pallandari, where, it is claimed, he was made Commander-in-Chief by popular acclamation and a War Council was set up with Captain Khan Muhammad Khan as President. A column under Subedar Barro Khan was despatched to Sehnsa; another column under Subedar Manga Khan was sent towards Dhadyal while a third group under Delair, left for Sarsawa.

When the retreating Dogras reached Hajira, the local ex-servicemen headed by Subedar Hidayat Khan and others set up their camp at Devigalli which is at a distance of a few miles on the western side of Hajira. It is an important Galli because it prevents contact between Rawalakot and Bagh on the one hand and with Hajira on the other. After the liberation of Rawalakot on 10th November, the ex-servicemen at Devigalli came down upon the Dogras in Hajira. There was some firing, lasting for four days which resulted in certain deaths but on 14th November, the Dogra garrison abandoned the village and withdrew to Poonch. With them were 66 political prisoners from Rawalakot area. As the withdrawal was made at night, 35 of them succeeded in freeing themselves from the clutches of their captors. Among them was Sardar Mukhtar Khan, now a Pleader at Rawalakot, Ali Muhammad Khan, Suleman Khan and Inayat Khan of Hurnamera. Some prisoners were later handed over to blood-thirsty Hindu-Sikh gangs in Poonch who led them to the bank of river Poonch for being killed and thrown into the running water. Among them were Bostan Khan, Havildar Sardar Khan, Maulvi Muhammad Hussain Khan, all of Rawalakot, Jawahar Khan, Abdullah Khan and Ali Bahadur Khan of Topi and Kothian and Afsar Khan and Hans Khan of Nar. Lt. Muhammad Ashraf Khan and Amir Ali Khan, who had been arrested alongwith others in connection with the Dothan incident, were also taken to the said butchery alongwith the above persons but succeeded in running away in confusion. Lt. Ashraf jumped into river and swiftly swam to the other side. Several shots were vainly aimed at him. Some non-Muslims had been unable to leave their homes in the Pallandari area. They were established in a separate camp but as most of them were naturally unwilling to stay back, they were eventually allowed to go to the Indian held area. Two Hindus, Hari Chand and Naubat Ram were appointed Head-master and Second master respectively of the High School at Pallandari.

## THE AMBUSH AT SARSAWA

While the column was resting for the night at Bobra, Mr. Muhammad

Iqbal,[1] who later retired as a Major, was informed by Ali Akbar, of the State forces, that a company of Dogra troops was leaving next morning for Sehnsa. Iqbal immediately went to Bobra, a distance of 11 miles, and informed Delair, who has, however, stated in his note that this information was originally given by a Muslim boatman, Shan, who had been told by the local tehsildar to be available next morning as there was going to be some troop movement. Sarsawa is at a distance of six to seven miles from Bobra; Delair led his men over the distance in utter darkness and before sun-rise, they were in Rangar nullah which separates Panakhah from Sarsawa. Delair then posted his men at all vantage points and told them to wait until he gave a signal with a revolver shot. In the morning, a Company of Dogra soldiers comprising about 120 men and a group of Sanghis left Kotli under Capt. Ishri Singh with Raja Saif Ali Khan Zaildar and Thakar Hari Singh Sub-Inspector Police on horseback as guides. When they entered the ambush area, Delair gave the signal whereupon his men started firing. The Dogras returned the fire but since Delair's men were safely located in hide-outs, they suffered no loss. The firing continued for about 15 minutes, resulting in the death of a number of Dogra soldiers and Sanghis. Zaildar Saif Ali Khan was also killed on the spot while Captain Ishri Singh was wounded. He was removed to Kotli by Ali Akbar Lambardar Dheri nullah and Subedar Sher Muhammad of Kala. Delair claims to have captured 20 ass-loads of supplies, 101, 303-rifles, six light machine-guns, one heavy machine-gun, 12 sten-guns, two 2" mortars and some ammunition. I think the claim is exaggerated. Two men from Delair's side were injured. Delair vainly waited there for the whole day, expecting a rush of Dogra troops from Kotli. The news spread fast with the result that the Senhsa-based Dogra troops, chose to avoid this area and instead joined their colleagues in the Throchi fort.

Subedar Baroo Khan who had been sent earlier to Sehnsa valley was killed in an encounter and Subedar Kaloo Khan of Tarala took over the command. He also moved towards Throchi. Meanwhile, the column headed by Subedar Manga Khan had cleared Dadhyal area and was moving towards Mirpur. While Delair was planning an attack on Kotli town, a platoon of the Dogra brigade stationed at Kotli, counter-attacked but was repulsed with 13 dead; 12 rifles, one machine-gun and some ammunition is claimed to have fallen into their hands. A few days later, Delair crossed the Poonch river and attacked the Dogra post at the Ban bridge. He easily over-came the resistance. Delair and his men then concentrated on the capture of the Kotli town. Col. Baldev Singh of the Dogra army, a relative of Maharani

1. Weekly Riasat, 21st March 1973.

Tara Devi was in the town. The siege lasted for forty days but Muslims were unable to liberate it, mainly because they had no long-range weapons to hit the Enemy. They had a few 2" mortars but no ammunition. Some houses in the south of the town, where the liberation force was mainly concentrated, was put on fire by the liberators themselves but without any tangible result. The town Muslims had already evacuated to Pakistan or to the interior of the tehsil and it was completely in the hands of Hindus. A dare devil, Delair entered the town one night alongwith 12 men and lodged himself in the three-storey building of Pehlwan, a baker. A Hindu boy who saw him, informed the Dogras who laid a siege to the whole area and put some houses on fire. Delair lost five men in the effort to get back to his camp. Delair then withdrew from the scene, placing Major Muhammad Hussain of Kahala, Pallandari, incharge of the front and after sending a group of sixty jawans under Muhammad Hussain of Kulla Tehilan to Baljuna, left for Khuiratta with about 160 men. Here an encounter took place with a group of Dogra soldiers who were reportedly in the area for Muslim massacre. While the siege was still on, Delair left for Rajauri at the head of a small force and was destined to liberate it, though temporarily.

## THE EPISODE OF 4000 RIFLES

It had been discovered by Col. Akbar that a previous Government sanction for the issue of 4,000 rifles to the Punjab Police had not by then been complied with by the G. H. Q. So these were made over to the Punjab Police on the clear understanding that they were to be issued to Mr. Kiani. Col. Akbar also took Brigadier Sher Khan, Director of Intelligence, into confidence; it facilitated the receipt of information coming in from the military sources. Lieutenant Col. Masud of the Cavalry offered to help with collecting and storing the condemned ammunition. Col. Azam Khanzada of the Ordnance Corps, who had some stocks of old ammunition which stood condemned as unfit for military use and was about to be transported to Karachi to be thrown into the sea promised to divert it secretly for use in Kashmir. Gul Mowaz, later Brigadier, was also helpful. Help also started coming in from the Pakistan Air Force through Air Commodore Janjua and others in the shape of winter clothing, weapons and ammunition. Khawaja Abdur Rahim, who had taken over as Commissioner, immediately began to collect funds, rations, weapons and even volunteers for service on the front.[2] At that time India and Pakistan had a joint Supreme Commander in the person of Field Marshal Auchinleck. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Forces was General Messervy while the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian

1&2. Raiders in Kashmir, p. 18-19.

Forces was Sir Robert Lockhart. The Pakistan Army had a large number of British officers. As the Kashmir operations were to be un-official, they had to be kept secret from the British officers and since they controlled almost all channels of incoming and outgoing supplies and since personal rivalries among Muslim Officers have ever been a permanent feature of our history at all times and in all parts of the globe, the arms and equipment of the Pakistan Army could not even secretly be made available for use in Kashmir and this is why ammunition already condemned as unfit for use had to be used and the maximum number of rifles that could be diverted was only 4,000 and that too because a way out was already available. And it was considered enough by the high-ups to liberate an 84-thousand square mile territory which had, not less than thirteen thousand fully armed and equipped soldiers; that is also why heavier weapons such as sten-guns, bren-guns, machine-guns, mortars, anti-air-craft guns, to say the least of armoured cars, were not made available to the liberators during these vital months when a decision could be imposed on India in the battle field.

Mr. M. Z. Kiani told this writer that the principles that were to guide him in his operations were as follows:

(1) It had always to be ensured that the revolt was internal and that there was no outside attack.

(2) Casualties had to be kept at their minimum so as to keep up the morale of the fighting men.

(3) No liberated area was to be abandoned or given up as there was no rear to fall back.

Mr. Kiani started his work in right earnest on 13th September; by 23rd September, all Sector Headquarters as well as the Main Headquarter started functioning. The Main Headquarter was set up at Gujrat whereas Sector Headquarters were set up at Rawalpindi and Sialkot to start with and a little later, at Jhelum, for the districts of Poonch, Jammu and Mirpur, respectively. Those who were associated with Mr. Kiani were Col. Kiani, Col. R. M. Arshad, Col. M. A. Khan, later an M.N.A., Col. Taj Muhammad Khanzada, later an M.P.A., Col. Tajammal Hussain and Captain Saif-Ullah. Col. Khanzada was put incharge of 'Pindi Sector while Col. Arshad took charge of the Jhelum Sector. Col. Kiani was put incharge of the Sialkot Sector and by the 2nd of October he started operations towards the south of Samba.

A few days later when the promised four thousand rifles were made available to Mr. Kiani, he discovered, to his horror, that the Punjab Police

had with-held the 303 foreign-made rifles made over by the G.H.Q. and had replaced them with darra-made rifles! This is yet another shocking example of the utter lack of responsibility that materially contributed to the Kashmir tragedy. Even when it became known and was pointed out, not only were officials responsible for it not taken to task but the original rifles were also not restored, the least that could be done by the authorities. It was Mr. Qurban Ali Khan, then Inspector General of Punjab Police who was responsible for it. Poor Pakistan! The "uncle" deserved the exalted offices he later held in this unfortunate country. The difference between the English 303 rifles and those of Darra origin is not in their appearance for both are almost identical but it is the difference in quality which mattered. The latter are of a very inferior quality and break down soon. According to Akbar, the tribesmen themselves rarely used them when fighting against troops. Mr. Kiani was obviously faced with a very grim dilemma, accept or not to accept them. He could have refused to accept them and in the perspective of history, perhaps that might have brought good results but essentially a soldier who is not expected to grumble, Mr. Kiani accepted them with grace.

Of these, 200 were handed over to Mr. Khurshid Anwar as previously agreed to. Mr. Kiani then met Maulana Abul-Ala-Maudoodi of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmed of the Ahmedi sect and officials of some relief organisations in Lahore for material help. Although 4000 darra-made rifles were now at their disposal and condemned ammunition was also made available by Col. Khanzada, there were no water bottles, shoes, haversacks, transport or supplies. Therefore, Mr. Kiani and some of his colleagues took rounds of markets in Lahore to collect whatever second-hand, Army-condemned material they could lay their hands on. Mr. Kiani also flew over the Pathankote-Kathua road in the personal plane of Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmed and found that a boat-bridge had already been constructed on the Ravi between Pathankote and Kathua.

## MAJOR KHURSHID ANWAR

A retired Major of the Indian Army, Khurshid Anwar was a Punjabi from Jullundhur though his wife, Begum Mumtaz Jamal, was a Kashmiri Pathan; her father was a Kashmiri and her mother, a Swati. She later became a Deputy Minister in a West Pakistan cabinet. Khurshid Anwar was conversant with Pashto on account of his posting in the tribal area during his military service. It was after the success of the Punjab Civil Disobedience Movement in which he played an active

role as an organiser, that he was deputed to the N.W.F.P. to help in the Civil Disobedience Movement that was launched there against the Congress Government on the eve of Referendum. Anwar had, sometime before partition, been appointed Salar of the Muslim League National Guards. Essentially a brave man, he was unfortunately, over-confident. It seems that in consultation with Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, it had been decided to send a force of about two thousand tribesmen, to capture Srinagar. Largely, they had their own arms but some arms and ammunition as well as transport, was provided by the N.W.F.P. Government. The presence of a large number of British officers in the province, created a number of handicaps because the plan had to be kept secret from them. This writer met Major Khurshid Anwar only once and that also at Garhi Habibullah where after my return from Srinagar, I was staying with a relative. It was here that towards the end of September, I happened to meet Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah Nadvi from Poonch, now Head of the A. K. Religious Affairs Department who was on his way to the adjacent tribal area. It was also towards the end of September that Major Khurshid Anwar came there to meet Muhammad Aslam Khan, the Khan of Garhi. The visit was obviously connected with the tribal activity. The tribal area on this side, starts just a few miles beyond Garhi Habibullah; as the Khan of Garhi owned considerable lands in that area, he commanded some influence. They held a secret meeting and I do not know what actually transpired inside but when he came out, we had a brief discussion. A few days earlier I had gone to Kohat and had, with the help of Doctor Abdur Rashid, secured a sizable quantity of dynamite from the nearby tribal area. Mr. Amir Zada, later an Additional Secretary to the Central Government was at that time posted as Civil Judge Kohat. We met in the local club. On Khurshid Anwar's assurance that it would be used for the same purpose for which I had acquired it in collaboration with Syed Anwar Shah, Incharge Garhi PS and the local SDO of the PWD, I made it over to the Khan of Garhi. Khurshid Anwar returned to Naushehra. In early October Khurshid Anwar came to Pindi and asked Syed Nazir Hussain Shah for four or five guides on the 12th of October to guide his five hundred men to the airfield in Srinagar. He claims that the original plan was to attack Muzaffarabad on the 15th of October.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE TRIBESMEN EXTEND SUPPORT

## CHAPTER XXIV

# The Tribesmen Extend Support

Haji Khawaja Lassa Joo Mir and Khawaja Ghulam Rasul Pandit, then President and Secretary, respectively, of the District Muslim Conference Muzaffarabad, and Khawaja Ghulam Din Wani, Acting General Secretary who was practising law at Muzaffarabad, were summoned to Rawalpindi towards the end of September, by Ch. Hameedullah Khan and introduced to Major Khurshid Anwar. Sardar Muhammad Sharif, now Judge High Court, has told me of a meeting held in Fair-View Hotel, Murree, also towards the end of September, 1947, which was attended among others, by Sardar Ibrahim, Major Khurshid Anwar, Begum Nasim Akbar and Sardar Sharif. It was decided in this meeting that the tribal invasion shall coincide with an internal uprising. Sardar Sharif claims that the D-day was fixed for the 6th of October while Sardar Ibrahim thinks it was the 22nd of October. It seems there was an error somewhere because while an uprising did take place at Mung and Thorar on the morning of 6th October, preparations for the induction of tribesmen were still in early stages.

According to Khawaja Lassa Joo, he met Major Khurshid Anwar and Mr. Abbas Khan, a Frontier Minister, at Abbottabad alongwith his above two colleagues and told them that according to their information, the Hindu-Sikh bands at Muzaffarabad had decided upon a massacre of Muslims on the coming Eid and that if Pakistan was really interested in the Muslims of the State rather than its territory, then, they ought to act in time. He says that Major Khurshid Anwar was perturbed and told them that an early attack was difficult because preparations in the tribal area had just begun but after a private meeting between Mr. Anwar and Abbas Khan, Haji Sahib was driven to the residence of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan at Peshawar where they reached at 3 a.m. Khan Qaiyum who was immediately awakened, came out in his night-clothes.

Next morning, several tribal Sardars visited his house and had a long discussion in Pashto which Haji Sahib could not understand. The same afternoon he was taken to Wana in the company of some Pathan Elders who moved him from place to place where however, the talking job was done by them. Haji Sahib was then a man of robust health in his early forties and grew a fairly long, impressive beard. It seems that the Elders spoke for him and impressed upon their colleagues the dire necessity of early action lest there was further bloodshed of State Muslims.

It will be recalled that largely through the efforts of Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif and some of his devoted followers, the Pakistan ideology had rapidly spread in the tribal belt. That is one of the reasons why Pandit Nehru had to face hostile demonstrations when he undertook a tour of the area, probably, towards the end of 1946. Thousands of Pathans had been working as money lenders, petty businessmen and chowkidars in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Ranchi and other Indian towns. During the pre-partition as well as post-partition riots, a large number of them were killed. This had naturally sent a wave of indignation in the tribal area where every unnatural death calls for reprisal. The pre-planned massacre of Muslims in East Punjab which even according to most conservative estimates ran into a hundred thousand, and which was carried out mostly by the Sikh armies of Patiala and Kapurthala, had received wide publicity in the tribal area. By the end of September it had so heightened their indignation and inflamed their hereditary passion for revenge that the word 'Sikh' had become an abuse. When news of the growing atrocities on Muslims in Poonch reached them through different sources, it was impossible to resist the temptation of going to their rescue. Apart from being bound by a common faith, Sudhans claim to be a branch of the Sadho-Zai Pathans and if someone were to undertake research, he may find striking similarities in their customs. It was therefore quite natural that the learned among them, the Maulvies, were already preaching a holy war when Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan decided to make use of them in Kashmir.

The tribesmen who entered Kashmir did not belong to any particular tribe. There were all of them, Mohmands, Mahsuds, Waziris, Afridis, etc. There were men from Malakand, Wana, Miran Shah and even from Afghanistan. It is often over-looked that these tribes have almost always been inimical to each other; they have been engaged in a vicious circle of blood feuds. Seldom in their history have they fought shoulder to shoulder and for a common Cause. How else did such a miracle come about? So on the 20th October, 1947, 900 tribesmen crossed Indus near Khushhalgarh

about 35 miles from Kohat towards Rawalpindi. The river here separates the N.W.F.P. and Punjab. Lt. General Ross McCay, then Commander of the Peshawar Military District, tried in vain to stop them.[1] The undivided Indian Army had not been divided as yet. Some units which had opted for India and consisted largely of non-Muslims were then in the Frontier guarding the approaches to the Settled areas. They returned to India long after the tribal invasion.[2]

## MUSLIM ELEMENTS OF THE STATE ARMY JOIN HANDS

The Dogras had the 4th J&K Infantry battalion located at Muzaffarabad. It had seen active service in Burma and was commanded by a Dogra, Lt. Colonel Narayan Singh. It had constructed defensive positions on features at Ramkote, Lohargali and Dhupgali that commanded the approaches to the State and at the Domel bridge. It is claimed by Mr. Mahajan as well as Lt. General Sen that Lt. Col. Narayan Singh had been warned by his Headquarter that Muslims could not be trusted and that they should be disarmed and returned to the Headquarters at Badami-Bagh, Srinagar but that he had stoutly refused to do so on the plea that he had more faith in them than the Dogra soldiers of the battalion. It may be true because he had led and watched them against the Japanese but what is absolutely untrue is Mr. Mahajan's further claim that they killed him on the morning of 23rd October.

The Khan of Garhi who lived close to Ramkote had already established close contact with Muslim elements of the battalion. Their pro-Pakistan leanings were no secret and one wonders how it could be expected of them to allow the passage of their mother-land into Hindu slavery, to say the least of being instrumental in bringing about such an end and of sheding their blood for their own enslavement? They had therefore, assured the underground organisation that they would join their ranks if and when an attack was launched which came on the night falling between the 21st and 22nd October, 1947. About 2000 persons who were mostly tribesmen but some of whom were from the civil area of Abbottabad district, assembled at Abbottabad wherefrom they travelled to Garhi Habibullah the same evening. On the border, the State had military posts at Ramkote, Lohar Gali and Dhup Gali. All these were exclusively manned by Muslims while the Dogras manned the strategically more important posts—the bridges at Neelum and Domel. Heavy guns had been installed near the present C.M.H., Domel and at Bakote, a village

1. The story of Pakistan Army, p. 88.
2. Slender was the Thread, p. 43.

at the top of the hill over-looking Domel, from where targets on the Lohar Gali road could be easily hit. Colonel Narayan Singh was himself at Domel. The Khan of Garhi, Muhammad Aslam Khan, was already in touch with the Muslims, manning the entry posts. Those at Ramkote and Lohargali had offered unreserved support. Those posted at Dhup Gali declined to give unreserved support in the expressed fear that the tribesmen may withdraw and leave them to the wolves; it had therefore been decided that the tribesmen would avoid their post so that they may have a convenient excuse, if need be.

Of the four companies posted at Muzaffarabad, 'A' company was at Kohala; 'B' company commanded by Lt. Labh Singh was at Barsala, about a mile from Kohala on the main road to Muzaffarabad; of the 'C' & 'D' companies which comprised of Muslims, a platoon under Capt. Sher Muhammad Khan was guarding Brarkot and another platoon under Jemadar Khawaja Ali Muhammad was guarding the vital Lohargali post. Another platoon under Jemadar Nawab Din was at Dhup-gali; the rest were posted at Garhi-Dopatta and the treasury at Muzaffarabad under Captain Muhammad Azam Khan. The Battalion Headquarter was at Domel. In consultation with the Deputy Commissioner Mehta, Col. Narayan Singh supplied some rifles and ammunition to the local Sikhs and Hindus. Muslim elements of the battalion were perturbed when they learnt that their Commander whom they had loyally served for years, was arming non-Muslims. The news of the Dogra excesses in Poonch, the burning down of houses and standing crops and the killing of innocent Muslims had been already reaching their ears. It was only logical that they should have been provoked into counter action with the result that excluding officers above the rank of J.C. Os, it was secretly resolved to help the local Muslims on the first available opportunity.

Rumours were already afloat in the town that a Pathan invasion was in the offing. This information must have been conveyed to Srinagar but it seems that either no serious notice was taken or the local force was considered sufficient to beat back such an attack. The second possibility is more probable because of the strategic location of Lohargali and Dhup-gali. On 21st October, the Battalion Headquarter definitely learnt that a Lashkar of tribesmen aided by civilians was gathering at Garhi-Habibullah because Colonel Narayan Singh personally visited all the posts and gave them necessary instructions. He sent Captain Azam Khan of the 'C' company to Lohargali. Captain Sher Muhammad Khan abandoned his Brarkot post and withdrew to Lohargali at 8 p.m. The withdra-

wal was pre-planned because Colonel Narayan Singh had rightly thought that due to the location of the Lohargali post, the incomers could be easily blocked there, at least for several days. While a conference between Jemadar Khawaja Ali Muhammad who hailed from Srinagar and Subedar Muhammad Jabbar 2-I/C of the Company was still in progress, the jawans, without having to be canvassed, expressed their readiness to make a common cause with the tribesmen and take revenge for the Dogras misdeeds in Poonch. At 4 a.m. Major Khurshid Anwar and Khan Rahim Dad Salar appeared at the post, heading a long column of tribesmen and civilians. There was no resistance. A substantial party of the Pathans came down to Gojra; a small group which included some Muslim soldiers from the State army, crossed the suspension bridge linking the gurdawara with the Battalion H.Q. They had been told not to open fire until there was a signal from the town and to ensure that the arms stores were captured intact. On reaching Ramkote which is now known as Brarkote, the main force descended upon Muzaffarabad through the main road without the slightest resistance because Muslim soldiers posted at Lohar Gali kept their vow and made a common cause with them. A second batch descended upon the town on foot through Dhup Gali nullah avoiding the military post while yet another group crossed via Kahori. However, the first group to reach the town was led by Major Khurshid Anwar himself.

## MUZAFFARABAD LIBERATED

The main problem which had already received attention was the anxiety to capture the Neelum bridge intact. Hundreds of logs stood stacked in the vicinity and a suggestion had been made that in case the bridge was destroyed, the logs could be so arranged as to provide a working bridge but it seems the tribal leaders had shown reluctance because they wanted to ensure an unhindered rear so that they could easily withdraw if need be. According to Mr. Mahajan, his government had earlier ordered the demolition of the bridges at Muzaffarabad and Kohala but it could not be done because no dynamite was available either at these posts or at the Army Headquarter, Srinagar and by the time some quantity arrived from India, the tribesmen had entered the scene.[1] Frankly speaking, this writer has lost faith in the integrity of Mr. Mahajan on Hindu-Muslim questions and therefore it is difficult to believe that no dynamite was really available within the State especially when Lt. General Sen asserts that Brigadier Rajendra Singh had large quantities in his possession on the 22nd for the demolition of bridges.[2]

1. Mahajan, p, 147.
2. Sen, p, 37

A glance through his autobiography would show that he pretends to be so in-fallible in everything as to be always able to correctly predict what was to happen, who would always give the correct advice and who always did what was ultimately found to be ideal. It is this self obsession of being gifted with total wisdom that in his retired life, Mr. Mahajan began dispensing advice to his countrymen on almost all subjects under the Sun, from family planning to grow more food.

Enquiries made by this writer suggest that at least the Neelum bridge had been heavily mined; the mines were elaborately linked with the battalion H.Q. at Domel. There is evidence that one Maulvi Abdul Rehman, Khatib Sultani Masjid who died a few years after 1947 was entrusted with the task of cutting the wire between the two ends, a distance of over a mile and it is likely that he carried out the job. It is, however, also possible that the mines were not there or if they were there, the Dogras had no time to explode them. In view of no resistance upto Neelum Bridge having been encountered, the appearance of tribesmen at the bridge must have been sudden and unexpected. As they arrived at the bridge in the unearthly hours of dawn, it may well be presumed that the well-fed Dogra soldiers who spent the nights at the foot of the Bakote hill in the compound of their Headquarter, may have been enjoying sound sleep. There was no resistance at the bridge; the sentry on duty may have thought that discretion was the better part of valour and may have run away for safety. On entry into the town, the first building, incidentally the nearest to the bridge, was the prison house, one of the Bastilles of Kashmir because it frequently housed political leaders. The gates were opened and within a few minutes, the inmates were free, embracing their tribal brothers and some with tearsome eyes thanking God for their deliverance. From here they took to different directions; some made for the treasury; another group for the Deputy Commissioner Mehta who was killed. His widow, Krishna, from Kishtwar, whose family is known for its captivating charm, spent about a year in A.K. refugee camps. On repatriation to India, she met Nehru in Jullundhur and accompanied him to New Delhi where she joined his house-hold as a maid-servant.[1]

Another group made for the gun-post installed at the existing C.M.H. grounds while most of them entered the town in search of Sikhs and loot. The first building set on fire was the Forest office. When the main column was at the Kishanganga bridge, a large number of Hindus and Sikhs were running in the opposite direction towards the Sikh gurdawara; a

1. The Untold Story, p. 117.

few got killed in the way. Within a few minutes, the group which had already taken position on the hillock across the suspension bridge in front of the arms-store was subjected to a barrage of fire by a group of Dogra soldiers who were trying to go to the arsenal to arm themselves. While a section of the tribesmen and many others indulged in plunder and loot in the small town, the Muslim elements of the State army crossed the Domel bridge by the evening time and silenced the Dogra resistance. At that time, a small number of Muslim soldiers were posted in the Battalion Headquarter; they joined hands with their advancing comrades and together over-came the opposition swiftly. Some Dogras were arrested and locked in a garrage for the night while arrangements were made to safeguard against a night attack by Colonel Narayan Singh and his men who had been able to escape.

On the next day, the 23rd October, the Muslim elements of the State army were invited to a sumptuous feast at Garhi-Habibullah where Major Khurshid Anwar, Rahim Dad Salar and Khan of Garhi, after thanking them for their co-operation, advised them to "take rest" claiming that it was the responsibility of the tribesmen to fight the Dogras. The advice was clearly provocative; it showed that they were not going to trust the Muslim personnel of the State Army. The latter thereupon held a meeting and rightly rejecting the advice, decided to continue their advance towards Srinagar. When they reached Lohargali, they were met by Major Muhammad Aslam Khan M.C. of the Pakistan Army who was proceeding to Srinagar on leave, unaware of what had happened. When acquainted with the position, he agreed with their decision, organised the elements for operation and putting himself at their head, marched towards Domel.

A large number of Sikhs had entrenched themselves in the principal gurdawara across the Neelum bridge. When a group of tribesmen went on that side mainly with the idea of taking a nearer aim on Domel, the Sikhs opened fire. The resistance was silenced by the next day. A number of male inmates died in the encounter.

Lt. General Sen's contention that Muslim personnel of the State army awoke at midnight under a pre-arranged plan and after taking arms from the armoury, killed their Commander as well as colleagues and that it was only then that tribesmen entered the State, is absolutely untrue and a figment of his imagination.[1] A study of the Muzaffarabad topography would show that Narayan Singh may not, afterall, have placed so much trust in the Muslims under his command as Sen and Mahajan[2] have

1. Slender was the thread, p. 36.
2. Mahajan, p. 147.

purposely publicised. It is also likely that the claim of his having been asked to disarm and return them to Srinagar is also a later innovation to defame Muslims. *There is no natural boundary dividing Hazara from Muzaffarabad, right upto Kishen Ganga (Neelum) river which flows in the latter district, nine miles inside Kashmir.* From Domel to Kail, in the north, for over 110 miles or so, the two districts have no natural boundary. It is therefore clear that this area of Muzaffarabad district which lies on the right side of Kishen Ganga was indefensible. *That is why Narayan Singh had not kept a single Dogra soldier on that side and had instead put all his Muslim subordinates there.* The best and natural defensive position was provided by putting the force either in the town across the river or across Domel and this is where the trusted Dogras had been positioned. To have placed Muslims on the real defensive positions as these, would have been a risk and Narayan Singh clearly did not take that risk; he did not place even a few Muslims in these positions, obviously to ensure that there was neither any leak nor an 11th-hour sabotage. That he was entitled to do what he did, is not disputed. What is intended to be stressed is that Sen and Mahajan have suppressed the truth and invented untruths to defame Muslim character.

Similarly it is also untrue that Col. Narayan Singh was killed by his Muslim subordinates. I have carefully investigated the facts. Being posted at Muzaffarabad, it has been possible to question several persons and the conclusion I have arrived at, is that after some feeble resistance at Domel which resulted in the death of some Dogras, some of them were able to hide themselves in the thick bushes of the hills some of which are as high as four thousand feet. Among them was Lt. Col. Narayan Singh. For two days, some occasional shots originated from one of the hills; the place was at last located and when some tribesmen began ascending towards it, the man ran away. The locals believe that he was Narayan Singh who was later killed somewhere near Uri.

A surprising feature of the capture of Muzaffarabad and Domel was that Dogras did not put up strong resistance. It seems that they had been demoralised by the suddenness of the attack, the desertion of their Muslim colleagues, the hostility of the local population and perhaps, the very fear of the reputed ferocity of the tribesmen. It was soon to afflict their whole rank and file as the campaign progressed. There is evidence that Major Khurshid Anwar not only personally led but was in the forefront of the attack at Domel. There was a clash between two groups of tribesmen at the local treasury which might have taken an ugly turn but for the timely intervention of Khurshid Anwar. In the town, a number of Hindus were killed but the number of Sikhs killed was com-

paratively larger. In fact the tribesmen were emotionally stirred to hunt for the Sikhs, in the background of what the latter had done in East Punjab. The absence of beards proved a boon for Hindus while in the case of Sikhs it was their very hair that betrayed their identity. Master Abdul Aziz, leader of the local National Conference, Bodh Raj Pleader, Faqir Chand and Chet Ram, prominent leaders of the Militant Rajya Sabha and a few others, were shot dead on the banks of Neelum, just below the bridge, two or three days after the capture of Muzaffarabad. Master Abdul Aziz had secreted some local non-Muslims in his house. It is claimed that he was instigating trouble and that there were incidents of brick-batting from inside his house. Perhaps he was killed as a reprisal. Another Muslim to lose his life was one Munshi Feroze Din, a School teacher who was killed on the doorsteps of his house while resisting the efforts of some tribesmen to enter it. About thirty non-Nuslims were killed on the out-skirts of the town. One Jemadar Prem Singh, his daughter and wife committed suicide by jumping into the river. Perhaps there were other incidents of this type. There is no doubt that looting and abduction of women took place on a large scale but there is also no doubt that some local Muslims also indulged in these activities. The non-Muslims, being largely money-lenders and tradesmen, were economically well off and therefore considerable property fell into the hands of the anti-social elements but a large part of it was taken away by the men of the Khan of Garhi. They also carried away a number of women. However, even liberal estimates do not put the number of females who were taken out of the district above two to three hundred or so. About three hundred non-Muslims were housed in a local gurdawara which functioned as a refugee camp for several months; they were later evacuated to India. Among them was Krishna Mehta, the widow of the SDM who has written a somewhat one-sided but essentially a moving account of the happenings, and published it from Delhi.

The Muzaffarabad Muslims are unanimous that if the tribesmen had not entered the town before Eid, the 25th of October, the Hindus and Sikhs would have successfully executed the plan for their extermination. The alleged plan was, to open fire on the main Muslim congregation at Eid prayers so as to finish the able-bodied men in a single attack and then carry out the sinister plan of arson, loot and abduction of women, without any real resistance. There can be no documentary evidence to prove the existence of such a plan because such dastardly matters are not reduced into writing. There is, however, an important piece of evidence which does go to show that afterall such a plan may have been in existence. On the 22nd October at dawn when the advance party fired a few shots at the Neelum bridge, the town was asleep, as usual. Nobody then knew that an invasion had taken place. As shots came from across the bridge,

the non-Muslims living in the main part of the town, on the left side of Neelum, thought that it came from the gurdawara, situate across the bridge. It appears that some of them were thus led to believe that the plan to attack Muslims fixed for the 25th, had, for some reasons, been advanced and that therefore the shots had been fired from the gurdawara as a signal. There might have been some such understanding. Within no time did a large crowd of armed Sikhs and Hindus gather outside the house of Gopal Das, a forwarding agent and broke open the Khawaja Boot House owned by Khawaja Abdul Qadir, incidentally, Secretary of the local National Conference and looted the same. Then they broke open the shop of Haji Gaffar Joo, a cloth merchant and were in the process of looting it, when a group of tribesmen appeared on the scene. The first non-Muslim casualty was Jia Lal, a tobacco vendor who was shot dead at this place. Some non-Muslims then barricaded themselves in the haveli of Ram Lal Shah and opened fire but were eventually compelled to surrender.

Brigadier Rajendra Singh, a Dogra from Jammu, had since about two months, taken over as Chief of Staff from Major General Scott, an Englishman. Mr. Mahajan has the honesty of claiming that even on the 19th of October, the post of Chief of Staff was held by a Muslim.[1] He rushed towards Domel at the head of a battle ready force of at least 200 Dogra soldiers. They also carried a large quantity of dynamite. On reaching Uri, a distance of 62 miles from Srinagar, at mid-day on 22nd October, the first thing he attended to, was the laying out of dynamites for the demolition of the large steelgirder bridge at the eastern exit of Uri which spanned a deep seasonal nullah. The force was augmented by a number of soldiers who had escaped from Domel. He also had the advantage of a number of long-range guns.

## LOSS OF PRECIOUS TIME

The liberators had two pockets of resistance to clear, the heavily-armed Akali bands in the Nalochi gurdawara and the Dogras at Domel. It was accomplished by the next morning but unfortunately, the advance was not resumed. On the 24th, the main column resumed its advance towards Srinagar and encountered heavy artillery and machine-gun fire from the enemy at Bagh-Kohan in Garhi-Dopatta which was easily silenced but towards the evening, the steel bridge on nullah Bhedi at Nambla, two miles ahead of Uri and already set for destruction, was dynamited under the personal supervision of Brigadier Rajendra Singh. The news of its demolition became known to the tribesmen at Garhi-Dopatta which is 36 miles from Uri proper. Meanwhile thousands of Muslims had assembled on the road side to welcome the tribesmen. While the main

1. Mahajan, p. 144.

column spent the night at Kalgai, a few miles behind Uri where a sumptuous feast had been arranged in their honour by the local Muslims, Major Khurshid Anwar led a group to Uri where the Dogras had dug themselves in at a place called Lagaman, in front of the town. There was an exchange of fire resulting in the death of two tribesmen who were removed to the rear to be taken back to their homes according to tribal traditions. These were, incidentally, the first casualties on their side. Khurshid Anwar then held a conference with local Muslims to devise ways and means for breaking up the Dogra resistance as they were holding all vantage points on the road. Consequently, 30 tribesmen were placed at their disposal. Together they crossed the dense forests through village Saidpur which meant covering several miles on the left of Uri town. This is how they were able to surprise the Dogras from behind. In the attack that followed, some Dogra soldiers were killed though some of them must have been able to disappear in the adjacent forest. This happened on the 25th morning. On the same day, the local Muslims constructed a diversion at Nambla within a record time of 5 hours. According to Lt. General Sen, it was so good that it remained in use for 6 months until the bridge was reconstructed by the Indian Army. The tribesmen were already carrying the necessary hand-tools for such a job because the possibility of such obstructions could have been easily foreseen. Mr. Bamzai's accusation that as construction of the diversion 'required considerable skill', so it was 'apparently effected by the sappers and engineers of the Pakistan Army,'[1] is wholly untrue. Mr. Bamzai deliberately forgets that from the very nature of the J.V. road from Murree to Baramula, the construction of such diversions has even to this day remained a permanent feature of its maintenance and that is why several gangs of locally recruited coolies are always found working here and there, identifiable from their red turbans. The technique has descended from father to son; they know the job better than sappers and engineers. He has also suppressed the fact that the tribesmen are among the best earth-digging labourers in the world. The diversion in question, it may be emphasised, did not involve the dynamiting of rocks. Paying a well-deserved tribute to the locals, Major General Akbar Khan says:

> "The locals had, however, turned out in large numbers, worked feverishly through-out the night and built a mile long diversion, cut into the hill-side, thus enabling the tribesmen to pass and catch up with the quarry."[2]

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1. Bamzai, p. 678.
2. Akbar, p. 436.

The convoy crossed it by 5 p.m. The same day Rajendra Singh took a last-ditch stand at Buniyar in the ruins of Diwan Mandir, an ancient temple, with stone pillars of 15′×6′×4′. There are about a hundred rooms, all built of stone; the Dogras had entrenched themselves in them. It was apparently very difficult to dislodge them quickly especially because of the tribesmen's traditional war philosophy of keeping their human loss to the minimum. Major Khurshid Anwar therefore held another conference with Muslims of the locality as a result of which it was decided to move a column to the Enemy's rear and occupy the top of the mountain at the foot of which stands the temple. At this point, stretch out two high altitude ranges, leading to Gulmarg on one end and to Gazan, on the other. Therefore accompanied by local Muslims as guides, a section crossed the Buniyar nullah and reached the mountain top via Braint. Another column, also guided by local Muslims, made a further detour and cut down a few trees beyond Mahura to block the Dogras' escape to Srinagar. The result was that the Dogras were surrounded and most of them got killed. Some may have escaped into the adjacent forest. It is claimed that a bullet hit the Brigadier's right arm and another one, his right leg. He fell down while some of his men ran away. With his death on the mid-day of 25th October, the road to Srinagar lay wide open and eager to be treaded upon by the liberators. Srinagar now lay at the vehicular distance of two hours and making allowance for the old buses with their "tired" engines, it was still possible to make it in a few hours, but alas the opportunity was lost and at what cost. Mahura Power House was occupied the same day though it had already gone out of order on the preceding night. It was Dussehra, an important Hindu festival. The Maharaja was holding his traditional 'Durbar' at Shergarhi when the lights went off. A chowkidar on duty contacted from Srinagar on telephone, reported that a wounded Dogra Captain from Uri had told them that the tribesmen were coming and that all officers and men on duty at the Power House had thereupon run away, obviously after switching off the machines. An Electrical Engineer with some staff was sent immediately to keep it going but in the morning he informed Srinagar on telephone that a group of tribesmen had entered the Power House. So they were permitted to return back. The information conveyed by the Electrical Engineer was factually wrong because the tribesmen did not enter the Power House till late in the afternoon. It seems he took advantage of the prevailing confusion and invented the false presence of tribesmen in the Station to manipulate permission for return to the comparative safety of Srinagar. It is admitted by Lt. General Sen that the Power House had not been damaged till the withdrawal of tribesmen on the 10th of November and that even on that date, out of three generators,

only one had been destroyed while the second one was slightly damaged.[1] Meanwhile the wounded Captain arrived in Srinagar the same night and narrated his story at the palace.

## DOGRA ARMY DEMORALISED

Brigadier Rajendra Singh reportedly died somewhere between Mahura and Rampur and was placed under a culvert, never to be found again. There were rumours current those days that at Uri he had an angry exchange with Maharaja Hari Singh who having fooled himself to believe his soldiers to be invincible, was shocked the way they had been routed by the tribesmen. It was also rumoured that Hari Singh who had in later years taken to abusive language, actually abused his Chief of Staff for his failure to check 'the raiders' advance' and without listening to the reasons that the latter may have had to advance, told him as to what he was meant for, whereupon the deeply injured Rajendra Singh is reported to have replied that he was, of course, going to die but that the Maharaja would be better advised to leave Srinagar immediately. It was also rumoured then that he had asked his companions to remove his rank badges so that his status may remain unknown. The Dogra army's total demoralisation at the time would be apparent from the fact that almost 1850 officers and men stationed in the Badami Bagh cantonment neither came forward to fight nor made their presence as a fighting force known for a number of weeks until they were accidentally discovered by Lt. General Sen. It was the fear of the famed tribesmen and their equally-famed superb marksmanship that had afflicted them with fear. Let Lt. General Sen himself narrate the story:

> "Strange though it may appear, a very large number of Jammu and Kashmir State Force troops, fully trained and equipped, with Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, were unknown to HQ 161 Infantry Brigade, concealing themselves in Badami Bagh Barracks in Srinagar. What made this crime even more heinous was the fact that I Sikh was deployed south-east of Badami Bagh Barracks and was in fact covering the route to the Barracks. The reason for HQ Jammu and Kashmir State Forces adopting this attitude unfathomable since, if 161 Infantry Brigade had suffered a serious reverse, the tribals would have slaughtered them in the Barracks. It was only towards the end of the first week of December, just over a month later and after 161 Infantry Brigade had attacked and hurled back the tribals and was consolidating its position at Uri, 62

1. Sen, p. 112.

miles to the west of Srinagar, that the existence of over 1,850 fully armed, trained and equipped officers and other ranks of the J & K State Forces in Badami Bagh Barracks came to light. The State Force had run out of rations and had submitted a ration indent to Rear Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade which was located in Srinagar. This request was relayed by telephone to Main Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade at Uri and permission sought to issue 2000 rations. As the Maharaja's Body-guard had been despatched to Jammu towards the end of November, and I had been originally informed by Major Kak that there were only a small number of State Force troops in Badami Bagh Barracks, hospital or convalescent cases. I assumed that the request was for 200 men for ten days. The rations were sanctioned, but Rear Headquarters was instructed to ensure that the State Forces realised that the rations were being issued for that period. I was, however, informed that the State Force indent gave the figure of 2,000 all ranks, which included the non-combatants enrolled.

Rear HQ was ordered to check back with the State Forces, it being more than probable that an extra '0' had slipped into the indent through a typist's error. The reply was received about ten minutes later. The figure of 2,000 was confirmed as correct by the State Force, that being the actual strength of the State Forces personnel in Badami Bagh. Wondering whether the rations were to be utilised to feed unauthorised personnel, I instructed Rear Headquarters to issue just 2,000 rations, and to inform HQ J & K State Forces that I would be arriving at Badami Bagh at ten O' clock the next morning and that all officers and men, including the non-combatants enrolled, were to be paraded on the barrack square in full field service marching order. Only the sick and convalescent cases would be excused from the parade, but their numbers and exact would be included on the Parade State.

I arrived at Badami Bagh Barracks at ten O'clock the next morning and was led to the Parade ground. I was greeted with a sight that was quite shattering. Lined up on the Parade ground was a mass of armed personnel equipped with light machine-guns, sten-guns and rifles. The Parade State showed 1,854 all ranks present on parade and 146 in the hospital or in the barracks. I inspected the parade and noticed that almost every man was wearing a campaign or other medal issued during World War II establishing the fact that they were not raw recruits. Meanwhile two of my Staff Officers were making a head count and confirmed that

the number 1,854 was correct. I ordered the parade to be dismissed and taking the officers aside I asked them where they had been during the last two months. There was a grim silence. On an answer being demanded from the senior officer present, he informed me sheepishly that everyone had been in Srinagar the whole period. My further question as to why they had concealed their existence from 161 Infantry Brigade, and done nothing to assist in the grim days that the Brigade had had to face, remained unanswered. I went away from Badami Bagh Barracks disgusted.

I telephoned Major General Kulwant Singh at Jammu and asked him to come to the Valley to see a very interesting sight. He arrived the next day, was presented with an identical parade, and was as stunned as I had been. I informed him that I did not want these personnel in the Valley and requested orders for their immediate despatch to Jammu. They were merely consuming rations that were still being built up, were nothing more or less than a liability, and would never win my confidence. He agreed, and orders were issued immediately. I was however persuaded to retain 600 Dogras and to form them into an *ad hoc* battalion. The battalion, when formed, was moved to Baramula to garrison that town and patrol the area. It proved, however, to be such a nuisance, upsetting not only the civilians but also the troops of 161 Infantry Brigade, that I had to pack it off to Jammu after a week."[1]

## BARAMULA LIBERATED

In the early hours of the morning, on the 26th day of October, the tribesmen entered Baramula. From here to Srinagar is a bus journey of one hour only and the road was even then one of the finest in the world. A prosperous town of about sixteen thousand souls, hardly a thousand of whom were Kashmiri Pandits, it was the biggest town in the Valley—apart from Srinagar city. Centre of fruit and timber industry, it boasted of the only factories outside Srinagar. Since late thirties, it was fast developing as a tourist resort. A large number of Sikh tourists used to spend summer months here. This had led to considerable building activity.

How anxiously Muslims waited for the arrival of tribesmen? Hundreds walked several miles down the river to welcome them ahead and accopmany them on their historic entry in to the town—perhaps to enshrine in their family annals the proud heritage of at least having joined their steps with those who were coming to help

1. Sen, p. 83.

them rid off the century-old Dogra slavery. Never, never in its history of several hundred years, had the town witnessed such a spontaneous gaiety and enthusiasm. The whole populace looked almost mad. It was the Day, eyes yearned to witness and the minds visioned to dawn. Which heart it was whose beating had not, out of sheer happiness, come almost to a halt! Which face it was that was not lit with beaming smiles, having shed aside, for a while, the woes and sorrows suffered over centuries? It was a spectacle to watch. How can a writer like myself, trained in a hard school where emotions have no place, arrest in words the ecstasy and the fantasy that it was? Almost the entire male Muslim inhabitants and thousands others from the countryside—as far away as Sopore, had turned up in their choicest clothes to greet the liberators at Khanpura. Major Khurshid Anwar particularly was the centre of attraction. Almost everyone wanted to thank him personally.

The road to Srinagar lay open but while the city of seven bridges kept hourly waiting, the tribesmen did not resume their advance. They wasted three most precious days which was nor only to cost us our freedom, for how long, God alone knows, but that was also to damage the reputation of tribesmen so much that it was never to be the same again.

## HARI SINGH PACKS UP AND RUNS AWAY.

While the main column of tribesmen was still at Uri, Maharaja Hari Singh hurriedly packed up and in the cover of darkness, on the night falling between the 25th and 26th October, fled away to Jammu along with his wife and son. According to Pandit Bazaz he also took away his family idol, the Gadhadar.[1] According to rumours current in Srinagar, a 100-truck convoy transported to Jammu the luggage, furniture, even carpets and curtains from the palaces. Sheikh Muhammad Saleem, S.P. who was at Banihal, vividly remembers having personally counted 57 cars in the Maharaja's convoy. Hari Singh made a brief halt at the Rest House at Ramban and ordered a cup of tea. Unfortunately for him the bearer was a Muslim who happened to wear a Fez cap when he ushered in the presence of his ruler with tea. The Maharaja immediately left for Jammu without even touching the same.[2] Was he afraid that the bearer may have mixed poison in the tea? Or had his hatred of Muslims become so total that he no longer desired to be served by a Muslim bearer? There was a time, prior to 1931, when even the Head of his house-hold was a Muslim. Now their mutual hatred was so total that he could not even trust the bonafides of a poor bearer. It was to protect this ruler and it is on the strength of a document signed by him, a ruler who fled for fear of his life

1. Freedom Struggle.
2. Sh. Saleem.

from the wrath of his people, that India flew its troops and bases its 'right' to the territory. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, the Indian propaganda that Muslims of Kashmir had nothing to do with the rout of the Dogras and that the tribesmen were raiders, then it was all the more necessary for the Maharaja not to abandon 'his people' but remain at his post of duty rather than run away for his own life. Maharani Tara Devi, dishevelled her hair and carried the Gadhadar idol in her lap in an open car from Udhampur, onwards. It had terrific effect in raising Hindu fury against Muslims.

While the tribesmen were having a "good time" at Baramula, fifty four State army soldiers, withdrew from Teetwal to Handwara. Together with reinforcements from Srinagar they took up defensive positions on nearby hills. A batch of Pathans then reached Sopore. The main road from Baramula to Srinagar branches off at the 7th mile-stone near a village known as Sangrama towards the left which leads to Sopore, about three miles away. From Sopore a road leads to Handwara about 20 miles to the west while another one goes to Bandipura, 17 miles to the east. From Bandipura the road leads to Srinagar via Badgam. One batch went to Handwara to bring down the treasury while two-lorry loads of Mujahids were taken to Bandipura by Khawaja Ali Muhammad Kanwal and Mr. Abdul Bari now President of the AK Jamaat-i-Islami. At both places some non-Muslims were looted but so far as killing is concerned, it remained confined to Sikhs whom the tribesmen called 'Siekhs'. Some of them had hidden themselves in the forest nursery at Sopore, locally called Ningal. Most of them were killed. In fact some tribesmen vainly combed the area upto Simbal, about 12 miles from Sopore, towards Badgam, in their search. Only one Kashmiri Pandit was killed in the entire tehsil of Handwara, and that also in Sopore. There were no incidents of abduction or rape in this tehsil. There were several cases of arson but only valuables were taken away; the rest of the loot was shared by hungry sections of local inhabitants who included Scheduled castes and gypsies. In Sopore the National Conference volunteers set the town's only bridge (wholly wooden) on fire to prevent crossing by tribesmen in strength and also to prevent the few lorries that had gone towards Handwara, from crossing back. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad visited the town on 24th October when despite the tribesmen having now been in the State for over 48 hours, Hari Singh had not been persuaded to hand over power to the National Conference. It was in this background that Bakhshi told a public meeting on the same day that the tribesmen were their brothers-in-faith and had come to deliver them from bondage.

That it was time for Hari Singh to hand over power to the National Conference so that they could go to the tribesmen and request them to return back but in case power was not handed over, they would naturally welcome the tribesmen and give them every assistance. Agha Ashiq Hussain who later retired as Revenue Commissioner, Azad Kashmir, was posted at Sopore as Munsif. A staunch Pakistani at heart and known for his integrity, he took over the administration of the tehsil on behalf of the liberation forces but had later to seek refuge in Azad Kashmir when the tribesmen chose to withdraw.

## MISBEHAVIOUR BY SOME TRIBESMEN

Unfortunately the enthusiasm with which the local Muslims had welcomed their entry into Baramula was short lived. A sizable number of tribesmen lost no time in turning against them and within hours, many a building were ablaze; entry was being forced in almost all pucca houses and its inmates were robbed on pain of death. It was a stunning blow to those who had welcomed them with open arms as liberators. Scores of houses on the left side of river Jhelum were burnt to ashes. The Assistant Mother-Superior, three Nuns of the St. Joseph's Hospital and a British couple staying there, were killed. Except for these, half a dozen Hindus and two Muslims, the killings remained confined to Sikhs. So far as Hindus are concerned, not more than six were killed in the town and only three, Shambu Nath and Ved Lal, who lived in the neighbourhood of my house and Arjan Nath, all School teachers, were Kashmiri Pandits. There was generally no distinction between Hindus and Muslims in so far as loot and arson was concerned. For instance, a tribesman snatched away the blanket of Ghani, a poor weaver with four daughters. When asked whether this was the purpose for which they had come to Kashmir, the victim was shot dead on the spot. The local Cinema hall was converted into a sort of a restricted brothel. The women of a prosperous Muslim family had, like most other Muslim women, moved out of the town, as a precautionary measure. Unfortunately, one of their dauthers-in-law was still in the house, perhaps to look after it. A tribesman caught sight of her and asked her to accompany him to their camp. Displaying great presence of mind, she was all smiles and asked permission to wear new clothes and bring her jewellery and cash as well ! This she was naturally allowed to do. While the tribesman lay waiting outside, she dashed into a large room which stocked grass for a dozen of their horses. Setting it on fire, she entrusted herself to the flames. Not only did she die herself but about two hundred houses in the Mohallah also got reduced to ashes. One Rasul Joo Darzi,

an oil-mill owner, invited about two hundred tribesmen to dinner but after the meals were over, the guests demanded women. Fortunately, women had already been evacuated and there remained only a great grand-mother who was shown to them as the only female inmate and it was with great difficulty that they left the house. An old widow, Nabad Dad, had a cow and its milk was her only source of subsistence. She had a minor son. A group of tribesmen snatched away the cow and, despite her wailing and the entreaties of by-standers, it was slaughtered, roasted and eaten just outside her house.

Some Kashimiri Pandit women with husbands alive wear a special golden ornament on their ears. Both by custom and superstition, no Panditani can even think of laying it down while her husband is alive. The two pieces weigh, perhaps, about two to three tolas. In some cases, the tribesmen snatched them away in a most barbarous manner and did not even give their victims time or opportunity to take them off; their ears got pierced and started bleeding profusely. A Pandit woman, Imberzal, whose husband was employed in the Shali store, with ears profusely bleeding, was locked in a room by a Muslim neighbour until the tribesmen withdrew. Shiv Gour, the astrologer and his newly-wed wife remained in hiding in the homes of Qasabs. One Khawaja Aziz Joo Kachru, a rich but noble man who was dead had constructed a four storeyed palace which was known as Aziz Kachru's house. Some tribesmen almost shattered its top two storeys although they were repeatedly told that it belonged to a Muslim. Their short answer was that such a house could not belong to a Muslim! They carried away not only cash, valuables, clothing but even Somavars and other utensils made of nickel. They thought it was gold. Many a tribesmen could be seen wearing Kashmiri pherans forcibly taken away from the locals and very often they were those worn by women. A local guide was working with a group of tribesmen. One day, one of them forcibly removed his blanket and when the youth protested that he was poor and that it was his only warm clothing for winter which had already set in, the tribesman replied blandly that he may as well treat it as a 'Bakhshish' and went away.

In this distressing surrounding, there also were moments of real-life drama. For instance, a local worker related to me an interesting incident. He was in love with a Pandit girl of his Mohallah and the burning was mutual. He tried his best to protect her house. One day, somehow, a tribesman entered the house but the boy was quick to follow. After collecting all members of the family, he demanded cash and gold which was either wholly or perhaps partly placed in his hands.

Probably he was watching the Muslim boy and the Pandit girl, though neither of them had any idea about it. After collecting the loot, he took away the girl and asked the boy to accompany them. This happened in the Jamia Masjid Mohallah which has a considerably long sand field on the right bank of Jhelum. It was already getting dark. After taking them to one end of the field, he placed the hand of the girl in that of the boy, and told them that he understood they were in love and that therefore he had married them! "Hum ne tumhara Shadi Kiya hai,".

Naturally, these excesses caused wide-spread indignation. It is said that bad news travels fast; the news of these incidents reached Srinagar and lent strength to the campaign of untruths and half truths that the National Conference leadership and the Mahajan administration had let loose against the tribesmen. The Muslim youth who had so proudly attached themselves to various groups as guides began to desert them, partly out of hatred for the type of freedom they had ushered in but largely for fear of their own lives. Major Khurshid Anwar and some tribal elders were deeply ashamed of what was happening. The eye-witnesses emphatically state that they were not only, not a party to these acts of pillage and plunder but did their human best, under the circumstances, to prevent their uncontrollable charge from taking to this path. A tribesman with a rifle is a king and it was not therefore unnatural that he should have ignored the entreaties of Anwar and men of his thinking and the impulse to loot and enjoy, the opportunity being at his feet, should have had the better of him. When Khan Abdul Qaiyum came to know of the situation, he lost no time in sending the late Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif who addressed them in Baramula and forcefully reminded them that plunder was not the primary purpose for which they had entered Kashmir. He also told them what were the commands of God and our Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) about the rules of conduct in a war and how essential it was to protect every body's honour, life and property, regardless of religious belief.

We have already seen that two hundred armed men were, under the plan, supposed to reach Srinagar in advance to capture the air-field so as to prevent landing of Indian troops by air. Two hundred rifles had for that purpose been specially given to Major Khurshid Anwar but unfortunately no such group appeared at the airport. May be, the Major was over-confident or may be, the darra-made rifles were considered ineffective for such an important task force. Two or three days after the entry of tribesmen when it was realised that no arrangements had been made to capture the air-field, a hundred volunteers

led by Mr. Latif Afghani, a brave Muslim League National Guard officer, were hurriedly sent from Rawalpindi to accomplish the job. It was too late.[1] They lost thirty men on the way but those who succeeded in reaching the air-field found Indian forces equipped with automatic weapons, heavy machine-guns and mortars already entrenched in defensive positions. They were therefore unable to achieve the objective.

Khurshid Anwar received a bullet injury on his right leg which got complicated due to carelessness and ultimately led to his death on 13th October, 1950. A six-month treatment in London was also of no avail. The last words he uttered on his death-bed were: "KASHMIR HAMARA HAI."[2]

A few days before the entry of tribesmen, the Maharaja of Patiala had sent an Infantry battalion and a Mountain Battery of the Patiala State forces. The former was posted at Jammu while the latter took up position on the Badami Bagh side of the air-field in Srinagar. The Infantry battalion collaborated with the Dogra army and local non-Muslims in the genocide at Jammu but the Mountain Battery which had apparently taken position in the air-field, was presumably feeling shy of coming in contact with the tribesmen. In fact no one responsible for operations in Srinagar seemed to have been aware of their presence until they were suddenly discovered on the 29th of October. According to General Sen it had been in Srinagar for ten days.[3] The Commander had been given no targets and his guns were without dial sights. . In the confusion that prevailed, neither were they given these dials nor did they ask for them, perhaps because of having been used to the killing of defenceless civilians, they were afraid of facing expert marksmen like the tribesmen. It is also possible that they were afraid of retribution for the crimes they had already committed in Patiala and perhaps elsewhere in East Punjab.

## VITAL INFORMATION GOES WASTE

On 26th October, Hari Singh "acceeded" to India and on the 27th, a hundred planes were promptly pressed into service for an airlift of troops and armour. By 17th November, 704 sorties were flown from Delhi.[4] The Indian High Command decided to lift the 161 Infantry Brigade, then posted at Gurgaon. It was part of the

1. Raiders in Kashmir, p. 23.
2. Interview with his widow.
3. Sen, p. 64.
4. Bamzai, p. 682.

5th Indian Division commanded by H. G. Russel, better known as Russel Pasha on account of his big moustaches which linked him probably to the famous Enver Pasha. The Brigade had, a few months earlier, moved from Ranchi to Gurgaon and was commanded by Brigadier J. C. Katoch. It was probably the 25th of October when Lt. Kaiser Beg, Cypher Officer at Lahore wireless station went to Col. Musa Khan (as the former Commander-in-Chief then was) at midnight and gave him a message from G. H. Q. Delhi meant for the 161 Infantry Brigade at Gurgaon which was known as Branjbes Brigade. It was an operational order from the Western Command informing them that "they were to be airlifted to Srinagar to save the airfield". This message was conveyed through Lahore due to some mistake. It caused 24 hours delay in the despatch of the 1st Sikh Regiment to Srinagar, but unfortunately the interval was not utilised by us for the capture of the air-field. Col. Musa ran to the house of Major General Nazir Ahmed and both discussed the message. Col. Musa then rang up Brigadier Sher Khan, Director Operations at Rawalpindi and speaking in Pashto, conveyed the message from Delhi and the implications involved. Brigadier Sher Khan is dead and one does not know what happened later but General Musa states that the Brigadier kept awake all through the night and did his best to do something in the matter but alas to no effect.[1]

On the 27th October, a High level conference was held at the Governor's House Lahore in the evening under the chairmanship of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. It was attended by Col. Iskandar Mirza, then Defence Secretary, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, then Secretary General, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Nawab of Mamdot, Brigadier Sher Khan and Col. Akbar. Col. Akbar claims that he proposed a tribal attack on Jammu city. His contention was that it could block the movement of troops and arsenal to the Valley, especially through the Kathua-Jammu road, relieve enemy pressure on Poonch and Rajauri and distract attention from Srinagar. Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and Nawab of Mamdot supported the proposal but unfortunately all others present opposed it as they feared that it might provoke an Indo-Pakistan war for which Pakistan was thought not prepared.[2] The only constructive decision taken in the meeting was the setting up of a Liberation Committee with Mr. Justice Din Muhammad as Chairman and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Khawaja Abdur Rahim and Col. Akbar as members. In order to facilitate the latter's active association with the Movement from now on, he was

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1. Genocide of Muslims by Musa: DAWN, 1st September 1970.
2. Raiders in Kashmir, p. 27.

appointed Military Adviser to the Prime Minister so that he could be free from the G. H. Q. duties. He was to assume, soon afterwards, the name of General Tariq after the name of the inspiring Muslim Hero from Morocco who invaded Spain and while alighting from their boats at the sea-shore, ordered them to be burnt down, to bring home to his troops that they were on a foreign land and had no hope of returning to their homes except as victors.

## MOUNTBATTEN'S SECRET VISIT TO LAHORE

A most important piece of evidence has recently come to public light which shows how questionable Lord Mountbatten's role really was to prevent Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. MB has strongly contested it. The tribesmen entered the State on the 22nd while the State's accession to India was publicly announced on the 27th; Indian army was flown to Srinagar on the same day. Lord Mountbatten flew into the Lahore air-port secretly during the interval and had a lengthy conference with senior British officers of the Pakistan Army. He was accompanied by senior British officers of the Indian army. This stunning evidence has come from no less a person than General Muhammad Musa Khan whose personal integrity has been testified to even by such an arch enemy of Pakistan as Lt. General Kaul. Says General Musa:

> "One morning in October 1947 I was rung up by the Pakistan Air Force Control room and was told that a few British General Officers had landed at the air-port (Walton) and another aircraft was due in shortly from India, carrying VIPs...No one in our H.Q. had any previous warning of their visit. I went to the airport. The C-in-C of both the dominions and their senior staff officers were standing outside our improvised reception office. The Pakistan Chief of General Staff had told me that they had come for a meeting with their Indian counterparts regarding the developments in Kashmir and I was to make the necessary arrangement immediately.
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> As far as I recollect, Lord Mountbatten had also come. I informed the area Commander from the airport. He was also surprised to know of the sudden arrival of so many senior officers. With great difficulty, we improvised a conference room. The meeting lasted till lunch time. I was not informed about its proceedings. No Pakistani officer attended it. I, therefore, could not ascertain the decisions arrived at between the representatives of two States despite my relentless efforts to ascertain the outcome of discussions."[1]

1. Dawn, 1st September 1970.

The first question that arises is as to when did Lord Mountbatten pay this visit? General Musa is not sure about the date but it is not difficult to locate it because if it had been before 23rd October, there is no reason why the publicity-conscious Mountbatten who would summon Campbell Johnson even at past mid-night to keep him informed of his "achievements and activities" uptodate, should have come secretly, suddenly and what is more important, unannounced. The very fact that he chose not to inform the Pakistan Government of his visit, most unusual and perhaps unprecedented in international relations and even on reaching Lahore did not inform it of his arrival or stay, despite his high exalted position, leaves no room for doubt that it had an ulterior purpose. According to General Musa, the meeting was taking place to discuss the "developments in Kashmir" and as these developments from the point of view of British officers of the two armies, could have only meant the situation created by the entry of tribesmen, the Lahore Walton meeting could not have taken place before 23rd October. George Cunningham, the then N.W.F.P. Governor has stated in his published diaries that General Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army had told him after his return from Delhi during those very days that Lord Mountbatten was personally directing military operations in Kashmir. News to that effect was published in all Pakistan newspapers at the time but I am quoting Mountbatten's fellow-countryman to show conclusively that Mountbatten was really in personal command of the operations. George Cunningham has recorded the following note in his diary:

> "Messervy came up from Pindi for a talk; just back from England, he was in Delhi two days ago and was surprised to find Mountbatten directing the military operations in Kashmir. Mountbatten is daily becoming more and more anathema to our Muslims and it certainly seems as if he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes."[1]

Says Ch. Muhammad Ali·

> "Simultaneously Mountbatten, as one of his staff told me on my visit to Delhi a fortnight later, assumed direction of military operations. To use his dramatic language: "The mantle of the Governor General fell from him and he assumed the garb of the Supreme Commander". To Mountbatten it might have appeared as merely an extension of his functions as Chairman of the Provisional Defence Committee. Anyhow his great experience of combined

1. Cunningham's Diaries—1947, p. 23 qouted in the partitition of India by Phillip and Mary Doreen, p. 292.

operations during the second World war was put at the service of Indian aggression in Kashmir."[1]

Records Campbell Johnson:

> "Mountbatten's extra-ordinary vitality and canniness were well-adapted to the demands of the hour."[2]

He must have therefore, in anticipation of this particular role and in order to ensure its success, paid the secret, surprise visit to Lahore to confer with senior British officers of the Pakistan Army *to learn of the deployment of Pakistan troops, as to whether regular army had or had not been sent into Kashmir with the tribesmen in the guise of civilian volunteers, the strength of the liberation forces and the type of arms and ammunition they were carrying. He might have also told these officers and used his prestige as the great-grand-son of Queen Victoria to oppose the involvement of Pakistan troops and threaten withdrawal from the army in case their advice was not accepted.* God alone knows what else he might have told them and what decisions were taken, but it is apparent that after his return to Delhi, he not only helped actively in manipulating the accession of the State to India from a despot who had no control over the State at the time and had fled away for fear of his own life but also took over the operational command of the Indian forces. It was not without reason that at the time of his departure from India in June, 1948, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru publicly said of him:

> "Earl Mountbatten has acted in India's interests as zealously as any Indian could have done."[3]

George Cunningham on receiving information on the 20th of October that 900 Mahsuds had left Tank for Kashmir, ordered the political department which he was also heading, to stop their further progress but by that time they had already crossed Indus near Khushalgarh. Simultaneously he learnt from General Ross McCay who commanded the Peshawar Division that tribesmen in lorries were crossing the Attock bridge. He was asked to block their departure which however was not possible because of the prevailing conditions. Similarly Mr. Gracey, the Inspector General of Police also received information from Attock and must have conveyed it to the Governor. It seems that the Governor and other concerned British officers in Pakistan service informed General Messervy at Rawalpindi of the tribal movement. He contacted

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1. Ch. Mohammad Ali, p. 293.
2. Campbell Johnson, p. 223.
3. Abdul Hamid, p. 245.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and advised against the sending of tribesmen to Kashmir. Cunningham then informed Messervy on phone that Khan Abdul Qaiyum was collecting Militia, transport, Scouts and tribesmen for an attack on Kashmir. Messervy again contacted Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and advised against such an invasion.[1] Soon afterwards, he flew to London and General Gracey took over as acting Commander-in-Chief.

*On 24th October, Mr. Batra the Deputy Prime Minister* of Kashmir was flown to Delhi to inform the Government of India of the entry of tribesmen and their continuing advance. No records are as yet available about the discussions that took place between them. However, it is admitted by Indian authors that the G.H.Q. Rawalpindi had independently informed the Supreme Commander at Delhi about the entry of tribesmen into Muzaffarabad and it is also on record that the former placed this information before the Government of India. It is claimed by Indians that on the night of 24th October, the Prime Minister had hosted a dinner in honour of the Foreign Minister of Siam and that it was here that for the first time, he informed Mountbatten of the tribal incursion.[2] This doesn't seem to be correct because it is unthinkable that Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, would not have informed Mountbatten immediately and independently. This story has since been falsified by the French authors who state that on 24th October, Gracey phoned the information from his telephone No. 1704 to his Indian counterpart, Sir Lockhart on his telephone No. 3017; that the latter conveyed it to Mountbatten and Auchinleck and that Mountbatten conveyed it to Nehru. Gracey also conveyed the number, composition and the arms of the tribesmen[3] George Cunningham had added the following postscript to a letter he had earlier written to Sir Robert Lockhart:

> "Some people up here have been acting very foolishly. You will know what I mean by the time this letter reaches you."[4]

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1. Hodson, p. 447.
2. Hodson, p. 445.
3. Freedom at Midnight, p. 352.
4. Menon, p. 397.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE FUGITIVE RULER "JOINS" INDIA

## *CHAPTER XXV*

# The Fugitive Ruler "Joins" India

On the 25th October, a meeting of the Indian Defence Council was convened at 10 A.M. It was attended among others by Lord Mountbatten and Sir Robert Lockhart who placed before the Council the information received from G.H.Q. Rawalpindi. Although no records are available as yet but there is no doubt that Pandit Nehru or Sardar Patel must have also placed before the Council the information brought by Mr. Batra. The Maharaja had "requested" for arms and ammunition and also for reinforcements of troops. According to Mr. Hodson, Nehru complained in the meeting that although the Ministries of State and Defence had approved the continual request for arms and equipments from the Maharaja's Government, nothing had been done.[1] It confirms that a secret understanding did exist between the two Governments even prior to the entry of the tribesmen. No details are available of what discussions actually took place in the Council meeting, but the Indian and British authors have unanimously stated that Lord Mountbatten emphasised that "no precipitate actions are to be taken until the Government of India had fuller information". Thereupon Mr. V.P. Menon was flown to Srinagar in a BOAC plane claimed to have been earlier chartered for the evacuation of Muslim refugees. Two officers, one each from the Air Force and the Army, accompanied him to make an on-the-spot study of the military situation. Pandit Nehru also sent a personal confident, Mr. D.N. Kachru, a Kashmiri Pandit. In Srinagar Mr. Menon went straight to the residence of Mr. Mahajan who apprised them of the situation and must have told him that the announcement of accession could no longer be delayed. Mr. Mahajan has, in his book, presented himself as having been perhaps the only one in Srinagar whose morale was enviable but this is what Mr. Menon says of him:

1. Hodson, p. 446.

"Mahajan, who is usually self-possessed, seemed temporarily to have lost his equanimity. From his residence we both proceeded to the Maharaja's palace. The Maharaja was completely unnerved by the turn of events and by his sense of lone helplessness."[1]

Says Mr. Hodson:

"Mahajan had been obsessed with the local situation; he had seemed to want to retire to Jammu and leave Srinagar to the mercy of the invaders."[2]

Both Menon and Mahajan then met Hari Singh and must have given him a secret message from Sardar Patel. It seems he was also told that the Government of India would be placed in a highly embarrassing position if he did not associate Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah with the administration and since he was already on the run and had been routed in the battle, he was ready for anything to save himself and his throne. According to Lord Birdwood, the Maharaja was even prepared to make a gift of the Kashmir valley to the Government of India and himself retire to Jammu. Mr. Menon then retired to the Guest House in the early hours of the morning, but before he could go to sleep, Mahajan rang him up and told him that tribesmen were already in Srinagar and that they must leave immediately. This was absolutely incorrect and it shows that Mr. Mahajan's morale was in shambles and the thought uppermost in his mind was not to lose a minute in escaping from Srinagar. Says Mr. Menon:

"Just as I was going to sleep, Mahajan rang me up to say that there were rumours that the raiders had infiltrated into Srinagar and that it would be unsafe for us to remain any longer in the city. I could hardly believe that the raiders could have reached Srinagar, but I had to accept Mahajan's advice. The Maharaja had taken away all the available cars and the only transport available was an old jeep. Into this were bundled Mahajan, myself and the air crew of six or seven."[3]

From the Safdar Gunj Airport, they went straight to the house of Pandit Nehru where Sardar Patel was already present. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who had returned to Delhi on the 25th evening to "plead" with Pandit Nehru for "Indian assistance," was staying at the Prime Minister's

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1. Menon, p. 398.
2. Hodson, p. 452.
3. Menon, p. 398.

house. He was in Delhi when tribesmen entered the State. On the morning of 25th, he seems to have been flown to Srinagar and returned back in the evening after discussing the situation with his senior colleagues. It seems they decided to organise the defence of the city. The civil administration having completely collapsed, the National Conference Volunteers were posted at the air-port, the bridges and the entrances to the city. What happened in the meeting is narrated by Mr. Mahajan in some detail:

> "When I told the Prime Minister of India that I had orders to go to Pakistan in case immediate military aid was not given, he naturally became upset and in an angry tone said, "Mahajan, go away". I got up and was about to leave the room when Sardar Patel detained me by saying in my ear, "Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan". Just then, a piece of paper was passed over to the Prime Minister. He read it and in a loud voice said, "Sheikh Sahib also says the same thing". It appeared that Sheikh Abdullah had been listening to all this talk while sitting in one of the bedrooms adjoining the drawing room where we were. He now strengthened my hands by telling the Prime Minister that military help must be sent immediately. This came as a timely help for the success of my mission to New Delhi. The Prime Minister's attitude changed on reading this slip. After few minutes talk, he told me to go and have some rest at Sardar Baldev Singh's house. He was calling a meeting of the Defence Council at 10 A.M. to discuss the matter and promised to convey its decision to me through my host, Sardar Baldev Singh (the Defence Minister) before lunch."[1]

Mahajan had no such instructions; even he doesn't claim that he had. A fanatic Arya Samajist who, despite having been a High Court Judge, could justify the killing of innocent Muslims on the ground that equally innocent Hindus had been killed elsewhere, he would have neither allowed Hari Singh to give him any such instructions nor agreed to carry them. This he said just to force a decision and overcome the apparent hesitation displayed by the crafty Pandit, to immediately rush his troops to Kashmir. This hesitation on the part of Jawahar Lal Nehru, however, should not be construed to prove, that there was no prior understanding between Delhi and Srinagar on the accession issue; it was due to complications that could arise in the case of Hyderabad and Junagarh by settingup a pattern for a Ruler to accede to the Dominion of his choice irrespective of the religious affinities of his people and their desires. Junagarh housed the famous Somnath temple

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1. Mahajan, p. 152.

whose destruction nine hundred years ago, marked the appearance of permanent Muslim power in the sub-continent and has ever since remained a symbol of Hindu-Muslim hostility. A few years later, the President of "secular" India went in person amidst unprecedented national jubilation, to rededicate the temple, reconstructed at an enormous cost, borne not only by Hindus all over India but also by the Central and provincial governments to signify the symbolic end of Muslim rule and the resurgence of the militant, rabid Hindu fanaticism. A Hindu-majority State, its Muslim Ruler had already acceded to Pakistan but the Government of India had, in writing and by official pronouncement, refused to accept the position. Instead, it had already manipulated the setting up of a puppet Provisional Government at Bombay with Mr. Samaldas Gandhi as President. The other hesitation was provided by Hyderabad, in population and resources the biggest State in the sub-continent. Nehru's predicament was that if India was to accept the accession of Kashmir on the strength of a document executed by a Ruler who was at the same time a fugitive in his own land, how could she dispute the right of the Nawab of Junagarh to accede to Pakistan? He was also afraid that it may provide the Nizam of Hyderabad with an easy stick to beat India by technically acceding to Pakistan.

It is claimed by Mr. Campbell Johnson, Mr. Hodson as well as by Mr. Menon that *it was Lord Mountbatten* who told the Defence Council meeting that in view of the population of the State being overwhelmingly Muslim, accession should be conditioned on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite which was readily agreed to by Mr. Nehru and other Ministers. The claim may be true but there is no doubt that it is not the whole truth. It was actually to safeguard India's determined bid for the acquisition of Hyderabad and Junagarh and NOT out of love for principles or political morality that it was made conditional on the holding of a plebiscite, because in any such reference, the vast Hindu majorities of the two States were more likely to throw in their lot with Hindu India than with Muslim Pakistan. A second reason was that unconditional accession of the Muslim majority State to India was bound to inflame public opinion in Pakistan which may have, unmindful of the consequences, even chosen to go to war or been forced to do so by a highly emotional public opinion. A third reason was that an unconditional accession was bound to enrage State Muslims and thus make the task of the Indian Army which had yet to fly and which it would have taken considerable time to build up to an extent when local resistance could be immaterial, difficult. It must not have been lost sight of that the revolt in Poonch and the desertion of Muslim elements of the State Army was aimed at preventing such an accession and therefore, if accession was accepted unconditionally, it was bound to invite serious repercussions in the State and force upon the

Muslims a desparate and total struggle. Yet another reason was the very remote likelihood of her ability to beat back the tribesmen who were already in Baramula. The active possibility was the loss of the famed Valley even before Indian troops were airborne. The proviso was therefore also intended for future bargaining because Nehru was well aware of Sheikh Abdullah's magic among Kashmiri-speaking Muslims and he might have entertained hopes that with his support, the Valley, lost in battle, may be regained in a free vote. Subsequent events proved beyond all doubt that the proviso was a mere subterfuge out of Chankaya's classic on State-craft, the Artha Shastra, and was never intended to be implemented. It is pertinent to point out that eight years later when Lord Birdwood discussed Kashmir with Pandit Nehru in connection with the book he was then writing on the subject, the latter told him unashamedly: "To place the responsibility for so vital a decision on the shoulders of *ignorant* Kashmiris, was hardly fair."[1] This sophistication was meant only for the British intellectuals because a few years earlier when Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was Prime Minister and asked Nehru why he was not implementing the promise of holding a plebiscite, the latter told him very bluntly that it was a 'tamasha'.[2] That Nehru should have thus practised fraud on a whole world is very sad, but sadder still is the thought that Mountbatten should have been willingly or unwillingly a party to its perpetration.

Consequently, soon after the meeting, Mr. Menon accompanied by Mr. Mahajan flew to Jammu with an Instrument of Accession drafted by the Ministry of States and a letter of conditional acceptance from the Governor General. These documents were flown to Jammu because he had run away from Srinagar on the night falling between the 25th and 26th of October at 2 A. M. It is claimed that the Maharaja had gone to sleep and had told his A. D. C. that if Mr. Menon returned back he should not be awakened because it meant that the Government of India had decided to intervene but that if he did not turn up, he should be shot dead in his sleep. It is doubtful if a man in the position of the Maharaja at the time could have actually been able to sleep and this raises a doubt that the story may have been invented to lend colour to the claim of the Indian Government that there was no previous understanding in existence about the State's accession to India. Mr. Menon got his signatures and immediately flew back to Delhi. It is interesting to point out that when he returned along with Mr. Mahajan in the morning, a car was already waiting for them at the airport to take them to the Prime Minister's house and this time when he returned from

1. Birdwoood, p. 203.
2. Dost ya Dushman, p. 64.

Jammu in the afternoon, Sardar Patel was himself waiting for him at the airport and took him immediately to Mr. Nehru's residence where a second meeting of the Defence Council was already in progress. This shows, in regretful contrast to the position as it obtains in Pakistan, how Hindu leaders remain alive not only to the importance of time-factor but also how enviably they rise above considerations of personal pride. Can we ever imagine any Muslim Central Minister, let alone a Minister of Sardar Patel's hard-earned greatness, going to the airport and that too in advance, to receive his Secretary? Here, the Minister as well as the Secretary are, generally, both power-conscious, snobbish personalities. It could only happen in Pakistan and NOT in India that a victorious General, almost poised for the capture of Akhnoor in 1965, was removed from command when he had half-accomplished the job, lest he should become popular, even if his removal meant, as it actually did, the sacrifice of the country's supreme interests. When the reader will compare this with what has already been written about the meeting held in Lahore on 12th September, one has to hang one's head in shame.

On return from Jammu, with the Instrument of Accession in his hands, V. P. Menon, waving it to Alexander Symons, British High Commissioner to the Nehru Court, told him frankly:

> "Here it is! We HAVE Kashmir. The BASTARD signed the Act of Accession. And now that we have got it, WE WILL NEVER LET IT GO."[1]

The Defence Committee accepted the so-called accession, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held to determine the question of the State's accession. It is claimed that even after the decision had been reached, Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air-force pointed out the risk involved in the operation, but Nehru is claimed to have asserted that "the only alternative to send in troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar which would be followed by major communal holocaust in India". He is also claimed to have said that "British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the tribesmen since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their lives."[2] In a secret report to the King, Mountbatten supported his action as well as that of the government he headed by claiming that if Indian troops had not been rushed to Srinagar, several hundred British and European nationals living in Srinagar and Gulmarg would have been killed by the tribesmen:

1. Freedom at Midnight, p. 556.
2. Menon, p. 400.

"It was unquestionable that if Srinagar was to be saved from pillage by the invading tribesmen and if the couple of hundred British residents in Kashmir were not to be massacred, Indian troops would have to do the job."[1]

Hodson discloses that "as soon as the news of the threat to the Valley reached Delhi", Auchinleck went to Mountbatten and sought permission to fly British troops to Srinagar to protect the British and European residents. Lord Mountbatten refused on the ground that they were not meant for operational duty and that they should not get involved in the affairs of the two Dominions. Upon this, Auchinleck is said to have exclaimed, "Those people will be murdered and their blood will be on your head", to which Mountbatten replied: "I shall have to take that responsibility but I could not answer for what might happen if British troops became involved".

It was clearly wrong. If British troops had been flown to Srinagar from Delhi or rushed by road from Rawalpindi merely to take the European community under protection, how would have they got involved in the inter-Dominion disputes? Besides the very thesis that European residents would have been murdered is largely preposterous. In Baramula, half a dozen were tragically killed but apart from the fact that it was no part of the objective but reckless trigger-happy shooting by some individuals and better sense and understanding had later prevailed, these unfortunate victims were not the only European residents of the town. There were at least five or six English teachers at the St. Joseph's College; the adjacent St. Joseph's Hospital, one of the best in northern India, was wholly staffed by European doctors and nurses; then there was a European hotel owned by an Irish lady, Mrs. Okaley who lived with her grown up daughters. None of them was harmed.

Those who wished to evacuate, were escorted to Abbottabad by Miss Mumtaz, the late lamented daughter of Begum Shah Nawaz, Begum Nasim Akbar Khan and Miss Mehrmand Khan. A group of tribesmen stopped their vehicles as he suspected them to be Hindus, where-upon Mumtaz recited verses from the Holy Quran to establish their credentials. Among them was also a British correspondent Mr. Doon Campbell who was introduced as a Turkish Muslim on the strength of a Turkish Red Crescent Card he had collected in Turkey.[2] Father Shanks, Principal of the St. Joseph's College, other English teachers at the institution and the

1. Hodson. p. 452.
2. Interview with Begum Nasim Akbar.

wife and children of Mutawal Singh, the College Superintendent, who had escaped for his own life, abandoning them to the mercy of the tribesmen, were also evacuated to Abbottabad. After the withdrawal of tribesmen, most of the Sisters went back to the Hospital but as Indian army had since occupied all surrounding buildings and set up a Divisional Headquarter in this area, Muslim women stopped their visits to the Hospital. The Sisters therefore broke from practice and started visiting Mohallas to attend to the sick on the spot. My mother who came from Baramula in the middle of 1950 told me that these Sisters used to stretch out their hands in Muslim families of acquaintance and say, "Mango, Khuda say Pakistan Mango": pray that the territory may go to Pakistan. This shows the falsity of the claim that the operation was agreed to by Mountbatten primarily for the safety of the European residents. It was to feed the British public opinion and cover his own questionable role in the matter that the question of the security of European residents was blown out of all proportions. Lord Birdwood, the son of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood who has made a special study of the Kashmir dispute, dealing with this aspect, says:

> "It has been argued that only swift military action saved the European community in Srinagar from the same fate as the Baramula convent. Certainly Srinagar, undefended, would have provided a Roman holiday for the tribesmen, in which case the Pakistan Government would have been called on to intervene...............It is impossible to believe that wisdom would not then have prevailed to restore law and order and control the situation. That there would have been bloodshed was not denied. But any suggestion that the situation was such as could not have been brought quickly under control, was equally not accepted. I was also reminded that such Pakistan regular troops as were available would obviously have been summoned to confirm the restoration of normal conditions. In the circumstances Abdullah was the only free leader capable of taking control.
>
> Whatever degree of urgency may have seemed to demand the decision in Delhi, it is impossible not to deplore the circumstances by which troops called in to save Srinagar assumed the role of rescuing a vast State in which large sections of the people were unwilling to be rescued!"[1]

The same evening after the Indian Cabinet "ratified" the decision

1. Birdwood, p. 60.

of the Defence Council, Mountbatten invited Mr. Ian Stephens to dinner and this is what the latter records about his impressions:

> "I was startled by their one-sided verdict on affairs; they seemed to have become wholly pro-Hindu. The atmosphere at Government House that night was almost one of war. Pakistan, the Muslim League and Jinnah were the enemy. This tribal movement into Kashmir was criminal folly. And it must have been well organised. *Mr. Jinnah, Lord Mountbatten assured me, was waiting at Abbottabad ready to drive in triumph to Srinagar if it succeeded.*"[1]

It is absolutely incorrect that the Quaid-e-Azam was at Abbottabad, to say the least of waiting to drive in triumph to Srinagar. I have no doubt that this false information was dinned into his ears by the crafty Brahmins to overcome his likely hesitation in taking over personal command of the military operations in Kashmir. We have already seen that the Quaid-e-Azam's refusal to have him as joint Governor-General was interpreted by him as a personal insult; his pride had received a jolt and he seemed determined to bring home to the former how damaging for Pakistan his decision was. By telling him falsely that the Quaid-e-Azam was at Abbottabad "ready to drive in triumph to Srinagar", the Brahmins played upon his weakness "to frustrate Jinnah" and avenge his own failure to become the joint Governor General.

Years later Mountbatten recorded:

> "We had to act fast, because winter was now coming on. But I had argued strongly that Kashmir must first accede since otherwise this action by India would be illegal. The Maharaja, in a panic, agreed just in time. But from the moment Indian troops arrived, tempers in Pakistan and in India became steadily worse. There seemed to be no meeting of minds at any point on Kashmir; normally reasonable men ceased to be reasonable on this issue.
>
> The result was a running sore, a permanent, disastrous quarrel between India and Pakistan. This was terribly disappointing to me as I felt particularly responsible for all matters affecting the princes. Yet I don't easily see what more I could have done."
>
> "I had to accept misunderstanding in India and at home. One could not take part in such vast events without making some ene-

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1. Ian Stephens, p. 109.

mies. But I could look into my own conscience without dismay. From first to last *I had done my utmost to serve the true interests of Britain and India, the whole of India.*"[1]

## THE ACCESSION DOCUMENTS

In view of the historical significance of the letters purporting to have been exchanged between Lord Mountbatten and Maharaja Hari Singh and which had been drafted by the same hand in New Delhi as is also apparent from their language, they are reproduced below in full:

"My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and for my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government under the standstill agreement is operating the post and telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, the Government permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridi soldiers in plain clothes and desperados with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then from Sialkot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining the Hazara District on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at

1. The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten, page 165.

several points simultaneously so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and the looting of the Mahura power house which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus left loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government as a first step to overrunning the whole State. The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motor trucks, using the Mansehra-Muzaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming into my State. In fact, both, the radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan radio even put up the story that a provisional government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With these conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. *Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India.* I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and the people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.

I may also inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. V. P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of

the situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kindest regards,[1]

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) HARI SINGH

"My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness's letter dated 26th October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. *In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute*, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil is cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.

Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.[2]

(Signed) MOUNTBATTEN
of Burma.

Next morning, the 27th October, a hundred planes began what turned out to be a decisive airlift of troops, arms, ammunition and other military supplies from the Delhi airport. In contrast to the behaviour of British officers in the service of Pakistan, the British officers in the service of India fully co-operated in planning and executing the invasion. The plan was prepared as well as carried out by the three British Chiefs of Staff under the direct supervision of Mountbatten. Wrote the latter to the king:

1. Birdwood, p. 213
2. Birdwood, p. 213.

"The commanders pointed out the extreme hazards of flying in troops and I added my voice to theirs. But as soon as I saw that my Ministers had made up their minds that the military risks must be accepted and Indian troops sent, I was clear that it was essential to send sufficient aid in time.........I therefore made it my business to over-ride all the difficulties which the Commanders-in-Chief, in the course of their duty, raised to the proposal."[1]

The collection of a hundred troop-carrying planes in two days in the year 1947 has legitimately raised doubts about the operation being spontaneous. Indian publicists have therefore released a time-table signed by their British Services Chiefs to show that there was no prior planning. One need not doubt the authenticity of the time-table, but the availability of such an armada at hand had nothing to do with it. They can both co-exist. It is more probable that its availability was ensured without the British Services Chiefs being taken into confidence. We have on this point the evidence of Ian Stephen who says:

"And listening a few days later to the troop carrying Dakotas steadily dronning over Delhi to Srinagar, I much wondered how so obviously a first-rate, little airborne operation could have been improvised. I know some of the difficulties, having as a War correspondent in Europe in 1944 been laid on for various airborne 'ups' which were planned but not put through."[2]

It has now come to light that as soon as Menon was flown to Srinagar on 25th October, i.e. at least 30 hours before the act of accession, Mountbatten set in motion preparations for an airlift of troops to Kashmir. He ordered all Indian civil air transport to drop their passengers wherever they were and head for Delhi.[3]

Commenting on the Indian decision to "accept" accession and fly troops to Srinagar, Lt. General Sir Francis Tuker, no sympathiser of Pakistan, says:

"We all know now......that Kashmir, most of which for many reasons should have joined Pakistan, was no less invaded by Hindustan than by the tribesmen of N.W. F. P.......... It looked to an observer as though Machiavelli was already in the Hindustan Cabinet."

1. Hodson, p. 452.
2. Horned Moon, p. 109.
3. Freedom at Midnight, p. 356.

That the knowledgeable Sir Francis had Pandit Nehru in mind when he spoke of the presence of a Machiavelli in the Indian cabinet goes without saying but what he did not know then was the later disclosure that Nehru actually kept Chankaya's book on State-craft, the Arthashastra, beneath his pillow, perhaps for ready reference before going to bed.[1] Even as early as 1937, ten years before assuming the mantle of free India's Premiership, Nehru had been writing for the press under the pen-name of Chankaya.[2]

## THE DEFEAT OF INDIAN TROOPS

A day after reaching Baramula and after having experienced the loot, arson and abduction indulged in by a section of the tribesmen and how it had alienated the sympathy and support of the local Muslims and naturally afraid that they may act likewise in Srinagar city with a population of over three lakhs, Major Khurshid Anwar convened a conference of the tribal Maliks and demanded an undertaking that on reaching Srinagar, they would not burn down any house nor loot Muslim property and also refrain from abduction of women but the Maliks refused to yield. Their contention was that they had been brought with the promise of "the loot being theirs" and although they were willing not to loot property belonging to Muslims or foreigners, they expressed their inability to distinguish between the Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus. The Jirga continued its deliberations for the whole day while the road to Srinagar lay completely open. While the deliberations were going on, nearly all the tribesmen disappeared on missions of loot and abduction in the town and its surrounding villages. An Afreedi Lashkar of about 600 men arrived on the same day. Next evening, when two enemy rifle companies with 3" mortars, had already taken up position on the high ground, about two miles east of Baramula, an effort was made to collect the tribesmen to resume the march, but hardly 200 Mahsuds and a hundred Afreedis were available.

On the morning of 27th October, the 1st Sikh battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Dewan Ranjit Rai was flown to Srinagar. The first plane landed at the air-port at 9.30 a.m. Indian High Command was afraid that the liberation forces may have already entered Srinagar and captured the air-field. Rai, therefore, had instructions that if the air-port was in hostile hands, he was to fly to Jammu and land there but it was India's sheer good luck that the tribesmen wasted precious time in Baramula and did not immediately move towards Srinagar when the Dogra resistance had completely collapsed. By mid-day, the formation of the

1. From Memory, p. 283.
2. The Untold Story, p. 315.

battalion was complete and Rai, after posting some men at strategic points in the airport, left for Baramula. He was not aware that the town had been liberated; his plan probably was to stop them beyond Baramula but on reaching the out-skirts of the town, he found that it had been already lost. When we leave the town, towards Srinagar, there are hill features on the right side, hardly fifty yards or so from the road. It is about a mile from the main town. Rai disembarked here.

In Baramula the main column camped in the Technical School ground which was then adjacent to the Government Middle School building. On the 27th, a large number of tribesmen returned to Muzaffarabad with their loot or women and it was with considerable difficulty that Major Khurshid Anwar and Rahim Dad Salar were able to bring some of them back on the 28th when the advance was resumed. When the advance column reached in the vicinity of the Matches Factory, about a mile from the main town, they encountered heavy fire from the right side. The Muslim troops of the State Army from Muzaffarabad had a three-inch mortar and 12 bombs from their own stock. Major Aslam and Jemadar Khawaja Ali Muhammad directed the mortar on the enemy post and under its cover, a platoon commanded by Jemadar Mumtaz Khan and about 20 tribesmen, carefully advanced and attacked it. Finding the tribesmen so close, the Sikhs abandoned the post but were mercilessly pursued with heavy losses. A little ahead, they had to face heavy fire again from a medium machine-gun, about 1200 yards from the Matches Factory. About 20 Indian soldiers on horse-back appeared from the left side and started firing; 14 were killed on the spot alongwith 6 horses. The M.M.G. was also silenced; 8 horses were captured alive. Realising the precarious position he was in, Col. Rai ordered a withdrawal. It was while retreating that he was hit in his jeep by a machine-gun fire and died instantaneously. A company commander travelling with him was also killed on the spot. Sometime later when India instituted the Maha Vir Chakra in place of the Victoria Cross which is awarded only for exceptional deeds of valour, even the fleeing Col. Rai was a beneficiary! It has since remained the general pattern of such awards in India.

A number of his 330 soldiers were killed on the spot but some were able to report back to their Headquarter in Srinagar. Muslim casualties too had been fairly heavy, about 35 killed and 25 wounded. Most of them were Afreedis. It was from here that a platoon of the State army and 40 tribesmen led by Captain Muhammad Sher Khan and Havildar Rehmat Ali proceeded through a short route to Badgam in order to capture the air-field. At this time Khurshid Anwar had only two trained platoons

from the State army and a Lashkar of uncontrollable tribesmen. With them he resumed the advance and reached Delinah, about five miles from Baramula, at about 10 P.M. As darkness fell, it was considered militarily unsafe to continue the advance. So they encamped there for the night but Khurshid Anwar took a van and accompanied by Khawaja Ali Muhammad went to Sangrama to ascertain the deployment of Indian troops. Ali Muhammad being a local, could talk to local Muslims in their mother tongue. They were told that a Dogra company stationed at Handwara had withdrawn in panic towards Pattan at 5 p.m. Khurshid Anwar then hurried back to Delinah and ordered the Lashkar to resume its advance. This naturally took some time but still they were able to enter the town on the morning of 29th October.

Another force was then sent ahead under the command of Major Sampuran Bachan Singh, 2nd-in-command of the 'B' Battalion. It included, the fugitives from Baramula. They stopped at Pattan where they took defensive positions. Pattan is mid-way between Baramula and Srinagar. Close by, lie the ruins of an ancient town, Tapar, excavated only a few years before partition and showing traces of a capital, perhaps more than a thousand years old. There are two villages not far from the town, Wanigham, the ancestral home of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's family and Kryeeri, the ancestral home of late Professor A.S. Bokhari. After leaving Baramula town, it is the only place where a considerable number of hills are situate very close to the road providing a good defensive position. Brigadier Katoch commanded the Brigade which had by now been fully flown to Srinagar. He went to Pattan to examine the defensive positions his troops had been building up but was hit in the leg by a long-range fire and had to be evacuated to Delhi. This happened on 30th October. By this time, groups of tribesmen had moved towards Pattan but no effort was yet made to dislodge the Indians in order to resume the advance. One reason of course was that a large number of them were still behind in Baramula and its surroundings collecting loot and enjoying their total freedom; another reason was that the Indian air-planes had gone into action from the 26th and begun strafing and bombing the tribal concentrations. It had therefore become risky for the tribesmen to come out of their camouflaged hidings during day-time; they were not prepared to take the risks involved. It must be said in fairness to them that they were not used to fighting in a regular manner as they had to do in Kashmir and besides, were not only powerless against the air support, their adversaries enjoyed but were also traditionally not used to air attacks.

Meanwhile, the Ist Sikh battalion had been joined at Pattan by two independent Rifle Companies, one from the Frontier Force Regiment and the other from Mountain Artillery. By 2nd November, the total Indian strength here stood at 1200.[1] The Kumaon Rifles, a parachute battalion, 650 in strength and commanded by Lt. Col. Pritam Singh, and two Rifle Companies of 4 Kumaon were manning the air-field. The Punjab Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Kullar and consisting of 450 men was posted at Magham, 12 miles from Srinagar, to prevent entry from or to Gulmarg. India had also flown three light ambulance units. Two battalions of Infantry, one squadron of armoured cars and a Battery of Field Artillery were despatched by road and there is evidence that they reached Srinagar by the 6th evening. It seems that partly because of the Indian army being first to reach Pattan and having thus been able to occupy all hill features, leave alone their heavy equipment and abundance of ammunition and partly because of the tribesmen's inability to bring pressure on the Enemy during day-time, due to the presence of Indian war planes over-head, no serious effort was made by the tribesmen to press the psychological advantage they enjoyed and several days, very precious days indeed, were again lost until the appearance of armoured cars left them with no option but to beat a retreat.

## THE STRENGTH OF THE TRIBAL LASHKAR

It is worth while to say a few words about the actual strength of the tribesmen who entered Baramula because their figure has been deliberately inflated by Indian publicists. They started with 2000 at the time of entry but then raised it from three to five thousand.[2] Lord Birdwood who spent months in the sub-continent and visited both sides of the Cease-fire-line, about 8 years later, has placed their number at two to three thousand.[3] This is fairly accurate. Those who first entered Muzaffarabad were definitely less than 2000, as the entrants also included a sizable number of fellow-travellers from Hazarah, the men of the Khan of Garhi and a group of former I.N.A. personnel. Most of them returned with and because of the looted property. They had no place either to hide it or to keep it safe except on their own persons and the only way under the circumstances, to ensure that the booty was not lost, was to return back to their homes. Same was the case with those who carried away women. Possession was the only law that governed ownership both of the loot as well as the wretched unfortunate women who fell into their hands. They could not be entrusted to anyone; they could

1. Sen, p. 58.
2. Bamzai, p. 683.
3. Birdwood, p,

not be entrusted to comrades because those who had not been able to get one or did not indulge in this shameful activity, could not be trusted either way. Therefore, every tribesman and civilian who got hold of a woman or possessed looted property, was eager to return by the first available bus or truck to deposit such loot or woman under his own roof. A large number of such tribesmen and civilians who were not able, for one reason or another, to leave back for their homes, had already lost heart for any battle because they did not want to risk the loss of their possessions and that is why a large number of them did not at all move out of Baramula. Thus a fair estimate would put the number of tribesmen who were facing the 1200 Indian soldiers at Pattan not in any case above 1000 souls or so. It is important to keep these facts in mind because Indian propagandists have blown their so-called victory against the tribesmen out of all proportions.

On the 29th afternoon, about 700 tribesmen launched an attack but as the Enemy was on high ground, they could make no headway. On 30th October, yet another attack proved fruitless and Muslim casualties, due to enemy air and ground action, were heavy. Khurshid Anwar, who had established his H.Q. at Baramula, realising that time-factor was in favour of the Indians, unless their air traffic was disrupted, decided to lead personally a column to capture the air-field. He left Pattan on the night of 30/31st October *via* Khor with approximately 500 Mahsuds, putting Major Aslam incharge of the main effort against Srinagar. The next day enemy aircraft were very active and Muslims lost a large number of trucks as the civilian drivers had not yet learnt to camouflage them properly; at the same time, Indian agents spread rumours that Kohala and Domel bridges had been damaged by air attacks, causing panic among the tribesmen. On the evening of 31st October, following rumours of enemy armour having arrived in the Valley, there was general stampede; by the next morning not many tribesmen were left forward of Muzaffarabad except Khurshid Anwar's raiding party which was already near the air-field. All efforts to stem the stampede having failed and finding nobody prepared even to stay in Muzaffarabad, Major Aslam returned to Abbottabad on 1st November and appraised the authorities of the situation. He was told that since tribesmen were not willing to go back, he should return to the Valley immediately with a hundred men from the Frontier Additional Police, and that regular troops were being ordered to move in and fresh lashkars of tribesmen as reinforcement would also follow. He returned to Muzaffarabad with the 100 Additional Police on the same night. The town was completely deserted, all Muslims having fled into the hills for fear of Indian troops. According to Aslam, who later retired from the

Pakistan Army as a Brigadier, the Police refused to go any further, saying that they had been sent as volunteers and were not prepared to "commit suicide" as in their opinion, the Indian troops were already very close to Muzaffarabad. The persuasion of their officers had no effect and finally it was agreed that the D.S.P. and Major Aslam would lead the convoy in a car while they were to follow at a respectable distance. They pushed on, expecting to meet Indians round every corner but were astonished to reach Baramula at about 0900 hours without having to fire a single shot. Baramula was completely deserted; all Kashmiris had fled for fear of Indian reprisals. The much awaited regular troops never arrived but on 2nd November, some Mahsuds and a party of about 80 ex-servicemen under a brave retired Subedar Major (holder of an I.O.M), whose name could not be ascertained, did turn up. During the night, falling between 2/3 November, this Subedar Major with his ex-servicemen and some Mahsuds were sent by M.T. via Sopore, Bandipur and Sumbal to block the road behind the Indian position near Shalteng, 5 miles west of Srinagar. This had the desired effect. On the morning of 3rd November when the Indian position at Pattan was attacked from its flanks, after some initial resistance, the enemy gave way. At 1000 hours contact was established with the Subedar Major's party near Shalteng; it had not been able to block the road at the desired spot but its outflanking move constituted a sufficient threat to the Indian position at Pattan to force them to evacuate it.

## GENERAL AND APOSTLE GIVE IDENTICAL ADVICE

As Brigadier Katoch was unable to perform his duties, a conference at the Prime Minister's house in New Delhi, apart from deciding to send more troops, selected Col. Sen to head the Indian army in Kashmir. He was promoted Brigadier and flown to Srinagar. Simultaneously, was raised a new force known as J.A.K. with Major General Kulwant Singh as its Commander. After his selection, Sen went to see Russell, his English commander who gave him the following advice:

> "If you get a chance of hitting them (tribesmen), hit hard with all you have got and don't let up."[1]

Thapa, the Director of Operations, and Sen were sent for by Mahatma Gandhi so that they could brief him on the situation and also receive his blessings. It is interesting to point out that the advice

1. Sen, p. 56.

tendered by this apostle of non-violence was strikingly similar to the one given by Russell, a professional soldier. Mr. Gandhi told them:

> "Wars are a curse to humanity. They are so utterly senseless. They bring nothing but sufferings and destruction. You are going in to protect innocent people and to save them from suffering and their property from destruction. To achieve that, you must naturally make full use of every means at your disposal."[1]

Sen who later retired as Lt. General says that he withdrew his forces from Pattan as a tactical move. Sen seems to imply that by withdrawing his force, he intended to create an impression among the tribesmen that the Indians had gone, that the main road to Srinagar lay open so that they could be deceived into marching upon the city through the main road and thus fall into his trap. He says it worked like a magic. Since tribesmen withdrew from Kashmir for reasons detailed elsewhere with which Sen had personally not much to do, he therefore has the opportunity, as normally happens after every success, to interpret even one's failures and shortcomings as deliberately calculated moves.

## TRIBESMEN ONLY 5 MILES FROM SRINAGAR

That the Indian army withdrew is correct but the claim that the withdrawal was tactical and not involuntary is incorrect. It is impossible to believe that Indian troops, enjoying air cover and being decidedly far superior in fire-power would have withdrawn for about 15 miles, purely as a tactical move. What happened is that the pressure of the tribesmen was increasing and Indians may have feared an onrush of tribal reinforcements; it may have also dawned upon them that their rear was really not safe because the tribesmen could take at least two easy routes to take them by surprise at their back. With local guides they could even ascend the hills on their right or take to the forests on their left. It is also important to note that, so far, the tribesmen had had no difficulty and had suffered negligible loss. On the other hand, not only had the famed Dogra army been totally routed but the Sikh battalion of 330 men under Col. Rai had also been largely wiped out. It seems it was for these reasons that the Indian forces withdrew and halted on the 4th mile-stone from Srinagar, that is 30 miles from Baramula. Unfortunately for the self-styled "strategist", he is refuted by his own countryman, Mr. Bamzai who says:

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1. Sen, p. 56.

"When it was realised that the raiders could by-pass our position at Pattan, 17 miles outside Srinagar, and infiltrate into city itself, Brigadier Sen decided to pull back his troops to a point 4½ miles due west of Srinagar city."[1]

Within a day or two, a large column of tribesmen and others encamped at the said mile-stone, known as Shalteng. While the adversaries were still sitting idle and either waiting for the other's initiative or building up their own strength or studying the local topography, a serious encounter took place in Badgam on 3rd November. It is 9 miles to the south-west of Srinagar and about three miles only from the airport. A mixed group of tribesmen and civilians had been advancing from Bandipura side towards the air-field. On reaching Badgam they received a memorable welcome by the local Muslims. They had hardly arrived when an Indian column headed by Major Somnath Sharma made its appearance. The Major and most of his men were killed. Sen gives no figures but Bamzai understandably puts the number of tribesmen at 500 to 700 while those of the Indians at three platoons and yet he gives the Indian casualties at 15 killed and 32 wounded against the tribal loss of an estimated 200. The truth is that the Indian losses were much higher while those of the liberators comparatively negligible. It may be emphasised here that the majority of the liberation force here consisted of non-tribesmen. It was the same group which had gone to Bandipura in two lorries and swelled in ranks while marching to Badgam. It was a spectacular victory, but unfortunately it was not pressed forward. They remained content with their temporary success and the arms and ammunition that fell into their hands and perhaps, in the flush of victory, lost sight of the importance of capturing the air-field. According to General Sen it was within their reach to capture it at that time and that by not doing so, they had, to quote him, "missed the chance of a life-time". The support they received from local Muslims has received, though grudgingly, the following compliment from the Indian Commander:

"The withdrawal of I Punjab from Humhom was given serious consideration but in view of the behaviour of certain elements at Badgam on 3rd November, it was decided to leave that battalion in its position."[2]

On 4th November Sardar Patel and Baldev Singh visited Srinagar and had a conference with their Army officers. It was decided to send more troops. Soon after their return to New Delhi on the same day,

1. Bamzai, p. 685.
2. Sen, p. 94.

the JAK Headquarter at Srinagar was duly informed that the requisite reinforcement was being despatched. Sen claims that armoured cars and a battalion of Field Artillery was despatched as a result of this conference. He, however, admits that armoured cars, Humbers and Daimlers, did take part in the so-called battle of Shalteng on the 7th November and that those taking part had reached Srinagar by 6th evening. This admission by itself shows that the armoured cars could not have left New Delhi on the 4th evening. It was more probable that they had started for Srinagar on or immediately after the 27th October.

## THE BATTLE AT SHALTENG

Major Khurshid Anwar who had gone to capture the air-field though able to inflict some losses on the enemy, was unable to capture it and returned to Pattan in a few days. Meanwhile, approximately 500 tribesmen and volunteers had re-entered the State and moved to Shalteng for the main effort. According to Brigadier Aslam, his plan was to avoid the main road for about 8 miles which would have taken his force to the Silk factory area between Srinagar and its air-field, so as to divide the Indian force but Major Khurshid Anwar wanted a frontal attack at Shalteng. Aslam also claims that his request to ex-Major General Akbar who made a brief appearance on the scene, to persuade Khurshid Anwar to give up his frontal attack plan, fell on deaf ears.

At about 0530 hours both the columns began their assault simultaneously. Although they managed to over-run the forward Indian positions, their reserve troops held up any further advance. Light Indian fighters started pounding continuously; the liberation force could see them taking off from the Srinagar air-field; the Indian artillery was also giving them no rest. By mid-day the attack had pestered out and the dead and dying were lying all over the area. Muslim losses were, by far, very heavy; approximately a hundred were killed.

By afternoon, Major Aslam was left with about 50 men in front of the Indian position. Khurshid Anwar had gone back to Baramula soon after the assault failed, to reorganise the tribesmen for another attack on the next day. The Indians, realising that the bulk of the opposite force had withdrawn, made repeated attempts to advance but were beaten back. By evening, due to heavy casualties, the Muslim force had dwindled to approximately 20 men. At night, Major Aslam and his men returned to Baramula in the only undamaged truck in their possession. This was the end of the tribal effort. For a few days it seemed as if everything was lost.

Did a great battle really take place at Shalteng? Indians insist that it did while Major General Akbar Khan who was intimately associated with the liberation Movement has emphatically denied it. He contends that the tribesmen had started withdrawing from Kashmir several days earlier and that only a group of snipers had been left behind in the vicinity of Shalteng. This writer has questioned several refugees from Baramula district who confirmed that the tribesmen had, soon after the appearance of Indian air-planes, started leaving the State in haste. War planes have been a dread not only of the tribesmen but of any people with their type of fighting traditions. It was so great that the people interviewed by me have unanimously said that the tribesmen referred to them as 'Khuda Ka Bacha', meaning how powerless man was against this war machine. My investigations have revealed that the over-whelming majority of tribesmen was already moving out of the Valley. There were, however, three to four hundreds of them, in addition to Muslim deserters from the 4th J&K, 60 Tochi Scouts and 40 Jawans from Mianwali. There were a number of civilians from Boi in Hazara as well as Garhi-Habibullah, all of whom dress like Pathans and speak Pashto but are no tribesmen. They were also short of ammunition.

Major Khurshid Anwar told his acquaintances such as Haji Khawaja Lassa Joo Mir that a number of Red shirts from Mardan and Peshawar had also entered the State along with the tribesmen and that it were they who were largely responsible, first for diverting their attention from the main objective—capture of Srinagar, to loot, arson and abduction both at Muzaffarabad and Baramula which meant the terrible loss of seven days upto the Matches Factory at Baramula and then, for spreading panic after the State's accession to India and instigating them for a hasty retreat. How much truth there is in this allegation, one cannot definitely say but it must be recorded in fairness to the departed man that according to enquiries made by me, there were some elements among the tribesmen whose behaviour was suspicious. For instance, at Domel bridge, one Pathan is claimed by the locals to have diverted dozens of buses carrying tribesmen towards Kohala, the wrong side, instead of to Uri.

There is evidence that on 4th November, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan accompanied by the Nawab of Mamdot and Col. A.S.B. Shah came to Rawalpindi and told Col. Akbar Khan that the tribesmen were retreating; that they had failed to persuade them to stay on and fight and that he must come forward to hold back the Indian advance. However, there is no doubt that a determined group of tribesmen, not very large in number, did stay on the post of duty in the vicinity of the 4th mile-stone and that there was an encounter between them and the Indian army supported by tanks and air force on the 7th of November, but to give it the name of a

great battle in the conventional sense, as the Indians have done, is doubtlessly an exaggeration. Sen claims that he used armoured cars from the rear and that it was sheer luck that the personnel of these vehicles were clean-shaved Jats and not bearded Sikhs because it helped to conceal their Indian identity until they were within the firing range. He places the Ist Sikh battalion on the front side and the Ist Kumaon on the right flank. We have two accounts about the encounter at Shalteng in book shape, both from Indians and both having special knowledge as well as easy access to all official records in India. The first account is given by Mr. Bamzai, a Kashmiri-speaking Pandit from Srinagar who later retired as Editor of India's premier propaganda Journal published from Delhi and the other one is by Lt. General Sen himself. While Mr. Bamzai says that the battle raged for twelve hours,[1] Mr. Sen says that it lasted only for 20 minutes. It was quite natural for the latter to be careful about the time because a 12-hour battle would need thousands of men to consume where the contest is between ordinary rifles and a few light machine-guns against armoured cars, heavy artillery and war planes. Again, while Mr. Bamzai gives the number of deaths on the side of tribesmen as 300,[2] General Sen says that 472 were killed at Shalteng while 146 lay dead between Shalteng and Baramula.[3] Again, General Sen claims that the tribesmen abandoned 138 civilian buses at Shalteng.[4] This is unbelievable for at least two reasons; firstly, if only 40 persons were travelling by each bus, it would mean the presence at Shalteng of at least 5500 men which exceeds even the highly-inflated number of the tribesmen released by the Indians themselves. The trucks and buses which brought the incomers as well as their supplies did not exceed 100 in any case. Most of them were pre-1939 model, worn out, and mechanically defective as they had already out-lived their utility. They would stop from place to place and some of them "agreed" to restart only after "proper courtesies"; they had to be literally pushed for a considerable distance. Between 1939—45, during war, there was no import of vehicles for civil use. The number of vehicles in 1947 was very insignificant as compared to the stampede we have today. To have collected so many buses and trucks then from N.W.F.P. was by itself a great achievement. People acquainted with public roads then would appreciate how difficult it must have been for Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan to collect such an "armada". Had the entire transport been destroyed or abandoned, and yet only about 500 were killed on the spot, how did the remainder succeed in not only reaching Baramula, 30 miles away, but had even evacuated the town by the morning of the next day when Indian army admittedly entered without firing even a single shot?

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1 & 2 Bamzai, p. 865.
3 & 4 Sen, p. 99.

According to General Sen, the Indian army entered Baramula at 7.30 A.M. on the 8th of November and by that time not a single tribesman could be found there. Just as tribesmen wasted three days in Baramula which cost them so dearly and led to their retreat, the Indians too did not fair better because they too lost two precious and valuable days in the town. They did not venture forth till the morning of the 10th. Had they pressed their advantage and continued their advance towards Muzaffarabad, there is no doubt that they would have been able to recapture the entire area without much resistance. Fate seemed to have willed it otherwise.

Baramula, my home-town, suffered badly as a result of these happenings and I shall always lament the loss of neighbours and teachers, the rape and abduction of a few of its women, the destruction of its property and the loss suffered by the St. Joseph's Hospital, but it is extremely regrettable that the Indian publicists have given the loss such dimensions that the word exaggeration is too insignificant to convey the truth. Even a normally balanced Indian as Mr. V. P. Menon has gone to the extent of claiming that out of its 14000 inhabitants, only 1000 were left alive.[1] According to General Sen:

> "The sight that greeted us in Baramula is one that no period of time can erase from the memory. It was completely deserted, as silent as a tomb, with not even a whimpering pie dog. Everywhere one looked, whether it was a house or a shop or a shed, there were signs of pillage, arson or wanton destruction."[2]

It is unfortunate that even foreign newspapers like the New York Times toed the Indian line and reported on the basis of "surviving residents estimates" that at least 3000 inhabitants of the town were killed. The truth is as told earlier that the number of Hindus and Pandits killed did not exceed six though a large number of Sikhs were unfortunately killed. It is difficult to give an exact estimate. Between Uri and Baramula they inhabited only one village Khadanyar, on the right bank of the river, the home-village of Sardar Harbans Singh Azad, a Law graduate from Aligarh and later Speaker of the State Assembly. The number of Sikh families did not exceed 10 to 15 and there is evidence that a majority of them had already fled away to considerably higher altitudes in the vicinity and thus escaped the tribesmen. In the town itself there was no Sikh population at all except 2 to 3 houses in the

1. Menon, p 406.
2. Sen, p. 103.

immediate neighbourhood of the gurdawara, situate in my mohallah. The male members were hardly 3 to 4, one of whom was a lunatic whereas I hardly recollect any Sikh lady of young age. The Sikh habitation was on the left bank of Jhelum, about half a mile from the town and it is true that on account of the influx of refugees from Hazara and Rawalpindi etc., their numbers had increased. The total population of non-Muslims in the three tehsils of Baramula, according to the 1941 census was 21492. Those residing in Baramula town and its immediate neighbourhood did not exceed a thousand. The number of refugees did not exceed two to three thousand. Thus in any case their total number did not exceed about three to four thousand. As information had reached the town as early as 22nd October that tribesmen were advancing and as there was an interval of four days in their actual appearance, the element of surprise was clearly missing and most of the Sikhs had already fled away either to Srinagar or to the interior which tribesmen did not visit. Therefore, the number of Sikhs left behind in their homes may not have been considerable. That most of them had escaped death is also proved from the fact that within hours of the appearance of Indian troops in Baramula, several hundred sword-hurling Sikhs swarmed into the ground adjacent to the Baramula gurdawara. They were bent upon starting a mass killing of local Muslims which gripped the town with great tension for several hours. There would have been heavy blood-shed but for the providential appearance of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad and Sardar Budh Singh.

## MAQBOOL SHERWANI

The National Conference workers in Srinagar, Sopore and Baramula rendered useful service to the Indian forces. Apart from manning bridges, the air-field, the entrances to the city and taking up the maintenance of law and order in Srinagar, several patrol parties were formed, comprising carefully selected volunteers who were sent out to collect intelligence about the advancing tribesmen and to spread false rumours against them. Both General Sen and Bamzai have, though grudgingly, acknowledged their contribution. Among these workers was Mr. Muhammad Maqbool Sherwani, the second-in-command of the party in Baramula. A semi-literate man of about 40 years, he was very unpopular for his goondaism which unfortunately was a trait common to a large number of National Conference workers and leaders. The local Muslims had specially begun to dislike him for his role on the day Quaid-e-Azam visited Baramula. But whatever his personal failings which are inherent in all human beings, the difference only being of degrees,

it can be truly said of him that he was fanatically loyal to Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and had about half a dozen times been sent to jail. It was on account of his unquestioned loyalty that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah liked him more than the sophisticated local Party leader, Sheikh Muhammad Akbar. Sherwani seems to have escaped to Srinagar for fear of his own life when tribesmen entered the town because there was every likelihood that those local Muslim Conference workers who had on several occasions suffered at his hands might seize the opportunity to pay him in the same coin. It appears that he returned to Baramula after the landing of Indian troops in Srinagar and seems to have been given the task of organising an underground movement to delay the advance of tribesmen so that India could gain time for building up its armed strength. This he did faithfully by spreading false news about the location of Indian troops or Sikh pockets which made at least some groups of tribesmen to wander fruitlessly from one end to the other. At least in one case, he reportedly got a group of tribesmen trapped by the enemy. At last, he was discovered and apprehended somewhere between Sangrama and the dense forests on the left of Wular lake. He was brought down to Baramula and after several days of interrogation, was tied to an electric pole in the centre of the town and nails were driven into his hands and forehead. Ultimately he was shot dead. How fanatically devoted he was to his leader and basically how brave he was, may be judged from the fact that even while being so nailed, he continued to shout Sher-e-Kashmir Zindabad. He was made a martyr not only by the National Conference but also by the Indian Government. Pandit Nehru made a special "yatra" to his grave perhaps on 11th November and presented a handsome amount to his old father. He was buried in the compound of the Jamia Masjid where his is reported to be the only grave and for several years almost every Indian, high or low, visiting Baramula, saw to it that he or she did pay a visit to it in acknowledgment of the debt of gratitude for what he had done to sabotage the State Muslims gigantic effort to throw off the shackles of bondage. Writes Mr. Bamzai about his role:

> "For several days earlier when the tribesmen were terrorizing the countryside, "Sherwani" who knew every path in the Valley, began working behind the line, keeping up the morale of the besieged villages, urging them to resist and to stick together regardless of whether they were Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims, assuring them that help from the Indian Army and people's Militia was on the way. Three times by skilfully planted rumours he decoyed bands of

tribesmen and got them surrounded and captured by the Indian infantry. But the fourth time he was captured himself."[1]

Dwelling on the role of the so-called National Militia, the National Conference Volunteer Corps in Srinagar, Mr. Bamzai says:

> "Thousands of volunteers from all communities came forward to offer resistance to the invader and under the inspiring leadership of Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, a sizable force was hurriedly trained in rifle shooting, including a company of women volunteers. A night long vigil was kept for any tribesmen entering the city by stealth or any fifth columnist creating panic. All available civil motor transport was requisitioned and kept ready for the Indian Army who were expected to come to the aid of Kashmiris at their hour of peril and misfortune."[2]

## GENERAL TARIQ

Colonel Akbar Khan who paid a visit to Pattan and further upward in the beginning of November to study the situation, came to the conclusion that in view of the bombing and strafing by Indian planes and the characteristics of the local topography, it was essential that the liberators should have the support of at least two tanks. He came to Pindi and spoke to Col. Masud who volunteered to take to Srinagar not two but a whole squadron of his armoured car unit. He even offered to take his men in plain clothes without official permission and at their own risk but Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Central Minister then in Rawalpindi and Brigadier Sher Khan opposed the move on the ground that it involved the risk of an Indo-Pakistan war.

As Indians were expected to follow up in force and the only place to delay their advance was in the narrow portion between Baramula and Uri, Major Aslam and his twenty men withdrew to just ahead of Rampur and took up their position at the Buniar nullah, and managed to burn down the bridge.

By now Khurshid Anwar had withdrawn and ex-Major General Akbar had been appointed instead. He immediately opened his "HQ" at Uri. When informed that Aslam was left with about 10 men only, he was ordered to fall back to the defile near Mohura. They took up their position here on the cliff and damaged the power house as worst as

1&2. Bamzai, p. 679.

they could with the few explosives they had. By 1000 hours the next day the Indian force made an attack on their new position. It was an unequal struggle and by evening, only 7 defenders were left but the Indian advance was delayed. Another bridge was burnt down and they withdrew to Uri on the night falling between the 12th and 13th November. Uri was completely deserted; the only persons in the town were Akbar and half a dozen other men. As no reinforcements were received, defence of Uri was considered not possible and they, therefore, withdrew to Chinari where a few locals, armed with Dara rifles, joined their ranks. The next morning 3 men of 5/13 FF Rif arrived in a jeep with a couple of bren-guns; they were in high spirits which cheered up everybody. Akbar sent them under Aslam to Uri to see if the Indians had reached there and then return after destroying all the major bridges between Uri and Chinari. They motored to Uri and did not meet any Indian soldier enroute. When they were burning the Dak bungalow and the post office at Uri, some Indian troops fired upon them from north of the town; so they withdrew. On way back they burnt six bridges. By the evening when they were back in Chinari, they had the satisfaction of knowing that it would be many days before the Indians could repair the bridges and catch up with them at Chinari.

On 15th November about 200 Mahsuds arrived and Akbar ordered Aslam to take them forward and establish contact with the enemy near Uri where he had by now a brigade group. On 16th November they advanced and after pushing back his screen near Islamabad (2 miles west of Uri), started to harass the Uri base. On 18th November 500 Swatis also arrived together with 10C0 Mahsuds; this was very welcome increase. Major (now Lt. Col.) Khilji MC also arrived and was posted as Deputy to Major Aslam.

On 20th November, Khilji had approximately 200 men to capture the hill on the bank of Jhelum which dominated Uri from the north. Khilji captured it after a brilliant night attack; the Indian company left behind 40 dead but on the next day he was forced to give up the position owing to heavy shelling and air attacks.

The attempt to capture the high ground north of Uri having failed, it was decided to make an attempt on the south. A Mahsud lashkar was sent to capture Khalan which they took without a fight. After the capture of Khalan, 500 Swatis were ordered to pass through and capture the high grounds south of Uri; they were shelled by the Indian Mountain guns and fled in panic to Chinari.

The Mahsud Lashkar was then sent from Kohalan for the same job. They reached the high grounds north of Uri but seeing a Kumaon Rifle convoy going from Uri to Poonch via Haji Pir, they left the high ground to loot it and although they inflicted heavy casualties on the Indians in this attack (approximately 30 vehicles destroyed and several men killed) the high ground which was their objective was not taken as the Indians soon reinforced their troops and the chance of its capture was lost. Lt. Col. Zahiruddin then took over from Major Aslam who had been ordered to fly to Gilgit.

On the opposite side, on 10th November, at 7 A.M. after a costly halt of 48 hours at Baramula, Brig. Sen ventured out and started moving towards Uri. He had with him the 161 Infantry Brigade, a troop of armoured cars and a troop of Field Artillery. It was again India's misfortune that the "gallant" Brigadier moved at a snail's speed and dare not go beyond the 44th mile, 10 miles ahead of Baramula. Sen claims that wooden bridges on his way had been destroyed by retreating tribesmen.[1] He untruthfully claims of having been engaged by the retreating tribesmen the whole way. The falsity of the claim is proved by his own admission that there was not even a single casualty.[2] A soldier was wounded but at the hands of his own men acting under a mistake. Armoured cars as well as two-pounder guns were leading the advance. They spent the night at the 44th mile-stone. On the 11th, they reached Rampur by late afternoon. It means that they advanced by only 5 miles. As soon as they reached Rampur, there were two explosions at the Mahura Power House. Armoured cars were immediately moved in and it is claimed that they countered machine gun fire. It is claimed by Sen that 5 uniformed persons, after they had taken their seats in a black station wagon, and had earlier come out of the Power House, apparently being responsible for the explosions, were killed by his armoured cars.[3] Actually it was the work of Major Aslam and his companions. Major Aslam is still alive which is a standing proof of the falsity of the claim advanced by Sen. On 12th November they resumed their march and arrived at mile-stone 54. Here was a bridge with a long gap, 15 feet in length 10 feet deep and 8 feet in width. They started filling it up which was completed by the afternoon of 13th. While it was under filling, a patrol of the 1st Sikh Regiment moved to Uri and reported it free of tribesmen. On the same day, after they were able to pass the armoured cars and heavy artillery to this side of the bridge, they advanced upto Uri and were now at a distance of 62 miles from Srinagar.

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1. Sen, p. 110-111.
2&3. Sen, p. 110-111.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE PARADISE LOST

*CHAPTER XXVI*

# The Paradise Lost

Col. Akbar, after his meeting with Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot, left for Uri on the 8th.

It had been agreed to at Rawalpindi that Col. A. S. B. Shah, for a long time associated with the tribal areas and therefore personally known to various tribal leaders, would be simultaneously reaching Uri to introduce Col. Akbar to the tribesmen but Akbar had to be disappointed as Shah did not turn up.[1]

For 6 days these handful of men made history; they destroyed bridge after bridge over an area of 15 miles, taking defensive positions which impeded the advance of Indian forward patrols. On the 6th day they destroyed an important bridge at Chakothi which had no easy diversion. When the first Indian patrol made its appearance, it was welcomed with a volley of carefully directed fire from several positions resulting in the immobilisation of two trucks and the death of two soldiers. Indians then reappeared in strength and made determined efforts to dislodge this small band of warriors because without doing so, they could not repair the bridge and unless it was done, they could not pass their armoured cars and transport to the other side. However, by this time the paucity of men and material had ceased to be an acute problem because new volunteers were coming from all sides. The news that the Indian advance had been blunted and the further news that it was due to the heroic efforts of a very small band of men under the personal command of Tariq, brought not only relief in a hopeless situation but also rekindled hope in a better tomorrow. But for Tariq and his dozen comrades, it was very likely that we may have totally lost the Cause. Among

1. Akbar, p. 62.

these, apart from Tariq and Aslam, was a former INA Subedar, Mr. Latif Afghani and Subedar Khawaja Ali Muhammad. The only arms they had were a dozen rifles and a captured sten-gun.

In the meantime Col. Akbar raised the Ist Muzaffarabad battalion comprising Lt. Qudratullah of the State Forces and a hundred other men; 350 ex-servicemen also joined him. Then came 300 Mahsuds, some Swatis and Mohmands who had been at Shalteng. They were now apologetic for their earlier withdrawal. According to General Sen, when he conveyed the news of the capture of Uri to Major General Kulwant Singh at Srinagar, he forbade further advance and ordered him to return to Srinagar for a conference. He was told that the next task was to hold Uri and prepare for the capture of the Hajipir pass in Poonch. 15 Para Brigade was already on move from Naushehra towards Poonch. The idea was to attack Poonch from both sides so that, according to Sen, "the jaws snapped together simultaneously."[1] A perusal of Sen's book which was first published in October 1969, shows that relations between him and Kulwant Singh who was perhaps dead by that time, were far from happy and the two sometimes took diametrically opposite views. Having already shown that Sen has made a highly exaggerated claim about the fighting at Shalteng, it is difficult to give credence to his statement that despite his advice to the contrary, it was because of the latter's orders that he did not go beyond Uri. An admission that he could not maintain his advance beyond Uri would have been quite inconsistent with the objective he had in writing the book, namely, to parade himself both as a great strategist as well as a scheming Field Commander, as is apparent from the under-currents in the book. What is likely to have happened is that after the unopposed advance was blunted at Chakothi, the Indian commanders may have thought it more advisable to stabilize their position over here while making a determined bid to recapture Poonch district which would have enabled them to reach Kohala and thus sandwich the liberation force at Chakothi.

## SHARDA AND ITS LIBERATOR, COMMANDER AHMED KHAN

Sharda is an important place in the Neelum valley, about 80 miles to the north of Muzaffarabad. The liberated territory on this side extends to over 110 miles though the width is pretty small. Sharda, as the name denotes, is a Sanskrit word which probably means, holy. It has been an important seat of the extant Budhist civilisation. It treasures

1. Sen, p. 114.

several Budhist stone temples with huge stone pillars and is widely believed to have been a seat of learning. As the place had no vehicular link with the outside world till mid 1974 and one had to climb several high mountains, the archaeological treasure has remained generally unknown. The existence of such temples at such an inaccessible place is rather intriguing. A possible explanation can be that it may have been an important resting place on the route between Central Asia and northern India via Gilgit.

Sharda also treasures a fort, though not very old. Because of the area's strategic importance, the Dogras maintained here a permanent Military post. In October 1947, the garrison which was headed by one Shyamlal, included 13 Muslims, notable among them being Khawaja Ahmed Khan. A budding youth from Srinagar city, in 1931 when slogans like Inquilab Zindabad and verses like:

سر فروشی کی تمنا اب ہمارے دل میں ہے
دیکھ لینگے زور کتنا بازوئے قاتل میں ہے

rented the city air like a hurricane, Ahmed Khan was deeply angered by the helplessness of the unarmed demonstrators in being cut down by sheer force of arms and vowed to take revenge. Surprisingly, he succeeded in being enlisted in the Dogra army in 1933.

In October 1947 when all sorts of rumours were afloat, Shyamlal secretly despatched two Dogra soldiers to Srinagar to ask for reinforcements. This put Ahmed Khan on the alert. The soldiers arrival in Handwara coincided with the entry of tribesmen and the liberation of Muzaffarabad. One of them therefore hurried back to convey the disturbing news. Ahmed Khan now took fellow Muslim soldiers into confidence and decided to strike. The day for which he had joined the hated Dogra army, had at long last arrived and in his own humble way, he was unhesitatingly committed, heart and soul, to do his duty.

Ahmed Khan took advantage of the confusion and told Shyamlal that two thousand Yagistanis were already secretly approaching the fort and suggested that the garrison be ordered out to block the approaches rather than be overpowered and roasted inside. Demoralised by the sudden rout of Dogra troops in Muzaffarabad, posted in a wholly-Muslim-inhabited and, at the same time, vast area, with no means to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the information conveyed by Ahmed Khan, Shyamlal agreed but decided to personally remain inside. At night Ahmed Khan bolted the door of his room from outside and simultaneously invited leading Muslims to the fort and unfurled his plan to capture it and

push out the Dogras from the area. They pledged their unanimous support. In the morning, after saying their prayers, they burnt down the Dogra flag and then Khawaja Ahmed Khan hoisted the Pakistan flag which he had brought from Srinagar where he had gone on leave in August and which he had been secreting in his bed. The congregation conferred upon him the title of Commander and henceforth, all through his life, he was to be known as Commander Ahmed Khan. It was the only fort of consequence in the entire Valley which includes Kail, Kayrun, Machhal, Teetwal, Gurez, Hari and Sharda. Its fall to Muslim elements meant the loss of the entire Neelum valley to the Dogras. With the spread of the news, a large number of local Muslims visited the fort to join their ranks. There were only 50 rifles, two small mortars, but a sufficient quantity of ammunition. Ahmed Khan posted his men on important outlets, leading to Handwara. The more important among them, Doodhiyal and Machhal, were manned by groups of 15 persons each. It was after 15 days that a contingent of the liberation forces arrived from Muzaffarabad. From the northern side, a group of a hundred men under the son of the Raja of Gilgit advanced upto Phalwai where they were met by an advance patrol from Sharda headed by Ahmed Khan.[1]

## INDIAN SUMMER OFFENSIVE IN TEETWAL SECTOR


The major portion of the tehsil of Karnah is situate on the left bank of Neelum. Teetwal was then the most important town of the tehsil. It is situate on the left bank of Neelum and was linked with the Kyrun and Sharda area by a foot-bridge. In the beginning, not only Teetwal but also Kupwara, was in Muslim hands but soon afterwards we lost not only both but the Indians crossed the bridge in strength and occupied a large area on this side. In the beginning, the sector was commanded by Major Sher Muhammad Khan known as Col. Khalid who later retired as a Brigadier of the Pakistan Army. Despite best efforts, he could not repulse the Indian thrust, largely because of inferior strength and absence of adequate weapons. Commander Ahmed Khan claims that he had been told by his Kashmiri-speaking contacts behind the Indian forward line that a thrust was imminent but that a Major from the Pakistan army who was his O.C. dismissed it as kite-flying with the result that when it came, it could not be stopped.

The Indian summer offensive began on 17/18 May 1948. The main column headed for Teetwal while one battalion set out for Kayrun. Some posts held by tribesmen were by-passed. A Swati Lashkar tried to hold them at Kupwara but had to fall back to Kayrun while Mahsuds withdrew towards

1. Weekly Tehrik, 23rd August, 1972.




Dr. Graham and party on arrival at Muzaffarabad with Ch. Ghulam Abbas, Ali Ahmed Shah, President and other Cabinet Members



UN Mediator, Sir Owen Dixon with Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and Kh. Sanaullah Shamim



Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, addressing the Security Council at New York on September 22, 1965. Acclaimed as the greatest speech made in the Council



SATTARA, The CHAUPAN
Guerillas' reliable Guide, as a prosperous A.K. citizen in 1978



The Chairman of the Pakistan Red Cross, Begum Noon, visits a refugee patient in the Muzaffarabad Hospital



Mr. Chou-En-Lai with Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah and Prof. Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi

Teetwal. Major Sher collected a band of about 400 men but was pushed back, his force disintegrated and Indians occupied Teetwal on 23rd May. Muzaffarabad was 30 miles away and only a 'C' Company of 5/12 FFR (Guides) lay between it and the Indians. On 23rd May, 10th Brigade under Haji Iftikhar Ahmed was ordered from Abbottabad to move for the defence of Muzaffarabad. Brigadier Harbaksh Singh rested his troops for two days by which time Major Muhammad Akbar reached the vicinity of Teetwal with an advance column of the 10th Brigade, covering the 30-mile long hilly distance on foot and without any rest. A number of tribesmen also joined him. By June, India laid a vehicular road via Shamsbari between Handwara and Teetwal, enabling it to bring field and medium artillery. The Pakistan Army constructed a rope and pulley bridge over Kishanganga (Neelum) at Kahori and a vehicular road capable of taking 15 CWT trucks. Lt. Col. Nausherwan set up his base at Nausehri. The Indians crossed the Kishanganga at Teetwal on the 25th May and by dusk, captured an important ridge on the Chunj range. Indians then attacked and occupied Richhmargalli which was superbly defended by Subedar Shandi Gul and Jemadar Dost Muhammad of 5/12 FFR (Guides). Their action delayed its capture. On the night of 30/31 May, Indians resumed their thrust towards Pir Sahaba with two battalions. A Company of 3/12 FFR with a platoon of 5/12 FFR (Guides) under the inspiring and fearless leadership of Jemadar Dost Muhammad and Havildar Jalal Khan gave their very best and when the situation became desperate, the two gallant soldiers led a bayonet charge with their few available men and laid down their lives before the position was finally lost on the morning of 31st May. In a few days, Indians dislodged our forward positions and were now in occupation of an area, 4 to 5 miles west of Kishanganga, down to Panjkot nullah.

## THE BATTLE FOR CHUNJ

In order to save Muzaffarabad, the AK Capital, it was essential to drive away the enemy from the Chunj heights and eventually throw him to the left bank of Kishanganga. Lt. Col. Nausherwan made feverish but effective preparations for it. As the support of heavy gun-fire was considered a pre-requisite, Nausherwan held a conference with Engineers and Gunners who enthusiastically offered to take a 3.7 inch mountain war-monster across the river in pieces. Consequently, Major Sloan, a British Officer of the Pakistan Army whose memory has brought, out of gratitude, a stream of tears into my eyes while I am writing this paragraph, improvised a sling and pulley by which the dismantled gun and ammunition boxes were pulled across the river at Kahori and 200 local volunteers, working as porters, carried them to its destination, involving a climb of 6000 ft. from the river and about 9000 ft. above sea-level. It took them

two days. The gun was then re-assembled, put in a position overlooking the enemy on Chunj and fittingly given the name, Shahzadi (Princess), for it had been handled like a princess. It was effectively handled by Captain Rao Farman Ali Khan. On the eve of the attack, Nausherwan addressed the whole battalion. He had familiarised at least 50% of the force with the routes and objectives.

> The attack was launched on 7th July. It was soon discovered that wireless sets were not in order; so resort was made to buglars which were ordered to blow 'Reveille', followed by 'retreat'. Suddenly, as if by magic, the wireless sets came to life.

In the attack, Havildar Noor Illahi, although fatally wounded, crawled to an MMG bunker and blew it up with a grenade, he had personally received from his Commander, Nausherwan. The Shahzadi opened its account just at day-break and picked up enemy bunkers one after the other. Within an hour the forward enemy positions were gone; the enemy ran away, leaving 30 dead and 13 prisoners. Soon afterwards appeared enemy aircraft to blast off Shahzadi, but Subedar Fateh Muhammad Khan ordered his men to engage it with their small fire-arms. An LMG burst hit one of the aircraft which was seen hitting the ground behind the enemy line.

After the capture of the first objective, the next objective was to be attacked. It had been heavily mined. So one Company of 71 Field Engineers was ordered to clear them. Most of them were raw recruits who sought to be very cautious. That would have meant loss of time which was of prime importance. Major Sloan, described by the GHQ chronicle as a 'young, enthusiastic officer', who was under strict orders not to enter the war zone—British Officers serving in the two Armies were to keep out of direct involvement—could not bear the situation and voluntarily rushed to the aid of his men. While negotiating a steep slope, this brave officer slipped and fell across a trip-wire which detonated a mine that killed him on the spot alongwith lance Naik Aman Khan of village Pindan, Hazara. Major Sloan was buried at Abbottabad with militiary honours. He was the second British martyr in the Cause of our freedom.

On 9th July the second point was abandoned by the Enemy and the first man to be there to discover it, was Nausherwan himself. The enemy retreated to Teetwal and destroyed the wooden bridge linking the Muzaffarabad-Sharda road with Teetwal-Kupwara-Handwara on the left bank of Kishanganga. A week or two later, Thimayya took personal command of his troops and launched a new attack which was blunted after a minor initial success. Thereafter, Nausherwan made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Akhrot Wali Tekri, a feature south of Richhmargali. Before the battle for Chunj, the

Swatis under their brave Naib Salar, Faqir Muhammad Khan, made two attempts to capture a feature on the Pir Sahaba ridge. With contemptuous disregard for their lives, they scrambled up the steep slopes and attacked the forward Indian positions. The Indians panicked and were in the process of withdrawal, when Faqir Muhammad was killed before his men could reach their destination; the attack failed. In the Takia Sadhu area, the Indians launched an attack on the 17th of June which was valiantly frustrated by Captain Muhammad Hussain and Jemadar Feroze Khan. Hussain Khan was severely wounded in the neck but despite injury, personally manned an LMG when the gunman was killed. He was killed on the spot. The Sector remained largely uneventful except for the capture of Sairagali by Captain Aslam. He climbed the 9000 ft. high feature on the night between 25/26th November 1948. It added a fairly large area to the Azad territory on the left bank of Kishanganga. Lt. General Kaul confirms that the objective of the Indian Army High Command in launching the twin offensive in Uri and Teetwal Sectors was for the two forces to join at Muzaffarabad.[1]

Among others who helped in frustrating the Indian bid to capture Muzaffarabad and thus sandwitch our forces on the Uri Sector, mention may be made of Major Muhammad Akbar, Lt. Col. Azizudin, Lt. Col. Karimdad, Major Khalidi, Major Farooqi, Major A.A. Sheikh, Captain Khattak, Captain Haq Nawaz, Jemadar Qamar Din, Major Rehman Khan, Captain R.D. Khan of Tochi Scouts, Major Aziz-ur-Rehman, Lt. Kiani, Major Ghulam Rasool, Captain Habibullah, Major Zafrullah, Subedar Mian Khan, Major Sardar Hussain, Captain Akbar, Captain Muhammad Sarwar, Major Masood, Subedar Suleman Khan, Col. Abdul Jabar and Major Saeed Ahmed. Mention needs also to be made of Major Tufail of the Engineers and Captain Rashid of the Army Medical Corps who set up, single-handed, an advance Dressing Station at Danni. We remember them all with gratitude.

Nausherwan was a fine soldier. After discharge from the army, he joined the AK Government as Director, Village Aid. Those were the days when Ayub appeared on the Asian stage as a Colossus. He thought well of Nausherwan and was interested in his well-being. Mr. K. H. Khurshid, then AK President and a known favourite of Ayub has told me that very often, on his meeting the President he would enquire after the welfare of Nausherwan. I have known the Commander personally and remember him as being passionately devoted to Kashmir's liberation.

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1. The Untold Story, p. 107

## MIRPUR SECTOR

Mirpur, then the most populous district in Azad Kashmir, had Hindu majorities in its three principal towns, Mirpur, Kotli and Bhimber. There was a fair number of Sikhs in Dadyal, a small town then at a distance of 10 miles from the district Headquarter. Mirpur town was largely inhabited by Hindu money-lenders known as Mahajans who had over the last hundred years attained great prosperity at the cost of the poor Muslim peasantry. A good number of Hindus, particularly the Mahajans living in different parts of West Punjab had taken refuge in the town since the March disturbances. On account of their wealth and Muslim surroundings, the Mahajans were normally well-provisioned with arms but after the March disturbances, the craze or perhaps the necessity for arms increased. At that time there lived an outlaw in the vicinity of the town, Khawaja Dost Muhammad better known as Dosta. He had become a legend because of his Robinhood-type activities of plundering the rich and helping the poor. Some Mahajans got in touch with him and began acquiring arms from him. By this time the Sub-continent had been partitioned and the Dogra government had established military pickets at Mangla, Mirpur and Dadyal. The number of non-Muslims in Mirpur town had by now touched almost the peak figure of 20,000 which caused scarcity of every-day necessities. The Muslim Conference had only a paper organisation. The District President was a semi-literate but otherwise fire-brand, jail-bird, Ghazi Illahi Bakhsh while its General Secretary Sayed Ali Ahmed Shah was a retired Major of the Dogra Army. Both moved to Jhelum.

By the middle of October, all Muslims, except a few individuals, had evacuated the town and taken shelter, largely in Jhelum. The responsibility for providing a lead to the tehsil Muslims again fell on politically obscure people like Mufti Abdul Hakim, Qazi Muhammad Bashir, Subedar Muhammad Hussain, Jemadar Manga Khan, Jemadar Muhammad Ismail, Subedar-Major Imam Ali, Subedar Muhammad Fazil, Maulvi Karam Ellahi, Mistri Fazal Karim and Muhammad Murtaza, who held a meeting and took an oath of secrecy. Together with the co-operation of others, they successfully manipulated the evacuation of Muslims from the town and secretly informed Muslims from village to village to prepare hatchets and spears. By this time a Sector Headquarter had been set up in Jhelum; forty darra-made rifles made available by it and smuggled through Naki or Janguan were duly distributed. Informed of the stakes involved, Dost Muhammad not only stopped supplying arms or ammunition to the Hindus but joined the forces of freedom. By the end of September, the more wealthier among Hindus began

sending out their families to Jammu. A bus transporting one such batch was ambushed by Dost Muhammad and his comrades at Pir Galli, at a distance of twelve miles from the old Mirpur town. Except for one or two who were killed, the passengers were allowed to return to Mirpur after parting with their cash and ornaments. It was the beginning of the revolt in the district and, at the sametime, stopped the further out-flow of Hindus.

In early October, when Qazi Muhammad Bashir and some of his colleagues were on their way to Jhelum, they came across, in a graveyard outside village Badbun, Captain Khan Muhammad Khan of Mung who was accompanied by Sardar Faqir Muhammad, now proprietor of the Hilal Bus Service and three Pathans. They were secretly taken to the house of Khawaja Muhammad Fazal in the said village and after dinner, were sent to Dost Muhammad in Bothi with Murtaza as their guide. On the following day, Captain Khan killed a Dogra soldier who was negotiating the Bala Gala curve on a motor-cycle. This created panic in Mirpur. On the next night Captain Khan accompanied by Dost Muhammad and others attacked the Sukhchainpur police station, a few miles inside the State territory. Within a few days, a large number of people armed with spears, axes and darra-made rifles came from Gujar Khan. A group remained in the vicinity of Dadyal while others came to Mirpur. They were looked after and provided free rations largely by the Muslims of Lidder and Tangdev. Captain Syed Ajaib Hussain Shah and Subedar Muhammad Fazil had by now, alongwith their colleagues, established a post at Pir Galli and blocked the road. The Dogra garrison at Dadyal kept up resistance for about a month when they withdrew to Mirpur. The fighters from Gujar Khan, headed by Shafi, were actively supported by the local Muslims, some of whom, like Raja Dilawar Khan, who retired later as a Brigadier, took a leading part in the liberation of Dadyal. While retreating from Dadyal, the Dogras resorted to indiscriminate firing, killing three persons in village Domal. Captain Dilawar Khan of the Indian National Army and later Defence Secretary of the Azad Kashmir Government was incharge of the elements who laid a siege to Mirpur town. He had assumed the rank of a Colonel! Had the Dogra army made a determined effort to break the blockade which was effective on three sides, they could have definitely succeeded because of their superior arms and discipline. Besides, they had the support of large bands of armed Sikhs and Hindus. Their failure to take initiative emboldened their Muslim adversaries who shifted their camp from Lidder to Pandora. Lidder was about five miles from the town while Pandora was hardly half a mile away. The construction of Mangla Dam in early sixties has submerged these roads and some of the villages. As the supplies

from outside had stopped, the Hindus began demolishing Muslim houses to use their timber as fuel. The first Mohallah thus ransacked was Naloi Kaasbian which presented a desolate sight. Sometime later the Muslim elements took up their position over there. Captain Khan Muhammad was also with them. Apart from rifles, they had only one brengun which was made available by Jemadar Raja Ratasap Khan who had deserted his unit alongwith some other Muslim members at Khuiratta. It was commanded by Col. Abdul Hamid Durrani. A few days later, a group of Muslims led by Subedar Muhammad Shafi of Gujar Khan attacked Dogra defences near Jamia Masjid Gakhran, killing some of them. In the encounter Shafi and two of his companions who were probably Pathans, were killed. After this incident the Dogras evacuated their post at Balagala and withdrew to Mirpur.

Col. Arshad had first to organise a chain of supply across the Jhelum river to selected points in the Mirpur district. Pakistani volunteers ferried the arms and ammunition to the patriots on the other side, some of whom also came across the river to receive them. It was arranged that on a date to be communicated, military posts especially those along the river and the Upper Jhelum canal, were to be attacked.

## MIRPUR LIBERATED

Col. Arshad moved his Headquarter to the Mangla Rest House to direct, personally, the mopping up operations. By this time a sizable force of Kashmiri Mujahids had been organized, which was augmented with volunteers from Jhelum and adjoining areas, armed with their own weapons. Intelligence reports revealed that the Dogra garrison in the tehsil, about a Brigade strength, except for a platoon holding the Mangla fort, and supported by MMGs and light automatics, had withdrawn to the Mirpur Cantt. On their refusal to surrender, the Mujahids launched several harassing raids on the fort, inflicting as well as receiving casualties. The presence of some water in the fort's under-ground tank helped the enemy to hold out for sometime but, finally, when Captain Rakhman Gul's 2" mortar fired a few rounds, the Dogras surrendered, and within a week of the first shot fired at Bala gala, the Dogra flag had disappeared on the fort. Captain Azam and Jemadar Akbar of Babiyam played a notable role in its capture.

In the meantime, several parties of local Mujahids and Pakistani volunteers were directed to cut off the Mirpur Cantt by taking defensive positions at the vehicular exits. The rest of the force, about 500 strong, moved on to the Mirpur town, which was surrounded by the second week of November 1947. Major Afzal and Captain Azam were commanding

two sectors of the siege, whilst Captain Khan Mohammad (of Mung), a released officer of the Indian Army, described by Mr. M.Z. Kiani, as "a great and daring fighter", was incharge of the third sector.

The Cantonment was situated at the eastern end of the town where the bulk of their force had fortified itself. The Dogras had also fortified the rest of the town by blocking all the out-lets. On the house-tops were built pill-boxes and other defensive positions with wide field of fire.

It was appreciated that it would not be possible to attack from the cantonment side as the area surrounding it was open, providing very little cover. On the western edge of the city, the ground was broken and afforded some cover for the attackers to reach the outer fringe of the town. It was, therefore, decided to launch the main attack from the western end. A number of preliminary movements were made in the western sector and a few houses were occupied, but further progress was halted by defensive walls built in the streets, guarded by well-protected position on top of the adjoining houses.

A full scale attack, led by Major Afzal, with about 500 Mujahids, armed only with rifles, was launched on the morning of 18th November from the western sector. Diversionary attacks were made by Capt. Azam and Capt. Khan Mohammad in the northern and eastern sectors. The main attack, however, proved unsuccessful against well directed enemy fire of M.M. Gs and light automatics.

In a subsequent conference, the sub-sector Commanders pointed out that the existing Mujahid force was insufficient to dislodge the entrenched and fortified Dogras who, besides their superior armaments, enjoyed the support of the Indian Air Force.

Col. Masud commanding the P.A.V. at Jhelum was good enough to send a 3" mortar team under Captain Nawaz in the morning of 23rd November to join in the attack. About a thousand-strong force from Dir under its own Sipah Salar and two ancient country-made cannons, arrived at Jhelum and were immediately moved to Mirpur by night to reach there on 21st November 1947. It was just in time to give the necessary boost to the Mujahids already investing the Dogra force. It was decided to make a full-fledged attack at dawn the following morning from western side with the Diris leading. In the other sectors of the perimeter, the commanders were to engage the defenders with heavy concentrated fire. It was also decided that, in order to dislodge the Dogras from their strong-holds, some of the houses providing them with cover, would have to be set on fire.

The Diris, after saying their morning prayers, started the attack with a salvo from their ancient field pieces. As was feared, the guns went out of action after the first few rounds were fired. The 3" mortars however, continued to lob their shells on the enemy positions. Regardless of their ineffectiveness, the Diri guns gave a great boost to the morale of the Mujahids, and since this was the first time artillery of any type was used, it had considerable demoralising effect on the enemy.

The attackers met with stiff resistance, but the tenacity of the Diris caused the outer defences of the town to crumble; some buildings were set on fire to provide a convenient smoke-screen for the attackers to make further progress, and by midday, half the town was occupied. A further reason for the weakening of the Dogra resistance was the inability of the Indian Army to come to their help. The retreat of the tribesmen in Kashmir valley and the growing build-up of Indian troops in Jammu had encouraged the Dogra garrisons at Mirpur and Kotli to hold out. But, with the Indian Army's line of communication threatened by the attacks of the Sulaiman Khel lashkars in the Dewa-Vatala-Chhamb-Akhnur areas and despite having reached Kotli, the compulsion to fall back onto Jhangar Dharmsal, the Dogra troops in Mirpur, now hard-pressed by the Mujahids and with no hope of succour from the rear, had no alternative but to surrender or run to the next safe place which was Naushehra. They chose the latter.

At about 4 p.m., a column of humanity was seen emerging from the barbed wire enclosure on the eastern side. It was made up of civilians flanked by armed Dogra troops. The column was followed up by the Mujahids as soon as it set itself onto the road leading to Tandar. The Dogras fired a few shots but soon ran away towards the hills, leaving most of the civilians in scattered places. These were collected and put together in refugee camps. Their condition was pitiable; the effects of the fighting and the conditions of siege were clearly noticeable; they were emaciated, exhausted and frightened; all that the poor shaking, shivering folk could say was "Hindustan Murdabad". By 6 p.m. the entire Mirpur town was free of the enemy and in possession of the Mujahids.

The retreating remnants of the garrison were pursued into the hills. Col. Kamal was asked to turn his attention to the Samahni valley and intercept them. Although he had only a small number of very tired men under him, he made a good job of it just as he had done earlier with the other lot at Kabutar Gala.

The remnants of the Dogra army withdrew towards Saria and the local Hindu officials headed by the S.D.M. Rao Rattan Singh, as well as a

number of Hindus, including the in-laws of Mr. Mahajan went with them. A few Hindu ladies committed suicide by jumping into wells. Probably one or two dead bodies were later recovered from a well situate in the vicinity of the District Courts. A number of women were abducted. The scene at the District courts where four to five thousand non-Muslims had gathered, must have been pathetic. Bewildered babies clung to their frightened parents carrying only cash and ornaments or a few clothes and wildly shrieking for the clouds of uncertainty hanging over their heads; same was the fate with lakhs of Muslims in the Indian occupied parts of the province. My Lord! What sort of freedom it was? Major Ali Ahmed Shah who had by now become "Defence" Minister was seen for the first time on the district soil on 26th November when he came from Jhelum with Col. Arshad to take possession of the local treasury which was removed to Rawalpindi. What happened to the gold and cash recovered from the treasury, remains unknown. Some Pathans as well as local Muslims wanted to kill the Hindus and abduct their women as part of the war spoils but a determined band stood in their way and ultimately succeeded in saving their lives and arranging for their evacuation to Naushehra. The remnants of the Hindu and Sikh population who came out of their hiding places within the next few days were sent to Ali Beg gurdawara which was converted into a refugee camp.

Among them were some Hindus from Mirpur, notably, Lala Sita Ram Advocate. During my practice at the Bar at Mirpur, I heard a lot of praise not only about his professional ability but also about his non-communal outlook. It was very sad that he was killed in the camp by unruly elements without any authority from their superiors. His daughter Lalita Rani, the only child, was abducted by a tailor! Such are the horrors of wars. Efforts made by Khan Abdul Hameed Khan, the District Magistrate, to trace her resulted in failure as she had been secretly removed to Jacobabad. In 1960 she came to see me in connection with the compensation of her father's house, which had since been allotted to refugees. She had several children and when I enquired in confidence whether she wanted to go to India to join her relatives, she told me that it was useless, now that she had so many children and that for their sake, she must continue to live here. In another case, a matriculate married woman, Ram Piyari, was abducted by a semi-literate Muslim, water-carrier by caste, though not by profession. Except for three girls, all were later recovered and repatriated to India. Recovery in at least one case resulted in a tragedy. The girl and her abductor, both belonged to Afzalpur area. Both were unimpressive. She was forcibly recovered in 1950 and before being forcibly taken to Lahore, told me at the District Courts that she could not live

without her Muslim husband but unfortunately no one paid any heed. On being finally told in Lahore that she *was* to be repatriated to India, despite her refusal, she died of shock. The husband followed her a few days later. In most cases, however, they were willing to return to their relatives in India. It may be recorded in fairness to the district administration that it was swift and resolute in their recovery. In the beginning they were camped at village Datiyal in the house and under the care of late Haji Khawaja Abdul Aziz. A man of nearly 55 years, he was widely respected for his piety and character. His wife and daughters did a wonderful job during those difficult days. Many girl inmates were later happily married in India and he was specially permitted by the Indian Government to attend the marriage of an inmate at Delhi where most of these grateful women came to thank him for his kindness and paternal look-after. Krishna Mehta, also an inmate, has paid him a fitting tribute in her narrative.

## INDIANS DEFEATED AT JHANGAR

On 23rd December, 1947 a Patiala regiment advanced from Naushehra via Jhanghar on way to Kotli. It was led by an infantry company and two armoured cars. Captain Khan Muhammad Khan of Mung, who was in charge of the inlets to guard against enemy infiltrations, covered a distance of 34 miles with lightening speed to reach Kalisan along with Kashmira Khan and his force. The enemy column was repulsed with heavy losses, about two furlongs from Jhangar. The liberation forces consisted of a volunteer force from Dir under Major Taimur Khan which was posted at Haripur, Captain Mahmud Khan's Kotli battalion covering Minchin, Keri and Gahi and about a thousand strong Sudhan force under Col. Sher Ahmad Khan at Tain. In a conference, the battalion Commanders decided to attack the enemy concentration and chalked out a plan to that end.

The Taimur force collected at the foot of the Matlashi hill feature and moving silently, attacked the enemy's 2nd Punjab battalion; a hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Indians were defeated; eight of their officers were later counted dead alongwith a large number of men. The Kotli battalion moved ahead from Keri and Gahi to take on another Indian battalion but its advance was held-up by heavy enemy machine-gun fire from Nehrun picquet. Thereupon, three volunteers including an under-teen enthusiast, Qazi Muhammad Jan who later rose to be a Major in the Army, moved to silence the machine-gun with hand grenades. They succeeded in capturing the machine-gun as well as silence a bren-gun at great personal risk; it enabled the Kotli battalion to capture the Nehrun picquet. Subedar Sultan Muhammad took hold of

an enemy machine-gun and employed it against the enemy to great advantage. The battalion also succeeded in capturing the small airfield. The Sudhan force over-powered the enemy at the Tain hill and advanced upto Patro. With the fall of Jhangar, remnants of the Ist/2nd Punjab and the Gurkha Machine-gun Coy who were running to Naushehra, were ambushed at Dindeka by Captain Khan and Kashmira Khan.

Apart from opening the Mirpur-Kotli road, its liberation brought the Liberation forces closest to Naushehra, the enemy's principal base in Jammu province. In addition to wireless sets, petrol, ammunition, rations, mines etc., 125 army lorries and 2 armoured cars also fell into the hands of Muslims. Except for a few, the vehicles which were sent to the rear, formed the nucleus of the first G. T. Company of the Azad forces.

Qazi Bashir claims to have arranged their despatch to Gujrat. Accompanied by late Syed Badiuzaman Shah, a Mirpur transporter and a man of many admirable qualities, Sardar Faqir Muhammad, Mr. Faiz Ali of Athmuqam and about twenty drivers, they had to clear the road blocks themselves and ultimately succeeded in despatching all the vehicles within four days, to Gujrat, where they were handed over to one Colonel Abdullah. Jhanghar was re-occupied by Indians on the 18th of March 1948.

## BRIGADIER USMAN KILLED

At the time of partition, there were few Muslims in the Artillery wing of the Indian Army, perhaps hardly 70 officers or so. A large number of them, perhaps 40 to 50 got stuck up in the Deolali Artillery School. Anxious to deprive Pakistan of their vital services, Hindus and Sikhs planned to derail the train that was to take them to Pakistan but the plan somehow leaked out and the English Commandant, Brigadier Frowne, refused to send them by rail. These were then transferred to the Kalyan transit camp whose Commandant, Brar, a Mona Sikh, having lost his father in communal riots at Ferozpur, resorted to third-degree methods to harass these officers and their families. Ultimately, they travelled by ship, landing at Karachi in the first week of November, 1947. As the danger of an Indian thrust from Muzaffarabad loomed large, a few artillery pieces were moved to Chakothi area under Ehsan-ul-Haq Malik and Lt. F. A. Chishti but these were not pressed into service as they had been sent as a precautionary measure.

It was months after Indians had reoccupied Jhangar and thus ensured the comparative safety of Naushehra, their main base in the whole province, that some artillery pieces were moved to Poona-Tandar area in Bhimber sector. Among the officers from the Artillery who moved in with

their machines were Major Mir Baz, the Battery Commander, Captain Shah Muhammad, Observer, Lt. F. A. Chishti as Command Post Officer as well as the Gun-position-cfficer and Lt. Mukhtar Karim as 2nd Gun-position officer. They belonged to the 3rd Field Regiment, which is now the 2nd Field Regiment. The guns were without marks and the officers and men, keeping them, were in civilian clothes, as volunteers.

Lt. F. A. Chishti placed his guns at Tandar proper. For ten days or so, they remained inactive. In the meantime, Indians at Jhangar had their annual sports. It was on the prize-distribution day, sometime in June 1948, with Brigadier Usman as the chief guest, that Lt. F.A. Chishti, suddenly and to the Enemy's utter confusion, opened up with 25-pounders, 8 guns salvo. It was for the first time that 25-pounders had been pressed into service in the Kashmir fighting from this side. The terrific effect of 8 such monsters, dropping fire in unison, can better be imagined than described. Brigadier Usman and a host of officers and men were instantly killed. The whole Brigade became ineffective. Both the OP as well as the Intelligence confirmed the Enemy's heavy loss as well as confusion but Brigadier K. M. Sheikh failed to exploit the situation, saying that his Infantry could not nold it, after capture. Lt. Col. Arif of the 5/13 FF took the same position. The area stayed without major strcngth of the Enemy for almost 7 days! It was a typical example, not only of bad coordination but also of the lack of initiative and defective leadership. This is yet another major blunder of the military campaign. The guns fired about 540 rounds on Pir Satawan (hill), Matlashi, Khambah fort and Makri.

Quite naturally, the Indian Air Force could be expected for punishment. Lt. F. A. Chishti therefore asked permission to withdraw the guns to alternate positions but the permission was first refused; it was subsequently available but at 4 a. m., after having wasted several precious hours and also after the protection of darkness was no longer available. Subordinating the essentially-human characteristic of giving top priority to his own self-preservation, Lt. Chishti displayed enviable qualities of leadership and an inspiring sense of patriotism by sending the valuable 8 guns as first priority, their ammunition as 2nd priority, command posts as third priority and so on. He was the last man to leave the gun position. Sure enough, an Indian plane hovered over-head, spotted the jeep but before it could be hit, Lt. Chishti, himself on the wheels, stopped and jumped out alorg with his three companions. They had a miraculous escape; the jeep was instantly hit, caught fire and got burnt. The plane also dropped two 500-pounders but there was no human loss. It has been truly said that brave men die only once.

Sometime later when we suffered reverses in Mehndhar area, the 3rd Field Regiment was recalled from Poona-Tandar area, replaced by elements of 9 Field Battery and sent to Hajira area. As there was no road link between Panjarr and Hajira, normal 25-pounders were converted into jury axle 25-pounders. The guns were deployed with a troop position in Ghambir nullah and the Battery, less a troop, in area Hajira. Mehndhar valley had already been occupied by Indians and the Battery was now in support of the 25 Brigade commanded by Brigadier Azam.

## BHIMBER LIBERATED

A large number of Hindu refugees from the adjoining areas of Gujrat had entered Bhimber. It is unanimously stated by Muslims that it was after their entry and due to their machinisations that Hindu-Muslim tension increased manifold. A Muslim chowkidar was assassinated one night which caused panic, resulting in the evacuation of the town by Muslims. A Company-strength of Dogra soldiers but very well armed was stationed in the town with their H.Q. in the old fort that now houses the tehsil office. One Triloke, a clerk of a Hindu lawyer advised his friend Abdul Hakim, a Town Committee Member, to take away his family as Sanghis were bent upon mischief.

It was in this atmosphere that a group of volunteers, gathered by Mr. Khan Mulk of Gujrat, attacked Manawar which, together with Vatala, was inhabited mostly by the Dogras. The attack was repulsed and among the dead, was Tore Khan, a Police-Sub-Inspector from Gujrat who had, on his own and unmindful of consequences, joined the volunteers. The Hindus intensified their campaign of terror and attacked Muslim localities in Barnala and the surrounding areas. Under the local leadership of Raja Inayat Khan, later awarded the title of Mujahid-e-Hyderi and Captain Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, both from the I.N.A., a group of Muslims armed with a few Darra-made rifles, surrounded the town on three sides and made two assaults but failed due to the weapon superiority of the Dogras.

The senior-most military officer from the tehsil then was Col. Habib-ur-Rehman of the I.N.A., ADC to Subash Chandra Bose, and perhaps the lone survivor in the air-crash in which Bose died. He later became Chief of Staff of the Azad Forces for a brief period and was then working as Senior Staff Officer to General Kiani. As operations in the area were directed and controlled by Mr. Kiani's Gujrat based HQ, Habib-ur-Rehman took considerable initiative and made use of whatever local volunteers he could muster together.

As the well-entrenched Dogras could not be dislodged with the Darra made rifles which were also limited in number, Col. Masud better known as Tommy Masud, then stationed at Jhelum, was approached for help. He despatched, on his personal responsibility and without reference to his superiors who would have not allowed it, two armoured vehicles under Captain Nawaz. They hit the Dogra cidatel at dawn on 24th October, causing panic. The Dogras abandoned the town in confusion and ran to Akhnoor via Chhamb. A few hundred Hindus, also evacuated under the protection of their arms.

When I look back to the 1947-48 Kashmir War, Col. Masud emerges out as one of those rare officers who cared for nothing except the success of the glorious Cause and whose name effortlessly brings tears of gratitude in my eyes. Had his offer of leading a squadron of tanks to Srinagar been accepted, for which he was at the same time taking the whole blame, the flag of freedom would now have been flying on Kashmir.

With the exit of the Dogras from the town, the whole tehsil was liberated except a few villages behind Gora Naka, inhabited by Hindu Jats, most of whom were ex-servicemen. They held for a few days but as pressure mounted, abandoned the area and left for Naushehra. They were, however, pursued and dispersed in a hill behind Samahni.

Bhimber town had a Hindu majority. The population was about five thousand, with hardly a hundred Muslim families, most of whom were concentrated in the Kashmiri Mohallah. Captain Sardar Khan of Makwal, tehsil Kharian, was appointed Administrator; there are wide spread complaints of loot and misbehaviour against him. A number of Hindus, including women, committed suicide either by taking poison or jumping into wells; the most prominent among them was Ajodhia Nath, Pleader, and his daughters. Wherever possible, particularly in the villages, Muslim neighbours gave them protection.

With Bhimber in the hands of the liberators and the fighting in the Mirpur tehsil having ended, further plans had to be made for an advance towards Naushehra and to the east from Beri Pattan in the direction of Akhar Gala and, if possible, to places in Reasi as far as the Ramban bridge on the Chenab. It was known that the area between Akhnur and Dewa-Vatala had strong parties of well-armed Dogras who, being mostly

ex-servicemen, were expected to put up organised and sustained resistance, for which no force was at that time available. Akhnur was also known to be held by units of the Dogra regular army. The area in between the above places being inhabited mostly by the Dogras, it was difficult to infiltrate into or to start guerilla operations with weak forces. On the other hand, the area between Bhimber and Naushehra and that lying to the north of the Naushehra-Akhnur road, had a mixed population; in the rural areas Muslims were in a majority and it was felt that a good deal of help could be available to sustain guerilla bands. The Gujrat H.Q., therefore, decided to pay attention to the latter area first, and to deal with the other area at a more suitable time.

At the same time, Chaudhry Khan Mulk, a leading member of the well known Gujar family from Gujrat brought a carefully selected group of forty five youthful tribesmen from Razmak. His family owned large property in the Pakistan area just across Deva Vatala. The Dogras had earlier started raids on the near by Pakistan villages. Afraid therefore that there may be damage to their property and also fired by the zeal to be of some use in the liberation of Kashmir, Khan Mulk brought them at his own expense and must have spent a large amount on their maintenance. Himself an expert marksman, he somehow succeeded in winning their total loyalty. It is said that he arranged a shooting competition between himself and his proud guests with the burnt part of a cigarette as a target in which he alone succeeded which had a profound affect upon his guests who never misbehaved. In recognition of his services, the A.K. Government invested him with the title of Fakhr-e-Kashmir.

The only armed parties that were more readily available for deployment were those from the Mianwali district. Immediately on arrival at Gujrat, they were sent off to Bhimber, given ammunition and posted to the north. Some were- ex-servicemen, but the majority consisted of ordinary village folk, with their own fire-arms and a rudimentary knowledge as to their use. They were grouped into convenient parties, and briefed in as much detail as possible both with regard to their role as well as the way to combat enemy A.F.Vs and aircraft attacks. By this time the Indian army had entered the State and was engaged in fighting in Srinagar-Baramula area. It was obvious that in due course of time, it would also advance into the southern districts of Jammu and Poonch.

The 'lashkars' were divided into three lots and put under Major Rana, Col. Kamal, both volunteers and Capt. Niazi of the Pakistan Army. The intention was for the first two parties to advance into the valley of

Beri-Pattan-Akhar Gala via Beri Pattan, leaving out Naushehra which was more strongly held, and to advance towards Akhar Gala by leap-frogging, with one party holding positions on both sides and providing covering fire, and the other, advancing to the next objective. The third party under Capt. Niazi, a smaller one, was to follow up the other two with the ultimate intention of infiltrating right upto the Ramban bridge and to blow it up. All available resources of animal transport and explosives, by themselves limited, were put at their disposal and the morale being high, it was hoped that, if the other two parties could block Akhar Gala before the Indian army's arrival, Niazi's party would have the opportunity of slipping out and making a success of its task which would have materially affected the operations in the Srinagar valley.

Major Rana and Col. Kamal reached Beri-Pattan without much difficulty and finding that it was held by a Dogra detachment, attacked and destroyed it, and also destroyed the ferry, without which no vehicle could cross the stream. An enemy convoy coming from Naushehra was also attacked and destroyed. Beyond Beri-Pattan, after an advance of a couple of days, when the Commanders, because of possible counter-action by enemy A.F.Vs, wanted to continue with proper tactical moves by leap-frogging, their loosely-knit parties who could not understand the strategic importance of these manoeuvres, became somewhat troublesome. What they wanted was that an objective, say a village occupied by the enemy, be pointed out to them and they be allowed to attack it. When told that certain precautions were necessary because of the likely intervention of the Indian Air Foce and armoured units, and being, by this time, a bit tired, they appeared to be somewhat apprehensive and hesitated to move forward. Major Rana, therefore, decided to send them back. Once a rear-ward move started, most of the lashkar abandoned its task and came back to Bhimber. Capt. Niazi's party with the mules and explosives also dispersed. It was with Col. Kamal's personal initiative that a small party of 30 to 50 men stayed on with him in the neighbourhood of Beri-Pattan to watch this obstacle. He established his HQ at Kalal, and was there when the Indian column advancing from Jammu brushed past them and went on to Naushehra and beyond, with Kamal's men holding on to the Kaman Gosha feature as best as they could. The Mianwali lashkar, when at Bhimber, was visited by Indian aircraft, and despite instructions to the contrary, they rushed out into the open and started firing at the aircraft. They were easily spotted and bombed with 500-pound bombs. The casualties were not many, but the effect on morale was considerable. The lashkar dispersed from Bhimber without anyone being able to stop them or to persuade them to return the ammunition and other articles

like haversacks and water bottles. It should be borne in mind that Gujrat H.Q. had no military police to look after the stragglers, and from Bhimber, or for that matter any other place at the foot of the hills and the south, there was no obstacle to the movement of persons sneaking away from the front-line and going back to their homes. This was the first experience of this nature. Later, the same sort of trouble had to be experienced at the hands of the Afghan lashkars who, when they had no more stomach to fight, fell back through devious roads into the plains, carrying the ammunition with them.

A timely move of considerable potential advantage was thus frustrated for lack of disciplined fighters, and the Gujrat HQ had to start building up all over again.

With the induction of the Indian army, Pakistan authorities started taking serious note of the situation. Mr. Kiani was hurriedly called to Rawalpindi in the beginning of November for a meeting presided over by the Secretary General. The question of the Indian Army's possible moves was discussed. Mr. Kiani told the meeting that due to the likely closure of the Banihal pass in the approaching winter, the Enemy would pay more attention to the southern districts and that there were neither regular troops nor even organized armed bands available to counter their moves. He was offered the help of the tribesmen, and appreciating the seriousness of the situation, he agreed to employ them in the sectors under his charge although previously he was opposed to this kind of move. To facilitate co-ordination with the Azad Mujahids, he preferred to have the Sulaiman Khel Pawindahs who, because of their seasonal migration to the Punjab, could speak and understand a certain amount of Urdu. The Pir Sahib of Wana who was present in the meeting and who had considerable influence with the tribe, was put in touch with Mr. Kiani and was to be his principal contact for providing the lashkars.

There being no time to lose, he arranged with the Pir Sahib to send whatever numbers were available immediately and to continue sending parties of not more than 1000 to 2000 at a time because the problem of providing transport, accommodation and rations was quite serious, not to speak of the limited ammunition available. The first lot of about 500 Sulaiman Khel reached Gujrat about the 10th of November 1947 followed by another 500 on the following day. Given necessary ammunition they were transported to Karian-wala camp on the north border of Gujrat where they were quartered and acquainted with the general topography of the area facing them.

## DEWA-VATALA LIBERATED

With the arrival of the tribesmen and an assurance of many more to come, the Dogra menace in the above area could now be seriously tackled. Mr. Kiani's plan envisaged a straight dash to Chhamb, with a smaller party branching off to take Manawar in the south, and other parties moving upto and attacking the villages of Dewa and Vatala. The intention was that with the capture of Chhamb, all the area to the west and most of it to the north, may be liberated in due course of time as more parties arrived. When this plan was explained to the tribesmen at Karianwala, they misunderstood Vatala for Patiala and being already worked-up because of the Sikh atrocities against Muslims in which the Patiala troops had played a despicable role, they were quite excited both about the prospect of taking a revenge, as of collecting considerable loot. Between themselves, they decided to make a strong thrust for Vatala instead of Chhamb. Having come to know of this, Mr. Kiani changed his plan to conform to their idea, so that best results may be achieved.They were therefore instructed to reach VATALA by early morning, attack it, and regardless of results, go into the hills and jungles to the north of the villages, there to take shelter during the day time and to protect themselves against reprisals from the air. In the afternoon they were to come down again and after eliminating pockets of resistance, were to continue moving along the line of the hills to the east in the direction of Akhnur. Once the armed resistance was over-come in the hills, the lashkars were then to operate on the Akhnur-Beri-Pattan road to intercept enemy convoys. The area to the plain south of the hills and east of the Manawar Tawi, was to be left alone, as it was a suitable ground for enemy armoured action and there was also less cover from the air.

The first lot left from Karianwala after sunset on 15th November. The Pathans said their prayers, got together in a big circle and danced their traditional 'Khatak'. Taking advantage of the twilight (and later the moonlight), they extended in a line along the border and after firing a few shots in the air and shouting Allah-o-Akbar and making their other war cries, they dashed into the enemy territory like a pride of lions. From north of Karianwala, right upto Dewa and Vatala, they cut a path for themselves, attacking whoever came in their way, and setting fire to many strong pockets from where fire was being directed at them. The first party reached their objective by about 4.00 in the morning, but as the Dogras took the alarm and started collecting from all the neighbouring villages, they succeeded in practically surrounding the lashkar that had got there. The second party of 500 which started off a few hours later, however, got to the rescue of the first party just in time to

prevent them from doing serious damage. In fact, the tables were now turned on the Dogras, and the Pathans, using knife, inflicted heavy casualties. Soon it was day-light and the tribesmen started moving to the hills to the north in accordance with their instructions. The Dogra bands which had been considerably weakened by the tribal attack, also ran into the hills in order to hide. What happened there can better be imagined than described. Among those who helped in the capture of Vatala, special mention must be made of Khan Mulk of the leading Nawabzada family from Gujrat.

The two lashkars moved on eastward in the afternoon and continued attacking armed villagers towards the south, moving by stages. What had facilitated their success at Dewa and Vatala was the fact, which came to light later, that some Dogra armed parties, on that particular night, were absent, as they themselves had gone to the north across the Akhar Gala-Beri-Pattan road to attack Muslim villages.

The path cut by the tribesmen south to north in the first attack also cut the Dogra area between Akhnur and Bhimber into two, forcing those living to the west to make for Naushehra to seek protection, and those from Chhamb eastwards, to move off in the direction of Akhnur and Jammu. These evacuees from west of the Manawar Tawi created considerable panic in Jammu, from where the PTI reported a few days later that 10,000 galloping horsemen were moving on to Akhnur and Jammu and were within 15 miles of Jammu itself. This, it is believed, caused some evacuation of the Jammu population towards India. Such of the armed bands from west of the Karianwala-Padhar-Vatala line, who were making for Naushehra, were taken on by Col. Kamal who had been directed to rush to Kabutar Gala, and though small in number, did considerable damage to the Dogras.

More and more Sulaiman Khel parties now kept arriving. They were quickly organized, provided with ammunition and pushed off to their objectives on the Akhar Gala-Beri-Pattan road via same trail that had been blasted by the other lashkars before them. Those of the Dogra parties from the Assar-Ambriala area who could not make it to Kabutar Gala, had, in the subsequent days, started escaping towards Akhnur via Chhamb. These, moving by night, when the tribesmen were also on the prowl, often bumped into the latter's follow-up parties and suffered casualties. With the Dogra power shattered in this area, it was easy for some of the other volunteers to move forward and occupy Dewa and Vatala as well as Chhamb and Manawar. The tribal parties themselves continued pushing through the hills at regular intervals, and interfering with enemy movement on the road.

It would be interesting to record here the way in which the tribal pressure was maintained at a constant level for nearly two months without any let-up. Knowing that the tribesmen were not accustomed to fight pitched battles of a static nature, parties of 500 to 100C were formed and given a general area of operation; they were instructed to go in, harass the enemy and stay on inside until recalled, knowing full well that they would not stay for longer than a week. In another week's time, another party would have been sent in with similar instructions to a slightly different area to be followed by yet another party and so on, as long as it was possible. In this way while there was no compulsion for the tribesmen to fight and hold on if they did not want to do so, yet constant pressure on the enemy was maintained, and every time fresh parties were available for operations. Later, when the Indian army established its HQ at Akhnur and tried to move forward to Pallanwala and Chhamb, these tribal lashkars and some of the smaller parties of the other Mujahids located in the hills used to come down behind the Indian units and threatening their rear, forced them to fall back onto Akhnur.

The tribal activity in this Sector, it must be recorded here, was greatly responsible for the Indian army's evacuation of Kotli, which they had reached in the third week of November, and for their inability either to reach Mirpur or to provide assistance to its garrison. While this pressure lasted, the Indian army units at Jhangar were defeated and destroyed in December 1947 and a considerable force invested in Naushehra.

## EFFORTS TO CAPTURE NAUSHEHRA

With the liberation of Bhimber in October 1947, of Mirpur in November, 1947, the activities of the Mujahids having spread to the Rajauri area and the tribesmen and Pakistani volunteers ranging between Naushehra and Akhnur and beyond the Chenab river, all the way to Kathua on the Ravi, the stage was now set for the Azad forces to converge on the pivotal and strongly-held Indian position at Naushehra. This was to be their coup de grace as far as fighting south of the Pir Panjal range was concerned. The efforts to harass the enemy line of communication between Kathua and Beri-Pattan would have been inconclusive if they had not tried to eliminate the enemy garrisons at the farthest ends of these communications, as had been done in the case of Kotli, Mirpur and Jhangar Dharmsal. The position which Naushehra occupied can well be described as the 'hinge of fate'. With its capture the Azad forces would not have had much difficulty in reaching the Chenab river and establishing themselves on the heights of the Pir Panjal range to the north. Poonch, which had already been isolated, would have fallen, in any case.

Actually, it was because of the preparations for an attack on Naushehra and the expectation of its capture that the Gujrat HQ did not publicise the success at Jhangar Dharmsal and Dhindeka which were very important in themselves.

Unfortunately, the scoop that Mr. Kiani wanted to bring about and present to the Nation with the capture of Naushehra was fated not to materialise; nor were plans for future activities beyond Chenab and the Pir Panjal range which had assumed tentative shape, destined to be put into operation. As stated earlier, Kamal with his small parties continued to operate from Kalal and Kaman Gosha against Beri Pattan and Naushehra out-posts. Freed from the operations around Kotli, the Sudhan group under Col. Sher Ahmed Khan had moved on to near Chingas, north of Naushehra with Rehmatullah's fighters also in the vicinity, having come down from Rajauri. Capt. Khan Muhammad and Kashmira Khan established themselves at Dhindeka, only 21 miles from Naushehra.

## THE LEGENDARY KASHMIRA KHAN

As the harassment of the Indian troops continued, every effort was made to build-up the forces for an attack on Naushehra. Kamal having left the sector in December, 1947, tribal lashkars had to be sent not only to fill up that gap but to prepare the way for a thrust. This was done by despatching a lashkar of Mangals and Zadrans approx 3000 strong under the general control of Haji Abdullah. Kashmira Khan with 40 Ghilzai who had worked as 'Kharkars' at the Rupar Dam in India and were in a tattered condition asked Mr. Kiani for fire-arms so that they could take part in the fighting. Having suffered in men and material at the hands of Hindus, they were itching for revenge. The party, after being put into some shape, was despatched to the Naushehra front, with instructions to join up with Capt. Khan Muhammad. it was just in time for the road-block action at Dhindeka on the 23rd and 24th December, 1947, when the Indian column dispersing from Jhangar-Dharmsal was virtually wiped out and practically all their vehicles including two armoured cars, captured. Amin Gul, who was later made a Lieutenant in the A.K.R.F., was conspicuous for his bravery, and was known to have mounted an armoured car, with its gun blazing, sat on the cupola with a drawn pistol, and challenged the Sikh crew to come out. He captured the crew but during the course of the battle, was hit by a bullet and lost an eye. Parts of the liberated territory still resound with stories of the legendary Kashmira Khan gal.oping on his horse and commanding his faithful followers in battle in total disregard of personal security.

During the offensive when Indians finally succeeded in occupying the forward posts held by Kashmira Khan, after his lashkar had exhausted all its ammunition, his remnants did not surrender but gathered around Captain Akram's position and after being issued ammunition, forced the Indians to withdraw into Naushehra again. Says the G.H.Q. chronicle:—

> "The indomitable Kashmira Khan kept the Indians worried for a long time."

The Diri lashkar, after their gallant actions in Mirpur and Matlashi, also moved on towards Naushehra and was positioned opposite the TAIN feature which dominated Naushehra from the north-west and which was strongly held by the Indians. There were other smaller parties, but their roles were generally not so important. The general pattern in the pre-attack period around Naushehra, was: Diris approximately 3000-strong opposite the Tain to the NW: Khan Muhammad's party and that of Kashmira Khan, in the vicinity of Dhindeka to the SE of the Diris; a few small parties at the western edge of Kaman Gosha to fill the gap; the Mangals and Zadrans, also about 3000 at Kalal and Kaman Gosha, south and south-east of Naushehra; and Capt. Sher Ahmed Khan's group and that of Capt. Rehmatullah on the Rajauri road, north of Naushehra.

While Naushehra was thus surrounded, every effort was being made to make up for administrative deficiencies. All available ammunition and supplies were pushed forward to the Mujahids. These had to be man-handled as there was very little transport. Liaison officers particularly with the Diris, were detailed to give guidance and try to bring about co-ordination. Capt. Sarfaraz (known here as Saladin), who had previously been put at Bhimber to look after the administration of the staging camp, was shifted to Samahni, to take charge of the administration of the whole of the Naushehra front, and to bring about such co-ordination on the tactical plane between the widely scattered forces as was possible. All this consumed sometime and the attack being postponed on two occasions, was ultimately decided to be launched on 6th February, 1948.

Visiting the front in the beginning of February, Mr. Kiani carried out a quick recon. of the area, met as many of the local commanders as possible, and after making out a tactical plan, issued necessary instructions to all concerned. The total area around which Azad troops were spread was 15 miles in circumference. It was, therefore, obvious that in the absence of wireless and telephone communications, orders could only be given in the beginning, and that there could be no departure from the given-out plan subsequently, if it could be helped at all.

The plan was that the Diris were to attack Tain from North-west in force, while the Mangals and Zadrans were to make a strong thrust against Naushehra from the South-east. The troops on the Chingas side were to work their way into the Naushehra Cantt from the North-east, attacking the lower hill features, after by-passing both Tain and the Mai Mangla fort. Khan Muhammad and Kashmira Khan, were to attack from the south-west along the low-lying hills running parallel to the Tain feature on the inside and reaching upto the Naushehra Cantt with the intention, ultimately, of linking up with the Azad forces coming from the Rajauri-road side, thus stopping the Indians from sending re-inforcements to Tain. While this was happening, the Afghan lashkar from the south-west was to push into Naushehra at all costs. It was hoped that once the Tain feature was captured, which held the same sort of a dominant position with regard to Naushehra as Matlashi had with regard to Jhangar, and with the strong tribal attack from the south, while a wedge had already been driven between the Tain feature and the Naushehra Cantt., all would be over by the evening.

When the attack started on 6th February 1948, Sher Ahmed Khan's force, and that of Rehmatullah, made some progress and got into the outskirts of Naushehra from the north-east. Khan Muhammad and Kashmira Khan almost succeeded in capturing their objective. But the two major thrusts, that of the Diris on the Tain feature, and of the Afghans from the south, failed.

## THE GALLANT HAJI ABDULLAH

The Zero hour for the combined attack was set at 4.00 a.m. As is obvious, it was to be a dawn attack and a surprise one. The Diris could not stick to the schedule; they took too long saying their prayers and started attacking the Tain feature at 6.00 a.m. i.e. two hours after the others had started when it was day light and the element of surprise had been lost. They also tried to repeat the same "human-sea"tactics against fortified Indian positions which they had successfully used against them at Matlashi. But this time the Indians were ready for them, and while they were well protected by barbed wire and mines, with the gaps covered with artillery fire from the Naushehra Cantt and with mortar fire, the most damage that was caused, was by M.M.Gs. pouring cross-fire on fixed lines. As wave after wave, usually of a hundred each, of Diris, with their drawn swords in their right hands and rifles in the left, dashed forward, they were simply mowed down. The first waves had gone to sustain the attack, and others, to retrieve the casualties, resulting in more casualties. The Liaison Officer was helpless. First there was the lack of com-

munication; then these people did not want any interference in their method of fighting. According to reports, in this single day's action on the Tain, the Diris suffered 1300 killed and wounded.

Regarding the Afghan tribes—the Mangals and Zadrans—it was a different story. At Zero hour when their gallant leader Haji Abdullah personally moved forward to lead the attack, only about a dozen men followed him; others slipped away and dispersed without notice. This was one of the greatest let downs in the entire course of the Kashmir fighting. Undaunted, Haji Abdullah did not turn his back. With the few men who followed him, that gallant leader of men made straight for an enemy MMG post and had himself and his men cut down to the last man.

When General Kiani visited the sector on the eve of attack, he was accompanied by Col. Atta Ullah, a Medical officer who stayed back and rendered valuable service during the operation. He was later appointed Director A.K Medical Services and the credit for the large and well-equipped net-work of hospitals and dispensaries all over Azad Kashmir goes to his ingenuity and examplary devotion to duty.

## INDIAN COUNTER-MOVES IN AKHNUR CHHAMB AREA

As tribal lashkars continued to operate from the hills north and north-east of Chhamb against the enemy L of C between Akhnur and Beri-Pattan, the Indians, after establishing a bridge position in Akhnur, tried to push down into the plains towards Pallanwala and Chhamb. Their intention was to take Chhamb and to cut off the tribesmen from the rear.

The Indians usually pushed out a mobile column supported by light tanks, and quite often reached as far west as the Manawar Tawi. By this time, the Azad forces were in possession of two Bren-guns; and Mr. Kiani's plan of stopping the Indians was to hold Chhamb with about 250 volunteers supported by one Bren-gun, with Manawar in the south being held by a small detachment. In front of Chhamb, on the west bank of Manawar Tawi, had been planted 5 anti-tank mines—all that they had—covering the track that crossed the Tawi at the ford. Another detachment of a hundred strong and with the other Bren-gun, was located some miles away in the hills to the north east. Further to the east and towards north of the Akhar-Gala-Beri-Pattan road, were tribesmen on their usual raids on the L of C. Whenever the Indian column would reach the east bank of Manawar-Tawi, they would be fired on by the LMG

in Chhamb which would also be a signal for the detachment in the hills to come down into the plain and make a demonstration behind the enemy's rear. In this way, the enemy forces were made to fall back on to Akhnur every time they came forward. On one occasion, the enemy AFVs tried to cross the Manawar-Tawi and the first vehicle that came to the west bank having been blown up by a mine, no effort at crossing was made for a long time. From the 3rd week of November, 1947, this situation lasted for about two months. In January, 1948, the Indians tried to move forward by stages, and as a first step, occupied Pallanwala. This made interference with their rear difficult. As a second step, supported by tanks and artillery, they attacked Chhamb and took it. While most of the Mujahids escaped from Chhamb, a few were caught, and it came to light later that the captives were brutally treated by the Indians; the eyes of two teen-aged students of the Gujrat Zamindara College, who were also amongst them as volunteers, were taken out before they were put to death. There were several volunteers right from their colleges. One of them, Malik Muhammad Saeed, later Finance Member POFW, came almost straight from the Engineering College Lahore.

Soon after their taking Chhamb, the Indians also tried to cut-off the other Mujahid parties that were still operating in Padher, Dewa, Vatala and the area to the north-east, by throwing a cordon of tanks for several miles along the Gujrat border and then to hunt out the Azad fighters. Two Azad parties, which were operating as fighting patrols, were attacked. The one that managed to find a suitable position and took cover, got away without casualties, but the other, which tried to disperse, offered a good target and suffered losses.

An inspiring example of dedication and self-sacrifice reported from the sector is that out of the two Bren-guns that were in use in this area, one had been lost due to enemy action. This did not mean much in itself, but it was the loss of 50% of the automatic fire-power available to Azad fighters, and for that matter, was a grievous loss. A few days later, a patrol party that had been sent out early in the morning under a spirited leader, Rashid Sawhney, a civilian—to look for any wounded, brought back the Bren-gun. This was great news, but the details were inspiring. The Bren-gun was found after the dead body of the volunteer who was carrying it had been located. From there, a trail of blood, as well as the impressions of a body that had obviously dragged itself laboriously on the ground, could be seen going back in the direction of the area held by the enemy. Following this trail, at one place the patrol found a clear diversion which led to a bush in which the Bren-gun was hidden. Obviously, this fighter, when mortally hit, tried to drag himself and

the Bren-gun towards the Pakistan border. Finding himself weak from the loss of blood, and realising that it would not be possible for him to take the Bren-gun with him, he made a deliberate move to go to the side of bushes, there to hide the Bren-gun so that it may not fall into enemy hands. While dragging himself further, he breathed his last before reaching safety. This was a supreme example of self-sacrifice and devotion to the Cause.

In the meantime, other volunteer parties, some Waziris, some Orakzais, and others of Turis and Bhittanis had been assembled to cover the area between Assar and Ambriala to keep the enemy troops engaged, the Sulaiman Khel lashkars, having been sent earlier to the Jammu Sector to operate under Col. I. J. Kiani on the Kathua-Jammu road.

The Turis who were holding Vatala abandoned it on the night falling between 8/9 January, 1948, without permission, and while Lt. Umar Khan held it upto 12th January, 1948, some Waziris and Mahsuds had to be sent to re-occupy Dewa and Vatala and to hold it. At this time, it was the intention to hold Assar—Ambriala area, make as many obstacles on the approaches to Bhimber from the east as possible, and also to keep as many Mujahids in the hills to the north and north-east as could be maintained.

Due to the changing military situation, particularly at Chhamb which was now in enemy hands, the Waziris and Mahsuds were stopped from going to Vatala. The party under Umar Khan moved on to Kalian. See-saw type of fighting continued in the areas between Ambriala and Chhamb upto the third week of February when the Gujrat Headquarter was wound up.

## KOTLI-SARIA SECTOR

The Saria sector was divided into two sub-sectors, Panjan, which was commanded by Col. Mahmood Khan and the Banah valley comprising Khuiratta, Seri and Jajot etc. which was commanded by Col. Sher Ahmed Khan. Mahmood Khan had set up his Headquarter at Seri. Col. Sher Ahmed had retired as a Major from the Indian army a few months earlier. It was in early December that he took over command of the Saria sector. He had under him four battalions, each consisting of a thousand men. Three battalions consisted entirely of Sudhans while the fourth comprised of ex-servicemen from Kotli which was raised by Col. Mahmud Khan, though most of them were already on the front in the shape of a lashkar. Each soldier carried a darra-made rifle and fifty rounds of ammunition, the standard set for liberation forces everywhere. Most of the arms were supplied by the rear Headquarter, though some had pur-

chased their own. The battalions were commanded by Subedar-Major Muhammad Hussain of Kahala, Subedar-Major Burhan Ali of Chhechan, Poonch, Captain Abdullah Khan of Pallandari and Col. Mahmood Khan, a retired Honorary Captain of the Indian army who had, like many others, assumed the rank of Colonel. Among the distinguished soldiers who fought heroically in various encounters, Col. Sher Ahmed remembered Captain Mahboob Khan, later a Colonel in the AKRF, Subedar-Major Muhammad Hussain who was specially mentioned by the late Commander, Sher Dil of Baral, Subedar Muhammad Sher of Baral, Lt. Abdul Hussain of Panthal and his own son Subedar Nazar Hussain, who was later killed at the Haji-Pir pass in 1965. Beginning from Kotli, the sector spread over fifty miles. The opposing Indian troops consisted of Sikhs, Gurkhas and Dogras.

Col. Abdul Hamid Khan whose battalion had been sent to Khuiratta in early September moved to Sehnsa in October with two Companies. He stayed there for a week. Sakhi Delair, after capturing Azad Pattan, captured the fort at Ain, a few miles upward on Jhelum. The State troops here comprised Muslims as well as Gurkhas. Among them was a Subedar from Panjeri, Muhammad Akbar who was largely instrumental in its capture. Col. Abdul Majid and Captain Rehmatullah were posted at Sehnsa and being sympathetic, voluntarily withdrew to Throchi fort where they were contacted by Col. Mahmood and without giving him a fight, withdrew further to Saria. Brigadier Chitter Singh was in over-all command on the Saria-Jhangar front. Both Abdul Hamid and Rehmatullah were sent back to the forward area where Hamid fell ill and was later removed to Jammu. Captain Rehmatullah who took over the Command advanced about six miles from Bal and set up his camp at Juna Dherian, where Colonel Mahmood simultaneously appeared with his force. Here also the understanding between them proved decisive because when Gurkhas were attacked by the former, Muslim elements of the State Army joined hands with them. The Gurkhas who were almost entirely wiped out, killed Naik Ali Akbar from Kotli and four or five other Muslim members of their own force. While Rehmatullah went to Khuiratta, Col. Mahmood and Sakhi Delair went to Kotli which was defended by a strong force personally led by Col. Baldev Singh, a close relative of the Maharaja. Col. Kashmira Singh, the Maharaja's Military Adviser had recently visited the town to check its defences. Mahmood Khan shifted the stone-hurling, primitive guns from Throchi fort to Rolli. Meanwhile, an enemy column from Saria penetrated into Banah valley and apart from killing a number of Muslims, also burnt down a large number of houses, reducing a vast area upto Dungi Sagiam to almost utter desolation. Sakhi Delair and

Rehmatullah had therefore to rush back to Khuiratta while Mahmood Khan went to Khanqah Kutaira. Rehmatullah set up his camp at Khuiratta and despatched Lt. Afrasiyab Khan (retired) to capture Dhral fort. Dhral and Saria face each other at some distance. There was a terrible fight in which Afrasiyab and 60 to 70 Muslims were killed; they included Hidayatullah Khan and Karamatullah Khan, youthful sons of Zaildar Amanullah Khan of Khore. In the meantime, the enemy vacated Dhral and gathered in full strength at Saria in order to advance in strength.

With the imminent fall of Beri Pattan which would have completely encircled the Dogra garrison, Col. Baldev Singh decided to abandon Kotli. 50 Para Brigade was sent from Naushehra to augment their ranks so that by withdrawing in strength, the safety of the force could be ensured. Receiving intelligence of the proposed withdrawal, a group of Muslims succeeded in cutting off the road somewhere between Kotli and Tata Pani, by the simple device of demolishing a retaining wall. Unaware of the death trap on the blind curve, the pilot jeep went straight into river Poonch, perhaps killing its occupants. The Indo-Dogra force demolished the houses of Muslims in the neighbourhood and used their roof logs to make a passage. 60 to 70 Muslim soldiers of the State army, were also evacuated and on reaching Naushehra, were brutally murdered, en masse. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah publicly accused Mehr Chand Mahajan of complicity in the dastardly crime. On his persistent demand, a court (Military) of enquiry was ordered on paper but the matter was hushed up.

In December, 1947 in a clash at Saria, Muslims suffered heavy casualties but almost the whole Sikh force except three persons was wiped out. It was a machine-gun battalion. Eight army lorries, some carrying arms, ammunition and other provisions, were captured. Before the attack on Saria as mentioned above, a group of Muslim soldiers led by Subedar Farman Ali, who was later given the title of Sher-i-Jang, succeeded in reaching Kalsian, about eight miles from Saria, in the rear of the Indian troops. An attack was launched at 5 a.m. A sizable number of retreating Indian soldiers were killed. Col. Sher Ahmed told this writer that he wanted to capture Naushehra immediately which according to his information was lying almost undefended at the time but the G. H. Q. did not agree. However it is possible that Col. Sher Ahmed was not fully posted with facts and the G. H. Q. was better informed. He remained incharge of this sector until the cease-fire was ordered. India launched a major attack in this sector in October, 1948 when they advanced by six miles. They captured seventeen posts, including Saria. Col. Sher Ahmed stopped at a mountain-crossing and asked his companions, Muhammad Sher

and Mohammad Hussain, to shoot him. He wanted to avenge himself for the defeat. His comrades naturally declined and instead promised to make a determined effort not only to stop the advance but also to recapture the lost ground. The same night after regrouping, Azad Forces recaptured some posts in a surprise attack; in one of these attacks, an entire group of 25 soldiers was killed. In all, thirteen posts were recaptured. Col. Sher Ahmad was very keen to stress that Saria was the only sector where Indians could and did use a large number of armoured cars on account of the suitability of the local topography.

## OPERATIONS ON THE KATHUA-JAMMU ROAD

This Sector was opened in September, 1947 with HQ at Sialkot. To start with, there were 8 ex-INA officers headed by Col. I. K. Kiani and a few hundred men, also of the former INA but with other volunteers, particularly from tehsil Khushab; the number soon increased to 3500 men armed with 3000 darra-type rifles. The Sector's primary task was to disrupt the enemy movement on the Jammu—Kathua road in order to delay the build-up of his forces west of Chenab. Its secondary task was to render help to the Muslim population of the area which was in constant danger of attack by the Dogra and RSS gangs. Sub-Sector HQs were soon established at Chaprar, Bajra-Garhi, Rupo-Chak and Shamal in Shakargarh tehsil and the Mujahids started attacking and harassing enemy road-convoys on the Kathua—Jammu road from 2nd October 1947 onwards. They were fed by the local inhabitants as there was no supply system but the biggest handicap was that of keeping up communications between different Sub-sectors. As fighting progressed, it became possible to install a No. 19 WT set in Sialkot and small sets with Sub-sector Commanders, which somewhat eased the problem.

As the tempo of fighting in Kashmir increased with the entry of Indian armed forces, some tribal lashkars which included Sulaiman Khel, Waziris and Mahsuds were also introduced and at one time, in early 1948, the total number of Mujahids in this sector was estimated to be well over 25,000.

Before the tribal lashkars arrived, the guerilla bands of the Mujahids, had captured about 550 303-rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, one Bren Gun and 2 Sten Guns in addition to inflicting considerable casualties on armed enemy personnel. By the middle of February, 1948, when they

1. Interview with the author.

began to thin out, under orders, the Sector had the following claims to make:—

(*i*) inflicting a large number of casualties;

(*ii*) capturing 1500 to 2000 rifles including those from the Indian army;

(*iii*) infiltrating about 200 rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle in the area north of Samba and distributing them among the Gujars of that area;

(*iv*) training local Mujahids in Rupo-Chak and Bajra-Garhi and arming them with captured rifles so that they could continue their guerilla activities;

(*v*) when the Indian pressure from Akhnoor towards Chhamb increased in January, 1948, this Sector also sent a strong party of Mujahids for boosting that front.

In December, 1947, a lashkar known as Burq force arrived in this Sector under the command of Lt. Col. Said Ghawas. It consisted of 3500 Waziris and was to operate independently of the previously established Sector-HQs though the Sector-Commander had been asked to look after its needs in the matter of accommodation and movement. It was mutually agreed between the Sector Commander and the force Commander that the force be placed near Marala Headworks with independent operational area including Bajwat and the dry Jammu-Tawi river area. The force arrived in the first week of December, 1947, and was transported from Sambrial to Marala by canal railway and was then marched to a vill ge on the protection Bund near Gondal. Composed of two rival groups—one headed by Khan Bahadur Ghazi Marjan and the other by Khan Sahib Hafta Jan, on the second night of their arrival, they tried to settle their tribal feuds on the front line! They also carried out raids on Pakistani villages around Gondal and there were reports of rape and arson etc. Major Yusuf, then Chief Political Officer dealing with the tribes, was called in and after a good deal of deliberation, it was decided that the force be sent back. They were moved back to Sambrial from where they were put into a special train. That was the end of the Burq force. At the request of the Sector Commander, Col. Ghawas handed over the automatics and ammunition brought with his force to be utilized by other Mujahidin. One of his officers Major Ishaq who stayed on under the command of the Sector Commander was

shifted to Rupo Chak where he did good work and remained there till the Sector-HQ was wound up.

The Sector, when it was formally wound up on instructions from above, in February/March 1948, handed over all the captured rifles etc. and about 5 lac rounds of ammunition to 106 Brigade at Sialkot which was commanded by Brig. Muhammad Musa who later retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army.

## "BUT YOU HAVE A SANDHURST ACCENT"

The entry of the Indian army and its speedy build-up necessitated the setting up of a Direction HQ at Rawalpindi towards the end of November or the beginning of December, 1947 which came to be known as Tariq Head Quarters first under Brig. Akbar Khan and later under Brig. Sher Khan. They were known as General Tariq after Tariq-Ibn-Ziad. A few days after his appointment was announced—not that Mr. so and so had been appointed but that General Tariq was Commander of the liberation forces, Mr. Doon Campbell, a British correspondent, sought and was granted an interview in an improvised hut somewhere on the Muzaffarabad Chinari Road. Akbar had disguised himself as a tribal Malik but as soon as he spoke a few sentences, Campbell was quick to ask: "But you have a Sandhurst accent".[1]

The principal function of the Headquarter was:

(i) Controlling the tribal lashkars which may have moved into the settled districts and to allocate them to the front line according to the needs of the moment;

(ii) The maintenance of these lashkars during their deployment and their dispersal after they left the front, which in most cases they did at will;

(iii) Securing whatever rifles or other light weapons it could from the army arsenals and passing them on to Mr. M.Z. Kiani's Gujrat H.Q. and to the tribal lashkars;

(iv) Collecting intelligence from different Sectors;

(v) Issue communiques about the fighting situation.

When the Pakistan army entered Kashmir in some strength, Tariq H.Q. also acted as an agency to bring about co-ordination between the Pakistani units and the Azad Kashmir Regular Forces. It must,

1. Interview with Nasim Akbar Khan.

however, be made clear that despite the admirable and arduous work that this H.Q. performed, it was not in a position to influence policy or to employ Pakistani army units and military resources in Kashmir at will. Nor was it in a position to direct, independently, the Pakistan army Divisional Commanders, whose troops were later engaged in fighting or the C-in-C of the Pakistan army who was an Englishman.

As the fighting continued and its intensity increased, more and more civil resources got mobilized in the rear and need was felt to channel the help received on the civil side, including that from the Government, through a Committee known as the Liberation Committee headed by Justice Din Muhammad. The Committee did some useful work. It also tried to 'regularize' things without having adequate resources and while this gave the Azad Kashmir Government an opportunity to fight its battles within this Committee rather than with C-in-C AKRF, yet there was no substantial help or assistance which the Liberation Committee could give to the fighting forces. One significant thing that it did was to fix its own rates of pay for the Azad Kashmir Regular Forces which were lower than those previously fixed by the Azad Kashmir Government. According to Mr. Kiani:

> "It wanted to know so many things which were materially of no importance to the fighting, and it particularly wanted to know why the number of fighting forces was not maintained at a particular low level etc. etc. On the whole, the Liberation Committee appeared to be claiming all the assets that may have accumulated in the course of fighting but were not prepared to accept the liabilities."

Khawaja Abdur Rahim, who was then Commissioner for Evacuation of Refugees, was appointed Commissioner Rawalpindi so that with his jurisdiction over the three districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat lying on the borders of Kashmir, the problem of getting assistance in accommodation, transport and rations could be facilitated. Says Mr. Kiani:

> "Khawaja Abdur Rahim did magnificent work, and besides other things, at later stages also helped in providing some firearms which were obtained either from the army or on payment from the tribal belt. The only trouble with him was that, with his zest and enthusiasm as well as his official position as the Commissioner of a Division, he tried to assume the role of a generalissimo, for which, of course, because of the lack of any training of a military nature , he was neither qualified nor suited."

## WE REMEMBER THE TRIBESMEN WITH GRATITUDE

We have two versions, both by professional soldiers, dwelling upon the failure of the tribesmen to fulfil their mission in Kashmir. General Akbar, a sympathizer, has elaborately discussed the topic and this is what he says:

"In their own country, the tribesmen fought as snipers and raiders. There they could go on endlessly harassing troops by their deadly sniping. They could pursue and cut off rear-guards. They were masters in the art of ambushing troops and transport. They could also attack isolated posts. But there were two things they usually did not do. They did not like to attack troops in defensive positions and they did not like to sit in defensive positions to be attacked by troops.

This was natural enough because in both these instances, troops had superiority of organisation, discipline and heavy weapons. Attacking entrenched troops or defending a particular place against an organised attack by troops, both involve prolonged and heavy fighting. The army can undertake these because its administrative organisation is designed to replenish ammunition, evacuate casualties and supply rations during the course of the fighting. Further, because of good means of inter-communication like the wireless, field telephones, signalling flags and messengers, the army command can control and direct its troops over any length of time and distance. And troops also have the advantage of possessing artillery and aircraft.

Thus, while it suits regular troops to get the tribesmen into battles of this kind, this is some thing which the tribesman tries to avoid like poison. Instead he looks for those conditions where he can exercise his own peculiar superiority. To begin with, since he is not tied by any central organisation, he fights where and when he likes—and he is free to disappear immediately from the scene when he wants to. The troops cannot do this because they are tied by complicated higher orders and plans. Thus, the superiority of the tribesman lies in his freedom and mobility. He is able to appear at the most unexpected times and places—and this unpredictability makes him a constant menace.

Further, he has only a rifle and a knife to carry, and because he is physically tougher, he can move very much longer and faster than any troops. Therefore, he roams around and patiently watches until he finds a suitable target and then pounces upon it with

lightening speed. One Mahsud tribesman aptly described to me their tactics as being like that of the hawk. The hawk flies high in the sky, out of danger; he flies round and round until he sees his prey and then swoops down on it for one mighty strike and when he has got his prey, he does not wait around, he flies off at once to some far off quiet place where he can enjoy what he has got. The tribesman is indeed very similar—he must have mobility, he must have the freedom to choose his own time and target, and he must have security to return to. This is why he is not willing to accept long drawn out actions which tie him down. And clearly, the task that awaited him around Srinagar was just such an action, now that regular Indian troops were arriving.

In his fight against troops, he also has to protect himself from artillery and aircraft. This he does by fighting only in broken and hilly country, which provide cover. Another point that he gains by sticking to the hills is that there the army cannot use its motor vehicles, and the troops have to move on foot which places them at a disadvantage so far as speed and endurance are concerned. Thus, in this respect too the action around Srinagar had begun to appear unattractive to the tribesmen because from Baramula onwards, the country is open plain on both sides of the road.

In their own country, the tribesmen dealt with an advancing column by sniping its head and flanks. More often they did not attack it in strength but worked more like bees, leaving their stings and flying off again. Although they would not succeed in stopping a really strong column, they often succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties and imposing great delay. If the advancing column was weak, they sometimes succeeded in bringing it to a standstill or even forcing it to retreat. They did this by keeping up their sniping, harassing and raiding activities for days and days until the column got worn down or cut off from its supplies and reinforcements. In their own country they could do this because there they were able, all the time, to scatter away into the hills where their own people provided them with shelter, food, ammunition and medical care for the wounded.

These conditions did not exist in Kashmir. Here the tribesmen were in foreign country where the people of the valley were not yet up in arms, and did not have the means, nor the habit, to provide such assistance. In consequence, for all their needs the tribesmen were dependent on the road, from which they could not stray very far and Protection of which was essential to them."[1]

1. Akbar, P. 51 to 53 and 55.

On the other extreme, giving his impressions, an enemy, General Sen, has stated:

> "In its selection of the tribesmen to consummate its plan, however, Pakistan made a blunder. The general impression about the fighting ability of the tribesmen from the west of the Durand Line is a fallacy. That he is tall and powerful in appearance is true, and his haughty air of independence, coupled with the rifle and dagger with which he is invariably armed, makes him appear formidable. In actual fact he is chicken-hearted. He will only attack troops who are careless and present him with an easy ambush from which he can escape unscathed. He will attack isolated bodies of men when the numerical odds are greatly in his favour, closing in when the garrison has expended its ammunition, and overpowering it by sheer weight of numbers. If there is the remotest chance of a reverse, he will break action and withdraw, and he is allergic to having his flanks threatened or turned. His worst trait, however, is unreliability.
>
> These characteristics of the tribesmen have been known for decades and are substantiated by numerous examples, the most important being that the British fought shy of enlisting the tribesmen into the regular Indian Army of the pre-partition era. They had been enlisted at one period, but their lack of soldierly qualities and their untrustworthiness, especially during World War I when they indulged in mutiny and murder, accelerated their disbandment. During World War II they were given another chance to prove themselves, but an Afridi unit raised as Infantry had to be relegated to the role of a Labour battalion and sent to Persia while the Mahsuds, enlisted and formed into a Rifle Company of the 4th Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles, behaved true to tradition when the unit was ordered overseas by deserting one night with its arms and ammunition. Recruitment of the tribals was, therefore, confined almost entirely to service in the Frontier Scouts, an irregular force located in their own tribal areas and utilized to keep their own people in check.
>
> In arming and equipping the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis and Mohmands, Pakistan scrapped in a matter of weeks what Britain had striven over a number of decades to prevent. In encouraging them to enter the territory to the east of the Durand Line, Pakistan nullified the very object of deploying three quarters of the pre-partition Army of India, composed of British and Indian troops, in frontier forests, to contain the tribesmen."[1]

1. Sen, p. 32.

It has been truly said that TRUTH is nobody's monopoly. Despite all said and done, the truth remains that the tribesmen as well as the INA personnel played a brilliant and historic role in the Kashmir liberation war. Muzaffarabad district owes it liberation to the tribesmen. Mirpur owes its freedom, largely to the INA-manned Gujrat HQ as well as the tribesmen from Dir State. Tehsil Bhimber also, owes its freedom to the Gujrat HQ. But for the pressure brought on the Indians in their rear at Beri Pattan, the Dogra army may not have withdrawn from tehsil Kotli. Besides, had not the tribesmen entered from the Muzaffarabad side and in a lightening action put the major part of the Dogra Army into disarray and immobilisation and shattered its age-old reputation as evidenced from what Sen has said about them, the Dogra pressure in Poonch district would have increased and this being the only district, largely, where armed resistance was forthcoming, the bulk of the Dogra Army could and would have been employed to put down resistance and in view of their superior equipment and regular supply, pitched as they were against men armed with darra-made rifles, that too were very sparse and with hardly 50 rounds of ammunition each, the odds were against the latter. We, therefore, remember them all with gratitude.

## WHOSE DECISION IT WAS?

Was the involvement of the tribesmen a personal decision of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and unauthorised by the Central Government? Both Mr. Akbar Khan and Mr. M. Z. Kiani have stated that it was not discussed in the September meeting at Lahore. Lord Birdwood who made a special study of the Kashmir dispute and toured the sub-continent for several months, has stated that the decision was taken in a high level meeting. It may be stated emphatically that it took place with the blessings of the Quaid-e-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. The tribal incursion took place in October 1947 and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan continued as Chief Minister not only till the death of the Quaid-e-Azam but until many years later. This is important because if the involvement had taken place without the consent of the Quaid-e-Azam, he could never have been continued in this post because of the vital political and military importance of such a drastic measure. My ten years experience of governmental activity, after watching its working from a very close quarter, has left no room for doubt that, to put it bluntly, in the provinces, even the leaves of trees do not move without the permission of the Central Government. I have no doubt, therefore, that a decision of such vital and far-reaching consequences, as to send thousands of unpredictable tribesmen through Pakistan territory to the Jammu and Kashmir State and to arrange for their arms, transport and supplies, could not have been taken by a provincial Chief Minister on his own. It

was a wise decision. But for it, there may have been no Azad Kashmir and no liberated territory in the Northern regions.

It seems, meetings between Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot, Chief Minister Punjab, used to be held at the Attock Rest House; that a part of the plan was a simultaneous thrust from Sialkot on Jammu, to cut off the enemy line of communication through Pathankote. It also seems that the responsibility for this thrust was entrusted to Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan.

Khan Abdul Qaiyum told me in an interview that one evening when, on summons from the Quaid-e-Azam, then staying at Lahore, he entered his room, he found that the light was dim and the Quaid-e-Azam was moving to and fro. He appeared very tired and weak. Pointing out that he was perhaps not feeling well, Khan Abdul Qaiyum begged permission to leave and come on any other day but the Quaid-e-Azam signalled a no and motioned him to come closer. When he approached the Quaid-e-Azam, the latter put his hand on his head, made him sit by his side and then after a pause, told him sadly:

> "My nation is now free but the experience of the last few months has shown that it is not yet ready for self-rule. The British have left a little early."[1]

There has also been some criticism about the involvement of the I.N.A. personnel. It is conveniently forgotten that the bulk of the Pakistan Army was out of Pakistan and whatever their strength might have been in the country, the Central Government, except for the Quaid-e-Azam, was so strongly opposed to its involvement in Kashmir that General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief, successfully managed non-compliance with the order of the Quaid-e-Azam to rush a battalion or two to Kashmir.

Unfortunately there is a general prejudice in the Army circles against the INA followers; sometimes and in some cases, it borders on contempt. It is true that they fought against an Army which trained them but it is also true that they were largely inspired by a noble desire to see their country free and motivated by the patriotic urge of fighting for its freedom. Subhash Chandra Bose, it must be conceded in fairness, was no Japanese agent. A patriot, rather than a politician, he collaborated with the Axis powers because it was the only source from where help was forthcoming. Freedom, afterall, is a Cause in which you may

1. Interview on 20-1-1978.

readily accept the assistance of even a devil. It is an irony that those who fought for British War objectives should raise their accusing fingers against those who shed their blood and sacrificed their careers in the Indian Army, for the sub-continent's freedom from British Imperialism.

What was the ultimate result of Pakistan's intervention? Apart from the fact that but for it, Muslims would have been massacred on a much wider scale, it was not without its other positive gains. The foremost gain was the liberation of approximately 4144 square miles of territory, now known as Azad Kashmir which has thrown back Pakistan's frontier with hostile India to scores of miles beyond its own border. Yet another positive gain which it is still too early to evaluate in its pregnant potentialities, is the liberation of nearly 29,814 square miles in the strategically vital Northern regions that has linked it directly with the People's Republic of China, and thus enabled it to influence the geo-political course of history in Asia. Among the short-range benefits was the peace and tranquillity that prevailed in the tribal area at a time when large sections of the Army were outside the country which also made it possible to withdraw our troops in bulk from these areas and utilise them in evacuating refugees from East Punjab and assisting in maintaining law and order inside the country. The policy of friendship and fraternity towards the tribesmen, initiated on the birth of Pakistan, needed time to take roots and justify itself; the Kashmir war of liberation provided a solid bridge to take out the tribesmen from their past attitude towards the civil areas to what it now is. Again, it checked the inflow of refugees from the State; but for the war and the prominent attention that happenings in Kashmir attracted all over the world, the Dogra-RSS-Akali axis would have certainly uprooted its entire Muslim population of 32 lakhs and pushed them into Pakistan as destitute refugees, bringing further pressure on the limited resources of this country.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## LIBERATION OF GILGIT

*CHAPTER XXVII*

# Liberation of Gilgit

The Northern region, comprising Gilgit, Punial, Nagar, Hunza, Chilas, Yasin, Gupus and Eshkoman, which had been leased to Britain in 1935 for 60 years, was handed back to the Maharaja's government on 1st August 1947. During the interval of 12 years while the lease subsisted, the territory was controlled by the Political department of the Government of India through the Governor of N.W.F.P. while the administrative control rested with the Frontier province. The N.W.F.P. having decided, in a Referendum, to join Pakistan, it was intriguing how despite the Lease subsisting, the territory was so surreptitiously handed over to the Maharaja. It seems that Pandit Ram Chandra Kak's abilities also had some thing to do with it because Maharani Tara Devi expressed the dynasty's abiding gratitude to him for its return.[1] The handing back took place in a function held in Gilgit on 1st August, with Major General H.L. Scott, Chief of the Staff and Brigadier Ghansara Singh, Governor designate, representing the State Government. A Dogra of about 55 years, Ghansara Singh was a distant relative of the Maharaja. People who came in contact with him in the region including his subordinates and captors have alike praised him for his simplicity, honesty, devotion to duty and kindheartedness. He was also acknowledged as an essentially brave man. Raja Noor Ali Khan from Bhimber who was then posted at Skardu, was appointed Wazir-e-Wazarat of the Agency and allowed a free hand in the setting up of the civil administration.

The 6th J & K Infantry battalion re-inforced by two Sikh companies, raised after April, was ordered to Boonji which was the principal cantonment in the region before 1935. The total strength of the Dogra army in the region did not exceed 1200, of whom 500 were Muslims; they could

1. Per Ch. Niaz Ahmed.

be expected to rally the support of the local population which was almost 100 % Muslim and pro-Pakistan. There was also a locally-raised para-military force known as Gilgit Scouts. It was a Levy, raised and officered by the British. At the time of partition, it was officered by Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, two Britishers from the Political Department. According to Mr. Bamzai, the two officers had opted for Pakistan but were retained by the Dogras, because of their experience and knowledge of the area and the men under their command. They had opted for Pakistan possibly because they thought that in accordance with the fundamentals of partition, the State was likely to accede to Pakistan. When Gilgit was handed over to Ghansara Singh, the two officers were confirmed in their posts but between them and the Levy were placed two officers from the State army, Lt. Sayeed and Lt. Ghulam Haider. Sayeed was a nephew of Col. Majid. The important Subedars in the battalion were Nadir Ali of C-Company, Muhammad Ali of D-Company, Subedar Major Bostan Khan, Subedar Ahmed Shah of the H.Q. Company and Subedar Shafi of the Admin: Company. Another Muslim officer was Captain Nek Alam from Mirpur who commanded the Admin: Company. Captain Mathieson headed the Scouts at Chillas.

One of the important men at Gilgit was Subedar-Major Babar of the Scouts. It was the highest active rank held by any Gilgiti in the Levy. He was the real uncle of the Mir of Nagar while Jemadar Shah Khan was the real uncle of the Mir of Hunza. During the British rule, Subedar-Major was the most important link between the OC and his Unit and for that reason, the job was always considered as one of prime importance.

As the Maharaja apprehended that the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar who commanded some influence in the area, may resist the transfer of the territories to the State government, he invited them to Srinagar as guests but prevented their return till completion of the transfer. On return to Gilgit, they sent him telegrams, demanding accession to Pakistan; these were repeated several times. Holding honorary ranks of Colonels in the Gilgit Scouts, they were personally thick with Brown and Mathieson who were frequent visitors to their houses. The transfer of the area was naturally disliked by local Muslims. While pro-Pakistan slogans were frequently shouted in the streets and painted on walls and buildings, the Scouts at Gilgit and Chillas were feeling uneasy.

## THE SCOUT VCOs PLAN A REVOLT

The arrival of a battalion of the State forces in Boonji alarmed the rank and file of the Scouts and as happens, wild rumours about the disbanding of the latter or at least their down-grading, got into circulation. It is

claimed that the VCOs, led by Babar, represented the matter to Ghansara Singh as well as Major General Scott who told them that they could not be placed at par with the State Army's JCOs. Rightly or wrongly, they took it as an injustice. It was quite natural that the creation of Pakistan and the genocide of Muslims in India had its own impact and the feeling gradually surfaced up that the salvation lay in taking up arms for the vindication of their rights and accession to Pakistan. Consequently, after cautious mutual soundings, the following VCOs met in their first decisive meeting towards the end of September 1947 and decided to stage a revolt, the moment Maharaja acceded to India:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Subedar Major Babar | ... | (Nagar). |
| 2. | Subedar Safiullah Beg | ... | (Hunza) Education JCO. |
| 3. | Jemadar Fida Ali | .. | (Hunza) Quarter Master JCO. |
| 4. | Jemadar Sultan Firoze Soofi | ... | Platoon Commander. |
| 5. | Jemadar Shah Sultan. | ... | „ |
| 6. | Jemadar Shah Khan | ... | Jemadar Adjutant. |

Two VCOs refused to join the movement, expressing inability to fight the Government. Sepoy Jehandad Khan of the Scouts was then sent to Abbottabad to post letters to the Quaid-e-Azam, the Prime Minister, Khan Abdul Qaiyum and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, requesting for help. The letters were in the hand of Shah Rais Khan and it took Jehandad two weeks to cover the long distance on foot via Babusar pass. There was no response.[1]

Major Brown told the Governor to advise the Maharaja to respect the will of the people and accede to Pakistan. This enraged the Dogra Brigadier and it seems that relations between them started deteriorating. Ghansara Singh then arranged a public demonstration of fire-power, employing all types of available weapons from Boonji cantonment. It did frighten a section of people as well as some leaders of the underground movement but as the stake involved was nothing short of survival, the hard-core, led by Babar, decided to continue with their plans. From the circumstantial evidence available, it may be assumed that the two

1. Major Sikandar Khan, p. 28/30.

British officers, even if not actively sympathetic, were not hostile to the aims of their subordinates. It is also very likely, as claimed by Captain Hassan, that he was in contact with Babar and his comrades and that there was some co-ordination between them though it does not really appear to be anything more than a meeting of minds. Captain Hassan had distinguished himself on the Burma front where he received the distinguished British gallantry award, the Military Cross. Hassan, it may be recalled, was a descendant of one of those Muslim officers who, having accompanied Gulab Singh's dare-devil commander Zorawar Singh in his subjugation of the Northern regions, had settled there. Strange are the ways of fate. While an ancestor had helped in the subjugation of the territory for Hindus, a descendant was now working for its liberation from the same hands.

Captain Hassan could not have commanded much appeal with the Scouts, partly because of being almost a stranger, on account of his education and service outside Gilgit and partly because of mutual mistrust, almost bordering on hatred that governed relations between the British-paid-*cum* officered Scouts and the Dogra Army. Therefore, there is no doubt that but for the initiative and dedication of Babar, the political history of the Northern region may have been altogether different. It was only in the fitness of things that on his death in 1972, he was officially given a hero's burial and a sum of rupees fifty thousand was awarded to his dependents by the Bhutto Government.

## DOGRA GOVERNOR ARRESTED

On 31st October, Ghansara Singh, getting wind of the underground movement, ordered Colonel Majid to send a company to Gilgit immediately. Whether he did it deliberately or otherwise, Col. Majid despatched a Muslim company under Captain Hassan which left on the same day at 4 p.m. It would have taken them sometime to reach Gilgit as there was no vehicular road and the distance of 34 mountainous miles had to be covered on foot. The VCOs, unaware that the incoming Company was Muslim, and apprehensive that Dogras may be on their way, decided to strike at once. In a hurriedly called meeting which started at 6 p.m., Zero hour was fixed at 10 p.m. The meeting also decided to request Major Brown to join them. 2nd Lt. Ghulam Haider was, thereupon, sent to the Major who gave his whole-hearted support. He accompanied Haider to the VCO's mess where other members were waiting for the outcome of their message; he reviewed the plan for action prepared by the VCOs and approved it. Lt. Haider then surrounded the residence of Brigadier Ghansara Singh who refused to surrender. There came a volley of bullets from inside, killing one sepoy of the Gilgit Scouts and one

non-Muslim. Telephone link with Boonji was cut off and the wireless station as well as post and telegraph offices were occupied. By morning, thousands of Muslims had gathered around the Governor's house with whatever arms they could lay their hands on. The Scouts assured the Governor of protection whereupon he surrendered himself. Consequently, when the sun rose on 1st November, 1947, Gilgit town had been liberated. The Dogra flag was lowered from the Agency House and Subedar Major Muhammad Babar Khan hoisted the Pakistan flag.

The happenings at Gilgit remained unknown at Boonji. On 2nd November, Hassan and Jemadar Shah Khan left for Boonji. On 3rd November, a wireless message was sent to the Dogra garrison, in the name of the Governor, to surrender but they refused to obey unless a written order was received from him. Major Brown sent a wireless message to Captain Mathieson at Chilas to move at once with three platoons of the Scouts and capture the following features:—

1. Jaglot village and its ferry service.

2. Ramghat bridge on the Astore-Boonji road.

3. Pratap bridge on the Boonji Gilgit road.

Major Brown then called a conference which was attended by men from the Gilgit Scouts, 6th Kashmir Infantry and civilian representatives. The Muslims unanimously decided to accede to Pakistan, declare war against the Indo—Dogra axis and set up a provisional Government with a former Subedar, Shah Rais Khan, as President. The following morning, the Pakistan flag was ceremoniously raised on the tower of the Scout lines amid great rejoicing. The ceremony was followed by prayers, dancing and feasting. The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar sent messages of support. So did the Governors of Kuh, Gizar and Yasin. The son of the Raja of Punial arrived with an Instrument of accession to Pakistan signed by his father. On the evening of 6th November when Brown and Mathieson returned to Gilgit after an extensive reconnaissance of the Thalachi region, they were given a triumphal but deserved welcome.[1]

Major Brown later told Raja Noor Ali Khan that he had expected Ghansara Singh to commit suicide or suffer a heart failure but that he had boldly faced a rebellious force of such strength, single-handedly, which showed that he was essentially a brave man. Ghansara Singh did not have permission to move out of the premises of his bungalow, but his two

1. London Times, quoted by Imrani, p. 168.

orderlies had all the freedom, could go anywhere in the town, purchase anything and cook and serve any dish of their master's liking. Before leaving his official residence, Ghansara Singh asked his captors what they intended to do with the prisoners and requested that if the policy was to repatriate them to Jammu, the first batch should consist of men with families while he would personally prefer to be sent last of all. He also requested that they be given some cash to enable them to reach their destination and undertook, personally, to refund the amount, after reaching Jammu. The Brigadier was treated with great respect. Sometime later he was transferred to the Attock fort alongwith two thousand or so Indian prisoners. They were later exchanged through the International Red Cross.

## BRITISH OFFICERS' ROLE

Meanwhile, a grand celebration marked the formation of the Provisional Government. A procession was taken out and there was illumination at night. Brown and Mathieson also participated in the festivities. Indian writers have understandably played down the role of the Scouts and the rebellious Muslim wing of the State army in the revolt and tried to suppress the whole-hearted support it received from local Muslims because of their anxiety to conceal the truth that the State Muslims were opposed to the State's accession to India. They have, therefore, highly exaggerated the role of the two English officers and attempted to make the world believe that it were they who manipulated it. Col. Hassan, on the other hand, emphatically claims that they had no hand, whatsoever, in the revolt. He claims, on the contrary, that they were hand-in-glove with the Dogra Government and neither knew anything about the underground movement nor lent their support at any stage. After considering the independent testimony of men like Raja Noor Ali, and some residents of Gilgit and after taking into consideration the accounts then published in the foreign press, I have come to the conclusion that Brown and Mathieson were not hostile to the idea and may have even used their influence with the Levy in support of the revolt. It is impossible to believe that two intelligent English Officers of the Political department who had been in Gilgit for several years, could have not known that the men under their command, were preparing to stage a revolt. If among the 500 men in the State army and even in the company of Captain Hassan, there were Muslims, who refused to fall in line, it is hard to believe that not even a single individual among the 500 Scouts would have informed either of the two British officers of what was happening. All Britishers, it must be said in all fairness to the race, were not pro-Hindu like Mr. Attlee, Jenkins or Mountbatten. There were also pro-Pakistan men like Sir Francis Mudie. The Political department had a large number of

British officers and having lived for a long time in the sub-continent, most of them had developed their own likings or dislikings about Congress and Muslim League. Brown and Mathieson may have, through experience and personal contact, developed hostility towards Congress and it gets support from the fact that both had first opted for Pakistan. Afterall, a British Officer, Major Sloan, gave his life for the Kashmir Cause on the Teetwal Sector. Another Britisher, Lt. Col. Harvey Kelly rendered valuable service on the Chakothi front during India's summer offensive.

Credit must also go to Colonel Majid CO Boonji who knew of the underground movement but neither took any steps himself to forestall a revolt nor informed his Dogra superiors about it. It was a Hindu—Muslim question in which he could have hardly remained uninvolved.

The first Pakistani political Agent, Sardar Muhammad Alam Khan who landed on 16th November in a Harvard, was welcomed by thousands of cheering people. He sent down Brown to Pakistan where he met Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and apprised him of the situation. He returned with orders to raise the strength of the Scouts to two thousand and grant special commission to Babar Khan and Shah Khan for their admirable role. They were commissioned in a special Durbar. On the appointment of Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, MC. as Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts in place of Major Brown, the two British Officers were given a very warm send off not only by the Scouts but by all sections of people. Major Sikandar Khan who spent a year in the region and has written, what seems to me, an impartial account of the liberation of the area, says of the two officers:

> "It is frankly admitted that Pakistan owes thanks to Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, particularly the former one who steered this movement to success at a very critical time. Their services need to be acknowledged with respect and gratitude."[1]

## BAKHTAWAR SHAH THE FUGITIVE

Telephone and telegraph wires between Boonji and Gilgit were cut off as a precautionary measure after Colonel Majid and Major Ehsan were given a false telephonic message, on behalf of the Governor, to reach Gilgit. They were arrested at Pari Bangla, midway between Gilgit and Boonji, by Hassan's men. At Chilas, Captain Mathieson, seems to have realised that the best way to prevent bloodshed was to

1. The Liberation of Northern Areas, p. 38.

abide by the will of the people. Consequently, the Dogra flag was removed and the Pakistan flag was hoisted on the fort. Non-Muslims were deposited in the fort to protect them from any likely violence and messages were sent to Darel and Tangir to remain calm. A group of Scouts was sent to hold the vital Pratap bridge on the mighty Indus and to occupy Juglote. On 3rd November, the Scouts burnt down the bridge when they saw a large body of Sikhs coming from Boonji towards Gilgit. On the same day, there was a bloody encounter at Juglote with Sikh elements of the Dogra army; the Sikhs were defeated. Subedar Sant Singh and his two platoons were almost completely wiped out.[1] Hassan then moved to Boonji and while mutual firing was still going on, the Scouts burnt down the Ram Ghat bridge. The non-Muslim members of the garrison, in the absence of their commander and about half their colleagues having deserted, seem to have thought it prudent to run away, but as the bridge on the Astore river had been already destroyed, they had to move eastwards. The Shaitan Nullah bridge, four miles from Boonji towards Srinagar, was burnt by Lt. Muhammad Khan and his men.[2]

The Northern region then had a fugitive from Justice, Bakhtawar Shah, who is alleged to have been responsible for six murders and a number of dacoities. One day towards the end of November, accompanied by his brother Ghulam Nabi, he surrendered to Hassan and promised to abide by law if forgiven for his past misdeeds. The request granted, he asked for any service and when told that a Sikh platoon had fled away from Boonji and gone towards what is known as the Valley of Defiles, he undertook to subdue them with his own men provided he was given two rifles and some ammunition. He engaged them when they were crossing the rope bridge at Rondu, killed a few and wounded four of them; the platoon surrendered. Single-handed, he removed bolts from their rifles and breech-blocks from their machine-guns which he collected and carried in his own haversack and brought the captives, one Jemadar and 21 men, back to Boonji. He was presented a rifle as a reward for this act of singular gallantry and initiative.[3]

On 16th November, 1947, the Pakistan government in response to urgent appeals from Shah Rais Khan, Babar, Hassan and others who counted then sent Sardar Muhammad Alam Khan as Political Agent to administer the area. The immediate cause of the appeal was the lack of funds, civil and military supplies and possibly, wild rumours that the Indian Army columns were advancing. Raja Noor Ali Khan, Wazir-e-Wazarat Gilgit at the time of revolt, has told this writer that the treasury had

1. Fateh-i-Kashmir, p. 261.
2. The Kashmir Campaign, p. 7.
3. *Ibid* p. 7.

over twenty lakhs of rupees. Where did this money go? Did it find its way to homes, and banks in Pakistan?

## THE BATTLE FOR BALTISTAN

Captain Hassan on return to Bunji sent Lt. Muhammad Khan to Astore and a Scout platoon under Subedar Murtaza across Burzil Pass to Guraiz on Kishanganga river. The treasury and the ration dumps at Astore were captured in tact. 350 Dogra soldiers including three officers who had escaped from Bunji were captured in these operations.[1]

Major Muhammad Aslam Khan whom we have noticed in the Valley, was sent to Gilgit in late November 1947 as Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. With the assistance of Hassan, Ehsan, Babar and others he raised a three-column force; the Tiger wing with Hassan as Commander, the Eskimo wing, consisting mainly of Hunza people commanded by Jemadar Shah Khan of Hunza who retired as a Wing Commandar of the P.A.F., and the Ibex force under the command of Major Ehsan Illahi from Nagar. It had two wings: 100 rifle men under Lt. Muhammad Khan at Bunji and 150 Scouts under Lt. Babar at Chilas. The Raja of Rondu, on his own, raised a force of about 300 men, armed them with local muzzle-loaders and took up position overlooking the Byicha gorge to check Dogra advance from Skardu. The Ibex column was sent to Haramosh, 25 miles east of Gilgit. It then moved to Tongas, covering a snow-decked distance of 100 miles in three days, an admirable feat of human endurance. Tufail Muhammad (later Major) who was to distinguish himself as the second recipient of Nishan-e-Haider, also belonged to these forces.

While the Dogras were preparing for the defence of Skardu and expecting relief from Srinagar, Naik Sher Ahmed escaped by boat and through a perilous journey reached Rondu to acquaint Major Ehsan of enemy dispositions. From Tongas, Major Ehsan came to Tsari which was held by two platoons, the Muslim platoon under Captain Nek Alam and the Dogra platoon under Captain Kishen Singh. The Muslim platoon was on the right bank of Indus. On 10th February, it gave up its position without a fight and joined hands with the liberators. Captain Kishen Singh, discovering his precarious position, took shelter in a cave. It was Bakhtawar Shah again who traced them to the cave; a hand to hand fight ensued in which Kishen Singh was killed. Meanwhile, a Dogra column under Captain Parbhat Singh arrived in Skardu after negotiating a difficult snow-decked road through Sonamarg. The first attack on Skardu was launched on February 12 which ended in a failure; one reason was the failure of Captain Nek

1. The Kashmir Campaign, p. 7.

Alam who was to secure the bridge-head, to appear; Naik Sher Ahmed Khan with seven local Baltis including Najaf Ali and Haji Muhammad Ali played a significant role. Sepoy Sultan Khan, Havildar Abdul Malik of Mirpur and four other soldiers were killed. Major Ehsan then withdrew to Komara, 15 miles from Skardu.

Skardu is 160 miles from Gilgit proper. It is surrounded by massive mountains such as Shinshat (18403 ft.) Marshaka La (16905 ft.), Banak La (16285 ft.), Bunji La (15800 ft.) etc. On 17th March 1948, a Dogra column comprising 350 men led by Brigadier Faqir Singh and accompanied by Col. Cootes of the Indian Army as Military Adviser, which was on way to Skardu to relieve the besieged Dogra garrison, was ambushed at Nurhbuchung, midway between Gol and Skardu. The ambush was planned and executed by Lt. Muhammad Khan. The Scouts led by Jemadar Amir Hayat captured 75000 rounds of .303 besides 2 or 3 mortars, M.M.Gs, rifles and stenguns and a lot of civil supplies. Out of a column of 350, about 150 were counted dead on the spot and only 75 were believed to have survived. A machine-gun which wrought havoc on the Enemy was brilliantly manned by Havildar Muhammad Nazir. The success of the ambush and its extent may well be judged from what the Indians have themselves admitted in their account of the fighting in Kashmir, contained in the book "DEFENDING KASHMIR":

> "Three hundred raiders ambushed the rear of this column eight miles north of Parkuta. The raiders hurled stones and rocks from hill tops. The commander of the relief column, Brigadier Faquir Singh, was wounded and the column scuttled. Our casualties in this attempt were 26 killed, seven missing believed killed, and 18 wounded. Ammunition and baggage were looted. The remainder of the column withdrew to Kargil, 70 miles south of Skardu. A third column was despatched for Skardu on April 8. The lead of the column reached Parkuta on May 8. Tolti was reached by the rest on May 11. But further advance was impossible owing to heavy opposition. The column was cut off by the enemy. Some 150 men returned cross country to Srinagar."[1]

In January, 1948 intelligence reached that an advance Indian supply column of 200 mules had entered Gurez. It may have been meant for onward despatch to Leh or Kargil. Indian army units were then stationed at Tragbal and Gurez. Subedar Ghulam Murtaza commanding Misghar fort who hailed from Hunza and was awarded Sitara-e-Jurrat for his excellent work as a guerilla leader inside Kashmir Valley during the 1965

1. Major Sikandar Khan, p. 72.

war, dashed to Gurez, covering almost 250 miles on foot or pony in intense cold, with the winter at its peak. He had to traverse many a passes as high as 16000 feet; these were not only decked with snow but even the normal tracks showing the progress of the path stood obliterated. This historic march, a feat of admirable human endurance and an inspiring example of Man's triumph over the handicaps of Nature, may, perhaps, rank among the classic military marches in the history of war. Ghulam Murtaza captured the entire supplies after killing the Indian protective guard.

In the first week of January liaison was established with Muslim elements inside the Skardu Fort. It was decided that State Muslim troops would lock the barracks occupied by Sikhs and Dogras, by 12 p.m, when the liberation force was to launch an attack. However, when the barracks were locked, many Sikh soldiers were not in and at the sametime, the Muslims could not be informed of the new situation. They launched an attack in accordance with the original plan which failed and several among them were slain. Havildar Muhammad Malik from Mirpur and ten sepoys belonging to the 6th J & K were killed in the fort.

In April, a Brigade strength of the enemy which left Kargil for Skardu, was engaged at Parkuta by Lt. Muhammad Khan. The battle raged from 14th April to 17th May. At one stage, the enemy occupied an important hill which was gallantly defended for 15 days by a platoon under Subedar Jan Alam. At the request of Lt. Muhammad Khan, Major Ehsan sent Subedar Dost Muhammad Khan and his platoon which climbed the Chorbat pass (16,700 ft.) and caught the enemy by surprise. On May 20, the Dogra soldiers who were cooking their meals leisurely in Kharmang were attacked; there was complete chaos. Col. Sampuran Singh escaped towards Leh while Lt. Col. Kirpal Singh, who was wounded, escaped with about 100 men in another direction. A number of Dogras were killed. As a part of the plan, Capt. Nek Alam had been ordered to proceed to Mareal to block the retreat but he was late and Col. Sampuran Singh and his men were able to make good their escape. The Ibex force then divided itself into three columns, each consisting of a platoon under a Havildar. One party went to Nubra; the second column went straight towards Leh and the third column was sent to Kargil.

## HASSAN KNOCKING AT BANDIPURA

Meanwhile, Major Aslam, Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts who was at Gilgit, realised the danger posed by the coming summer in the presence of the enemy in Kargil. He raised 2000 volunteers but could

arm only 700 of them. He chalked out a plan for the Gilgit Scouts to capture Kargil and strike at Zojila, if possible. The G.H.Q. chronicle has termed it as a desperate plan, bordering on fool-hardiness as it involved hundreds of miles of trekking by small groups in various directions across mountains covered with snow to an average depth of 15 feet. Accordingly, 600 men with a train of coolies came to Astore.

Hassan shifted his Headquarter to Chilas because of its warm climate. The freshly raised troops went through a vigorous training programme and in April 1948 he advanced as far as the out-skirts of Bandipura with a body of about 1500 troops. On reaching Gurez, some "villagers" invited him to a dinner but two Kashmiri-speaking teen-agers forced their entry into his room to inform him, in time, that the feast was a trap to disarm them and that Indian agents had already left for Bandipura with the news of his sudden arrival. They insisted to be enlisted in his force and proved reliable guides in the advance ahead. Hassan remembers even to this day, 25 years later, their courage, fearlessness and total dedication to the Cause of freedom and the invaluable assistance rendered by them.[1] Hassan, therefore, swiftly moved to Tragbal which is the last frontier post in the northern regions on way to Srinagar. A strong Indian detachment was no doubt at the post but it was easily overcome and Tragbal was liberated. The importance of the capture of this place lay not only in the fact that it cut off the conventional land route between Srinagar and Gilgit but also in the more important fact that for the first time Indian advance positions at Uri and Teetwal were threatened from the rear. The difficulty however was that the liberators' supply line apart from being very lengthy, was very difficult and without any vehicular link. Hassan's force was, unbelievably, able to set up its advance post at Baba Shukar Din's hillock, a place of pilgrimage, situate a few miles from Bandipura on the motorable road leading to Sopore, and Sundarwan forests in the rear of the Dak Bungalow at Bandipura. The idea was to set up a base at Tragbal and launch a pincer movement towards Srinagar. As the force at his disposal was insufficient for such an attack, G.H.Q. (Azad) was requested for reinforcements of at least 2000 men. By the middle of June, a force of 2000 tribesmen including a few companies of the Frontier Rifles did appear at Tragbal via Muzaffarabad but in the meantime, Indians had not been sitting idle. They had assembled a huge force in and around Bandipura; these preparations could be easily detected from the forward postions held by the liberators. Among the officers who had been sent to Tragbal was Lt. Anwar of the Frontier Rifles, a brother of Major Aslam. According to Hassan a dispute arose as to whether the new force was or was not to act under his over-all command.

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1. As told to this writer in August, 1972.

On reference to the G.H.Q. (Azad) at Rawalpindi, Hassan claims to have been recalled and told that a man from the State Army could not command forces from Pakistan! He was offered a commission in the Pakistan Army and within a week given the rank of a Major.

The Eskimo force at Chilam started for Kargil on 1st May under 2/ Lieut. Shah Khan. For the next three days and nights, it kept moving through snow deserts of Deosal without any cover as even trees and bushes stood buried under snow. The altitude was 14000 to 16000 ft. and the temperature many degrees below zero. On the second day there was a terrible snow-storm and for hours men sat back to back to keep themselves from freezing. Many a porter and soldier were without boots and had wrapped their legs and feet with sacking. Naturally a number of them suffered from frost-bite and snow-blindness. After three days and nights when they reached Gultari, after having covered a distance of 60 miles, the force had suffered 4 deaths and 60 cases of frost-bite. The attack on Dras was led by a company under Subedar Sher Ali on the night between 9th and 10th May but the enemy could not be dislodged upto 6th June. A platoon under Subedar Safi Ullah Beg captured the bridge at Hardus and another platoon, the bridge at Chaliskamboo in surprise dawn attacks. A polo match was being played in Kargil which was being watched by the entire Dogra force. About 30 of the enemy were killed and about 20 were taken prisoner. Others ran towards Suru. This is how Kargil was liberated. One platoon of Scouts was sent to Suru; another one to Lamayuru on the road from Leh to Kargil and another company under Lt. Babar was sent to Leh. The remainder of the force proceeded towards Zojila.

## SKARDU LIBERATED

Meanwhile India began its Summer offensive in all sectors. The Leh airfield had been enlarged and a military build-up was going on. They had also started building a road to Zojila from Sonamarg and sent two infantry battalions with artillery support to Zojila. On this side, efforts were made to open up Babusar pass in order to establish a direct link with the Gilgit sector and airfields at Chilas and Gilgit had been enlarged to take Dakota type air-craft. Volunteers from Chitral, Swat, Yasin and other places were joining the Scouts. About 400 Chitrali Scouts with a section of 3.7 Howitzers were sent to Skardu to take over the siege. A Balti Militia of about 600 men was raised and armed with small arms. Meanwhile, by 16th July 1948, Lt. Babar had established his Headquarter at Nimu, after having beaten the enemy at Nurla, Himis and Nimu. India rushed reinforcements to Leh via Kulu and Lahul from East Punjab and also kept up supplies from the air. Lt.

Babar stayed at Nimu until November 18 when he had to withdraw because of the success of the Indian offensive. In the meantime, Leh could not be attacked as the force under him was very small.

The Chitral Scouts were commanded by Prince Mata-ul-Mulk. He sent a letter to Col. Thapa to surrender but the Colonel refused to yield and instead secured vital information from the messenger about the disposition of Scouts, which enabled him to inflict some casualties by accurate firing. A company of Gilgit scouts which came for assistance had two 3.7" guns which, for the first time, harassed the Dogra soldiers inside the fort. At the same time, the cloudy weather which persisted for sometime, prevented the Indian Air Force from dropping supplies. Col. Thapa, a brave and valiant soldier, sent about 200 soldiers out of Skardu and with the remaining 250 soldiers surrendered on 14th August 1948 after raising a white flag on the fort. The soldiers who had earlier escaped, were ultimately arrested. The G.H.Q. chronicle says about Colonel Thapa:

> "Col. Thapa and his men had put up an extremely brave fight for over a period of six months. The Indians had tried their utmost to relieve him and he surrendered when there was no hope of succour. In all fairness to him, it was admitted by the people of Skardu that Col. Thapa did not resort to barbarity against the local Muslims which had been the chief characteristic of the Dogras and Indians in their areas of operation."[1]

Captain Ganga Singh of the 6th J & K was allegedly shot dead later by Mataul Mulk who was arrested soon afterwards on a charge of murder and detained in Peshawar jail for two to three years. It seems that the charge could not be proved. Col. Thapa deserves praise for his qualities of leadership.

Meanwhile, another column of about 400 men consisting of a mixture of Marwats, Mianwalis and Mohmand volunteers and known as Khayam Lashkar crossed 200 miles through Kaghan, Babusar pass, Chilas, Boonji and Astore and captured Folowai. Later it captured Bagtor. A successful ambush was laid by Jemadar Islam Shah against an enemy section approaching Bagtor. In early June 1948 India launched a massive attack on Tragbal which was held by a detachment of the Frontier Constabulary. Indians had the advantage of an easy and handy supply line, apart from being much better armed and equipped. The Muslim force was uprooted by the terrific Indian ground fire and incessant bombing from the air. It had to abandon not only Tragbal but also Gurez. When the news of the debacle reached Rawalpindi, Brigadier Sher Khan (then General Tariq)

1. Kashmir Campaign, p. 30.

immediately sent for Major Hassan, and, after giving him the distressing news, ordered him to fly back. He was immediately flown to Gilgit in a helicopter. Tariq was personally at hand to see him off.

By the time Hassan returned to Boonji, the area, south of Burzil pass including Gurez and Tragbal had already passed into Indian hands. With the re-appearance of Hassan, a large number of volunteers and Scouts who had deserted because of being disheartened either by the change of their Commander or the advance of Indian troops, rallied back and within a short time a sizable force was again on its feet. It was augmented by two thousand Chitral Scouts commanded by their prince Col. Burhan-ud-Din of the I. N. A. and a regiment of Frontier Constabulary under Major Qureshi.

Burhan-ud-Din's force was miserably ill-equipped. A few had darra-made rifles but most of them carried primitive weapons like bows, arrows and axes. They were equally ill-clad, without shoes or beddings; yet their spirits were very high. Together with the Frontier Constabulary, they were sent to the Kishanganga Valley to capture Kail, Kanzalwan and Taubot. They succeeded in the capture of the first two posts but at Taubot, unable to face heavy gun fire, they hastily withdrew as far as Astore, leaving the entire Kishanganga valley to the enemy. The interesting part of the story is that Indians had also withdrawn in confusion beyond Kanzalwan. Both seemed to be labouring under some mistake, each thinking that the adversary was advancing. A few days later, in the first week of August, a patrol commanded by Havildar Najibullah, comprising a platoon strength, reported that the entire Valley lay vacant and that the only enemy presence they had encountered was a patrol party which had been put to flight after an exchange of fire. Chitral Scouts were therefore sent back to the Valley. They were reinforced by a company of regular troops under Subedar Akbar Hussain. The Frontier Constabulary, however, refused to go back to the area and was, therefore, disarmed and sent home.

Towards the end of August, Indians attacked the Durmat post at night. It was probably the 8th of August. The post was manned by only one platoon commanded by Jemadar Khush Lilli of Punial. It was three miles away from Qamri where Hassan had set up his Headquarter. On receipt of a wireless message, Hassan hurried with a few pieces of machine-guns, arriving there at dawn. The post was still being held by the platoon, magnificently, despite heavy odds. With reinforcements at hand, a hand to hand fight ensued, resulting in the defeat of the Indians who lost 25 men. Indians then attacked Dudhghai and Hub-i-Khatoon but as Muslims were holding the surrounding heights and had also prior infor-

mation, the attacks failed. These battles were fought and won within a short span of two weeks or so. The Durmat post is situate on a hill about 10,000 ft. high and its possession is considered necessary for the control of the Tilail valley in the Western fringe of the Zojila pass. Muslim losses were 25 killed and about 50 wounded. Their names stand inscribed on the Freedom Minar later erected at Gilgit and financed by the late Agha Khan. The Indian losses were heavier. Some of them were taken prisoner.

## INDIANS REOCCUPY ZOJILA

The Zojila pass provides a direct link between the district of Ladakh and Kashmir valley via Sonamarg. After the liberation of Kargil and Dras, Major Ehsan decided to capture the vital pass. Lt. Muhammad Khan was put in charge of the combined force consisting of A & B wings of the Gilgit Scouts. The Indians had already rushed a battalion of the Patiala State force to the pass which is about 11,578 ft. above sea level. On June 12, Captain Muhammad Khan led the attack on two forward Indian companies at Khoru and Gumri but due to heavy Indian firing, no progress was possible. Lt. Shah Khan detailed Subedar Rustam Khan with a platoon to eliminate a vital picquet. The party climbed the hill above the enemy trenches and took up a position within 50 yards of the picquet during the night of June 20-21. They remained hidden during the whole day and on June 21 put in a surprise dawn attack. In a hand-to-hand fight, the enemy platoon was forced to withdraw after suffering casualties. Many other picquets were also captured. The Patiala force, realising that its rear was threatened, withdrew in disorder. Zojila was captured on the 7th of July. In early July Col. M.G. Jilani relieved Major Muhammad Aslam Khan as Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. The Commandant was in over-all charge of military operations in the Northern areas.

Two Indian attempts to re-capture Zojila were frustrated. A strong platoon under Subedar Ismail sent from Dras, intercepted a Gurkha battalion in the vicinity of Dras and compelled it to withdraw after inflicting some casualties. The first attempt was made on 6th September under Brigadier Atal. Lt. Muhammad Khan was ready to receive the thrust; the Indians were not able to capture even the outlying bunkers and trenches. A platoon of Yasin Scouts under Subedar Sher Ali played a prominent role in its defence. However, the pressure continued and the second attack came on 14th September. It is claimed that Generals Thimayya and Shrinagesh were personally present. The attack claimed to have been made with a two battalion strength, failed to make any headway. The winter had now begun to set in. The Indians

began widening the road to be able to bring heavy armament and, at the same time, started building huts to create an impression that they intended to camp for the winter and had no plans for a further attack. Lt. Muhammad Khan and Major Ehsan who had successfully led the ill-equipped volunteers against a professional army, proceeded on leave to the plains to be with their families after a long time. The remnants of the State Army also returned to the plains. Major Qureshi took over the command on the Zojila sector and Lt. Col. Ismail on the Leh sector. The strength of Major Qureshi's force was approximately 800 men which was spread over a vast area.

After constructing the road, the Indians brought a squadron of Stuart tanks, covered with shrouds, right upto their camp. Col. Jilani who was in Leh sector, was told that a motorable road to Zojila was being built and that they may be intending to push up heavier artillery and even tanks but he refused to believe that tanks could be brought forward to operate at these heights and in that terrain. Major Qureshi is stated to have given him the impression that the enemy had withdrawn from Zojila front for the winter. He requested and was allowed a thinning out of his troops to escape the bitter cold.[1] Jilani then directed his attention to the Leh sector where he made no headway and whence he ultimately withdrew while the Indians mounted an attack on Zojila on 1st November 1948. It was held by 4 depleted platoons. Hearing of the attack, Major Qureshi who was at Dras, sent a company to stop its advance on Batkundi ridge which rises above Pindras to the west. Meanwhile, Indians succeeded in extending the road over Zojila by continuously working for 8 days and nights and thus brought the tanks forward. After several reverses here and there, they captured Dras on 17th November after it was evacuated by Major Qureshi. Kargil was also evacuated and the Indians advanced towards Marol. The Leh column had also pulled back to Marol area and Col. Jilani established a defence line about 10 miles east and south of Indus and Suru rivers' junction which forms the cease-fire line on that front. The G.H.Q. chronicle says about these operations:

> "The battle of Zojila was one of the most brilliant operations of the Kashmir campaign. A small force of about two companies' strength of irregular Militia, armed with nothing but their personal weapons, had withstood repeated attacks by some of the best units of the Indian Army for nearly two months and inflicted nearly 1000 casualties on the enemy. It had withdrawn only when the enemy had amassed against it two infantry brigades, tanks and

1. Kashmir Campaign, p. 36

artillery, backed by an absolute air supremacy. The enemy had taken four months to cover a distance of 50 miles from Zojila to Kargil."[1]

## THE PAF ROLE

The most difficult problem in the operation of the liberation elements in the vast Northern areas was one of supply as there was no motorable road linking it either with Pakistan or Azad Kashmir. There was also no air support, whatsoever. At the time of partition, Pakistan had 21 Tempests, 16 Harvards, 1 Tiger Moth and 5 Austers which were operationally fit. 7 Tiger Moths ferried from Judhpur in India in September which had to force land, were found to contain sugar and sand in their petrol tanks. There were only two old Dakota air-craft which were made operationally fit after great efforts. The Dakota aircraft couldn't normally rise beyond 10000' above sea level while many a mountain between Rawalpindi and the region are above 17000 ft. However, a supply mission had to be undertaken. An office was, therefore, set up in Risalpur under a Havildar. Wing Commander M. Asghar Khan, a younger brother of Major Muhammad Aslam Khan, then Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts who was Commandant of the P.A.F. College Risalpur, started the training of the air crew of the two Dakotas in air dropping. The operation which commenced a few days later, lasted until the cease-fire. Ground wireless stations were set up in Gilgit, Bunji, Chilas and Skardu for weather information and warning about the presence of Indian fighter aircraft in the area. The first sortie was led by Flying Officer "Polly" Shah. On 4th November 1948, two Indian Tempests attacked a Dakota, returning after a para drop of supplies near Skardu, flown by Captain Mukhtar Ahmad Dogar with undertraining crew Navigator Jagjivan, Pilot Officer Munir, Air-signaller Mohsin and Air Supply Ejection Crew detachment under Naik Muhammad Din. Captain Dogar skilfully escaped their attacks but Naik Muhammad Din was killed and Jagjivan seriously wounded. A night service was then introduced to avoid similar interference. It was a really difficult operation because of the region's geography. It was inaugurated by Wing Commander Asghar Khan who was himself at the controls, with Squadron Leader M.J. Khan as his co-pilot on the night falling between the 17th and 18th of November, 1948. Two fairly old 4-engined Halifax bombers, recently acquired, were also converted for air-dropping missions. Each Halifax aircraft was fitted with a compartment under the fuselage to carry an additional supply of 1000 Lbs. Two men equipped with parachutes were cramped in the compartment, to push out the supplies and yet there never was a dearth of

1. Ibid, p. 39.

volunteers for these sorties. To keep up the morale of the detachment, a Lewis gun was fitted in the front of these aircraft and a brengun was mounted in the rear. A civilian volunteer engaged in training the crew of the Halifax aircraft volunteered to fly supplies to Skardu and on 12th November at 5 p.m., he flew with a load of 4000 Lbs. of essential supplies and dropped it at Parkuta. Flight Lt. A.K.S. Ahmed flew many sorties in the Halifax aircraft. During the 12 months of the emergency operations, the P.A.F. flew 437 sorties and dropped the following supplies:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Gilgit. | 243,884 Lbs in | 79 sorties. |
| Burzil. | 514,454 Lbs in | 299 sorties. |
| Chilas | 32,433 Lbs in | 8 sorties. |
| Skardu | 224,695 Lbs in | 51 sorties. |

The Harvard aircraft also made hundreds of communication flights to important stations in the region carrying important personnel, and on return evacuated prisoners as well as civilian evacuees who were housed in Attock and later repatriated to India through the International Red Cross.[1]

The Pakistan Army Engineers began the construction of a hundred mile long jeep track from Balakot to Babusar pass and Chilas from the 7th of June 1948 and completed it, four days ahead of schedule, on the 16th of August, 1948. The construction was carried out by an Engineer group consisting of 70 Field Company and 67 Field Company, assisted by 1st Mahsud Battalion and about a thousand labourers. The height rose from 3000' at Balakot to 14000' at Babusar. The foundation of the road was an ordinary mule track approximately 3 feet wide. It involved the construction of a large suspension bridge, three snow bridges over frozen snow and 60 wooden cantilever bridges. 90 jeeps with trailers were collected from various formations and units in Peshawar and Major Riazul Karim was placed in charge of the operation. The 102 Composite Platoon ASC was established at Balakot to handle the stores and supplies. The 3 armoured brigade and 125 workshop EME (Abbottabad) provided a workshop at Balakot. The first convoy left on 22 August. About 250 tons of stores and supplies were thus transported to the Northern areas until 9th October when snow fall brought it to an end. Approximately, 5000 gallons of petrol was consumed.[2]

## RAJAURI WON AND LOST

Sakhi Delair and Captain Rehmatullah, as already stated elsewhere, went to Rajauri in early November at the head of a small force which

1. The Kashmir Campaign, p. 40
2. *Ibid.*

was joined by several others as the march progressed. They camped at village Karaiyan, about three miles from the town. Sheikh Zia-ud-Din of the Police department who later retired as Inspector, Mirza Faqir Muhammad, Matiullah, Raina Nizami, Mirza Muhammad Khan, Mirza Wazir Hussain and several others who were in the town, established contact with them. After the local garrison ignored a surrender call, the town was taken under siege. There was an exchange of fire, resulting in the death of Syed Rasul Shah, a local youth and two members of the Muslim force; 11 non-Muslims were killed; the town was liberated on 10th November. It is claimed that some Hindus killed a number of their women and children.[1] Mirza Muhammad Hussain, Head of the Jaral tribe whose ancestors once ruled this principality, was appointed Head of the administration. Sakhi Delair returned to Kotli. Rajauri was lost in April when it was reoccupied by Indian forces. There is some evidence that the Gujjars who largely inhabited the tehsil, were ill-treated by the local administration, and rumours were current during those very days that some disgruntled persons amongst them who may be said to have had a cause for grievance, collaborated with the Indians.

3 Azad infantry companies had been locally raised in Rajauri: 13th A.K. battalion commanded by Major Rehmatullah, the 14th A.K. battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Ali Bahadur Khan and a third one commanded by Captain Nausherwan. According to the GHQ chronicle, these "lived practically on the country."

The recapture of Jhangar by Indians had created serious supply problems for the elements holding Rajauri. In the first week of April 1948 an Indian Brigade consisting of four infantry battalions moved from Naushehra to re-capture Rajauri. There were hardly four companies to hold it and obviously they could offer little resistance. Because of tribal rivalries which came into sharp focus after the area's liberation, due to mishandling of affairs on local level, I think some sections of population with-held their support but the Indians, to be sure, made no distinction and resorted to killings, rape, abduction, destruction of built up property and the plunder of movables on such a vast scale that almost the entire Muslim population had to seek shelter in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Rajauri was lost on 12th April, 1948.

## URI SECTOR

By the end of November 1947, the Indian advance on the J.V. road having been blunted, the front reformed around Uri. A group of 100

1. Weekly Daur-i-Jadeed, November, 1977.

Khattak tribesmen under their gallant leader Subedar Shadi Gul occupied a hill overlooking Uri, south of Salamabad. Noticing an enemy observation post across the river, they crossed the river about 10 miles back and on 20th November 1947, marched to Sultan Dhakki. Shadi Gul was led to the vicinity of the post by a local guide. In the ensuing night, employing their only 3" mortar with 15 shells and 2 L.M.Gs., they eliminated the picquet. Only a few Indians escaped alive. The tribesmen lost four men.

A group of Afridis was sent to Poonch while a group of Mahsuds marched to Gohalan, about a mile or so, west of Uri. They had to climb about 7000 ft. high hills which were covered with snow, 2 to 3 feet deep. After two days, the Afridis were able to take up positions opposite north-west and south side of the Uri perimeter. Colonel Akbar who was in personal command had arranged a surprise for the enemy by bringing six 3-inch mortars and 250 shells. However, the volunteers on duty at the mortars ran away due to incessant bombing from the air. The tribesmen sniped the Indian camp so long as their ammunition lasted but had to withdraw at a time when according to Akbar the Indians were preparing to withdraw from Uri. He estimates about 250 casualties in the enemy camp. The Indian claim that they killed 700 to 800 on this side was really fantastic. Actually only 11 persons had been killed. General Messervy was later told by his counterpart in India that they had lost a 100 men in the attack which, on their own admission, was their biggest single loss so far.[1]

In the first week of January 1948, an effort was made to surround the Indians in Uri by blocking their rear at Mahura. A force of some 900 Mahsuds, 600 Mohmands and some volunteers from Poonch and elsewhere was collected for the purpose. The Mahsud lashkar was commanded by Major Rana and the Mohmand by Captain Jan. The plan was for the one thousand Afridis who had recently joined, to walk a distance of 32 miles over the hills on the right bank of Jhelum along Kathai nullah, Safeda forest and Chhota Qazinag; this accomplished, the Mahsuds were to make a frontal attack at Uri simultaneously. On the 13th of January, the Afridis started under Captain Yusuf but were held up by heavy snow and blizzard in which some of them perished. An advance column did reach Mahura but was repulsed by heavy Indian concentration. They had to pull back on the 23rd January. Many lost their lives and many

1. Akbar, p. 83.

more suffered from frost-bite and snow-blindness. The Indians started a barbarous punitive action against the local villagers for having helped the liberation force. It was the last major effort made on this sector, the most important of all, to break-through the enemy defences and forge ahead. India was greatly perturbed by the intending assault and it not only contributed to its decision to approach the UN but at one desperate moment, it sought to widen the conflict by attacking West Pakistan.[1]

1. Hodson, p. 469.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## INDIAN SUMMER OFFENSIVE IN URI SECTOR

## *CHAPTER XXVIII*

# Indian Summer Offensive in Uri Sector

By the beginning of April, 1948 it was apparent that India was going to launch an offensive during the ensuing summer. When information to this effect was received at the G.H.Q. Rawalpindi, General Gracey told the Pakistan Government in writing:

> "An easy victory of the Indian army, particularly in the Muzaffarabad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan. If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about two and a half million people up-rooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the door steps of Pakistan to the rear on the flank, if the civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushehra."[1]

Pakistan was faced with a grim situation. An inherently hostile India, determined to bring about a re-union of the two countries, could not be allowed a totally free hand in Kashmir because it would have brought her to the international borders from where she could, at will, destroy this country both economicall) as well as militarily. The Mangla Head-Works is in the State area; Jhelum, the only important cantonment then, besides Rawalpindi, is hardly ten to twelve miles from

1. Akbar, p. 100.

various points on the State border and the strategically important town of Gujrat is hardly six to seven miles away. Another danger in allowing India to over-run the half-starving and almost primitively-equipped Azad irregulars was that it would have roused public indignation against the Government and it may have been really difficult to suppress it because public opinion at the time, particularly in the western wing, was deeply committed to the Cause of Kashmir's liberation. This fact has been universally acknowledged even by neutral observers and writers. Pakistan, therefore, had only two alternatives, namely, either to allow India to knock at its international border and thus permit it to strike at will or to take some preventive measures, short of going to war. Pakistan, therefore, took a very cautious decision of committing a small number of its troops to Azad Kashmir. They were under strict instructions to take a defensive position behind the Azad forces and were not to participate in the battle unless, of course, India launched an offensive and broke the Azad defences. This writer would like to emphasise with complete responsibility that the Pakistan regular forces were not in action in Azad Kashmir before April, 1948. Of course, individuals from the Pakistan army, 90% of whom came from the State, were participating in the war much before, as volunteers; they were either on leave or had deserted their units. It was quite natural because their homes and hearths were on fire; their standing crops were being burnt and the war was to determine their and their descendants political, social, economic and even religious future; only a coward could watch this gruesome annihilation helplessly. People who had so magnificently fought around the Globe—in the deserts of Africa, the dense epidemic-infested jungles of Burma and on the white-man's lands in Europe, in defence of others' freedom, could not be expected to watch from the fence their own destruction. India has been persistently and deliberately telling the world that Pakistan troops were fighting in Kashmir from the very beginning because it was the only way to explain the failure of its Army in preventing the irregular, old-fashioned lashkars of civilians from liberating large chunks of territory by April, 1948 when Pakistan Army came in. Dealing with the induction of Pakistan Army, Major General Akbar Khan who had left Azad Kashmir towards the beginning of February, has said:—

> "A few days later, the Pakistan Government decided to send some troops into Kashmir as a measure of self-defence. These troops were, however, to avoid, till the last possible moment, any direct clash with the Indian army; they were to stay behind the Azad

forces, to be there only to prevent any sudden break-through to the Pakistan borders by the Indians."[1]

Initially, India's main thrust in the Summer Offensive seemed to be towards Muzaffarabad because with its capture, the liberated territory in Poonch and Rajauri as well as Kotli tehsil could have been easily overrun. It would have also cut off the main supply line for the Azad troops then knocking at Bandipura. When the offensive started on 18th May, the troops facing Indians in this sector consisted of a few Azad Units, some Frontier Scouts, some tribesmen and one regular Pakistan battalion. The number of Scouts was less than a hundred and Azad soldiers were, in the words of General Akbar, "only loose bodies of volunteers equipped with nothing more than rifles; they had no pay, no uniforms, no regular scale of rations and not even a proper system of supplies". Some of them were civilians with no military experience. Towards the north, beyond Teetwal, there was only one rifle company of regulars and some Azad irregulars. The Indian force at Uri was at least three to four times the strength on this side and included an armoured unit. By 5 a.m. on 20th May, they had succeeded in breaking frontal resistance and were advancing; by midday they were somewhere mid-way between Uri and Chakothi.

## PAKISTAN ARMY COMES IN

It was at this stage that Brigadier Akbar Khan who had his Headquarter at Murree sought and was given permission to move to the front himself. He was promised, as desired by him, another battalion in place of the one that had been earlier taken away from the Brigade. Mr. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, then Editor of the Pakistan Times, accompanied him. Some miles beyond Muzaffarabad he found two platoons of Frontier Scouts who were on their way out, without having fought anywhere. He ordered them back to the front. On their refusal they were disarmed and two of their officers taken prisoner while they were ordered to stop there. Some tribesmen were handy to help in disarming them. The intelligence reports revealed that in the rear, as against less than one infantry battalion, Indians had two to three battalions and as against 1½ battalion in battle area, Indians had 8 to 9 battalions; as against four machine-guns, they had 12 and while they had 24 pieces of artillery, 12 anti-tank guns, 9 armoured vehicles and full air support, Azad forces had nothing of the sort. Akbar took up defensive position at Chakothi and placed one of the battalions on the road position while the other one was posted at the 6000' high hill, Bib Dori because "its flanks were reasonably difficult to approach and its front was

1. Akbar, p. 101.

covered by a stream which provided some protection". It was five miles behind Chakothi but it could not be helped as there was no time to reach and occupy the Pandu hills. The battalion, promised before Akbar left Murree, reached on the 21st and was immediately posted partly at Bibi Dori and partly at Chakothi. Meanwhile, small bodies of Azad irregulars and tribesmen had also reached the front to strengthen the defences. Pakistan sent another battalion and two field guns in the beginning of June.

250 Mahsuds and 4 platoons of South Waziristan Scouts with one Mortar and 2 Machine-guns were in the upper reaches, north of Uri. Chhota Qazi Nag was held by four Azad (Bagh) Battalion under Captain Ghulam Rasool; 2 Azad Battalion was at Sugna and 23 Azad Battalion on the Hathlanga feature. The Azad training Centre at Chinari was converted into 5 Azad Battalion under Lt. Col. Ibrahim Shah. Lt. Col. Bashir was incharge of the Sector. While 161 Brigade tried to advance upon Chakothi, the 77 Brigade moved from Mahura towards Chhota Qazi Nag and Pandu. By the 20th of May, Indians had captured two forward positions, Sultan Dhakki and Salamabad. The 77 Brigade captured Chinal Dori. On the 21st May, the defensive position deteriorated. It was at this stage that Brigadier Akbar Khan rushed from Murree and reorganized the defences. On 23 May he set up his tactical Headquarter at Chakothi. He deployed some elements of 4/10 Baluch along with a group of tribesmen. On the same day, Indians attacked Sugna and compelled the Azad Battalion and Tochi Scouts to withdraw towards Chakothi. Jemadar Akbar Khan with a platoon of Kurrum Militia advanced and attacked them. There was also firing from the Chakothi ridge with the result that the Indian company was almost totally wiped out. After several attempts, the Indian Battalion dislodged him from the ridge but ignoring the Indian strength with contempt, Jemadar Akbar, gallantly led his men into attack once again. Severely wounded, he forced the Indians to withdraw though simultaneously he died on the spot. Indians were pursued upto Sugna. Major A.R. Shami was meanwhile sent to Chinari with one Battery of 3 Field Regiment and one troop of 8 medium regiment but the Artillery was not allowed to be used.

Before the Indians could advance further, Lt. Col. Harvey-Kelly, a British officer, organised intensive raids against enemy positions along the Chhota Qazi Nag/Pandu ridge. Major Amir Jan with some Mahsud tribesmen badly mauled a Gurkha Company. Brigadier Akbar Khan organised a "Kala Force", after the name of Subedar Kala Khan, a great soldier, to harass the Indians in their rear. The platoon was from 'A'

company of 4 Baluch stationed at Saran. It made a long detour, south of the Valley and carried out a number of very daring raids between Uri and Chakothi by suddenly descending on the road through unguarded gaps. Subedar Kala Khan did not return to his Unit until after the Indian offensive against Chakothi had been completely brought to an ignoble end. Subsequently, Indians captured the whole of Pandu area which developed a great threat to the defence of Muzaffarabad. The Indians made their final attempt on Chakothi on the morning of 31st May. The attack was led by 8 Armoured cars, and 4 light tanks. Although they were able to make a small advance upto the point where the ceasefire line now stands in this Sector, the offensive was blunted. Lt. Khan Zaman made good use of a 3.7 inch mountain gun. On 1st June, 4/13 FF Rifle under Lt. Col. M. Siddique Raja was pulled out of the Mirpur Sector and placed under Brigadier Akbar Khan. The Battalion, supported by a tribal lashkar, was allotted the wide gap between 4/10 Baluch on Kathai nullah and the Kafir-Khan range, to the north. These tribesmen under Major Shirin Qazi and Captain Abdulla did a wonderful job in the rear and kept the enemy engaged and disorganized. On June 8th, Indians had to vacate several important positions.

The absence of mules and porters was greatly handicapping the operations of Azad troops. There also was the danger of India dropping paratroops behind the front line. Mr. Latif Afghani who has been already noticed, was requested to organize a Home Guard. He was given the local rank of Colonel. He was able to recruit and train about 1000 men for reinforcement of the Azad Battalions in the area and also quickly organized volunteer groups into porter companies and small groups of local Home Guards to guard the approaches, bridges and supply points. He also organised an Intelligence and Counter-intelligence organization. According to the official war chronicle, "he proved a great asset to Brigadier Akbar Khan during the operations that followed south of the river". On June 19, the Khyber Rifles platoon and a Section of 4/10 Baluch ambushed an Indian party near Bhatir Nag and killed 15 of them. Among those wounded was a Lt. Col. Subedar Kala Khan launched a series of attacks from the hills around Tilpatra, forcing the Indians to divert a considerable force for the protection of their line of communications.

## INDIAN GENERAL TESTIFIES

Lt. General Kaul whose Militia units were part of the invading force and who was himself in Uri when the offensive was launched on the 18th of May, states that the plan was for the 161 Brigade to capture the heights of

Slamabad feature opposite Uri and then advance to Domel. The task was entrusted to the 2nd Dogra battalion. The strategy was based on intelligence that the feature was lightly held and that Azad troops spent the night at the lower and warmer altitudes on the reverse slopes. A day before, the Indians admittedly suffered many casualties. At 10 p.m. when the Dogras started to climb the Slamabad feature, Kaul says:

> "The plan was to storm its heights before first light and catch the enemy unawares. But, somehow, our men took longer to crawl up this position and, in the meantime, they, getting scent of their advent, stole a march and were ready to give us a hot reception from the top. When the Dogras, instead of capturing their objective got involved in a battle, the Brigade Commander had to send 6/6 Rajputana Rifles to retrieve this situation later...Now he (Azad) got time to consolidate his positions all along the route, anticipated our moves and frustrated our plans."[1]

The 7 Sikh and the Kumaonis tried to break-through the defences on 21st May but:

> "The Brigade as a whole came to a stand-still after a little more fruitless fighting and our advance petered out not far from the 58th mile-stone on the Uri-Domel road. Thimayya had made a bold bid for Domel. He was a good leader himself, and though some of his subordinate Commanders fought well, he failed to capture his prize."[2]

Why did the Indians not pursue their long planned offensive to its logical end? They lost about a thousand men but this alone could not have prevented them from continuing the offensive. Major General Akbar Khan, the man on the spot, gives his appreciation of the position in the following words:

> "For the first few days they advanced without much difficulty, and they must have been greatly encouraged by the ease with which opposition in front of them melted away. Then they came up against two defensive positions at Chakothi and Bibi Dori, and these they never seriously attacked. Their air reconnaissance reports and the strength of our firing must have shown them that these positions were held only by one battalion in each case. They knew we had no artillery, aircraft or tanks. However, when they came to Chakothi, it was clear to them that a single battalion

1. The Untold Story, p. 109.
2. Ibid, p. 110.

was holding a compact defensive position. The position was so compact that no portion of it could be isolated; it had to be attacked as a whole. That would mean attack by a full brigade, working on the generally accepted convention that the attackers have to be three times the strength of the defenders. Attack on our left flank was ruled out by the river. A frontal attack was very seriously discouraged by the deep nullah in front of Chakothi. That only left our right flank, but this involved going through forest and also the step by step capture of several high hills as a preliminary to the attack on the real position itself.

This would take several days, and the Indians probably appreciated, rightly, that they would seriously expose themselves to sniping, ambushes and raids by tribesmen in this area. To safeguard against this threat, it would be necessary to make large detachments. A hundred tribesmen could compel them to employ a couple of battalions on this task alone. They had got the extra battalions, but this was not the only task to be done as a preliminary. The actual attack would have to be supported by a strong artillery bombardment. To do this, all their guns would have to be brought forward along the road. These again would be exposed to attacks by tribesmen from the flanks, and once again more infantry would have to be deployed to protect them. There was no knowing how many tribesmen we had, and the process of making detachments might turn out to be endless. This in itself must have seemed a deterring factor—but assuming that they could make all these arrangements, the assault on Chakothi would still mean very heavy casualties—and what would it achieve?

After Chakothi, we might again be holding another position two or three miles further back and the whole process would have to be carried out all over again. And thus it would go on. With each advance the Indians would have a longer flank to protect, and the tribesmen would draw and scatter their forces endlessly. A few battalions of our regular troops in compact positions, with Azads and tribesmen floating around the flanks, could go on playing this game until a major portion of the Indian army would be needed if they were to force their way through to Muzaffarabad.

But such a large force could probably not be used here. The one narrow road, the mountains and the problem of maintenance put a definite limit to the amount of force that the Indians could safely deploy here. And even if such a force could be brought up, it would be enough only for a specific situation. That specific

situation may not remain the same as we would be able to upset the balance again by adding a little more to our strength from the Pakistan army.

Thus the Indians probably concluded that unless the Pakistan army itself was kept out of it some where else, there was no prospect of reaching Muzaffarabad on this particular occasion. It was, therefore, not worth all the expenditure of blood and material to assault a few positions like Chakothi."[1]

## POONCH TOWN

Since the middle of November, Poonch town had been encircled by the liberation forces comprising locals as well as tribesmen and other elements from Pakistan. A large civilian population dependent entirely upon supplies from outside was also in the town. The Uri-Poonch road which was then its only vehicular link with the other occupied part of the State, had been blocked by the liberation forces. The only other land route was a mule track which traversed over the Gulmarg hills but was closed on account of heavy snow. A Dakota Service was introduced to bring in civil as well as military supplies from Srinagar; it helped the besieged units to maintain themselves for some time.

Some time after the town was taken under siege, Lt. Col. Pritam Singh arrived with some men and boosted the morale of the Dogras. The combined enemy strength was about one brigade with one Mountain Battery. As elsewhere, the Indians held a monopoly of the air. India also constructed, at top speed, a landing ground in the town, capable of taking Dakota type aircraft. On 1st January, India launched a major attack and pushed back the Azad troops about five miles when it was stopped in the Chirikot—Degwar defile. After a month, the Azad troops, in a counter attack, drove the Indians back to the town. At this stage, Col. Anwar Kamal arrived with a group of tribesmen. The liberation elements had only one 3-inch mortar to support their attack. The tribesmen crossed the Poonch river from the south and reached within a few hundred yards of the main Indian defences but were held up by heavy Indian fire. The Azad troops also crossed the Betar nullah but were stopped by heavy enemy fire. The attack failed and both tribesmen as well as the Azad troops suffered heavy casualties. On the night falling between 8th and 9th February, about two Indian battalions, after covering the Surun valley for about five miles, made for Khanetar. A body of tribesmen was already in the area. They gathered near Chandak at the rear of

1. Akbar, p. 119.

the Indian column and adopted all kinds of ruses such as mixing with the local population or walking with herds of sheep or pretending to be carrying dead or sick bodies on cots or carrying sheaves of grass and fodder, in order to avoid detection. The tribesmen and the Azad troops then waged a surprise attack, compelling the Indians to withdraw to Poonch town with heavy losses. Alam Khan Mahsud and the Azad Machine-gunner Naik Ghulam Muhammad played a notable role. A similar attack by Indians in the Salotri-jhalas sector, to link up with Naushehra and enter the Mehndar valley, was again frustrated by tribesmen and the Azad troops but, with increasing activity in the sector, it became clear that unless Pakistan sent its Army, the heavily-equipped Indians may succeed in pushing back the liberators. Consequently, Brig: Haya-ud-Din was sent to take charge of the Sector. His force consisted of 3 Mountain Battery under Major Muhammad Adalat, 'D' Coy: of 4/13 F.F. Rifle under Captain Muhammad Nawaz Tiwana, one Platoon of 1/15 Punjab MMG, 4 Mountain Battery under Major Muhammad Gulzar and detachments of medical and signal units. 42 Field Coy:, Engineers, under Major Riazul Haq, was detailed to improve the track from Panjar to Lachhmanpattan bridge and then to Pallandari and Hajira. They widened the track upto Lachhmanpattan within 15 days and constructed a suspension bridge over Jhelum at Lachhmanpattan in a record time. Then they constructed a jeep road to Pallandari and Hajira. The column, however, did not sit idle but went on foot from Panjar to Hajira—50 miles. Brigadier Haya-ud-Din, like a good leader, went ahead of his force and covered the distance in two days. Haya-ud-Din had orders not to commit regular troops to a direct combat but merely provide Artillery support.

After completing necessary arrangements, and despite baffling problems of discipline and military as well as civil supply shortages, Haya-ud-Din launched an attack on March 17. The Mountain gun, operating for the first time, must have surprised the Indians. A Mahsud lashkar moved from Khanetar and after crossing Poonch river near Chandak advanced along the right bank of the river towards the landing strip. The Azad troops, at Salotri bhainchh ridges, advanced upto the Poonch river line. Three Azad Battalions, 6,8 and 10, then started approaching the town fortifications. While they were poised for an attack, there began an incessant down-pour. The Wireless communications broke down and the ground turned into a sea of mud. The attack thus ended in a fiasco. Haya-ud-Din then sought permission to use the Coy: of 4/13 FF Rifle to lead a fresh attack next night but permission was refused. Although the attack failed, it had a demoralizing effect on the Indians. The introduction of a mountain gun for the first time had created panic in Poonch town because it was directly hitting the air-field which brought the air-ferry to the town to a stand-still. With the destruction of one

Indian Dakota on the field and damage to another one while trying to land, plus observation posts established all around the town, it appeared as if the day was not far off when the enemy would either surrender or be wiped out of the town. Lt. General Kaul has confirmed the untenability of the Indian garrison at one stage and revealed that on a visit to the Sector, Pandit Nehru was told by the Army Command that it had become difficult to hold the town and that "it should really be given up", but that the Prime Minister lost temper and told them "in no uncertain terms" that it was the responsibility of the Army to defend it, "at all costs."[1]

It appears that it was then that the Indian High Command, with approval "at the highest level"[2], played a fraud. On the 24th of March, 1948 the Indian Commander-in-Chief gave a signal message to his Pakistani counterpart, requesting for an 11-DAY TRUCE to enable them to evacuate non-Muslims from Poonch and even Rajauri. He also assured the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief that the details and dates of evacuation of Poonch town, Rajauri and Reasi area would be shortly intimated by a signal.[3] Brigadier Haya-ud-Din, the Sector Commander as well as the local commanders Col. Rehmatullah and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan opposed the move but the order had to be obeyed. The humanitarian excuse by India to evacuate civilians and the sick and wounded soldiers was a sheer fraud because as soon as Dakotas made their appearance after the cease-fire became operative, they disembarked troops and arms. This information was conveyed to the G.H.Q. and the local Commanders pressed hard to be permitted to resume hostilities but as the former had given a pledge, they thought that they were now honour-bound to stand by it. Conceding that everything is fair in war, one can merely lament the simplicity of our own Government in agreeing to a Truce.

Brigadier Haya-ud-Din then ordered the blowing up of all bridges on the roads from Naushehra to Poonch through Sehr in order to obstruct and slow down any Indian attempt to relieve Poonch by land routes. At his request the remaining companies of the 4/13 FF Rifle were sent to Hajira and Sehr. He was replaced by Lt. Col. Muhammad Siddique Raja.

The Indians then made an attempt to capture the Chirikot—Gulpur ridge where the mountain gun and most of the MMGs which were harassing the air-field were located. Ultimately, the attack failed. After the occupation of Jhangar and Rajauri by the Indians, the Azad troops operating there were regrouped into 6 Azad Brigade under Lt. Col. Rehmatullah

1. The Untold Story, p. 95.
2. Kashmir Campaign, p. 124.
3. Ibid, p. 124.

Khan. By the end of May, it had five though depleted Battalions, 7 (Riasi), 12, 13, 14 and 22, spread over a vast area. Rehmat Ullah established himself in Mandhar and posted the battalions on important gallies. On the night of June 14-15, two Indian Infantry Battalion and one Mountain Battery moved out of Rajauri, crossed the mountains at Behramgala and reached Poonch without any resistance. At the same time, the Indians had started their offensive in Uri Sector and captured the Pirkanthi peak. The Indians made slow advances from Poonch and occupied Chirikot and Tetrinote ridges. The Tetrinote ridge was given the name of Chhaja (Cornice) on account of its strong bunkers, built on a long, flat top. It is five miles from Poonch. Lt. Col. Siddique then requested the rear for some longer-range guns so as to bring the Poonch air-field under fire. Consequently, one 25-pounder field-gun and one 6 pounder gun were sent to the Sector. The guns were provided by 6 Battery of 2 Field regiment and 29 anti-tank Battery. The 25-pounder gun was broken into 15 parts. The detachment was so trained that they dismantled it in eight minutes and reassembled it in 11 minutes. The Commander-in-Chief personally saw the dismantling and assembling drills. From Panjar two hundred Azad civilian volunteers carried them to Hajira, a distance of 57 miles. These reached Sehr on August,13, and were ready for use on August 14th. Lt. Col. Siddique launched an attack on Chhaja on August 27. Major Ghani was personally on the 6th pounder gun. 'C' and 'D' Companies of 4/14 Punjab successfully occupied trenches vacated by the Indians but before they would consolidate their gains, the Indians brought in air support and opened up their fire power with the result that there were 60 casualties in two companies. The remainder had to withdraw and the attack was called off. Later in the day, India made a determined bid to capture the 6 pounder. Major Ghani was injured but the gun was dismantled and carried to an alternate position before the Indians arrived at the spot. The 25 pounder gun was not allowed to be used as yet. Finally, permission to use it, was received on 6th September. It made the Poonch air-field very unsafe for use and Indians, therefore, were quick to bring their air-force to destroy it. On the night of September 9-10, a shell landed straight in the bunker and rendered it unfit for use for several days. Warrant Officer Muhammad Shafi rushed to Rawalpindi and brought the replacements of the damaged parts which again put it into action in a few days. In the light of the past experience, 6 alternative gun positions were prepared and it was rotated amongst them, almost every night. Meanwhile, three Orlikan guns were also brought in, to provide anti-aircraft protection to the gun. On October 10, the Indians brought a Harvard aircraft and as soon as the gun fired, its location was detected and a number of fighter aircraft blew in with rockets and bombs. The Harvard was destroyed on the run-way. One of tne fighter aircraft was destroyed in the air and despite an all-day effort

by the enemy aircraft and guns, the 25-pounder remained in action. It was then affectionately given the name of "Rani."

Since then it was only in 1971 that Muslims were ever able to come close to the out-skirts of the town. There is a general impression that the blame for the non-capture of the town must also be shared by the rival commanders around the town who could, by concerted action, successfully over-come resistance during the early days of the war especially in the six weeks or so after the fall of Rawalakot. Co-operation and co-ordination between them is claimed to have been practically non-existent. It is also said that there was neither proper planning nor secrecy. It is also alleged that most of the besiegers were keen to capture the town with its wealth and valuables intact. This is not possible in a war and however sentimental their attachment for the town or the need for its valuables may have been, they ought to have realised that it was too risky not to press forward their advantage and instead just confine themselves to a blockade and keep piously hoping that some day the defenders would surrender.

## BAGH SECTOR

The defence of Bagh was then entirely entrusted to the Qaiyum Brigade, raised by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan. 2/12 FF Regiment under Lt. Col. Babar was moved to Pirkanthi. On the night of 27/28 June, India was able to capture Pirkanthi.

In view of the Indian offensive, C-Company of 2/13 FF Rifle with two sections of Additional Police under Major Zakria was sent to Bagh in the first week of May. One section of 3.7 inch Mountain gun with Captain J.A. Timms and Lt. Jamal Said Mian made a forced march from Dwarandi to Bagh and climbing to the top of Pirkanthi ridge, occupied a position at 10500 ft. to support B and C Companies. In the middle of July, Headquarter 102 Brigade under Brigadier Muhammad Yusuf was moved from Bannu to Bagh, but he was not allowed to attack Pirkanthi on account of negotiations with UNCIP. Meanwhile, Indians constructed a bridge at Hathlanga in preparation for a forward thrust but it was burnt down by Major Afridi in a surprise attack. About two Indian Companies attacked Sar and Sank hill features but were repulsed by Azad forces after a three-hour fighting in which the latter suffered five casualties. The 2/13 FF Rifle was relieved by 4/8 Punjab under Lt. Col. Sawal Khan and 17/10 Baluch by 7/10 Baluch. Brigadier Adam Khan took over from Brigadier Yusuf. 2/1 Punjab minus two companies commanded by Lt. Col. Adam Khan who later became 'famous' in 1956-57 for the persecution of AKRF Officers when he was Div. Commander, was then moved from Nanga Tak to the vicinity of Gangachoti. The Battalion covered a distance of about

20 miles over an extremely mountainous terrain in one day. Adam Khan made many attempts to capture enemy positions on the Tilpatra ridge and Pirkanthi but did not succeed. It is claimed that when Adam Khan decided to attack Pirkanthi, the two Azad battalions with him, a battalion of the Bagh Brigade, better known as Qaiyum Brigade and the 3rd Azad Battalion, "apprehensive of the threat to Bagh from Poonch, were somewhat reluctant to get seriously committed in battles away from their homes" and therefore the 2/1 Punjab advanced alone.[1] Did Adam Khan, nourish this sad experience and consciously or unconsciously, fell a victim to it as soon as he assumed peace-time command of the AKRF in 1956 ? When it became known that India would make a determined bid to link Rajauri with Poonch, 25 Brigade under Brigadier Azam Khan was sent to Kotli to block the Indian break-out from Jhangar. It is stated in the GHQ account that the Indians had begun their advance from Naushehra before the Brigadier arrived on the scene.

Having failed to link up with Poonch town through the Uri-Hajipir pass, India launched an attack in the third week of September, 1948 from Rajauri for a link up with the besieged town. The relevant chapter in the G.H.Q. chronicle, the Kashmir Campaign, is somewhat thirsty. I have no doubt that the G.H.Q. possesses the reports and remarks given by the Div. Commander, Major General Tottenham which also go to show how these were ignored and by-passed in days to come. The Indians completed the link-up with Poonch without any worthwhile resistance but on account of the difficulty of supplying their troops, vacated Pirkanthi ridge with the advent of winter and settled at Urusa.[2] When 100 Brigade under Brigadier K.M. Sheikh relieved the 25 Brigade, its Headquarter was shifted to Bhimber. 17 Field Company Engineers under Major Safdar did a fine job by constructing, almost round the clock, 200 miles of motorable tracks from Qazi Bakar to Bhimber, Bhimber to Sadabad, Kotla to Kabutar Gala etc. which made the quick movement of troops and their supplies possible.

With the link-up of Rajauri and Poonch town by India, Brigadier Azam Khan decided to withdraw guns from the Hajira area and take them to Pallandari, about 33 miles behind and only 14 miles from the Pakistan-Azad Kashmir border although, despite the link-up, the Indians were still on the right side of Poonch river while the Azad territory was situate on the left side of the river. Thus we were in a strong defensive position. Sardar Ibrahim, who was in the area, opposed the move and told the Brigadier that it would practically amount to the surrender of the vast area upto Pallandari to the enemy without a fight and despite our strong

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1 & 2. Kashmir Campaign, p. 187.

defensive position. He also told him that with the withdrawal of the guns,[1] the entire civil population of the area would be on their feet towards Pakistan. In the meantime, about 15 to 20 officers came to the Brigadier and told him that if the guns had to be withdrawn upto Pallandari, he was free to do so but they would not leave the front line and would remain there on their posts of duty. These included Major Ghani, Major Mir Baz, Lts. Bajwah, Durrani, Chishti and 2nd Lts. Iftikhar and Ghulam Yazdani. Upon this, Brigadier Azam Khan contacted the G.H.Q. and conveyed the situtation. Ultimately it was decided not to withdraw the guns. Poonch river still remains the dividing line between the two Armies in this sector in 1979 as it was 31 years ago.

A jemadar from the 25 Brigade met Lt. F.A. Chishti whose Regiment had been withdrawn from Tandar and sent to Hajira sector in support of the 25 Brigade which had, by now, lost Mehndar, and told him that he had been ordered by his Brigade HQ to burn down their own supply depot situate somewhere near Dawarandi/Madarpore. The order had apparently been issued in haste and out of sheer panic, without giving proper thought to the likely grave consequences. At great personal risk, Lt. F.A. Chishti put him in the quarter-guard to prevent him from carrying out his orders. The burning of the supply depot, it would be realised, would have indicated to the Enemy our readiness for withdrawal, the effectiveness of their pressure and the lack of stomach by higher-ups in the area to give a determined battle and thus brought them rolling in, with redoubled confidence. When the fate of the Jemadar became known in the Brigade HQ, Captain Aslam, Staff Officer to Brigadier Azam, phoned Lt. Chishti telling him that he was being placed under arrest for disobedience of the above order. Lt. Chishti, fortunately, stuck to his position.

At the time India launched its final offensive in Mehndar, Poonch sector, 600 Swati Scouts were already back from the front, on way to their homes, in order to be replaced by another contingent whom they had to relieve at Swat. At Trarkhel, when they learnt of the Indian offensive, instead of continuing their homeward journey, they returned to the Hajira front immediately. Next day, about 50 of them were evacuated to Rawalpindi in a seriously wounded condition. They had to

1. As he told this author.

be removed on cots as there was no vehicular road. Mr. Justice Sardar Said Muhammad Khan was among the volunteers who tended to their wounds and other needs.

Before the agreement on cease-fire was arrived at, the Pakistan Artillery was employed in shelling the Beri-pattan bridge on Manawar Tavi and the Naushehra cantonment. It is claimed that one span of the bridge collapsed and that considerable damage was inflicted on the Indians which was mainly responsible for India's agreement to a cease-fire.

Among those who fought on the Bagh sector were Major Muhammad Ayub Khan who later commanded the 38 Azad Kashmir Battalion, Captain Abdul Khan, M.B.E., Captain Muhammad Hayat Khan, Major Mansab Dad, Major Muhammad Saeed Khan, Major Muhammad Saleem, Major Ibrahim Shah, Captain Ghulam Rasool Khan, Captain Noor Hussain Khan, Muhammad Saleem Khan, Sitara-e-Jurrat and Col. Muhammad Siddique. Major Muhammad Ayub has special praise for Havildar Kala Khan of Kharal Gialan and two youth, Muhammad Siddique of Kharal Malialan and Muhammad Hanif of Ratnoi, both of tehsil Bagh who were very young. Havildar Kala Khan, who is perhaps the same person whom we have noticed under Brigadier Nausherwan Khan, used to fight till the last bullet of his brengun and as soon as there was a lull in the fighting, would sing Punjabi songs at the pitch of his voice. At Pir Kanthi, on one occasion, when he came up with a song during a lull in the fighting, someone from the enemy bunkers loudly asked whether he was not the same person who was earlier on the Uri sector? For their action on the Hajipir pass, Naib Subedar Tufail Hussain and Sepoy Muhammad Hanif were posthumously awarded Mujahid-e-Haideri. Lieut. Muhammad Azam Khan was made a Sher-e-Jang. About 60 members of the 38 A.K. Battalion were decorated. Their Commander, Major Muhammad Ayub, received a Distinguished Service Certificate.

## THE REECHH FEATURE

In the Sadabad valley, Bhimber, there are two beautiful forts, one at Baghsar in the Azad Kashmir territory and the other one, three to four miles away in the Indian-held territory. The Baghsar fort which this writer visited in February 1978, is built of chiselled stone and can house about a thousand persons. It seems to have been built by the Mughals whose Kashmir route is not far away. Baghsar which is about 3500 ft. above sea-level, is, to my knowledge, the best hill-station in the district of Mirpur. Personally speaking, I was enchanted by its scenic surroundings. It has a lake, about four to five hundred yards long. If properly looked after, it could be used for developing fish culture.

At some distance, in front of the fort, are two ridges, better known as Maindak and Reechh features. On 2nd June 1948, when Indians began intensive bombardment, Major Malik of the Shaheen Azad Battalion, expecting no support from behind, ordered a panicky evacuation of the Reechh feature held by Kashmira Khan; seeing the forward Azad troops and tribesmen withdrawing from the feature, Major Masud Karim also withdrew and thus the entire Saadabad valley fell into Indian hands without any fight at all. Actually, Indians occupied it four days later, perhaps thinking that the tame withdrawal was sham and a tactical trap.

Kashmira Khan made two unsuccessful attempts to recapture the lost Reechh feature. By the time a third attempt was to be launched, his men had practically exhausted all their ammunition and it was discovered that there was ust no ammunition available to be given to them.[1]

Lt. Col. Sarfraz Khan made a strong bid to recapture these features. The Azad Battalion of Captain Khan Muhammad Khan which was allocated the eastern half of the feature, succeeded in achieving its objective with complete surprise. In order to dislodge the Indians from the western part of the ridge, Sarfraz sent a Waziri lashkar of about 2000 men, a Shaheen Azad Battalion under Major Inayat and Kashmira Khan's force, each from a different direction. Two 3.7-inch Mountain guns and 2/14 Punjab mortars provided direct support. The attack failed because the Waziris disintegrated immediately after the attack and out of 500 men under Kashmira Khan, only 50 remained with him. He was, therefore, ordered to withdraw.

Captain Zafar Iqbal, Commanding A-Company of 2/14 Punjab, opposite Reechh feature had taken part in many a battle during the Kashmir War and distinguished himself. He discovered that the Indians had a detached post on a prominent feature, called 'Pyramid' which was slightly ahead of the main position. It was an MMG post protected by about a platoon of the Indian Infantry. On 14th August, 1948, the first anniversary of the creation of Pakistan, he led a platoon from his Company with Lt. Hamid of the Furqan Battalion and two junior Commissioned Officers and reached within 50 yards of the feature in complete silence. The surprise was soon lost when one of his men stepped on an anti-personnel mine resulting in a blast. He immediately adjusted his plans but the Indians having been alerted for the assault, all his men except himself and a Sepoy named Barkhurdar were severely wounded, one by one. Zafar bandaged the wounds of some persons and then tried to lift one of the more severely wounded soldiers but as soon as he got up, a burst of LMG fire hit him in the chest, killing him on the spot. His death

1. The Kashmir Campaign, p. 238.

was mourned in the entire sector and soldiers were itching for revenge but unfortunately, the sentiment was not taken advantage of. The A.K. Government awarded him the title of Fakhr-e-Kashmir and the Pakistan Government, the gallantry award, Sitara-e-Jurrat.

## THE BATTLE FOR PANDU

Pandu is strategically a very important mountain between Chakothi and Baramula. The origin of the name remains unknown. Perhaps it derives its name from the ancient legendary Hindu war-like tribe of the same name who fought the mythical Mahabharat battle. It is more of a range than a single mountain and stretches over a large area which treasures several big mountains such as Nanga Teek 10000 ft., Rusi Kuta 11500 ft., Sing 10500 ft., Chota Qazinag 10000 ft. and Qazi Nag 13500 ft. They belong to the Qazi Nag range which begins from Baramula and extends beyond Muzaffarabad towards the Neelum valley. It is situate on the right side of the Srinagar-Kohala road across the river. Pandu proper is almost in the centre and commands a domineering position in relation to the Jhelum valley road. On its top is a grassy plot about 50 to 2000 yards long and some 700 to 800 yards wide. The entire area is known as Pandu. According to General Akbar, it was so important that while he had given it the code name, Delhi, the Indians had given it the code name, Karachi. The operation was a really difficult one. First, the sappers put up a wire rope across the river along which a single basket carried at a time, two men or 300 Lbs. of stores. 2,000 local Muslims assisted in the carriage of supplies. Some artillery pieces were moved to within the range of the target alongwith 900 shells. 300 Mahsud tribesmen available for the attack were divided into three groups; two were entrusted with the task of harassing the enemy while the third, named L-3, was given the special task of pursuing them, if and when the enemy was dislodged. A wooden bridge was put up across the stream in front of Bib Dori and by 17th July, the liberation force was poised for attack. On the 18th there was some rain and nothing could therefore be done except to launch a few patrols comprising the tribesmen, the Scouts and the Azad irregulars. A local guide was arrested by the Indians and tortured but General Akbar testifies that he gave away nothing.

In the early hours of 19th July two columns advanced in different directions; their target was the top of Pandu. Each had to climb more than 500 feet in pitch dark; there were no tracks to follow. The ridges were sharp and precipitous and the ground muddy. By 6 a.m. the right column had successfully occupied a 9300 ft. high peak on the flank of Pandu, over-looking it. A hurried counter-attack by the enemy failed and by

after-noon the right column was only 500 yards from the target. The left column ran into serious trouble as its telephone wire drums had rolled down the hill and it lost contact with the Commander. It then ran into an unexpected enemy pocket and had to suffer 30 casualties. It had still a long way to go to reach the top but as its movement had been discovered, it was being heavily shelled. So they had to withdraw and by 4 a.m. were back at their starting point, the Bib Dori. The harassing parties finding that the column had withdrawn, also withdrew. Meanwhile, half the battalion that had captured 9300 feet high feature, was placed in a difficult position as it was being subjected to intensive mortar shells as well as frequent bombing by the planes. It was, however, gallantly holding its ground. The Commander sent the harassing parties back to engage the enemy so as to add to his confusion and by next morning the reserve half battalion succeeded in dashing to the top of the peak to join their comrades who were still gallantly holding it. The Indians were well entrenched in their dug-out trenches. Their troops had withdrawn from several surrounding peaks and reinforced those at Pandu proper. They were now about 500 yards from each other. Several lashkars of irregulars consisting of tribesmen, Tochi Scouts, deserters from the State army and those from Gilgit made an all round thrust. Some were repulsed but others succeeded. There was a bayonet charge and finally the Indians abandoned the area and ran away towards Qazi Nag.

According to General Akbar, the Indians lost nearly 300. The Azad forces continued their advance for six miles and about 90 square miles of territory passed into their hands. Among those who participated in the attack was a Baluch battalion with the code name Iqbal, commanded by Captain Muhammad Iqbal Khan which attacked from the right side, a Mujahid battalion of 300 persons better known as 2nd Muzaffarabad which came down towards Nanga Teek and attacked from the front side via Chak Hama. Their various sections were commanded by Major Qudrat Ullah, Captain Muhammad Ilyas Khan of Lawasi, Captain Khawaja Ali Muhammad and Major Zaffar Umar Khan. The enemy retreated towards the villages Pal and Gondi but was pursued by a platoon of Gilgitis commanded by Malik Rashid, right upto Qazi Nag. The pursuers were held up at Burji which is about 175 yards ahead of Chhota Qazi Nag. Here the enemy had a full section of M.M.G. which checked their advance. Burji is still in our hands. In the attack on Pandu about 60 Jawans from the Iqbal battalion including their Company Commander Muhammad Iqbal were killed. Several Jawans from the 2nd Muzaffarabad battalion also lost their lives. They were duly buried there. Among those who played a magnificent role in the fighting, the most outstanding was Subedar Kala Khan who lies buried at Pandu. General Akbar remembers him even to this day in the following words:

"But the story of Pandu will not be complete without the mention of one brave man, Subedar Kala Khan, who lies buried there under the deep green turf. During the previous month his daring raids and harassing missions had turned the scales in our favour—and at Pandu he was killed in the assault. In life his name had already become a legend—and after death his 'spirit' still haunts the area, often appearing in human form, dressed as he was on his last day. Many an unsuspecting newcomer to the hill, not knowing that Kala Khan is dead, has been welcomed by his spirit and given accurate details of how Pandu was won."[1]

## JUMA BAHADUR

Akbar was succeeded by Brigadier Nausherwan. One day he sent a column to harass Indian troops in the rear. A Mujahid Company, some Waziris and a Mortar platoon from the F.F.R. moved to Bhup, Sultan Dhaki, Govasar and Busian. When they reached Sultan Dhaki, there was a serious encounter with an enemy company which was compelled to withdraw. The column was able to reach as far away as the vicinity of Mahura where it was heavily attacked both on the ground as well as from the air. The Mujahids were across the river on its right side. One Juma Khan risked his life and almost jumped into the jaws of death by swimming across the river at night and after successfully blasting important installations, swam back about 800 yards to rejoin his comrades. He was lucky to escape injury from the volleys of fire that burst from Indian guns. Next morning they had to withdraw to Chakothi as a Tiger battalion was thrown against them. In recognition of his feat of valour, Juma Khan was awarded the title of 'Juma Bahadur' and a rifle with a silver-plated butt. Thus the Indians who had taken for granted their triumphal march to Muzaffarabad and had kept civil administrative top brass machinery in readiness for the take over, had to suffer loss of face. Pandit Nehru had reached Srinagar a day earlier and it was widely believed that he had come for a triumphal speech to be delivered at Muzaffarabad. It will be recalled that the United Nations Kashmir Commission was already in the sub-continent for several weeks but India was avoiding meaningful discussions, because of its impending Summer offensive. It was only after their shock at Pandu which demonstrated that even an irregular force with the support of some Pakistan troops had the capability of a long drawn out fight and even had the chance of an upper hand, that India agreed to the 13th August 1948 UNCIP resolution which envisaged a plebiscite under UN auspices.

1. Akbar, p. 141.

Lt. Col. Harvey Kelly who had served so well in the Sector, was withdrawn on 17 July because orders had been received that British officers were to be entirely withdrawn from Kashmir. Lt. Col. Malik Sher Bahadur took over the command of the Battalion in his place. Among those who fought on this Sector, were Captain Muhammad Jamshaid of 2/1 Punjab, Captain Afridi of 4/10 Baluch, Lt. Col. Qudratullah, Major Karamatullah, Captain Khalid, Captain Syed Ghaffar Shah of 17/10 Baluch, Major Afridi of 4/10 Baluch, Lt. Khan Zaman, Captain A.Q. Sheikh, and Lt. Haque Nawaz Kiani. Sepoys Muhammad Yaqub and Said Muhammad displayed great courage in bringing back their casualties near the Indian position, Kewa. Yaqub died of enemy bullets which hit him when he was bringing in the last casualty. A lashkar, comprising a hundred Mahsud tribesmen went in pursuit of the retreating Indians. They were quickly joined by the Azad and other troops. Apart from killing a number of fleeing Indians, they collected a large number of arms and ammunition. The equipment captured at Pandu included 125 rifles, 11 Sten-guns, 7 LMGs and MMGs, two Mortars, 1500 Mortar bombs and 3,12,000 small arms ammunitions.[1] Lt. Nasir Khan of 2/1 Punjab subsequently occupied Sing.

## THE BATTLE AT CHHATRA

Another memorable battle was fought at Chhatra in tehsil Haveli. Indians made a three-pronged assault, one via Handwara to Teetwal, the second via Uri on the Jhelum Valley road and the third via Haji Pir pass to capture Bagh. These attacks were blunted by the Azad forces supported by certain number of troops from Pakistan, after yielding some ground; the halt came at Teetwal, Chakothi and Pir Kanthi. Lt. General Sen, the Indian Commander in Kashmir valley has attributed the failure of the offensive to what he calls the absence of teeth or rather the absence of sufficient teeth, but the fact remains that while the Indian Army, apart from being armed to the teeth, also had the support of Air Force, the liberation forces were even numerically out-numbered. The obvious reason for their failure, apart from the tough resistance encountered, was the fact that they were lacking a Cause, were fighting a colonial war and did not enjoy the support of the local inhabitants except for non-Muslim pockets.

When the summer offensive fizzled out, the Indian Commanders decided to extend the front; consequently, one column of four battalions was sent to Poonch via Surun valley. Mr. M.Z. Kiani who had by then taken over as Commander-in-Chief of the Azad Kashmir Forces but whose operational area had been restricted to Poonch district, was lying ill.

1. Kashmir Campaign, p. 206.

Rushed to his HQ on a stretcher, he found that the Indians had as many as six outlets if they wanted to advance. He posted his men in different directions. Subedar Major Ghulam Muhammad was put incharge of some men on Mehndar side; Mr. Hidayat Ullah's 12th battalion and the 5th battalion headed by Sher Khan were kept in reserve; 8th, 10th, 6th and 9th battalions took defensive positions at different places. A new battalion of raw recruits from the area composed of minorities such as Mughals, Kashmiris, Qureshis, Lohars etc. and better known as the "Farooqi Brigade" was placed at Potha. On 26th June, the enemy started heavily shelling the post commanded by Subedar Ghulam Muhammad. Kiani's own assessment, which had been communicated to sector commanders and in the light of which he had already made deployment of his forces, was that the enemy's aim could only be Chhatra itself so as to capture Bagh. He, therefore, asked Ghulam Muhammad to stand fast and engage the enemy till it was clear whether they really intended to advance that way or had resorted to it merely as a diversionary tactic. River Poonch separated the Subedar's post from the other defensive posts. As a precautionary measure, the General ordered Col. Hidayatullah Khan to begin transportation of a part of his battalion across the river with a further direction that they were merely to regroup themselves a few yards away from the bank and await further orders. This was necessitated by the eventuality of enemy attacking the Subedar's post in strength. At about 4 a.m. the Indians crossed the river in strength and moved towards Satwal Hill. On the right of Chhatra, at some distance, is the town of Bandi Abbaspur, and on the left are important posts like Titri-Note and Ghambir while further left, is the important town of Hajira. About 700 Mahsud and Waziri tribesmen had arrived only two or three days before. Being fresh from their homes with high spirits and not having yet had the experience of long inactivity, they had been posted at Ghambir. The General, therefore, ordered a swift counter-attack which was led by the tribesmen and 12th battalion, headed by Sher Khan. The other battalions also did a wonderful job. Although out-numbered by the enemy and subjected to incessant firing, the defensive positions were not abandoned with the result that although the Indian army was able to break through their defence line and advance upto Chhatra, the continued manning of the posts in their rear, not only damned their spirits but raised the morale of the counter-attackers. The action started at 6 a.m. and lasted till 3 p.m. when the enemy was completely routed; they retreated to Poonch town. The Indian casualties were over a 1000, both wounded and dead, whereas Azad casualties were 150 killed and 350 injured. The General had a special word of praise for a certain Quarter-master who pursued a group of Indian soldiers who had entrenched in a house and were directing machine-gun fire. The Quarter master crawled to the place and blasted them with a hand grenade,killing

several of them and silencing the machine-gun, but one or two enemy soldiers who remained unharmed by the blasts, killed him on the spot. The importance of the Chhatra engagement lies in the fact that but for this success, the Indians would have been able, with the mere capture of Chhatra, to occupy the entire area of the Haveli tehsil; it would have given them direct and unchallenged access to Bagh on the one hand and Hajira and Trarkhel on the other. With the capture of Bagh, the road to Kohala on the one side and to Chikar on the other, also lay clear; that such a feat should have been achieved by an irregular force which was not only fed and clothed on a highly unsatisfactory scale but had no heavy arms at all and whose most important weapon was an ordinary rifle with an extremely restricted supply of ammunition, makes it all the more creditable.

## THE FURQAN BATTALION

The Jamaat-e-Ahmedia first sent a forty-men group under Mirza Mubarik Ahmad, which was posted at Merajkay, Sialkot; two of them were killed. Later, in June 1948, they sent a battalion, named "Furqan Battalion" which received its training at village Sohan near Sara-i-Alamgir. It was led first by Col. Muhammad Hayat Kaisrani and then by Col. Mubarik Ahmad. It was posted to Baghsar, Bhimber, on 10th July 1948 to see active duty. Five of its men were killed in action. It was disbanded on 15th June, 1950. A special function was held at Sara-i-Alamgir on 17th June, 1950, to mark its disbandment. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, General Sir Dougles Gracey sent a message, read by Brig. M. K. Sheikh, in which he said:—

> "In Kashmir, you were allotted an important sector and very soon you justified the reliance placed on you and you nobly acquitted yourself in battle against heavy enemy ground and air attacks, without losing a single inch of ground. Your conduct, both individual and collective, and your discipline have been of a very high order."[1]

## THE WAR DECORATIONS

Many Indian Army Officers in command positions, sent highly coloured reports to their superiors about their performances. Consequently, several Courts of inquiry to investigate charges of such misconduct had to be set up. Lt. General Kaul was a member of one such Court. In this case, a senior Officer had reported that his garrison was "heavily-pressed" by the enemy and that he was fighting "a grim battle". On another

1. Tareekh-i-Ahmediyat, Vol. VI, p. 666.

occasion, he sent a situation report of "the heavy losses" he had inflicted on the "enemy". According to Kaul, when his superiors visited the ground, no evidence was available to support this claim. This officer later complained of the shortage of troops and demanded reinforcements when in fact he was superior to the "enemy" in strength. Kaul states:

> "I am constrained to mention that there were numerous instances of officers during the Kashmir operations who sent up to higher authorities situation reports which were exaggerated. There was a tendency to enlarge upon what actually happened, to one's credit. There were cases where officers got specific orders from their higher commanders but found many lame excuses for not obeying them implicitly. I also saw certain commanders playing up to the politicians, often to the detriment of military interests."[1]

The Pakistan Government awarded Defence medals (1948) to 1970 members of the A.K. Regular Forces, both officers and ranks who participated in the Kashmir liberation war. The A.K. Government also instituted several awards such as Fakhr-e-Kashmir which was awarded to 53 persons, including Kashmira Khan, Haji Abdullah (posthumous), Major Muhammad Afzal Khan (posthumous), Lt. Col. Rehmatullah Khan from Poonch, Col. Hassan and Col. Ehsan Ali from Northern areas, Major General M. Z. Kiani, Brigadier Habibur Rehman, Lt. Babar of Gilgit Scouts, and Ch. Khan Mulk (Gujrat). Khan Ismail Khan and Ghazi Elahi Bakhsh (Mirpur) were awarded the title of Ghazi-e-Kashmir. 128 Sardars and men from amongst the tribesmen were given awards of Fakhr-e-Kashmir, Sher-e-Jang, Mujahid-e-Haidri, Ghazi-e-Kashmir, Bahadur and Distinguished Services Certificates Class one or Class two. Four received the award of Hilal-e-Kashmir. From amongst the fighting force outside the tribesmen, 511 were given awards or Distinguished Services Certificates. 43 Officers from 2nd Lt. upwards who had served in the Indian National Army, played a prominent role in the liberation movement and partly officered the AKRF.[2] It needs to be emphasised here that scores of ex-servicemen and others who fought in the war, had been decorated for their gallantry during the 2nd World War. Two of them, Major Muhammad Aslam Khan and Captain Hassan Khan had won the Military Cross for their performance on the Burma front.

The highest gallantry award instituted by the Azad Kashmir Government, 'Hilal-e-Kashmir', was posthumously awarded to Naik Saif Ali Janjua of Khandar, Tehsil Mehndar. It was the 16th of October, 1948; Saif Ali

1. The Untold Story, p. 127.
2. Abdur Rahim Afghani.

was commanding a platoon of 18 AK which had lost communication with its base camp. A large Enemy force, assisted by Mountain guns and enjoying air support attacked his picquet. He displayed rare qualities of leadership with the result that his men fought valiantly till the last round. He died on the spot alongwith most of his men.

Captain Muhammad Sarwar of the Pakistan Army from Gujar Khan has the distinction of being the first and the lone recipient, in the 1948 Kashmir war, of the highest gallantry award, Nishan-e-Haider. He laid down his life in the Uri Sector on 27th July 1948. He led a group of jawans from the Punjab Regiment against a well fortified bunker which was raining unending fire. In total disregard of his safety, Sarwar successfully led his men to the target which was destroyed. Sarwar received three gun-shots in his chest, died on the spot and was posthumously awarded 'Nishan-e-Haider'.

An Indian plane was brought down in the Poonch Sector with Bren-gun fire by Captain Muhammad Saeed Khan on the 1st of April, 1948. He was awarded the title of 'Sher-e-Jang'. 223 officers and men of the AKRF who were killed during action, were awarded pensions for dependents by the Azad Kashmir Government.[1]

A number of foreigners also participated in the war on the Muslim side. They included Brigadier Russell, an American, Mr. Auckland, a Finish Engineer, Mr. Noel Green, of the Royal Indian Air Force, Mr. R. Anderson, a Burmese Engineer, and Mr. Muhammad Al Arabi, an Arab, teaching Arabic in the Oriental College Lahore.

## WAR PRISONERS IN INDIA

The officers and soldiers taken prisoners of war by India were first put in torture camps set up at several places in the State where they were subjected to third degree methods. A moving account of their incarceration is given by Muhammad Saeed Bukhari.[2] His life was saved when taken prisoner by the timely arrival on the scene of Brigadier Pritam Singh. While Saeed was being taken to the military camp, another fighter, Syed Haider Shah was disarmed after resistance and on a personal search, a small quantity of maize was found in his pocket. Upon this, Pritam Singh opened up:

داندے کھاندا کاہدے لئی آیا سین

(Dogri)

1. Abdur Rahim Afghani, p. 269.
2. *Ibid*, p. 190.

Trans: What for did you come, if you (people) can only afford maize?

Haider Shah retorted appropriately:

ظالماں نوں مارن واسطے آیا ساں

Trans: I had come to give the tyrants a drubbing.

The Brigadier lost patience and ordered them to be removed to the camp, blind-folded. A few days later, he visited the camp and pointing out the prisoners, remonstrated his men:

"Look, these people are fed only with Maize and yet they fight but you don't fight even though you are fed so well."

They were removed to a prisoners camp at Jammu where they stayed for a few months. In June, 1948, they were removed to the Yole camp in Kangra where their number was 150. Apart from being abused and tortured as a matter of policy, they had to put in hard labour, 12 hours a day. Some of them were later driven to the Red fort, Delhi and interrogated. One day, after receiving clothing for the first time, General Carriapa, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian land forces visited the camp. A Christian, he had, unlike his Hindu Generals or officers, no particular hatred against Muslims. The prisoners had been already lined up and on coming face to face with them, Carriapa asked, after the British fashion:

جوان ٹیک ہائے

Jawan Teek Hai.

Trans: Soldiers, Are you well.

Naturally, the prisoners had a number of complaints and, therefore, they were asked to select a spokesman. Mr. Saeed Bukhari, a school teacher who later became Headmaster of a High School in Azad Kashmir, was somewhat conversant with English language. He spoke in English and listing their complaints, said that they were prisoners of war and deserved to be treated in accordance with the International law governing war prisoners. Carriapa replied that they were not prisoners of war because India did not recognize Azad Kashmir. Upon this, Bukhari made a brilliant attack:

"Sir, afterall, you have arrested us *from our own country*."

There was pin-drop silence. Not the type of bigoted, small-minded and chicken-hearted Generals like Sen, Choudhry or Kulwant Singh,

Carriapa was, for a moment, motionless. He stared into the eyes of the prisoner and moving forward two steps, motioned him to come closer:

> "Jawan, who are you and what is your rank?"
>
> "I am merely a soldier and hail from Poonch."
>
> "You are telling a lie, you are a pucca badmash (Army slang, he didn't mean ill). Even Pakistan doesn't have men in the ranks who can speak English. How can there be such men in Azad Kashmir?"
>
> "Sir, I have spoken the truth. I am not an officer. I was aiding the soldiers; my duty was to maintain their supply line."

Bukhari then pointed out Lt. Ahmad Ali and Subedar Major Lal Khan and showed him their broken teeth, thin eye-brows and moustaches from where hair had been pulled out. Thereafter, obviously on the intervention of the General, their fatigue was limited to four hours and they were better looked after. Miss Mcqueens, the talented niece of the Punjab Governor Sir Francis Mudie who rendered invaluable services as Head of the Red Cross Society, visited the camp soon afterwards and provided the prisoners with 175 copies of the Holy Quran, four sets of Allama Iqbal's books, in addition to writing-pads, pencils and envelopes. The Red Cross also arranged exchange of letters with their relatives and delivery of gift parcels from their homes. Carriapa visited the camp again after a few months and was told that they were better looked after. I think it was the impact of a prisoner's unforgettable words: Sir, afterall, you have arrested us *from our own country*: that brought a man of his immense pre-occupations to the camp again and in a few months, to satisfy himself that they were actually properly treated. Miss Mridulla Sarabhai who then Headed the Indian organisation for the recovery of abducted women, also visited the camp. In May, 1950, the war prisoners were exchanged and on the 21st of May, the Yole camp prisoners crossed into Pakistan.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## KASHMIR AT THE UNITED NATIONS

*CHAPTER XXIX*

# Kashmir at the United Nations

## THE COMPLAINT

On January 1, 1948, India lodged a complaint against Pakistan with the United Nations Security Council under Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations Charter which provide that "any member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council". The communication from the government of India said:

> "In order that the objective of expelling the invader from Indian territory and preventing him from launching fresh attacks, should be quickly achieved, Indian troops would have to enter Pakistan territory; only thus could the invaders be denied the use of bases and cut off from their sources of supplies, and reinforcements, in Pakistan. Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government of India are entitled, in international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders. However, as such action might involve armed conflict with Pakistan, the Government of India, ever anxious to proceed according to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, desire to report the situation to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 35 of the Charter. They feel justified in requesting the Council to ask the Government of Pakistan:
>
> (1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State;

(2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;

(3) to deny to the invaders:

(*a*) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir;

(*b*) military and other supplies;

(*c*) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle."

Why did India take the issue to the United Nation? Certainly, it was neither due to any statesmanship nor the so-called high principles of international morality which India has been trumpeting to the world. The reader has already seen that by the end of December, Indian advance on the Uri sector had been effectively blunted; the Uri-Poonch road had been blocked; the Poonch town stood besieged and the Indian garrison at Kotli had been compelled to abandon the town and withdraw to Naushehra with the result that the entire Mirpur district had been liberated. In the Northern regions, after the liberation of the Gilgit agency and Chillas, the vast district of Ladakh was almost waiting for the liberation forces to march in. The advent of winter had posed another problem for the Indians because their heavy war machine could not be effectively used during snow. They also feared a winter offensive by the ill-clad and crudely armed but mountain-dwelling liberation forces. These were the compelling factors that led to the filing of the complaint. In India, powerful elements both within and outside Government were seriously thinking of an attack on Pakistan itself. Not having accepted the creation of Pakistan sincerely, they thought the situation provided them an excuse to undo partition but it was also feared that there might be a hostile reaction abroad, particularly in the Muslim world. Lord Mountbatten, it seems, was keen to avoid extension of the war beyond J & K frontiers because it would have not only compelled him to give up his post but would have further damaged his own reputation both at home and abroad. His pro-India role during and after partition had already made him a controversial figure and blurred his image in history and it seems he was eager to avoid further damage to his name. It may be emphasised that India did not go to the United Nations with a request to hold a plebiscite but with the demand that Pakistan be declared an aggressor and ordered to stop aid to the liberation forces so that it could be easier for her to enslave its citizens and grab their territory. Testifies Lord Birdwood:

"It will be recalled that December 1947 had not been a good month for India's Army in Kashmir. They managed to relieve Kotli (?) which had been hard pressed by raiders for 31 days; but apart from the initial advance from Srinagar, the Azad Kashmir troops were hitting back at many points along India's tenuous lines of communications. There was therefore some relief in Delhi at the Government's decision to take the matter to the Security Council."[1]

Mr. F. Van Langenhove of Belgium who was President of the Council for the month, immediately sent a telegram to the two governments requesting them "to refrain from any step incompatible with the Charter and liable to result in an aggravation of the situation". Both governments sent in their "assurances' but the fighting continued. That is the pattern of diplomacy. The Indian delegation was led by Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyengar and included Mr. M. C. Setalvad, the Attorney General and Sh. Muhammad Abdullah. The Pakistan delegation was led by Chaudhry Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the foreign Minister and included Mr. M. A. H. Isphahani then Ambassador to the U.S.A., Mr. Wasim the Advocate General, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan. Doctor M. D. Taseer, at one time Principal Amar Singh College, Srinagar, acted as Private Secretary to Sardar Ibrahim.

On his way to Lake Success, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah stopped for a day in Cairo and met the Egyptian premier, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, a friend of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who carried a letter of introduction from the Pandit explained his version of the Kashmir war but press reports indicated that the Wafdist leader had not been impressed though his government adopted a neutral attitude on Indo-Pakistan issues.

## THE COUNTER COMPLAINT

The Security Council first met on 15th January. Mr. Ayyengar told the Council that if the situation was not resolved immediately, it would be "a threat to international peace and security." He brought to the notice of the Council, Lord Mountbatten's pledge that "the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". Mr. Ayyengar chose to describe the statement as "high principled statesmanship". India opposed a request for adjournment by Pakistan, claiming that "the situation does not brook delay"; however, a brief adjournment was granted. Pakistan then filed a counter-complaint which consisted of three documents. In the first document, Pakistan denied the accusation

1. Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 87.

of giving aid to tribesmen and thereby committing an act of aggression: on the contrary, it stated:

> "......On the contrary and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war."

It did not deny that some tribesmen as well as individuals from Pakistan were "helping the Azad Kashmir Government in their struggle for freedom, as volunteers." In the second document, Pakistan submitted its counter complaint as follows:

(1) India was charged with wide-spread genocide against its Muslim population both before as well as after partition pursued by responsible officials of Princely States in the Indian Union.

(2) India was accused of having, by force of arms, occupied Junagarh, Mangrol and Manavadar, though they had acceded to Pakistan. The document said:

> "This action on the part of the Government of India amounted to a direct attack upon and aggression against Pakistan which Pakistan was entitled to repel by force".

(3) It gave the history of the Kashmir case and challenged its so-called accession to India. It accused India of having sent its Army to Kashmir "without consultation with, or even any notice to, the Government of Pakistan with which the State had concluded a standstill agreement. About Indian promise to hold a plebiscite, the document pointed out that it would be nothing but a farce if it were held in the presence of the Indian armed forces and if proper conditions did not exist to guarantee complete freedom to the people of Kashmir to make their choice.

(4) It protested against Indian failure to fulfill various agreements reached in connection with partition such as the division of Military stores and cash balances etc.

The counter-complaint then requested the Security Council:

(1) to call upon the Government of India to desist from acts of

aggression against Pakistan and implement all agrreements she had signed with her.

(2) to appoint a Commission charged with the task of investigating all the accusations against India, arranging cessation of hostilities in Kashmir, and forcing the withdrawal of all outsiders whether they came from India or Pakistan, facilitating the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri refugees, establishing an impartial administration in Kashmir and finally conducting an impartial plebiscite under U.N. supervision.

In the third document, the Pakistan Government gave detailed information about the preceding matters. It was like a white paper which stressed that:

"Even the Kashmir episode in all aspects is but one link in the chain of events which has been unfolding itself ever since it became obvious that there was no solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem except a partition of India.........The Pakistan Government have not accepted and cannot accept the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to India. In their view, the accession is based on violence and fraud.

## SIR ZAFRULLAH'S HISTORIC ADVOCACY

Sir Zafrullah made a most remarkable presentation of the Kashmir case. He spoke for five hours and set up a speech-making record in the Security Council, later bettered by Menon in 1957. Having been associated with the Kashmir movement in 1931, he spoke with authority. The pathos of the people of Kashmir, eloquenced by Sir Zafrullah, was so moving that not only did tears roll down his own eyes but also down the cheek of many a delegate and observer. Sir Zafrullah traced the servitude of the people of Kashmir from days of old and spoke in detail how they had been sold by the East India Company for a paltry sum to Maharaja Gulab Singh. He quoted Iqbal's famous verse wherein he had, as long ago as 1931, prophesied the coming up of the Kashmir issue before the League of Nations. About India's lip service to the so-called "high principled morality", he quoted the Indian proverb about the elephant having two types of teeth, one for the purpose of eating and the other for public display. Pandit Nehru was so rattled by the apt comparison, that he used unbecoming language against him. In course of his speech, Sir Zafrullah said:

"Their (Kashmiris) high artistic talents are well known. What is not fully known is the depth of misery to which they have been reduced by a century of unmitigated tyranny and oppression under Dogra rule until it is difficult to say: which is the greater tragedy to a Kashmiri? His life or his death. Death often provides release from the unbroken chain of suffering, misery and privation which begins in the cradle and ends up in the grave."[1]

Commenting on the role of Sir Zafrullah, Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan has said:

"Sir Muhammad Zafrullah led the Pakistani delegation and with the help of lies and imaginary acts alleged to have been done by India, his brilliant advocacy stole a march over the Indian delegation. The Indian delegation came more or less disappointed as Pakistan was not named an aggressor nor asked to evacuate Kashmir forthwith. When I saw Pandit Nehru after the return of the delegation to India, he also felt somewhat disappointed at what had happened."[2]

With India's approach to the United Nations, most of us got worried lest the Pakistan Government be compelled by the power-politics dominated Security Council to stand between ourselves and our freedom. It is in this important context that the brilliant role played by the Pakistan delegation headed by Sir Zafrullah has to be looked at. Sir Zafrullah's excellent exposition of our case which resulted in putting the deceitful and Machiavellian complainant in her proper place—the dock, has won him a pride of place in the history of Pakistan. Kashmiris will gratefully cherish his memory, generation after generation, for having put all his talents to use in serving their cause of freedom. His is a house-hold name in Kashmir.

Due to Sir Zafrullah's advocacy, the agenda was changed on 22nd January 1948 from the Kashmir Question to "the India-Pakistan Question." Ayyengar strongly protested against the change and was supported by Russia.[3] Rejecting Indian argument that as it was she who had come with a complaint and that therefore, Pakistan's counter-claim to Kashmir cannot be gone into, Mr. Arce stated:

"Even supposing that this body were a court of justice, although I do not know what would be the procedure followed in other

1. Security Council Reports 1948, s. 226, p. 47.
2. Mahajan, p. 172.
3. Rehmatullah Khan, Kashmir and the U.N., p. 19.

countries, in Argentina, if a charge were brought up by one party against another in a court and the other party then brought a countercharge, the court would not attempt to separate those two charges. It would take them together and settle them on their merits."[1]

Mr. Austin of the United States threw his powerful support behind the change. He pointed out that even without tracing the facts, the Kashmir situation warranted urgent application of all "pacific powers" of the Security Council. He invoked the ethical aspects of the U.N. to establish peace before making a "decision with respect to guilt or with respect to what the actual facts are in detail."[2]

Commenting on Sir Zafrullah's role, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali has said:

> "Zafrullah Khan's masterly exposition of the case convinced the Security Council that the problem was not simply one of expelling so-called raiders from Kashmir, as the Indian representative would have them believe, but of placing Indo-Pakistan relations on a just and peaceful basis and solving the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the will of the people of the State."[3]

After mutual consultations, the Council adopted a Belgian resolution in its 230th meeting providing for the despatch of a 3-member Commission for mediation.

While presenting the resolution, the Belgian representative declared that it was being presented "also on behalf of both parties". A modest resolution, it made no mention of the withdrawal of Indian Army and the tribesmen or of the plebiscite. What is, however, tragic in retrospect, is that the three Member Commission never came to the Sub-continent and when ultimately a larger Commission arrived here in July, many months later, the situation had considerably changed and India was now more determined than before, to frustrate international efforts at an amicable settlement. Mr. Josef Korbel, the Indian nominee on the UNCIP, has said:

> "It is tragic, in retrospect, that such a commission, as was agreed to, was not constituted and dispatched to the Sub-continent without delay. Even if it had not been able to stop the fighting, in all

1. Ibid., p. 20.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. Mohammad Ali, p. 301.

probability the commission could have prevented, through its mere presence in Kashmir, the spring offensive and the continuance of large scale operations. But this was not done—and the United nations documents do not offer explantaion for the omission—and inevitably the bitter wrangling broke out again in an intensified form."

The Indian delegation made the following proposal:

1. The fighting must stop and the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals must withdraw.

2. *After* restoration of peace, refugees were to return, law and order to be maintained and *security of the State to be assured.*

3. India claimed responsibility for defence but offered to progressively reduce its forces to a strength compatible with the external security of and internal order, in Kashmir.

4. Sheikh Abdullah to continue as Prime Minister.

5. The Commission to proceed to the Sub-continent at once to mediate and supervise the cessation of hostilities and the termination of military operation.

6. A National Assembly to be elected under Sheikh Abdullah's administration.

7. A National Government to be constituted after election.

8. This Government to arrange a plebiscite under the advice and observation of the United Nations.

9. The National Assembly then to frame a new constitution for the State.

Even a cursory glance at the proposals would show that India was not at all sincere about implementing the solemn pledge given at the time of the so-called accession that the State's future was to be decided through a plebiscite. Many a loop-hole were provided in the proposals so as to be handy for use, from time to time, to sabotage their implementation. It was, therefore, natural that the Pakistan Government should have rejected them out-right and instead proposed that the Commission be invested with the authority to arrange for:

1. the establishment of an impartial interim administration;
2. the withdrawal of all troops;
3. the return of all refugees to their homes, and
4. the holding of a free, fair and unfettered plebiscite.

## UN REJECTS INDIAN CLAIM

A perusal of the proposals would show that all that India wanted was a cessation of hostilities so as to present the world with a fait accompli. Pakistan rightly wanted an agreement on plebiscite prior to a cease-fire because how could the State inhabitants who had risen in armed revolt and sacrificed thousands in the pursuit of the Cause, be successfully persuaded to lay down their arms without a prior agreement for a plebiscite? This had great appeal to the illustrious members of the Council. The Security Council then consisted of five permanent members, representing U.S.A., Russia, Britain, France and China and six members, Ukraine, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia and Syria, elected for a two-year term. Russia and Ukraine chose to remain neutral perhaps because they thought it was an Anglo-Saxon head-ache or perhaps because the post-Stalin Soviet thrust abroad had not as yet begun. China was then ruled by Chiang Kai-Shek who had visited India in February 1942 along with his more famous wife, Madam Chiang. Pandit Nehru who always had an eye on the international scene, cultivated their friendship, especially that of Madam Chiang. That explains why the Chinese representative Dr. Tsiang leaned in favour of India. However, other members adopted a reasonable and just attitude. Kashmiris gratefully remember the principled role played by them, particularly by Mr. Noel Baker, Mr. Warren Austin, Mr. Fares El Khoury, the Christian representative of Syria and the representative of Argentine. Says Mr. Korbel:

> "Again, the members of the Security Council supported the Pakistan point of view. They attached great importance to having the plebiscite conducted by the United Nations and under an impartial government. They rejected the Indian contention that the administration and actual conduct of a plebiscite was an internal affair for Kashmir. The American delegate particularly, Mr. Warren Austin, subjected the Indian argument to a critical, juridical analysis."

It may be noted that plebiscite was already an internationally recognized mode of determining the future of disputed territories. After the first World war, plebiscites were held, in 1920, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commissions to determine the future of Schleswig, Marienwerder and Allenstein, Upper Silesia, Klagenfurt and

Sopron. In 1935, a plebiscite was held under the supervision and organization of the League of Nations Plebiscite Commission to determine the future of the Saar territory, which had embittered relations between Germany and France for over a century. Similarly, in 1945, the Yalta Conference made provisions for the composition of the Polish and Yugoslav governments and for the conduct of free elections in five countries. The elections in South Korea were held under the observation of the U.N. temporary Commission in May, 1948. The elections in Greece in March 1946 and the plebiscite in September 1946 were held in the presence of observers from U.S.A., Britain and France.

Between January 22 and February 4, the Security Council held 8 meetings. The Canadian, Belgian and the Colombian delegations presented separate draft resolutions or memorandums which largely supported the stand taken by Pakistan for the holding of a free and fair plebiscite. On 5th February, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah addressed the Council. His speech was hardly helpful to the Indian cause. He seemed to have forgotten that he was addressing a select gathering of seasoned diplomats and not a multitude of blind supporters in a corner of the State. In course of his speech, he said:

> "There is no power on earth which can displace me from the position which I have here. As long as the people are behind me, I will remain there..............The dispute arises when it is suggested that in order to have free vote, the administration must be changed ............to that suggestion we say 'No'................We shall prefer death rather than join Pakistan. We shall have nothing to do with that suggestion."

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan had no opportunity to address the Council. He, however, addressed the world press and though blushing, as it was his maiden experience to address such a critical and well-informed inquisitive gathering, he created a good impression and was warmly applauded by members of the fourth estate. It was perhaps a comparison of the physique of the two Kashmir leaders that the Argentine representative remarked in the corridors that it was rather Sheikh Abdullah who looked like a raider.[1]

The Indian Government was sorely disappointed by the rejection of her assertion that Pakistan had committed aggression or that Kashmir's future was an internal question. As naturally happens in such situations, the anger was directed towards poor Mr. Ayyengar who was accused

1. As told by Sardar Ibrahim.

of not having done well. Mr. Campbell Johnson records the Indian mood on 17th February 1948:

> "Both (Austin and Noel Baker) are wildly accused of being unashamedly pro-Pakistan for a variety of unedifying reasons. Some of this trouble has sprung from the failure of the Indian delegation to make its mark...............Moreover, the Pakistan delgate was their foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan, an experienced and popular practitioner in United Nations dialectic who was as suave and smooth as the Indian delegates were awkward and angular."[1]

On 8th February Mr. Ayyengar requested for an adjournment to fly home for consultations. The Pakistan delegation opposed the request and most of the delegates expressed concern because the request was incomprehensible not only in view of the continued fighting but also in the light of India's own earlier assertion that the situation was grave and brooked no delay. The Chinese delegate supported the request and the Council, therefore, adjourned. It seems that the request for adjournment was made to gain time to exert pressure on the Labour government in Britain and through her on the United States and France and also to finalize an understanding with Peking for a more pronounced pro-India attitude. It has not come to light so far but perhaps New Delhi might have also attempted to use Chiang Kai-Shek's influence with Washington. Mountbatten unfortunately again allowed himself to be used to further Indian interests or may be, he perhaps thought, the British interests, at the cost of Justice and fairplay. Confesses Campbell Johnson:—

> Their attempt to deal out even-handed justice is producing heavy-handed diplomacy. The crux of the problem as seen in London is India's unwillingness to recognise that a plebiscite carried out under the auspices of Abdullah and with the sole support of the Indian troops, even with Security Council backing, would not be regarded as fulfilling the condition of its fair conduct. In Mountbatten's opinion the U.K. delegate could with advantage take a less unfriendly line towards India by supporting the view that the first step should be for Pakistan to stop helping the raiders. The question of superintending the plebiscite without interfering with the legally constituted Government deserved, he felt, more sympathetic discussion and treatment than it has yet received."[2]

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1 & 2. Campbell Johnson, p. 287.

Both Mr. Warren Austin and Mr. Philip Noel Baker who was years later deservedly awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, ironically, against the Indian pretender Nehru, were fair and forthright in demanding the total withdrawal of both tribesmen as well as Indian troops and the neutralisation of administration, to ensure that the plebiscite was really free and unfettered. We remember them with gratitude. Mr. Noel Baker told the Council:

"The cause which is now in dispute here, the cause of the fighting in Kashmir, is the question: To which of the two Governments, India or Pakistan, shall Kashmir accede? In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their rights will be assured. In other words, as I remarked to the representative of India in our first talk after his arrival, in my profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing from the preliminary measures as to the fighting, right up to the conduct of the plebiscite in the end, is all one problem."

Mr. Austin said:

"I think that all members of the Security Council understand that a settlement would gain great strength if it had the approbation of good people all over the world. There is nothing, in my view of the matter, that will command that approbation as will a machinery that is free from suspicion and that gives to all the world the appearance of impartiality by actually being an impartial administration of the plebiscite."

Mr. Arce, the Argentine representative said:

"This matter having been referred to the Security Council, it is perfectly free to decide as it thinks fit, on the sole condition that it acts within the framework of the Charter. This is the legal point of view. But even from the factual point of view, there can be no other solution. Both the Maharajah, as absolute monarch of Kashmir, and the Government or governments established by him have already shown themselves biased in favour of one of the parties and cannot therefore preside over a free plebiscite. Even if they could, they should not do so, because the opposing party would not recognize the fairness of this plebiscite, even if it had been fairly conducted."

Mr. Arce eloquently added:

> "It is worth-while remembering the Latin proverb, which says *sublata causa, tollitur effectus,* or, in other words, remove the cause and the effects will disappear. In this case, the cause of all the disturbances, whether from India or Pakistan, or from the tribes, lies in the rebellion of the people of Kashmir against the absolute monarch who rules them as if he were running a farm and the 4 million inhabitants were so many heads of cattle and not human beings."

## "HE HAS BEEN AT HIM"

Mr. Attlee was at no stage friendly to Pakistan. From the partisan role he played in relation to the sub-continent, the Pakistanis have been led to believe that he was not essentially a man of high intellectual attainments. When in 1975 I brought this to the notice of Sir Pumphery, his one-time Private Secretary who was then British Ambassador to Pakistan, he resisted the suggestion indignantly and said that he was one of the greatest men of the century, perhaps because it was during his Premiership that the sub-continent, Ceylon and Burma became free. But without minimising his courageous role in the matter, it is quite obvious that Britain could not, even for ten years more, hold the sub-continent in bondage, largely because it could no longer rely upon the Indian Army to maintain its imperialism, leave alone, its own shattered economy and the world-wide climate for freedom and equality; therefore the sacrifice of principles or the estrangement of Pakistan, was too small a price as compared to the advantages of keeping Indian leaders in "good humour". Mountbatten shrewdly, and may be quite patriotically as a Briton, utilised his position as the "man on the spot", in persuading the Attlee Government to abandon, in the words of Campbell Johnson, the policy of "even-handed justice" and replace it with a pro-India attitude. When it was realised by the Pakistan delegation that the interval may be used by India to influence a change in the British Policy, Sir Zafrullah Khan accompanied by Ch. Muhammad Ali flew to London. He first met Mr. Earnest Bevan the foreign Secretary who told him that *although he personally agreed as well as sympathised with him, in matters relating to India, Mr. Attlee was greatly under the influence of Sir Stafford Cripps and that "he has been at him"*. He then met Mr. Attlee who gave a clear indication of a pro-India shift in the British policy. On reaching New York, a change in the atmosphere was clearly visible because U.S.A. largely relied upon British opinion in the matter of Commcenwalth and countries from Latin America and Europe could hardly be expected to go against a joint Anglo-American stand. *Three years later when Sir Zafrullah had*

*the occasion to meet Mr. Noel Baker in Paris, the latter told him in anguish that in February 1948 he had persuaded Ayyengar and Bajpai at New york to press their government for the acceptance of the Security Council resolution and that after a few days both told him that the reaction in Delhi was favourable and that in a day or two, they hoped to be officially informed of its acceptance but "then on Monday I received that disastrous telegram from Attlee upsetting everything". He also told Sir Zafrullah that he protested and that Attlee resented his protest to the extent that he was first transferred to the junior ministership of Fuel and Gas and after sometime, pushed out of the Cabinet.*[1] It also gave Pandit Nehru a new opening, namely, the dangerous realisation that the sanctity of United Nations decisions was meant only for those who were willing to abide by them and that these decisions could be influenced from behind the door pressures and bargaining with big Powers. It was a sad situation. The U.N. had an opportunity to demonstrate its strength and vindicate the principles that went into its founding and thus enhance its own prestige but alas, the opportunity was sacrificed at the altar of British expediency.

When the Council resumed its debate, the Chinese delegate presented a highly pro-India resolution. It appears that during the interval, Mr. Nehru had succeeded in persuading China to introduce such a resolution. Pakistan was quick to reject it and Sir Zafrullah chided the sponsor by "confessing" his "failure" to place his country's case before the Council. Dr. Tsiang continued to represent his Government in the U.N. until the expulsion of Taiwan in 1972. After the September (1965) War when the only positive gain on the Kashmir front registered by us was the capture of Chhamb, he is reported to have told Mr. Yusuf Buchh, then Director of the Free-Kashmir Centre, that Kashmir issue had been reduced to Chhamb issue and next time if there was an Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan would not be able to do more than capture Chhamb. How prophetic!

## THE BASIC COUNCIL RESOLUTION

On 21st April 1948 the Council passed what may be called its basic resolution on Kashmir. One of its sponsors characterised it as "our most considered views on the best approach we could propose to this problem" while another one termed it as "the considered judgment of six delegations" and a third one described it as "fair, just and necessary". It was passed by 9 votes against none; Soviet Union and Ukraine abstained. This is the fundamental resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council on the Kashmir dispute; it has unambiguously laid down that the future of the State is to be decided through a fair and unfettered plebiscite

1. Tehdis-i-Niamet, p. 539.

to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. Since then, whenever the question came up before the Council or whenever there was outside international effort or direct negotiations between the two countries, the discussion has centred round its implementation. The resolution was a triumph for the UN founding fathers, a triumph for the people of Kashmir, a triumph of the stand taken by Pakistan and no less a triumph of the advocacy of Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. The resolution laid down:

1. That the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic way of a free and impartial plebiscite.

2. Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and such of its nationals who had entered for the purpose of fighting.

3. When the *Commission* is satisfied that tribesmen *are* withdrawing and arrangements for cease-fire have become effective, the Indian Government, in consultation with the Commission, shall withdraw its forces from the State and reduce them to the minimum strength required for the support of civil power in the maintenance of law and order.

4. Personnel recruited from each district to be utilised for the maintenance of law and order.

5. Major political groups to join the Government at the Ministerial level while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.

6. A nominee of the Secretary General to be the Plebiscite Administrator who will Head a plebiscite administration.

7. Complete freedom of speech, press, assembly and travel, including the freedom of entry and exit.

8. Indian nationals, other than those who are normally resident therein, to be withdrawn.

9. All citizens who had left the State on account of disturbances, to be invited to return to their homes.

10. The Commission to certify whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.

## THE UNCIP

The Commission had its first meeting on 15th June 1948 at Geneva. It consisted of the representatives of Argentine, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Belgium and the United States. Argentine was nominated by Pakistan, Czechoslovakia by India while the United States was nominated by the Security Council President, India and Pakistan having failed to agree on a common nominee. Argentine was represented by Ricardo J. Siri and his alternate was Carlos A. Leguizamon; Belgium was represented by Elbert Graeffe and his alternate was Harry Graeffe; Colombia was represented by Alfredo Lozano whose alternate was Harnando Samper. The United States was represented by J. Klahr Huddle whose alternate was C. Hawley Oakes. Mr. Josef Korbel, represented Czechoslovakia. The United Nations Secretary General nominated Mr. Erik Colban as his personal representative. When the Commission met at Geneva, it decided upon its procedure and adopted as its name 'The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan'. There is no doubt that they were, all, men of goodwill who wanted the war between India and Pakistan to be brought to an end and help in the solution of the Kashmir problem so that the two countries which had only recently won freedom, could live in peace and harmony. Says Mr. Korbel:

> "There seemed to be a strong feeling that the long struggle of the ancient people of the Indian Subcontinent for that greatest of all treasures, freedom, should not, at the last, be negated by a senseless war. Each member of the Commission seemed to feel a personal responsibility to restore freedom and peace to Kashmir. The American delegate, a seasoned diplomat, spoke with tears in his eyes when, opening a session, he pledged all his efforts to the noble and honourable task with which he had been entrusted."[1]

It is again tragic that although the Commission was appointed under the April 21 resolution, it took 11 weeks to assemble in Geneva by which time India had already launched its summer offensive compelling Pakistan to rush three Brigades to Azad Kashmir. The Security Council had to pass another resolution before the Commission embarked upon its task. It was passed in its 312th meeting on 3rd June and was moved by the representative of Syria. It directed the Commission to proceed to the sub-continent without delay.

The Commission arrived in Karachi on 5th July, 1948. They were housed in the Governor-General's house as the Quaid-e-Azam was ill

1. Korbel.

at Ziarat. Apart from a few formal engagements, they had meetings with Sir Zafrullah Khan who informed them how Pakistan had been compelled to send three Brigades to Azad Kashmir to meet the Indian offensive. About their first meeting with Sir Zafrullah, Josef Korbel records:

> "At this meeting Sir Zafrullah gave the Commission a three-hour discourse on his concept of the background of the Kashmir conflict. His tone was calm, his language precise, and, following the best traditions of his English schooling, his narration was broken by good stories".[1]

On 8th July they flew to New Delhi. They were lodged in the Cecil Hotel but their office was established ten miles away, in Faridkot House. It was symbolic of Indian determination, evidenced by her later conduct at every stage, to frustrate the efforts of men of goodwill, to bring about a just and peaceful solution of the problem. In their first meeting with Pandit Nehru, he lectured to them about "the 8 cultures of Delhi". His own representative Korbel records with grief that while Pandit Nehru spoke, "he seldom raised his head to look into their eyes; nor did he utter a word about Kashmir". It was on 13th July that Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, presented the Indian case before the Commission. At the end of his harangue, the British-knighted diplomat said:

> "The sands of time are running short; if the problem is not resolved by reason, the sword will find the solution".[2]

India demanded that it was only after the Commission condemns Pakistan of aggression, that she could consider the implementation of the Security Council resolution. This was not within the competence of the Commission; its mandate was limited to the four-walls of the 21st April resolution. India was trying to confuse the issue by raising matters clearly foreign to its jurisdiction. It was because she had no doubt about the outcome of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite.

The Commission had several meetings in Delhi and Karachi. Subsequently, *Pandit Nehru chose to meet each one of them separately*. Their desire, expressed in Delhi, to fly to Srinagar was discouraged and they were told that the problem could not be solved in Srinagar but only in New Delhi and Karachi. The Commission began with an effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities. This was not possible because while India was not ready for an unconditional Cease-fire, without at least a declaration of Pakistani troops

1&2. Korbel.

present in Azad Kashmir and their withdrawal, the Pakistan Government insisted upon a prior agreement about the implementation of the resolution on plebiscite. The Commission also examined the chances of a partition. According to the authentic record of Mr. Korbel, India was willing to consider a partitition but Pakistan could naturally not agree to any scheme that did not provide the people of Kashmir valley with an opportunity to decide whether they wanted to join Pakistan.

The Commission then divided itself into two groups, one, led by the American representative, toured Azad Kashmir and the other, visited Srinagar where it was later joined by the former. In Rawalpindi, they had an informal meeting with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan over a cup of tea. Chief Justice Sheikh Abdul Majid who was present, told me that the briefing was done, largely, by Mr. Yusuf Bachh, then Principal Secretary to Ch. Ghulam Abbas. They also visited Muzaffarabad and Mirpur. On its visit to Mirpur it was accompanied by its official photographer, Ali, an Iranian who took photographs of a badly demolished building in Mohallah Bakhshian.

In occupied Kashmir, the Government strained every nerve to prevent the Commission from having a glimpse of the hatred that the Muslims had for India and their unbounded love for Pakistan. That the Government failed in its effort is evident from the following passage from Mr. Korbel:

> "......She (Pakistan) felt she could not abandon the fate of the Kashmiris who preferred (the Pakistanis were sure) to join Pakistan and indeed the Commission's experience in Kashmir supported this opinion.
>
> Time and again the individual members of the Commission and its secretariat were secretly approached, and the people—simple, modest, and humble Kashmiris, would tell them with tears in their eyes, how anxiously everyone awaited the arrival of the United Nations Commission. In shops, in streets, and through letters written by various women, youth organizations, and anonymous individuals, the Commission was beseeched to undo the wrongs, to stop the political terror and corruption, and to make it possible for them to choose freely.
>
> At one moment (Baramula) a young man broke the police cordon, threw a paper in front of the Commission, and shouted in English, "I want to tell you that these people oppress us." The Police took him away immediately, but one could still hear him shouting from among the crowd, "Long live Pakistan!"

This was a disturbing scene for the Commission, which had been assured that the people enjoyed political freedom in Kashmir. It asked its host, the District commissioner, to send for the man and to bring him before the Commission. A few minutes later a man appeared, but it was quite obviously not the young man who had spoken to us.When this fact was brought to the commissioner's attention, he insisted that it was the same person, but the substitute himself disrupted the attempted deception. "Yes," he said, "I am somebody else. My friend is in prison, but it does not matter; I can also tell you that we want to join Pakistan."[1]

The youth, hustled away, from the crowd was Mr. Yusuf Shah, now Executive Vice-President, United Bank of Pakistan.

On the Commission's first visit to Srinagar, the Government arrested Begum Birjis Abdul Ghani, Inspectress of Schools and Begum Musarrat Shaukat Ali, wives of Mr. Abdul Ghani M.L.A. and Agha Shaukat Ali. The two ladies made frantic efforts to meet the Commission and present a memorandum. The efforts were foiled by the Gestapo who made a last minute change in their programme and instead of being taken to the S.P. College as scheduled, they were diverted towards the Secretariat. The two ladies had meanwhile gone to the College where a clash took place between pro-Pakistan and pro-India students. Some sustained injuries. The two ladies were arrested together with 15 pro-Pakistan students and removed first to Srinagar Central Jail and then to Jammu Central Jail. As the Commission appears to have desired to visit the Jammu jail, perhaps having learnt of the two ladies detention, they alongwith other political prisoners including late Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Gilkar M.L.A. were removed to the notorious Bahu fort where the detenus went on a 48-hour hunger-strike and after a few days were brought back to Jammu. The ladies were transferred to Srinagar and released after a detention of about five to six weeks. Sh. Abdullah personally visited them in jail and this is what Begum Birjis records about their meeting:

"The Hon'ble the Prime Minister wants to speak to you. Have you any objection?" shouted the burly superintendent from the threshold of the outer door of the compound wall of our jail. "We have none", I replied, and he dis-appeared.

After about quarter of an hour, Sheikh Abdullah, alongwith his entourage of Ministers and Police highups stepped into the

1. Korbel.

courtyard. The women convicts fell down on his feet begging and imploring him to set them free as they were innocent. We continued to sit on our beds holding the pages of the newspaper in a manner as if we saw nothing, while all the time peeping from corners.

After saying some words of comfort to these women, Sheikh Abdullah waved out all others and walked towards us until he was right in front of us. "As-Salam-o-Alaikum", he said gently. Putting down the newspaper quickly, we said "Wa-Laikum-as-Salam". "Why are you here. Abdul Ghani and Shaukat are sufficient for me. I want you to go back to your children", he continued. This much was enough and I rattled out a long tale of misery and sorrows which the Muslims had suffered ever since he had assumed the reigns of government in Kashmir. The persecution and harassment of innocent people had surpassed those inflicted upon them by Gopala Swami Ayyengar and Kartar Singh. I went on and on for nearly an hour and a half, and he stood listening, holding on to one of the poles supporting the roof. It must be said to Sheikh Abdullah's credit that his behaviour was that of a perfect gentleman that afternoon. Not once did he interrupt me or show any signs of impatience.

When at last I had finished my tale of woes, he said, "Kashmir is a keg of gunpowder at this time. One match to it and the whole thing will blow up. You must remember Indian army is here." "It is you, Sheikh Sahib, who sent for the Indian army" I interrupted. No answer. "Do you know, Birjees, that if on the day of your demonstration in the College, you had been killed, twenty thousand Muslims would have died", he said sadly. "The cause would have been you, Sheikh sahib", I said excitedly. "'Well now, you both must go home and pray to God Almighty for the safety of Kashmir. If and when a plebiscite is held, you can vote according to your conscience", were his parting words."[1]

The Commission finally adopted a resolution on 13th August 1948. It is the second important U.N. document on Kashmir and provided:

1. Cease-fire within 4 days of the acceptance of the Resolution.
2. Both sides to refrain from steps aimed at augmenting the military potential of their forces.
3. Appointment of Military observers by the Commission to supervise the observance of the cease-fire.

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1. The Land of our Dreams.

4. Pakistan to withdraw its troops, and use its influence to seek the withdrawal of tribesmen and its nationals who had entered for the purpose of fighting.

5. The territory evacuated by Pakistan troops to be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

6. When the tribesmen and Pak. nationals have withdrawn and Pakistan troops are being withdrawn, India to begin the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces.

7. All human and political rights to be guaranteed in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

8. Both Governments re-affirm their wish that the future status of J & K *shall* be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

On September 21, 1948, the Commission returned to Geneva to prepare its report. The Security Council was then in session at Paris where the United Nations General Assembly was also holding its session. In all, the Commission held 113 meetings and it is really remarkable that all its decisions were unanimous. In Paris, they held further meetings with the representatives of the two countries in order to bring about a cease-fire and to evolve a plan for the conduct of the plebiscite. By the beginning of December, the Commission formulated its proposals and deputed Mr. Alfredo Lozano and his alternate Mr. Hernando Samper to the Sub-continent to explain the proposals to the two Governments and clear any doubts arising out of the draft. Finally, the proposals were accepted by the two Governments and they were embodied in a resolution known as the January 5, 1949 UNCIP resolution, which provided:

1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan, will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

2. There will be an immediate cease-fire.

3. The Secretary General will, in agreement with the Commission, appoint a Plebiscite Administrator.

4. As soon as peaceful conditions are restored, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will, in consultation with India, determine the final disposal of Indian and State armed

forces and those in A.K., in consultation with the local authorities.

5. All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances, will be invited and be free to return to their homes and enjoy all rights as citizens. To facilitate repatriation, two Commissions, one composed of the nominees of India and the other of nominees from Pakistan, will be appointed.

6. All persons who have entered on or after the 15th of August, 1947, for other than a lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State.

7. All political prisoners are released.

## CEASE-FIRE AND ITS SUPERVISORY FORCE

A cease-fire was agreed upon by the two Governments and consequently hostilities ceased at one minute before midnight on 1st January 1949. A group of military officers designated as U.N. Military Observers was sent to supervise the cease-fire and assist the two Governments in demarcating the truce line. The Observer's group has generally varied from forty to sixty members. In the beginning, the countries who sent their officers were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Uruguay and the United States. Headquarters were established at Srinagar and Rawalpindi and a sub-office was later set up at Muzaffarabad. Observer posts were opened at Uri, Kotli, Rawalakot and Northern areas. These were linked by a radio communications net-work, operated by U.N. personnel. Complaints of violations are jointly investigated by representatives from both the Headquarters. In February 1954 Pandit Nehru demanded the recall of the U.S. Observers on the pretext of U.S.—Pakistan co-operation in the military field. The demand was resisted by the United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold on the reasonable ground that after joining the United Nations team, citizens of various countries became denationalized. However, a tacit understanding was reached that observers from the U.S.A. would not be replaced from that country after their term expired.

The Commission returned to the sub-continent on February 4, 1949 to implement its resolutions. It held 126 meetings in Delhi, Karachi, Srinagar and Rawalpindi. Mr. Korbel resigned from membership of the Commission for personal reasons. He represented India but adopted a just and reasonable attitude. He was nominated when Communists had not as yet seized power in his home country. This happened soon afterwards. An ardent supporter of individual and collective

freedom, he worked sincerely for the resolution of the dispute in accordance with demorcratic methods. His resignation and consequent replacement by a Communist, introduced tension and intrigue into its working. It was soon apparent that the new member was in total sympathy with Indian efforts to sabotage the solemn undertaking given to the people of Kashmir for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. Says Mr. Korbel of his successor:

> "He sabotaged the Commissions efforts, encouraged intrigue among the individual delegates and reported regularly to Sh. Abdullah on its confidential meetings."

The first to be appointed as the Chief Military Observer was a Belgian Officer, Lt. General Maurice Delvoie. He arrived in the subcontinent on 2nd January 1949. The two Commanders-in-Chief met on 15th January 1949 at the Indian Army Headquarters Delhi to implement Part-I of the UNCIP resolution of 13th August 1948 relating to the Cease-fire. It is interesting to point out that in vivid contrast to the politicians negotiations, they brought abcut the following agreement in one day:

1. Slight adjustments in troop dispositions to avoid minor incidents;
2. Use of specified supply routes by both armies;
3. Withdrawal of all tribesmen and other outside elements as soon as possible;
4. Relieving of Azad forces in forward areas by Pakistan Army, perhaps to ensure a strict observance of the Cease-fire agreement.
5. Both the armies agreed to give all facilities to the UNCIP, required for establishing observer teams.
6. Each Observer group consisting of neutral observers was to be joined by one Indian and one Pakistani Officer.

General Delvoie communicated his satisfaction at the agreements. In the same meeting, agreement was also reached on the exchange of prisoners, return of abducted women and efforts to stop the burning of villages. The demarcation of cease-fire line was successfully worked out by the UNCIP in meetings held from July 18th to 27th. It empowered the Commission to "station observers where it deems necessary".

By 19th July 1949, 32 Military Observers from U.S.A., Canada, Belgium, Mexico and Norway had taken up their duties. Their number

did not exceed 65, but several other countries from Latin America and Europe such as Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Chile and Norway also designated representatives. In 1954, the number of Americans was 19. General Delvoie returned to New York the same year and was replaced by a Canadian Officer, Brigadier Henry Angle who was killed in a plane-crash along with two U.S. Officers and a member of the U.N. Secretariat. Another Observer was killed in a jeep accident and several others sustained injuries while performing their duties. Angle was succeeded by Major General R. H. Nimmo from Australia. The pattern established was that the field observer team posted with a unit, on either side, consisted of two or three Military Observers and one Radio operator. They are rotated from one side to the other to avoid a spirit of partisanship by remaining too long with one army. The headquarters staff consists of three Military Observers, the Chief of Military Staff who represents the Chief Military Observer during his absence, an Operating Officer, an Intelligence Officer who keeps records and a U.N. Administrative Officer who is also a sort of an Account Officer. Then there are Liaison Officers who establish contact with the two Governments. The Headquarter of the group is located for six months during winter in Rawalpindi and during Summer, in Srinagar. The Staff and Liaison Offices move to Delhi and Srinagar when the HQ is in Rawalpindi and to Rawalpindi when the HQ is in Srinagar. Beginning in 1950, a communication network was set up with mobile transmitters and generators. The observer teams receive their salary from their respective national armies but are paid a subsistance allowance and also an allowance of $ 100 for personal field clothing and equipment. The U.N. also assumes responsibility for their total disability or death. India and Pakistan provide hospitalization and medical expenses in case of temporary disability.

The U.N. expenditure for the group for some years is given below:—

| | |
|---|---|
| 1958. | U.S. $ 3,62,532 |
| 1959. | U.S. $ 435,039, |
| 1960. | U.S. $ 421,915 |
| 1961. | U.S. $ 446,336 |
| 1962. | U.S. $ 456,322 |
| 1963. | U.S. $ 433,200 |
| 1964. | U.S. $ 447,400 |
| 1972-73 | U.S. $ 1142,000 |
| 1973-74 | U.S. $ 1190,000 |
| 1974-75 | U.S. $ 1264,000 |
| 1975-76 | U.S. $ 1191,000 |
| 1976-77 | U.S. $ 4661,000 |
| 1978-79 | U.S. $ 4864,000 |

The expenditure rose to nearly five crore rupees for the years 1978 and 1979. In 1979, it employed 137 officers; these included 57 members of the air crew. The present Chief Military Observer is a Swede, Colonel Stig Waldensfrom.

The details of the figure for the year 1964 were as follow:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Staff Costs** | | |
| Salary and wages of staff recruited for mission | $ | 45,500 |
| Subsistance and travel of staff recruited and detailed | $ | 68,500 |
| Subsistance and travel of Military Observers | $ | 301,900 |
| **Operational Costs** | | |
| Maintenance and rental of premises and equipment | $ | 17,800 |
| Operation and maintenance of vehicles | $ | 15,000 |
| Communications, freight supplies and services | $ | 48,800 |
| Rental of air-craft | $ | 41,000 |
| Purchase of furniture and fixtures | $ | 13,700 |
| Purchase of vehicles | $ | 9,200 |
| Total | $ | 447,400 |

One of the most important tasks of the group is to determine the opposing army's order of battle and other troop formations. Dealing with this point, the knowledgeable author states:

> "The second operation of determining general troop formation is directed primarily to ensure against dangerous build-ups of troops on either side. It involves highly classified information, the disclosure of which would create grave problems for the opposing side. So far as is known, no other peace-observation group has ever been furnished with this information, a testimony to the confidence of both armies in the United Nations military observers. The sparseness of published reports from UNMOGIP stems largely from their responsibility for this function. All information of this nature is classified as "top-secret".[1]

With the completion of detailed arrangements regarding cease-fire, Pakistan withdrew a part of her Army but not India which matched it with the withdrawal of a squadron of Air force! An exchange of prisoners was

1. David Wainhouse, p. 357.

also agreed upon. Brigadier Ghansara Singh and hundreds of Indian and State soldiers who were in detention at Attock, were exchanged with prisoners in occupied Kashmir who included politicians and civil servants. Among them were Mr. Allah Rakha Saghar, Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Bachh, Agha Shaukat Ali, Qureshi Muhammad Yusuf, Maulvi Abdur Rahim, Mr. K. H. Khurshid, Mr. Abdul Ghani M.L.A. and Maulvi Noor-ud-Din.

The Commission had this time come for the implementation of the Security Council as well as its own resolutions so as to make possible the holding of a plebiscite. The first and the most vital step was to bring about an agreement on demilitarization. India appeared determined, as ever, to prevent the holding of a plebiscite and would not, therefore, allow any reasonable agreement on demilitarization. From now on, for years and years to come, the U.N. Representatives stood tied to this question without any progress because an agreement is only possible when there is a desire on both sides for a settlement and since India desired otherwise, it blocked the chances of progress by coming out with ulterior and wholly incompatible interpretations of the UNCIP resolutions. The beginning was made when Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai told the Commission that "the disbanding and disarming on a large scale of the Azad forces was an essential condition to be fulfilled before any plebiscite could be held". He also sought to give strange and novel interpretation to the terms "local authorities" and "surveillance" as used in the UNCIP resolution. Says Mr. Korbel:


> "This statement heralded new difficulties. The terms of the Commission's proposals, accepted by both governments as the basis for the truce, had contained no suggestion of disbanding or disarming the Azad forces during the truce period. Now India had thrust this new element into the picture. Pakistan, disturbed by the proposal, once again questioned India's goodwill."[1]

India also refused to intimate her Army strength in occupied Kashmir and the scope and schedule of their withdrawal. Says Mr. Korbel:

> "………Again it was evident that India was principally pre-occupied with the control of the sparsely populated areas north and north-west of Kashmir proper, a control which clearly went beyond the stipulations of the accepted resolutions".[2]

Despite efforts by the Commission, no progress could be registered because of Indian obduracy. The Commission, thereupon, proposed to


1 & 2. Korbel.



Begum Nasira Kiani addressing a public meeting at Muzaffarabad in 1950



The Author with Miss Fatimah Jinnah at the civic reception in Mirpur in 1957



Col. Ali Ahmed Shah and Kh. Ghulam Ahmed Jeweller President & Minister (1951)



Col. Sher Ahmed Khan A.K. President addressing a public meeting (1952—1956)



Haji Aminul Hussaini, Mufti Azam Palestine, addressing admirers at Muzaffarabad



President Ayub with Sh. Muhammad Abdullah, Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan,
Mirwaiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah in Rawalpindi in 1964



President Ayub in Muzaffarabad with "Chhota President" K. H. Khurshid in October 1960

settle the difference of opinion about the implementation of the truce agreement through arbitration and proposed Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as arbitrator. The move was supported in a joint appeal by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. Pakistan accepted the appeal as well as the proposal but India rejected it. Said India:

> "This procedure was novel and without precedence and could hardly be justified...... She could "only express surprise and disappointment at the attitude of the Commission".[1]

## MADAM LOZANO Versus QUDRATULLAH SHAHAB

The Commission visited Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Northern areas, Srinagar, Jammu and other places in the State and had talks with political leaders. The A.K. Government Headquarter had those very days been shifted to Muzaffarabad. The administration was naturally ill-manned because it was new. It gave rise to many an interesting situation. One of the Commission members, perhaps Mr. Lozano, was accompanied by his wife. On reaching Muzaffarabad, she went to the town, ostensibly for sight-seeing and insisted to be left alone. She went to the war-ravaged interior and found a condemned letter-box of pre-partition days wherein she deposited a letter. Mr. Qudratullah Shahab, then Secretary General of the Azad Kashmir Government had taken care to detail someone to watch her. When he brought the news that she had dropped a letter in an *unused* letter-box, it was immediately recovered; it was a self-addressed letter on her Rawalpindi address. It was immediately stamped and sent by a special jeep to Rawalpindi where it was delivered on the next morning, hours before her return from Muzaffarabad! This very much impressed the Commission and it praised the efficiency of the A.K. Postal Service! On the other hand, the telephone put at their disposal did not work well and although the Army telephone service was actually working in the areas, they thought it was fake and had been installed to hoodwink them! They also desired to watch proceedings in the High Court which had recently been set up with late Sh. Abdul Majid, a retired Sessions Judge from Jullundhur, as Chief Justice. Housed at Rawalpindi, it heard cases at district Headquarters. The late Chief Justice, a man of many qualities, told this writer that on the night previous to its visit, he spent hours preparing a local lawyer, Sayed Tasaddaque Hussain Shah, a murder appeal, especially in the light of medical evidence. The Court sat in a tent and next day the Commission members sat for a considerable time, hearing arguments.

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1. Korbel.

The Commission's report was very critical of India. Of course, the Czeckoslovakian representative wrote a dissenting report, hurling abuses on the British and American Governments. It recommended its own dissolution and the appointment of a single Mediator. It also recommended arbitration if further attempts at meditation failed. In the report, the Commission said:

> "The roots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong undercurrents —political, economic, religious—in both Dominions have acted, and do act, against an easy and prompt solution of this outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan. These currents, which at this early stage of national formation, are often antagonistic, account to a considerable degree, for the misgivings, reluctance, and hesitancy which the Commission felt were often present in the negotiations and which restricted both governments in the concessions which they might otherwise have been prepared to make to facilitate agreement."

## ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ

Meanwhile, immediately after cease-fire, the U.N. Secretary General, after prior consultations with the two Governments, nominated Admiral Chester Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator. He was formerly Commander-in-Chief of the American Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas in the World war. A man of unquestioned integrity and international prestige, he responded to the call as a duty and immediately engaged himself in studying the history of the sub-continent, its geography, religions and cultures. Pakistan demand for his immediate induction into office was stoutly opposed by India. Had he been permitted to assume office on the scene, it is possible that he might have been able to bring to bear on the situation, an urgency that might have helped in advancing the cause of peace. Unfortunately, it was quite the reverse that India aimed at.

The Security Council then met again under the presidentship of the Canadian statesman, General McNaughton to consider the report. The General formulated certain proposals which are since known as "McNaughton proposals" for demilitarization. These were formulated pursuant to the Council resolution passed in its 457th meeting on 22nd December 1949.

Uptil now, the world press had practically continued to be misled by India's so-called morality and was also under the spell of Pandit Nehru's so-called high statesmanship but, by and by, it saw the real face of India

and its Prime Minister. The intransigence displayed by her at every stage to frustrate the holding of a plebiscite brought forth critical comments from the world press, and this criticism increased from year to year, to such an extent that one leading newspaper condemned Pandit Nehru as an international Thug. With the failure of the UNCIP Commission in 1949, the Economist London commented:

> "......But the whole world can see that India, which claims the support of this majority (of the Kashmir people)......has been obstructing the holding of an internationally supervised plebiscite. From this the world opinion can only conclude that......India really has no confidence that the vote would go in its favour."

Pandit Nehru immediately condemned these comments as "blatant and lying propaganda in the foreign press". The McNaughton proposals were incorporated in a resolution sponsored by Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was adopted by the Security Council on 14th March 1950 by eight votes. Yugoslavia, then already under the heels of Tito, abstained. The Soviet Union was then boycotting the Council.

## SIR OWEN DIXON

The choice for a single mediator fell on Sir Owen Dixon, a Judge of the Australian High Court and a Jurist of repute. Appointed in April 1950, he left Australia a few days later and spent some time at the United Nations Headquarter to acquaint himself with various aspects of the problem. On reaching the Sub-continent, he first went to Delhi on 27th May 1950 and after having several meetings with Pandit Nehru and other Indian leaders, came to Karachi on 1st June and met Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. On 7th June, he went to Srinagar and remained there till 12th July when he returned to the two capitals to resume the parleys. In Srinagar, he had several meetings with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and other Government leaders. Pandit Nehru had meanwhile gone to Indonesia and returned on 24th June while the Prime Minister of Pakistan who was then touring the United States, returned to Karachi on 13th July. The two Premiers met in Delhi in the presence of Sir Dixon on Thursday, the 20th of July and the meetings continued from day to day until Monday, the 24th of July when by common consent, it was broguht to an end. His first proposal was that Pakistan Regular Forces start withdrawing from a named date and after a significant number of days, the other operations on each side of the Cease-fire line, aiming at demilitarization, should take place, as far as practicable, concurrently. He, however, did not specify the interval for completion of demilitarization

or a time-table for the various steps that were to take place in the process. Sir Dixon's proposal also visualised the withdrawal or disarming and disbanding of the Jammu and Kashmir State forces and the Militia, though on the Pakistan side also he visualised the disbanding of Azad Kashmir Forces and the Northern Scouts. The proposals were accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. The lame excuse advanced by India was that the possibility of an attack by Pakistan still existed and that the Militia, though commanded by Indian officers, was organised and paid by the State and India could not ask the State government to disband it. It needs no argument to expose the hollowness of the claim. It was simply a subterfuge to frustrate an agreement.

India also contended that the local authority mentioned in paragraph A (3) Part-II of the UNCIP resolution of 13th August 1948 meant the 'Maharaja's government' and as such she demanded that even the liberated territory should be administered by Sheikh Abdullah's government. It was a wholly destructive interpretation because the term 'local authority' was nowhere used for the Government in the Indian occupied part of the State, but only for the liberated territory which clearly meant the authority having de facto jurisdiction in the area. Under the resolution, this 'local authority' was to function under the surveillance of the Plebiscite Administrator. The word 'surveillance' is itself very unfortunate but its use clearly shows that the local authority meant the authority having de facto power in the area; the term 'surveillance' was used with regard to it so as to treat it at an inferior level than the government across the Cease-fire line in order to meet the Indian claim, of the so-called validity of the Srinagar regime. However, Sir Dixon sought to meet the Indian objection by proposing that in the Azad territory, the District Magistrates carry on the administration but that an officer of the United Nations would be attached with each DM to supervise his work and report to the UN Representative. This again was not accepted by India. With regard to the liberated territory in the Northern area, Sir Dixon proposed that instead of the existing Political Agents, new Political Agents be appointed by or under the authority of the Security Council after consultations with the two countries and both here as well as in Azad Kashmir, the laws and customs having the force of law were to remain the same as they were before the revolution broke out. Again, India did not agree. It wanted to place its own garrisons or set up its military posts in certain places on the Northern side of the Cease-fire line. On the Indian side of the Cease-fire line, Sir Owen Dixon felt:

> "It appeared to me that some provision was necessary to ensure that arbitrary powers which at present exist were not exercised

so as to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite and that Police powers were not so used. As I have already said, the Government of the State would be vitally interested in the result of the plebiscite."

He, therefore, proposed:

(*a*) A United Nations Officer be posted with or attached to each District Magistrate;

(*b*) He should be entitled to see the administrative records and proceedings of the District Magistrates and all officers subordinate to him;

(c) The duties of the United Nations officer would include observation, inspection, remonstrance and report;

(*d*) without the prior consent in writing of the United Nations officer, no warrant or order for the arrest of any person should be granted or made under emergency powers or any powers of detention or imprisonment ever used ar d all prisoners held under the authority of any like warrant or order to be set free within seven days, except prisoners to whose further detention the United Nations officer consented in writing or criminals.

This plan was also rejected by the Prime Minister of India.

Sir Dixon then proposed a single government for the entire State and the first possibility mooted was a coalition government to be formed by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas or by placing certain portfolios at the disposal of the respective parties. The second plan was for the formation of an administration composed of trusted persons outside politics holding high judicial or administrative offices and commanding general confidence. It was to be chaired by a nominee of the United Nations and other members were to be equally divided between Muslims and Hindus. It was to assume office six months before actual polls. The third plan was to have an administration at the top, entirely of U.N. representatives. Again, the proposals were rejected by India. Sir Dixon could not help but condemn India in the following words:

"In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to

provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any character as would, in my opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled."

Sir Dixon must have naturally lost patience and finding that there was no chance of an overall plebiscite in view of Indian obstructionism, asked the two Prime Ministers in their final meeting on 24th July as to whether it was not possible to dispose of the State on the following basis:

(1) Such areas about which there was apparently no doubt, may without a plebiscite go to one country or the other, and

(2) A plebiscite to be held only in other areas.

The Pakistan Prime Minister naturally protested because the entire State had to join one or the other country through a plebiscite. Mr. Nehru sought an adjournment to consult his colleagues and later informed Mr. Dixon that his government was prepared to accept the proposal on the following conditions:

(1) That part of Jammu province which was already under Indian occupation may directly go to India; also the tehsil of Ladakh and the tehsil of Kargil except the area above Suru river.

(2) The territory constituting Azad Kashmir except the Muzaffarabad district, and the northern region, already liberated, may directly go to Pakistan.

(3) A plebiscite be held not only in Kashmir valley but also in the district of Muzaffarabad upto the natural boundary formed by river Kishan-ganga.

(4) The valley above Suru river should go to the country which emerges victorious in the plebiscite to be held in the Kashmir province.

India also demanded straightening of the Cease-fire line near Gulmarg by which she meant to lay claim to the Haji-Pir pass.

India was prepared to guarantee the flow of the Chenab river. Mr. Nehru was prepared to sit in another conference with the Prime Minister of Pakistan to discuss the plan. According to Mr. Dixon:

"The territorial demands which the foregoing information disclosed appeared to me to go much beyond what according to my conception of the situation was reasonable and I so stated to the Indian authorities."

Pakistan was not prepared to sit in a conference for a discussion on the said plan but was willing to consider an outright partition which gave her Kashmir valley. India was not ready for it. Sir Dixon then envisaged a plan of his own for a partial plebiscite in a limited area including or consisting of the valley of Kashmir and for partitioning the remainder of the State, of course, according to his own concept of what was just for purposes of allocating areas to the two countries. After certain initial objections, the Pakistan government was prepared to accept the proposal provided India gave an advance assurance that she would agree to the neutralization of administration. It was consistent with the views already held by Sir Dixon and he, therefore, enquired from the Prime Minister of India about his reactions but as usual, he declined to accept it. The objections taken by Delhi are given below:

"(1) Pakistan is an aggressor and it would be a surrender to aggression to allow her to take any part in the plebiscite. For the same reason and because of the danger involved, Pakistan troops can never be allowed to enter the plebiscite area and therefore it was impossible to countenance the proposal to enable the administrative body to request the parties to provide troops if it thinks them necessary.

(2) The provision would mean the supersession of the State Government.

(3) Only, people belonging to the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be allowed any part in the "campaign" over the plebiscite. There can be no equality between India and Pakistan in this or other relevant respects.

(4) The security of the State would be endangered."

That a plebiscite under Indian bayonets would have been a fruitless exercise, has been very clearly brought out by the eminent jurist himself when he reported to the Council:

"These arguments appeared to me to overlook the real nature of a proposal for partition and a partial plebiscite or else to make it completely impossible. The question whether Pakistan had or

had not been an aggressor had, to my mind, nothing to do with the results of a partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite. To agree that Pakistan should take, under a partition, part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, she took not merely an interest in but sovereignty of the territory. Again, as I saw the matter, to agree that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan should pass to one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree to a text involving an equal interest in both countries in the result. Further it is to agree to the ascertainment of the will of the people by an independent authority because that authority will see that the plebiscite is freely and fairly conducted.

I had formed the opinion that it was not easy to exclude the danger that the inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir would vote under fear or apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are not high-spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part they are illiterate. There were large numbers of regular soldiers of the Indian army as well as of the State Militia and police and more often than not, they were under arms. The State Government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest. These are not matters that the Kashmiris inhabiting the Valley could be expected to disregard in choosing between voting as the Government of Kashmir asked them and voting for accession to Pakistan.

It appeared to me that the danger to the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite could not be removed unless in the administrative hierarchy of the State so far as it controlled the plebiscite, United Nations Officers were interposed temporarily. The authority of the Ministry over the rest of the State would not be affected. The ordinary working of the machinery of government in the plebiscite area would go on without change, but for the limited area, the United Nations Administrators would for the time being be responsible for the working of the machinery in order to see that it was not used to influence the voters. The presence of numbers of troops, armed militia and police in the Valley did not appear to me to be favourable to a free expression of the people's will and I considered that the administrative body might be safely given powers to decide what was necessary to insure the maintenance of order and to protect the area from external danger if they found that any existed. I did not suppose that they would invoke Pakistan troops without good cause, but I saw no reason why

both countries should not be under an obligation to provide troops if requested. I saw no reason to change the opinion I had formed or to depart from the provision I had intended to include. I could not expose a plebiscite conducted under the authority of the United Nations to the dangers which I believed certainly do exist. Indeed I came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to give effect to the doctrines formulated by India in objection to my plan and at the same time frame a plan for partition and a limited plebiscite which I could ask Pakistan to accept."

Mr. Dixon left Karachi on 23rd August 1950. It was unfortunate that in the final analysis, he recommended that the initiative be passed back to the parties by the Security Council though he also recommended that the U.N. military Observers be retained on the Cease-fire line for the time being. It is really sad that merely on account of the failure of his patience and sustained work, the great Jurist should have thought it fit to ask the Security Council to wash off its own hands and leave the parties to do what they liked. Such a course, apart from being negative and bound to be fruitless as was proved by subsequent events, meant also to prove the futility of the United Nations, brought into being to extinguish fires and bring about a world of peace and understanding. Fortunately for the United Nations and the posterity, the Security Council did not accept this line of approach.

## THE GREAT GRAHAM

The Security Council considered the Dixon report in several meetings. India and Pakistan were again represented by delegations headed by Sir B.N. Rau and Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan. On 13th March 1951, the Council adopted a resolution submitted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States re-affirming its previous resolutions and after declaring that any decision that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly may take about the future of the State, would not constitute a disposition of the State as laid down in the Council resolutions, relieved Dixon and appointed Frank Graham as sole U.N. Mediator.

Meanwhile, on 25th November 1949, Karan Singh issued a proclamation directing that the constitutional relationship with India, was hence forth to be governed by the Constitution of India. It came into force on 26th January 1950.[1]

The All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference General Council in a meeting held in Srinagar passed a resolution "calling" upon the Go-

1. Kashmir Awakes, p. 104.

vernment to convene a 'Constituent Assembly' to frame a Constitution for the State. The resolution was in accord with the New Kashmir pamphlet adopted as fundamental policy and programme in 1944 but the speeches made at the meeting were highly abusive of Pakistan and its leaders; the feeling in Pakistan was that it was being done under the inspiration of the Indian Government so that the so-called Assembly may pass a resolution confirming the Maharaja's so-called accession which India may use as an expression of popular will. On 1st May 1950, Karan Singh issued a proclamation convoking a constituent Assembly. The "elections" were held in September—October 1950 and the Assembly met for its opening session on 31st October 1950. Pro-Pakistan parties boycotted the election and most of the members were returned unopposed. Pakistan therefore brought the matter to the notice of the Security Council on 14th November 1950 requesting it "to call upon India to refrain from proceeding with the proposal for a Constituent Assembly". Addressing the Council at its 538th meeting on the 29th of March 1951, the representative of India Sir B.N. Rau gave the following commitment:

> "Some members of the Council appear to fear that in the process, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly might express its opinion on the question of accession. The Constituent Assembly cannot be physically prevented from expressing its opinion on this question if it so chooses. But this opinion will not bind my Government or prejudice the position of this Council."[1]

The Security Council this time appointed Dr. Frank P. Graham as its representative. He was appointed on 30th April 1951. At the time of his appointment, the ex-American Senator was working as Defence Manpower Administrator in the Labour Department of the United States. He arrived in the sub-continent on 30th June. His staff of 11 members included, as Military Adviser, General Jacob J. Devers who commanded the 6th Allied Army that invaded Germany and who was a former Commander-in-Chief of the American ground forces. He spent 11 weeks in the sub-continent and returned to Geneva on 12th September to prepare his report. On 7th September, he despatched a letter to the two Prime Ministers containing the text of a draft agreement and invited their comments, suggestions and detailed plans for demilitarization.

Most of these proposals were not of a substantive nature. While India accepted most of them including proposal No. 4 which re-affirmed her acceptance of the principle that the question of the State's accession to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a

1. Korbel.

free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, she proposed that on its side of the Cease-fire line, the minimum number of troops, she would like to keep was one line of communication area—Headquarter, and one Infantry Division of four Brigades of four battalions each, plus the State Militia comprising a force of six thousand, all totalling about 33,500 soldiers. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, she insisted that the Azad Forces should be disbanded and disarmed and at the end of demilitarization, there should be not more than a force of four thousand men consisting of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom to be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half, of persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. It was to be commanded by U.N. Officers or locals and not by Pakistan officers. The Indian government also stated that demilitarization was not possible within ninety days and also declined to give any definite commitment about the date on which the Plebiscite Administrator was to be inducted into office. On the other hand, the Pakistan government wanted immediate induction into office of the Plebistite Administrator; it also accepted the period of ninety days tor demilitarization. The Pakistan Government also stated that the forces to be maintained on both sides for the period of plebiscite should be of the status of civil armed forces and that a force of not more than four Infantry Battalions should remain on each side of the cease-fire line. However, the Pakistan Government expressed its willingness to a slight increase in the forces on the Indian side, should an agreement be arrived at. At this stage, para 4 of Mr. Nehru's reply to Mr. Graham regarding the Indian commitment to plebiscite is quoted below verbatim:

> "4. As regards paragraph 4, the Government of India not only re-affirm their acceptance of the principle that the questicn of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations but are anxious that the conditicns necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible. It is with this object, and this object alone, in view, that they have examined your proposals."

The Indian proposal about the stationing of four thousand men in Azad Kashmir, half of whom were not to be the followers of Azad Kashmir and all of whom were to be the residents of the area, was a mischievous proposal and it seems that ground was being laid for creating a row on this issue later on so as to defeat the plan because if negotiations had reached that stage, she would have definitely intepreted this provision as meaning the enlistment of non-Muslim refugees from the area living outside Azad Kashmir. Dr. Frank Graham, therefore, reported his pro-

gress to the Security Council. He made a statesmanlike statement before the Council in its 564th meeting held in New York on October 18, 1951 in which he said:

"With respect to the value of a settlement to the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the first significant result which would proceed from an agreement would be the exercise by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of the promised right of self-determination for which they have been anxiously waiting for three years. It would recognize the enduring idea that, in the long run, the sovereignty which proceeds from princes is subject to the sovereignty of the people who, after all, under God, are the highest sovereignty. Any status based on the compulsions of force by either nation or on the attrition of long delay in settlement would not be permanently accepted by the people of the State or of either nation, would not be in accordance with the principles and spirit of the United Nations, would not have the support of the moral opinion of mankind, and therefore not long endure.

As a practical matter, without fulfilment of the promised right of self-determination through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the continuing dispute, as has been well said, would become a running sore, which would tend to drain away resources and energies to the damage of the State and the peoples of both nations.

As a key part of this forward movement of freedom, an agreement of the provisions for the actual demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by preparing the way for a free and impartial plebiscite and the self-determination of the people, would prepare the way for the settlement of other disputes and the larger co-operation of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan; would strengthen the democratic and moral values cf the Indonesian, Southern Asian, North African, South-Eastern European and Mediterranean world, not as a bloc but as a spiritual force for freedom and peace, and might bring about a reorientation of the relations of East and West for a decisively human turn in the Tragic history of our times.

The great leadership of the peoples of India and Pakistan by the settlement of this crucial dispute might set in motion a spiritual chain reaction which, we pray, would encompass the earth with

the moral power of mankind in behalf of human freedom, the self-determination of people and the co-operation of nations for the peace of the world.

May India and Pakistan be nations in which, in the larger fulfilment of their own ancient heritage and youthful hopes, in response to their own great leaders, the people more and more become brothers in the sight of God and in the human heart; where the lowest and the highest and all the people equally together have the freedom to struggle for a higher freedom and where life is made richer by the vigour and variety of the differences of the people; where the answer to error is not terror, and the response to a difference in religion, race, colour, economic condition or social status is not discrimination, exploitation or intimidation; where and when men are free, the way of progress is not subversion, the respect for the past is not reaction, and the hope of future is not revolution; where the majority is without tyranny, the minority without fear, and all people have hope for freedom, peace and brotherhood in the long human pilgrimage, under God, towards one world, neighbourhood of human brotherhood."

On 10th November, 1951, the Council requested Mr. Graham to continue his mission.

It will be recalled that the two fundamental points of difference between the two countries were:

1. the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization and;

2. the day on which the Government of India would call the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.

Mr. Graham wrote to the parties on 7th December 1951 that "the number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator". This time the Indian Government made one improvement only, namely, that they offered to reduce their troops at the end of the period of demilitarization by seven thousand. No agreement was possible on proposals 3,6,7 and 10, initially advanced by Mr. Graham. Mr. Graham also proposed that the demilitarization should be completed by 15th July 1952 and that the Plebiscite Administrator should be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period.

The following demilitarization plan was drafted by General Devers on 29th November 1951 and sent to the parties:

"1. D-Day to be 30 days after the principal Agreements have been signed.

2. D to D plus 30.

(*a*) The United Nations Observer force be increased to approximately 80 officers and 600 men with necessary jeeps, helicopters and communication equipment to assure that there is no violation of the cease-fire agreements and to assist in demobilization of forces and give stability and backing to local Governments in maintaining order.

(*b*) Pakistan to close the western border of the Azad Kashmir sector against unauthorised ingress from the west. This to be done by selected regular troops.

(*c*) All regular Pakistan forces to be withdrawn to Pakistan except three Battalions.

(*d*) The Azad Kashmir armed forces to be reduced to 4 Battalions.

(*e*) The regular Indian forces to be reduced to one Division and one Line of Communications Area Headquarters.

(*f*) A police force of 4,000 civilians/armed civilians to be created in the Azad territory of Kashmir as follows:

*a*. 1,200 carefully selected armed civilians who were formerly members of the disbanded Azad forces.

*b*. 1,200 carefully selected armed civilians who at no time have served as members of the disbanded Azad forces. None will be Pakistan nationals or former members of the Pakistan armed forces.

*c*. 800 carefully selected unarmed civilians who were formerly members of the disbanded Azad forces.

*d*. 800 carefully selected unarmed civilians who at no time have served as members of the disbanded Azad forces. None will be Pakistan Nationals or former members of the Pakistan forces."

The Government of India apart from taking several objections to the plan, giving its own distorted interpretation to previcus agreements, rejected the suggestion of bringing in a U.N. force. It demanded that the border between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir be closed, that all regular Pakistan forces be withdrawn, that all Azad Kashmir forces be disarmed and disbanded; with regard to the police force of four thousand civilians, she demanded that only half of them be armed but their recruitment and composition was to be the same as was demanded by her earlier. Dr. Graham therefore submitted his second report to the Security Council. This time he did not visit the sub-continent but conducted negotiations with representatives of the two Governments at New York. In his statement before the Security Council at Paris on January 17, 1952, Dr. Graham made an impassioned appeal for a settlement and stated:

> "The plebiscite would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a free, secure, and impartial plebiscite. They are a people of legend, song and story, associated with snow-capped mountains, beautiful valleys and life-giving waters. The valleys are set like gems in the midst of mountains which surround the land and the people and which look down upon them from untold ages of history and from the highest majesty of this earth. These people, Moslems, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christian, as farmers, craftsmen and artists, small shopkeepers, boatmen, bearers and other workers in areas now on both sides of the cease-fire line have, through the centuries, been the victims of exploitation and conflict. The recognition of the rights and dignity, the security and the self-determination of these historic pecple, under the auspices of the United Nations, might well become a challenging example of the progressive values of self-determination to the dependent peoples of the earth. The people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite would signal through the darkness of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by ballots, not through conflict of armies but through co-operation of peoples, is the enduring way for people to determine their own destiny and way of life.
>
> The agreement of two sovereign nations on a plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as the basis of self-determination, peace and cooperation in the great humane programmes on the sub-continent, might help to contribute its bit to the hopes of the people for an eventual agreement of all the nations through the United Nations for universal disarmament as a basis for freedom, peace and cooperation in great human programmes across the earth.

The people of the earth who do the work of the world and carry the loads of these desperate days still look for some sign of better times for themselves and their children. Without finching from the privations of self-defence or the burdens of their daily toil, they look east and west for the intelligent and spiritual leadership which would guide the ways of the world from self-destruction to self-realization of the cooperative and creative capacities of the sons of God and the brothers of men.

On the sub-continent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have met in one of the great junctures of human history for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world.

The place is where meet the three largest nations and perhaps the five largest nations in the world.

The time is past when society can safely take slow decades and centuries to muddle through adjustments to scientific and technological revolutions. Social drift and unsettled disputes, such as the Kashmir issue, heavily charged with high potentials, did not then as now possibly involve mankind in the swift and total tragedy of global war and the scientific destruction of civilization. Human society with an atomic bomb in its bosom cannot lag in humane and creative adjustments to its potentially suicidal power.

The opportunity in time and place is for the leadership on the sub-continent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of four hundred million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by challenging examples of demilitarization, self-determination, reconciliation and reconstruction in a fearful and broken world."

Alas, this eloquent appeal by a great visionary indirectly aimed at the so-called visionary Nehru to rise above petty nationalism and peep into the broad visions of tomorrow, had no sympathetic response. He refused to act as a Statesman.

## THE WRANGLES ABOUT DEMILITARIZATION CONTINUE

The Security Council met again on 31st January 1952 in its 572nd meeting to consider the report. No resolution was passed but the President made a statement on behalf of the Council requesting Mr. Graham

to continue his negotiations, expecting to receive a report within two months. The period was extended and the report was made on 16th September 1952. The basis of negotiations continued to be his earlier 12 proposals. This time India went further, taking, for the first time, objection to the continuing of the Azad Kashmir Government in the liberated territory. In New York, the U.N. Representative placed revised proposals before the two Governments on 16th July, 1952 which envisaged further reduction of troops in Azad Kashmir, at the end of demilitarization to a force of 3 to 6 thousand, as a basis of discussion; the remainder of the AK forces, after its large-scale disbandment and disarmament, were to be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and what is more, were to be officered by neutral and local officers under the surveillance of the United Nations. On the Indian side of the Cease-fire line, he suggested 12 to 18 thousand forces at the end of demilitarization. The Jammu and Kashmir Militia or the Gilgit and Northern Scouts were not included. Pakistan accepted the proposals with certain clarifications but India declined to reduce the number of its forces below 21 thousand plus 6 thousand State Militia. It claimed that the local authorities in Azad Kashmir could not be given the charge of troops as it was a violation of the sovereignty of India and Jammu and Kashmir State. The Government of India also demanded that the civil armed force of 4 thousand in Azad Kashmir be commanded by neutrals which, however, was quite inconsistent with the UNCIP resolutions. However, the Pakistan Government accepted it with certain modifications.

The negotiations were conducted in New York from 29th May to 16th July 1952 and a conference was later held at Geneva from 26th August to 10th September 1952. In New York, the Pakistan delegation was headed by Professor Ahmed Shah Bukhari, then Pakistan's permanent representative to the United Nations. Mr. M. Ayub, a Joint Secretary who had from the very beginning remained associated with negotiations on Kashmir acted as Adviser while Lt. Col. Muhammad Iqbal Khan acted as Military Adviser. Indian delegation was led by Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, her permanent representative to the United Nations. During these meetings, it was agreed to have a conference at Geneva where Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan led the Pakistan delegation which included apart from Mr. Ayub and Iqbal Khan, Major General K.M. Sheikh and Brigadier Altaf Qadir as Military Advisers. Indian delegation was led by Mr. Ayyengar and included Mr. D.P. Dhar, then a Deputy Minister in Kashmir, and Major General K.S. Thimayya. As a result of these meetings, Graham submitted new draft proposals on 2nd September which left a minimum force of 6 thousand on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and 18 thousand on

the Indian side. Again they did not include the State Militia. The Government of India reiterated its previous stand and declined to accept the proposal. The Pakistan Government accepted them though it pointed out how they were weighed in favour of India. Another conference then began from 4th September. Differences again arose about the different interpretations that were given to the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5th January 1949. New draft proposals were therefore introduced on 4th September, in which numbers were omitted; it was a fruitless exercise. After considering the report, the Security Council passed a resolution introduced by Britain and U.S.A. at its 611th meeting on 23rd December 1952 embodying the Graham proposals for the quantum of troops at the end of demilitarisation and asking both the Governments to continue their negotiations with the U.N. representative.

## MENON DESTROYS ALL HOPES

It was tragic not only for the people of the State but also for the people of the sub-continent that by now Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon had successfully spread out his ominous tentacles and brought the Nehru family, particularly Pandit Nehru, under his spell. He was determined to come up in his race for succession against senior politicians. Having never been to jail for the Cause of freedom, a dominant qualification for a politician in the country, but having instead chosen to remain in London and support the Congress from a safe distance, he had no chance of by-passing a dozen other aspirants. He, therefore, chose to popularise himself in his country by playing upon his countrymen's innate hatred against Pakistan. It was in execution of this plan that he pushed the Indian Government into an extremely unreasonable position with regard to Kashmir and converted its intrasigence into arrogant repudiation of solemn international commitments and agreements which have so far cost the two countries so much in men and money and also permanently tarnished the image of Pandit Nehru. Addressing the Security Council after the resolution was introduced, Mr. Menon said:

> "The Government of India has already stated that it is unable to accept the draft resolution now before the Security Council. The Government of India is not prepared to be a party to any talks on the basis suggested in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. With these explicit reservations, however, the Government of India would, in line with its readiness to explore all avenues towards a peaceful settlement, be prepared to join and continue in any talks in connection with this dispute. If the Council, in its wisdom, still considers it useful or necessary to proceed with the draft resolution, we can only profoundly regret its decision."

Dr. Graham invited the representatives for a meeting on 12th January, 1953. India told him that she was unable to accept the resolution as a basis for the resumption of negotiations. However, she expressed willingness for a meeting and it was ultimately agreed on 23rd January 1953 to hold a Ministerial level meeting at Geneva which began on 4th February 1953. Sir Zafrullah led the Pakistan delegation while Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, then Governor of Bombay, led the Indian delegation. Dr. Graham proposed to begin with the examination of the resolution of 13th August 1948, part by part, in order to determine, as to what extent it had been already implemented and pin-point the obstacles which had impeded the implementation of those parts which had not as yet been carried into effect. It was agreed to start with the consideration of part I and then Part II of the said resolution. Even India conceded that part I had been implemented; so discussion began with regard to part II. India thereupon began giving a distorted interpretation to the word 'bulk' as used in clause b (*i*) of the resolution. India claimed that at the time of cease-fire, on the basis of ration cards, she had an army of 1,31,000 in the State while those of Pakistan, including all types of volunteers was 81,000. The latter was the claim of the Pakistan Government. Dr. Graham then proposed to have a force of 21,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line which was contrary to the Security Council resolution passed earlier and which was in the nature of a mandate for him. India also demanded:

1. that the Azad Kashmir Government should not be allowed to function in the liberated territory either collectively or individually, through its Ministers;

2. that no connection should be maintained between the local authorities and the Pakistan Government;

3. that all officials appointed by the Pakistan Government should cease to function;

4. that the administration should be conducted under the surveillance of the United Nations representative by local officials who could be relied upon to discharge their duties effectively and impartially with strict regard to the needs and conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite.

India this time expressly agreed that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office on the last date of the period of demilitarization. The Pakistan delegation told the U.N. Representative that increase in the strength of the Indian army contravened the Security Council resolution

of 23rd December 1952 and that it was convinced that if "on the Indian side of the cease-fire line 21,000 Indian and State armed forces were allowed as against only 6,000 Azad Kashmir forces on the opposite side, the security of Azad Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy. The delegation also pointed out:

> "The figures now proposed have avowedly no other object than to meet India's wishes with regard to the number of forces to be retained on its side of the cease-fire line. This fails to take into account the corresponding needs of security on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. This process of continuous yielding ground in face of Indian intransigence amounts in effect to an endorsement and abetment of the Indian attitude. It was a clear indication to India that its sustained attitude of intransigence would ultimately procure the formulation of a Truce Agreement on its own terms."

As there was no ground left on which to continue the conference, it was decided to conclude it. With the fifth report of Dr. Graham, this phase of the Security Council effort for the holding of a plebiscite came to an end. A few months later, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was dismissed and imprisoned as a result of which, direct negotiations between Pakistan and India were started at Prime Ministers' level. These talks also failed in their objective a few months later because India had not started them with any sincerity of purpose. Meanwhile, Pakistan signed a Defence Agreement with the United States as a result of which she started receiving military hardware from America and soon afterwards became a founder member of the U.S. sponsored military Organizations SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. This enabled India to isolate Pakistan from the Afro-Asian world and start a vicious campaign against this country. The United States of America, Britain and France used their enhanced influence with the Pakistan Government in putting the Kashmir issue into cold storage which was responsible for not bringing it before the Security Council till January 1957. It was so because these Powers did not want to extend full support to Pakistan in the Security Council as they were keen also to keep India in their sphere of influence. The Council at last resumed consideration of the issue after a break of nearly four years, in January 1957.

## INDIA REPUDIATES ITS COMMITMENTS

On 14th February 1957, Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdoms and the United States of America introduced a resolution which was vetoed by Russia, while Sweden abstained. The voting was held on 20th February.

Apart from the movers, China, Colombia, France, Iraq and Philippines voted in favour of the resolution. It may be pointed out that it was for the first time that Russia came forward with a Veto on the Kashmir resolution which has since been repeated from time to time, just on India's asking. The resolution, after taking note of Pakistan's proposal for a U.N. Supervisory force in connection with demilitarization, had merely termed it as deserving consideration and had instructed its President, the representative of Sweden, to proceed to the sub-continent and enter into negotiations with the two Governments to examine proposals for demilitarization or establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute.

Under these circumstances, a new resolution was adopted on 21st February 1957, which not only dropped any reference to the U.N. Supervisory force but also any reference to its previous resolutions.

Pakistan delegation was this time led by Malik Feroze Khan Noon, the Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy while the Indian delegation was led by Mr. Krishna Menon. Mr. Menon spoke for several days and his speech lasted for about 13 hours. He repudiated his country's commitment to Plebiscite and unashamedly told the Council that its only job was to condemn Pakistan as an aggressor and get Azad Kashmir vacated and the territory made over to the Indian Union. He used highly provocative language designed to win popular support at home and embitter further the already bedeviled Indo—Pakistan relations. He introduced the irrelevant issues of American military aid to Pakistan and this country's participation in Defence Pacts. This was done to damage Pakistan's image in the Afro-Asian world and thus cover up India's repudiation of solemn international agreements. He was also critical of Sir Piercy Dixon, the British representative on the Council whom he accused of possessing "the art of tracing history". His main argument was that Kashmir not having opted out of India at the time of partition, it remained a part of India. This argument was not only contrary to the provisions of the Independence Act but also contrary to the Instrument of accession. If it was so, why had the Government of India demanded of the Maharaja to accede to the Union of India as a prerequisite for sending military aid? Malik Feroze Khan Noon made a short but undoubtedly a brilliant speech exposing Mr. Menon's filibuster. What however damaged India most was a letter addressed by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah from Kud jail to the President and members of the Security Council. It was claimed that it had been smuggled to Colombo by a friend and sent to New York. This of course was incorrect. Wrote Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah:

> "In March 1956, the Prime Minister of India made a public declaration ruling out plebiscite in Kashmir. It has shocked the world

conscience and stunned the people of Kashmir to whom innumerable assurances had been held out that they will shape their own destiny through a fair and impartial plebiscite...............

Reasons advanced for this volte face are that Pakistan has joined SEATO, received arms aid from America and signed the Baghdad Pact. The absurdity of the argument is patent. Whatever Pakistan may do or might have done, that can be no valid reason for denying the Kashmiris the exercise of their right of self-determination in order to shape their own future. Secondly, India's Prime Minister has hinted that a vote in favour of Pakistan will rouse communal passions in India and endanger the security of its Muslim minority under the so-called secular Democracy of India! Were India's oft-repeated promises to the people of Kashmir that they alone shall have the right to decide their own future through an impartial and fair plebiscite intended to be implemented only in case a vote in her favour was certain?......... .....

India has repeatedly claimed that Kashmir is far progressing and that the political uncertainty has ended. Nothing can be farther from truth. Kashmir is at present ruled by monstrous laws which have crippled all political and social life in the State and paralysed all progress. A lawless law of preventive detention has been promulgated in the State with the sanction of the President of the Republic of India which has stifled all civil liberties. This law authorizes arrests and detention for a period of five years without trial or even without disclosing the grounds of detention. Free and frequent use is made of this law of the jungle. Respectable citizens and political workers have been arrested under this law on the excuse of having publicized the speeches of opposition members delivered in the Legislature or even legitimately organising support for the Opposition in the House. Members of the Assembly who expressed their intention of crossing the floor in the House were put under arrest. In certain cases resignations were extorted under the pressure of this monstrous law and instances are not wanting where members were publicly threatened of getting them involved in fabricated criminal cases if they failed to support the Government party...............

Indian money is being lavishly used for organising gangsters for looting, insulting and publicly flogging respectable citizens who do not see eye to eye with the ruling party. Colossal amounts borrowed on interest from India are used in corrupting public life and thereby purchasing the public conscience. It is, however, gratify-

ing to note that all these dirty methods have so far failed to corrupt the people into submission, and with one voice they demand the fulfilment of the promise made to them by India, Pakistan and the United Nations to exercise their right of self-determination in a free and democratic manner."

The original letter was written in pencil and was in the hand-writing of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Mr. Alamgir, a worker of the underground movement brought it to Rawalpindi via Gulmarg and handed it over to Mr. Mehraj-ul-Hassan, the then Superintendent of Police, incharge Kashmir Intelligence. Along with it also came the entire record pertaining to economic development in the State.

Mr. Krishna Menon's volte face in the Security Council and the promulgation of the Constitution in occupied Kashmir which treated it as an Indian State, shocked the world public opinion. Hundreds of newspapers the world over condemned Pandit Nehru and his Government. Since then India and Nehru have never been the same again as they previously were in the eyes of the world. Even in the council, Mathai admits, India was "bailed out by the Soviet veto."[1]

## WHAT KASHMIR INTRANSIGENCE COST NEHRU

Indian intransigence and duplicity had now been realised even by essentially pro-India observers of the scene. During UNCIP negotiations when Pakistan negotiators insisted from time to time that whatever Mr. Nehru was saying must be reduced into writing, the Commission members, particularly Mr. Joseph Korbel, the Indian nominee on the Commission, used to be annoyed because they thought that a man of Pandit Nehru's international stature and reputation could be taken merely at his word of honour but after some time they too realised his unreliability. Many years later, he told Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, "all your suspicions of Pandit Nehru were more than fully justified".[2] Sir Zafrullah Khan has mentioned yet another incident: Sir Owen Dixon having realised that it was impossible to secure the consent of Pandit Nehru to a free and impartial plebiscite, thought of alternate solutions such as partition. He discussed the said alternatives with Pandit Nehru and told him that if Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed, he would prepare a detailed plan. Mr. Nehru gave his consent. After securing the consent of the Pakistan Government without prejudice to its official stand, he telegraphed Pandit Nehru that since the Pakistan Government had also agreed to his proposal,

1. M. O. Mathai, p. 180.
2. Tehdis-e-Niamat, p. 544.

he was preparing a detailed plan which he would be sending to him at Delhi. Pandit Nehru replied that he was unable to understand his telegram, that he was unaware of any such suggestion, that it was a totally new matter for him and that Sir Owen Dixon should come to Delhi to discuss it with him. Sir Dixon spoke of this to Sir Zafrullah with visible displeasure. A few days later when he went to Delhi and was met by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, he couldn't help telling Mr. Bajpai that he could understand if his Prime Minister changed his mind but how did he write that he was not aware of this suggestion and that it was a totally new matter for him? Replied Mr. Bajpai:

> "Sir Owen, I conceive the Prime Minister must have suffered an attack of temporary amnesia."[1]

Another incident mentioned by Sir Zafrullah relates to the President of the International Court of Justice at the Hague. Sometime before 1957, Pandit Nehru was returning home from London after attending a conference of the Commonwealth Premiers. The Indian Ambassador at Hague arranged a reception in his honour. The President and Judges of the International Court were also invited. The President, a Norwegian, asked Sir Zafrullah whether he was attending the function and on being told that he was committed elsewhere, perhaps a polite way of declining the invitation, the President told him that he had also decided not to attend the function as it was given in honour of a man who had no respect for his own word of honour.[2] It was therefore only in the fitness of things that when India invaded Goa, even President Kennedy, a one-time Nehru-admirer, remarked: "The priest has been caught in the brothel."[3]

## WORLD PRESS ON NEHRU

Pandit Nehru was very popular with the world press which built up a halo of holiness around his person but as his intransigence on Kashmir increased, the same press dismantled his false image. Some of their comments, which are worth preserving for posterity, are reproduced below:—

> "There is a well-known story. A shepherd went to a Kazi and said: "Mr. Kazi: while crossing the bridge, an ox pushed another ox into the river. The ox which fell, got drowned. What should be done?"

1. Tehdis-e-Niamat, p. 547.
2. *Ibid*, p. 184.
3. Mathai, p. 180.

The Kazi promptly replied: "They just pushed against one another and one of them fell down. So there is nothing to be done."

"But it was your ox that got drowned."

At this the Kazi took the book near him and said: "Oh then it is a different matter." (Exactly what Mr. Nehru said)

Then the shepherd said: 'Because it is your ox, it becomes a different matter."

I need add nothing except that those who talk of neutrality, humanity and universal justice, should not contradict themselves so blatantly."[1]

"Though the Security Council has said that there must be demilitarization of Kashmir and a free and impartial plebiscite to determine the question of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan, Nehru's Government has flagrantly flouted this. It is maintaining a number of divisions in Kashmir and so rendering a "free and impartial plebiscite," out of question.

Unless he dissociates himself from this (Menon's) outburst, he cannot blame the world if it brands him as a fraud."[2]

"Only a few people in Britain will regret the Government's likelihood of supporting Pakistan's demand to the Security Council to enforce U.N.'s decision for a plebiscite in Kashmir. But, those few friends of Nehru are influential.

Nehru knows that Muslim Kashmir would elect to join Pakistan and it is prevented only by Nehru's armed "colonialism".[3]

"The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, has exposed himself as the number one Impostor of the international scene. Mr. Nehru parades as a man of peace; an idealist; a staunch champion of the United Nations. He picks up garlands in Moscow and White House dinners in Washington and accepts them as his due. From Bandung to Edinburgh, people have been beguiled by his act. The climax of the Kashmir question, however, exposed Mr. Nehru for what he is.

1. The Gumhuriyet, Istanbul—December 1, 1956.
2. The Truth, Sydney—January 13, 1957.
3. The Recorder, London—January 12, 1957.

He wants Kashmir. That is all there is to it. The man of peace ceases to be a man of peace; the champion of the United Nations thumbs his nose at the world organization; the exalted arbiter of international behaviour becomes a thug."[1]

"India, which likes to play the role of a great promoter of peace in world conflicts, suddenly finds itself put in the wrong through the United Nations' resolution on Kashmir. The fact that India has annexed Kashmir, in spite of the Security Councils' orders to the contrary, constitutes the worst possible judgement on Indian leaders' understanding of the world situation."[2]

"India has defied the Security Council and integrated Kashmir. Mr. Nehru can look back on succeeding in the long game he has played with Pakistan, but, in the longer game of keeping the world at peace he has injured his own position. By occupying Kashmir and refusing to budge by delaying the plebiscite upon one pretext or another until the idea of a plebiscite had gone stale, Mr. Nehru has been able to achieve what he wanted with a minimum of violence. He has most of India behind him. But for the future he has stored up a feud with Pakistan which in all reasonable likelihood will bring disaster to both countries and which at least will distort their foreign policies indefinitely. The Security Council is bound to be angry—more so as India's action is a flagrant disregard of her promise to the United Nations in 1951."[3]

"Pandit Nehru has presented the international do-gooders with a golden chance to exercise their talent for self-righteous indignation once again. But the most punctuous of all the do-gooders and professional holy men was Pandit Nehru. He tried to shut his eyes to the massacre of Hungary in the hope that he could turn the indignation of the world solely on to Britain and France.

Now the prophet of international morality has turned into the pharisee. He has flatly defied the United Nations over Kashmir and he means to go on with his defiance. He is not only a sinner but a stubbornly un-repentant sinner."[4]

"Following the pathetic downfall of Hungary and recent difficulties in Sinai desert and Gulf of Akaba, the United Nations has suffered

1. The Daily Telegrapy, Sydney—January 29, 1957.
2. The Berner Tagwacht, Berne—January 29, 1957.
3. The Manshester Guardian, Manchester—January 28, 1957.
4. The Daily Sketch, London—January28, 1957

one of the severest blows their prestige has ever received. And, this attack has been delivered by a man who, during the last few months, has most frequently invoked the authority of the United Nations and made greatest show of pacifism and moderation. This man is Nehru.

His dear principles have gone up in smoke, and, by deliberately ignoring the resolutions passed by the Security Council, he has integrated Kashmir with India in the way as the infamous annexations in Europe during the last 30 years which ultimately resulted in the Second Great War."[1]

"To all objective observers it is an open case of stubbornness on the part of India and particularly of Nehru who has shown himself capable in this issue of flouting every one of the principles which he so ardently preaches to other countries when they face their problems. Nehru, the leader, the dispenser of advice, is on the Kashmir issue deaf to all arguments. Menon, in the Security Council, recently showed the obvious hypocrisy of India's case when he said she would not agree to a plebiscite because Pakistan had not yet removed the Azad Kashmir forces while neglecting to mention that the present Government of Kashmir was put into office with the aid of the Indian forces who are still there."[2]

"What should be done about wrongdoer Nehru of India?

Moral censure will not force him to relax his grip on Kashmir. Far stronger measures are needed to punish him for defying the Security Council. If U.N. is to be taken seriously, let it get tough with Nehru and apply sanctions. Tell the nations to stop exporting goods to India. Tell the World Bank to halt the flow of loans to New Delhi.

Actions such as the Kashmir grab, so strikingly in contrast with the conduct he demands from others can only arouse contempt and anger.

Nations, like the United States, who have shown a tendency to regard Nehru as the possible saviour of the world peace, may now think twice. His position as lord justice-in-chief of the world's morals was shaken badly by his hypocritical attitude towards Russia's rape of Hungary. His action in Kashmir may lose him his self-made crown."[3]

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1. YA, Madrid—January 28, 1957.
2. The Nation, Rangoon—January 28, 195.
3. The Evening Sentinel, Nanley, Stoke of Trent—January 28, 1957.

"The Prime Minister, Nehru of India, one of the busier bees of the International diplomatic set, is a man who is very strong on matter of "Self-determination", a term that is being handled about a good deal these days.

This propensity for minding other people's business, however, is a speciality with Nehru who blindly chooses to ignore the fact the there are bees in his own garden too.

His attitude strictly follows "don't do as I do, do as I say" line of thought. And Kashmir is not the only case in point. Another is Goa, which Nehru has affirmed, will become part of India, no matter what people think about it, including Goans themselves.

Someone should officially mention these matters to Nehru. In case they have slipped his mind, next time he starts making speeches about independence."[1]

"The show-boy of the United Nations has failed in his first examination, the Asian pioneer against the "Western Imperialism" has proved himself to be imperialist, the pupil of Mahatma Gandhi has become a preacher of dual morality."[2]

Nehru, as leader of the anti-colonial nations, may feel himself strong enough to defy U.N. Let U.N. prove itself stronger.

Sanctions are the test. Failure to put them into operation against India will finally expose U.N.'s double standard high principles for one nation, expediency for another."[3]

"The Indian Prime Minister Nehru has often appeared as a self-appointed, impartial mediator in major political conflicts and as a devoted defender of the United Nations and its Charter; his condemnation of Anglo-French action against Egypt, last autumn, was categorical and his support of the United Nations' action was total. At times in moralizing and censorious words he has urged other countries to follow India's path—that of reconciliation and understanding—and extended his understanding even to the Communist oppressors; he procrastinated and smoothed over when he was asked to brand the Soviet enslavement of Hungary. But

1. The Evening News, Springfield, Massachusetts—January 18, 1957.
2. Die Presse, Vienna—January 30, 1957.
3. The Daily Express, London—January 30, 1957.

politician Nehru has not shown himself prepared to follow consistently "preacher" Nehru's commandments.

In the dispute over Kashmir he himself has pursued a clearly "imperialist" policy, himself openly broken all agreements and defied the United Nations' decisions."[1]

"Nehru always referred to the United Nations for solving international problems, but in the Kashmir question he has not only refused to carry out a plebiscite as recommended by the U.N. to give the people, an opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to join Pakistan or India, but he has even gone further; he has ignored the Security Council resolutions and annexed the part of Kashmir occupied by Indian troops. In the light of this attitude, one can only look upon the great Nehru as a hypocrite who played towards the U.N. the role of Brutus."[2]

"So Jawaherlal Nehru, the apostle of peace and upholder of law and order, self-determination, etc., etc., has annexed Kashmir for India in direct defiance of the United Nations Security Council instructions.

Let us hear no more about the fine, idealistic character of Nehru. Let us pay no more attention to anything he or the members of his Government have to say in the halls of the United Nations. He has destroyed any value his country might have had as a leader for the cause of peace and understanding."[3]

"The Indian Government has done no good either to its international reputation or to the prospect of friendly relations between India and Pakistan by declaring in defiance of a Security Council resolution, that Kashmir had become an integral part of India.

But the process by which this fait accompli has been brought about, the years of resistance to United Nations decisions, the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister of Kashmir, the disregard of the principle of self determination and the silly filibustering tactics of Mr. Krishna Menon in the Security Council, are an affront to every principle of international morality which Mr. Nehru has laid down as a basis for judging the behaviour of other nations."[4]

1. The Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm—January 30, 1957.
2. Gelderlander Pers, Hague—January 29, 1957.
3. Peria Jourenel-Star, Illinois—January 30, 1957.
4. East Anglian Daily Times, Ipswich—Jan. 28, 1957.

"Nehru defied the United Nations. He contrived a vote by the handpicked Constituent Assembly and resting upon the Indian bayonets, uniting Kashmir with India. He proclaims the result as a fait accompli.

The Indian Prime Minister ran the risk of war with his neighbour. He sacrificed his moral standing in the United Nations. He revealed himself as wilfully reckless. He exhibited at least one spring of his sympathy for the Soviet imperial system; he, too, appropriates countries by force.

This calm appropriation of the beautiful Muslim State of Kashmir in the teeth of the four United Nations' recommendations and demand for a plebiscite displays Nehru what he is."[1]

" It is not the cowl that makes the monk. Jawaharlal Nehru, who always has something to say, about Cyprus and Algeria, when he is not giving "moral support" to his friend Nasser, has been unmasked as a vulgar imperialist in Kashmir.

This "man of peace" uses force in Kashmir, when his own interests are involved. This "international conciliator", when it touches his own purse, barters away the dove of peace for vulture of death (which Menon looks like in angry moments)."[2]

"This is the same Nehru who won't permit a free vote in Kashmir on the vital issue of whether the people there want to join India or Pakistan. Until he does that, the free world—and the United Nations which he has rebuffed—will have to reserve judgment on the lily white democracy he wears like the carnation in his buttonhole."[3]

"India's refusal to accept the resolution of the Security Council has established that words and deeds do not go together in New Delhi. If the United Nations asked the wicked Western Powers—Great Britain and France—to yield to the decision of the World Assembly, Nehru finds it quite all right. But, if India is asked to make the fate of Kashmir dependent on a free plebiscite, then it is quite a different matter.

Disregard of U.N. in Kashmir is just as old as the Kashmir dispute itself. Nehru's tactics to lead the Security Council by the nose made him a good second to Machiavelli."[4]

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1. Cincinnati Enquirer, Cincinnati—Feb. 4, 1957.
2. L'effort, LA Chaox-de-Fonds—February, 4, 1957.
3. Sura Masjumi Djakarta—March 145, 1957.
4. Pfaelzer Abendzeitung, Badgodeberg—February 28, 1957.

The Council President, Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, paid a flying visit to the sub-continent and finding himself unequal to the task, returned back, reporting not only failure but also the futility of such efforts. Impatient, hasty and self-centred, Jarring was bound to fail in a situation where much distinguished men of real goodwill and enviable vision like Graham and Dixon had discovered their helplessness in the face of endless Indian intransigence.

The only time, Kashmir again came up before the Security Council was September 1965. As per its resolution dated the 22nd of September 1965, it decided to consider, after the cessation of fighting, "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict". However, all that it did, after cease-fire, was merely to re-affirm the said resolution and that too because of Mr. Bhutto's brilliant advocacy and expertise.

Amongst those who eloquently espoused the Kashmir Cause abroad, the names that effortlessly come to our minds and whom Kashmiris remember with abiding gratitude are Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mr. Agha Shahi.

Since then the Kashmir question has not come up before the Security Council nor has the Council taken any steps whatsoever to implement its resolutions which had provided for the holding of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite, though legally the issue remains on its agenda and crores of rupees are spent annually on the maintenance of peace-keeping observers on the cease-fire line.

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# CHAPTER INDEX

## INDO-PAKISTAN NEGOTIATIONS

*CHAPTER XXX*

# Indo-Pakistan Negotiations

## QUAID-E-AZAM'S ORDER DISOBEYED

When the news of the State's fraudulent accession to India became known on 26th October, Quaid-e-Azam who was staying at Government House Lahore, ordered General Gracey, the acting Commander-in-Chief, through Sir Francis Mudie, the Punjab Governor, to despatch, immediately, detachments of the Pakistan Army to Srinagar to capture the air-port. General Gracey expressed his inability to obey, without prior clearance from Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander. It appears that Gracey's excuse enraged Sir Francis Mudie who told him angrily to carry out the orders. Mudie, it may be recalled, was widely credited of pro-Pakistan leanings as Governor of Sind. Gracey telephoned Auchinleck at Delhi; he came post-haste next morning and had a long meeting with the Quaid-e-Azam. His argument was that since Kashmir had, due to accession, legally become a part of India, induction of Pakistan troops may lead to a total war and that in accordance with the British Government decision, taken on the eve of partition, and known as the "Stand-down order", British officers of the two armies would have to be withdrawn in such a situation and since Pakistan Army had a large number of British officers, its efficiency would be adversely affected. Auchinleck simultaneously proposed that instead of sending troops to Kashmir, the Governor-General may invite Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru to an immediate conference to search out an agreed formula for a solution of the problem. It is very likely that Auchinleck may have cleared the proposal with Mountbatten before flying to Lahore. There, however, seems to be no doubt that the Quaid-e-Azam must have been assured of the acceptanca of his invitation by New Delhi and may have got an impression that an agreed solution was likely to be found out.

Quaid-e-Azam, therefore, withdrew his order and formally invited Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru to a conference at Lahore for the 29th of October.

Sardar Ibrahim told this writer that when he met the Quaid-e-Azam in January 1948, on the eve of his departure for the United States, the latter told him that when he told his Cabinet that armed forces be sent to Jammu and Srinagar, "my Cabinet got cold-feet". This shows that although Gracey had initially opposed the sending of Pakistan troops and communicated it to the Supreme Commander, the matter also came up in the Cabinet and it was not merely the opposition of General Gracey who could be over-ruled as a Service Chief but it was more due to the opposition of the Cabinet that the order to send troops to Kashmir was cancelled by the Quaid-e-Azam. That the opinion of the cabinet was a grave mistake is borne out by history but it is possible that they opposed the move for fear of an Indo-Pakistan war which in their opinion posed a graver danger to the existence of Pakistan.

What happened in Delhi is important as it shows that Pandit Nehru and his government never really intended to enter into any meaningful discussion except on terms that would have stamped the fraudulent accession with approval.

*Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan reveals that Pandit Nehru asked for an Oxford dictionary to make sure that the meaning of the word referendum which he was going to use in his broadcast on 2nd November, also meant elections.*

For several years all that was known was that the invitation was accepted by both; that Sardar Patel and several other members of the Cabinet were stoutly opposed to its acceptance; that Sardar Patel compared Mr. Nehru's going to Lahore to Chamberlain's visit to Munich but that the Indian Prime Minister had 'manfully' stood against these pressures and told them that after all, they had not gone to Kashmir for the purposes of "acquisition". It had, therefore, been claimed that Mr. Nehru suddenly fell ill, was advised complete rest and that it was for this reason alone that he was unable to accompany Lord Mountbatten to Lahore. The departure of Mountbatten which was to take place on 29th October, was, on this pretext, delayed till 1st November. Mountbatten telephoned the Quaid-e-Azam on 28th informing him of Pandit Nehru's illness.

This version we get from Campbell Johnson. Mr. V.P. Menon, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of States and a great Indian himself, first published his book, the 'Integration of Indian States' in March, 1956. He

has given a part of the inner story. He says that after the meeting in which Sardar Patel opposed going to Lahore, he received a telephone call from Mahatma Gandhi's Secretary, asking him to meet the Mahatma urgently and that when he went to Birla House, he found Nehru and Sardar conferring with Gandhiji. Says he:

> "Gandhiji asked me what my objections were to Nehru going to Lahore. I replied that when this was mooted to me by Lord Mountbatten, I was entirely opposed to the idea and I gave reasons for my stand. While the discussions were going on, we noticed that Nehru was looking flushed and tired. It was found that he was actually running a high temperature. His going to Lahore was therefore out of the question."[1]

Lord Ismay who was on the staff of Lord Mountbatten to lend a helping hand in the transfer of power, was contacted by Auchinleck frcm Lahore. At that moment, a meeting of the Indian Defence Council was going on. Says Lord Ismay:

> "Mr. Jinnah had cancelled his orders for troop movements and had fallen in with Auchinleck's suggestion that he should invite Mountbatten and Nehru to come to Lahore as quickly as possible and discuss the Kashmir problem. I congratulated Auchinleck on having intervened in the nick of time, and made haste to extract Mountbatten and Nehru from the meeting and tell them the purport of Auchinleck's message. They agreed to fly to Lahore the next morning. But the other Indian Ministers were highly indignant at the idea of the Governor-General and Prime Minister going 'hat in hand' to Jinnah. Patel, who was particularly angry, said that it was reminiscent of Mr. Chamberlains's visit to Germany to plead with Hitler. I thought it right to point out that President Roosvelt had, on two occasions, travelled half across the world to settle war business with Marshal Stalin, and had not lost face by so doing. Nehru stuck manfully to his promise; but unfortunately he had to go to bed with a high temperature *that evening*, and was unfit to travel. The chance of striking, while the iron was hot, was lost."[2]

The proposed conference had been postponed from 29th October to Ist November, apparently on account of the so-called illness of Pandit Nehru. Without attributing motives to Mountbatten, it is more

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1. Menon, p. 385
2. Ismay, p. 444.

probable that New Delhi wanted to watch and wait the progress of its military operations in Srinagar so as to tailor its policy to their needs. "The Great Divide" by H.V. Hodson, first published in 1969, gives the following account about Mr. Nehru's inability to go to Lahore:

> "The Prime Minister eventually agreed to go to a Joint Defence Council meeting in Lahore on 1st November, but on the evening before he was due to leave, he read in the papers a statement by the Pakistan Government to the effect that the accession of Kashmir had been accomplished by 'fraud and violence' and could not be accepted by Pakistan. He telephoned Lord Mountbatten to say that it was more than he could stomach, and that, if the Governor-General still insisted on taking him to Lahore, he begged not to be expected to discuss Kashmir with Mr. Jinnah. Lord Mountbatten excused him from coming, and went to Lahore without the Prime Minister, refusing himself to allow motives of personal pride or prestige to stand in the way of efforts for peace. Dog snarling at cat, and cat spitting back at dog, the interchange was all too typical of relations between India and Pakistan at this time."[1]

Conceding that Nehru had high temperature on 27th and even assuming that he was neither used to travel nor doing State business whenever the temperature was high (which, however, is quite untrue) and even assuming that the fate and future of the two countries was less important than the risk involved in air travel from Delhi to Lahore, there is no evidence at all that the temperature lasted till 1st November—six days later. It truly mirrors India's broken promises on Kashmir.

## QUAID-E-AZAM—MOUNTBATTEN MEETING

Mountbatten came on 1st November alongwith Lord Ismay. None of the Indian Ministers or the influential officials like Menon or Patel, was accompanying him. It was clear that India was simply bidding for time to consolidate its military build-up in the State while ensuring, through the hoax of negotiations, the non-intervention of the Pakistan Army. His arrival had been preceded by two telegrams addressed by Mr. Nehru to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. The first telegram sent on 27th October said:

> "I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State

1. Hodson, p. 458.

to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view."

In the second telegram sent on 31st October, Mr. Nehru gave the pledge:

"Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this State to the people of the State is not merely a promise to your government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."[1]

In their meeting at Lahore, the Quaid-i-Azam put forward the following proposal:

"1. A proclamation should be made by the two Governors-General giving forty-eight hours' notice to the opposing forces to cease fire and warn the tribesmen that, if they did not comply, the forces of both countries would wage war on them.

2. Simultaneous withdrawal from Kashmir of the Indian troops and the tribesmen.

3. The two Governors-General should be vested with full powers to restore peace, undertake the administration of the State, and arrange for a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision."[2]

Lord Mountbatten suggested the holding of a plebiscite under U.N. auspices but presumably he had nothing concrete to offer about internal administration. It was quite clear that with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in power, an impartial plebiscite was out of the question because he was too pronouncedly committed to the State's accession to India. He commanded a large personal following and if a plebiscite were held with his extremely partisan administration in power, this writer may testify as a Kashmiri that large sections of our people could not have freely and independently exercised their right of vote. That is why Quaid-i-Azam was insisting on either a neutral administration or an administration responsible to the two Governors-General. Mountbatten was unable to accept the proposals. That may be reasonably explained away on the ground of his being literally a constitutional figure-head, but nothing prevented him from accepting their reasonableness and promising to use his influence

1&2. Mohammad Ali, pp. 295 and 296.

in Delhi for their acceptance. This writer has no hesitation in accepting the position that as free India's first Governor-General, the decision-making power had shifted to the Prime Minister and that on account of being an Englishman, he held a somewhat delicate position but even conceding all this, it remains undeniable that the line of action suggested above could have hardly hurt him or his delicate status. However, all that he could promise was that he would refer these proposals to the Indian Cabinet which rejected them. In his report to his Soveriegn, he wrote about this meeting:

> "At the end Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite clear that the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion of Pakistan at birth, and that if they continued with their oppression, there would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. However depressing the prospect might be, he was not afraid; for the situation was already so bad that there was little that could happen to make it worse. I pointed out that war, whilst admittedly very harmful for India, would be completely disastrous for Pakistan and himself. Lord Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but he was not very successful. However, we departed on good terms."[1]

With the rejection of the proposals, Pandit Nehru made a broadcast on November 2 pledging again that the government of India

> "are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations."

The developments in Kashmir greatly disillusioned the Quaid-i-Azam, especially when a high-ranking British officer told him the very next day that he had seen Nehru as fit as ever the day before in Delhi. Says Chaudhri Muhammad Ali:

> "The turn of events in Kashmir had an adverse effect on the Quaid-i-Azam's health. At the time of partition, he had been confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim population and geographical situation. "Kashmir," he would say, "will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit". Now he felt deceived, and his earlier optimism gave way to a deep disappointment. "We have been put on the wrong bus", he remarked."[3]

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1. Hodson, p. 459.
3. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, p. 297

## THE BEGINNING OF NEHRU'S NO

On 8th November, on account of the illness of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar accompanied by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali went to Delhi for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. After the meeting, Nishtar had a discussion on Kashmir with Mr. Nehru and since he was returning home, Mr. Muhammad Ali was advised to stay back. Lord Ismay, V.P. Menon and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali had several meetings. The plan discussed was the withdrawal of tribal lashkars and Indian troops and the holding of a plebiscite under conditions guaranteeing a free vote. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali records that in the evening he was told that Mountbatten and Sardar Patel agreed to such a plan but not Nehru; he was, therefore, advised to see Mr. Nehru. This is what he has to say about these discussions:

> "I had a long discussion with him and came away convinced that Nehru was resolved to hold Kashmir by force and had no intention of allowing the people of Kashmir the right to determine their future. My argument that a fair solution of the Kashmir dispute was the best guarantee of friendly relations between India and Pakistan, and was, therefore, in the best interests of both countries, left him cold. He talked only in terms of power politics, and said again and again that in matters of state no sovereign independent power could be trusted. If Pakistan had to be, it must never have the strength to be a possible threat to India. I pointed out that Kashmir's accession to Pakistan could not pose a threat to India because of the mountainous barrier between Kashmir and India. On the other hand, India would by occupying Kashmir, be commanding the heights of Pakistan and controlling its life-line of rivers flowing from Kashmir. I found no trace in him of those sentiments of attachment to Kashmir with which he is often credited by virtue of his family's origin in Kashmir. The fact that in a prolonged struggle over Kashmir, its people would be the worst sufferers did not move him in the least. What mattered to him was that Kashmir's accession to Pakistan would strengthen Pakistan."[1]

On 26th November, Mr. Laiquat Ali Khan, though still ill, flew to New Delhi for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. Mountbatten had meanwhile returned from England on the 24th after attending the wedding of Princess Elizabeth. It was the first meeting between the two Prime Ministers since 30th September. It seems Mountbatten had already spoken to Pandit Nehru and secured his agreement for a discussion of the

1. Mohammad Ali, p. 298.

Kashmir issue by the two Prime Ministers. In his report to the king, Mountbatten said:

> "In the middle of the Joint Defence Council meeting itself, whilst everything was going very well, a 'Most Immediate' letter from Pandit Nehru (who was not himself present) was brought in to me. This enclosed two telegrams which he had that morning received from Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan. They were of such a nature that Pandit Nehru wrote: 'In view of what Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan has said in these telegrams, I see no particular advantage in my discussing the Kashmir situation or indeed any other matter with him'.
>
> If Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan's intention had been to ruin any chance of further negotiations, he could not have phrased or timed his telegrams better. He accused Sheikh Abdullah, who, he must full well have known, was one of Pandit Nehru's closest friends, of being a Quisling and a paid agent to disrupt the Muslims of Kashmir; and he accused the Government of India of trying to mislead the world, of evasion, of contradiction, of tyranny and of attempting to eliminate the whole Muslim population of Kashmir. In one of the telegrams (which was also addressed to Mr. Attlee), he laid down, as one of the principles upon which Pakistan founded their case, the setting up of an impartial and independent administration immediately."[1]

## POLITICIANS REJECT THEIR CIVIL SERVANTS PLAN

At last the two Prime Ministers met at 4 O' clock through the efforts of Mountbatten. Pandit Nehru reiterated his position and claimed that if India had not accepted the accession of the State and flown her troops, his own government may have been over-thrown. On the other hand, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan countered by saying that his government was already being severely criticised by the Urdu press for its failure to support the Muslims of Kashmir. He made a comparison of Junagarh and Kashmir and asked Pandit Nehru how the accession of a Hindu Maharaja in flight, when the majority of his subjects were Muslims, was valid if it was invalid in the case of Junagarh on the ground that the majority of its inhabitants belonged to a religion different to that of the ruler. Obviously, the stand of both with regard to Kashmir versus Junagarh was contradictory. The only difference was that India wanted to have both the States and therefore her position was irreconcilable. Speaking about this meeting, Lord Ismay states:

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1. Hodson, p. 460.

"In November, Liaquat Ali Khan came to Delhi, and I was invited to take part in his talks with Nehru. I suggested that it would be better if they had it out alone, and sent for me later if they thought I would be of any help. When they had been together for a full hour, they asked me to join them and proceeded to summarise the results of their talk. They seemed on the friendliest of terms, and Nehru jokingly observed that very little had been agreed. On the other hand, they both said that they were determined to settle the business once and for all, and would meet again after dinner. Meanwhile would I try my hand at drafting a basis of discussion? I co-opted V.P. Menon and Mohammad Ali, and we drafted and redrafted for a full three hours. In the end, we were rather proud of our handiwork, and I went so far as to write to my wife that evening that at long last I could see a light at the end of the tunnel. But my hopes were dashed the very next morning. Each side thought that our paper was too biased in favour of the other to merit discussion."[1]

According to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, the draft provided for a cessation of the fighting, withdrawal of both the tribesmen and the Indian army, the establishment of conditions of peace and the return of refugees to their homes, release of all political prisoners, freedom of legitimate political activities and a joint request by the two Governments to the United Nations to hold a free and fair plebiscite under its auspices. The agreement was to cover both Kashmir and Junagarh. Mr. Nehru was not prepared to agree to the withdrawal of Indian troops nor in the creation of conditions which could ensure an *impartial* plebiscite. That the Prime Minister of India should have thus destroyed an agreement to which his own representative, Mr. V.P. Menon and incidentally, no friend of Pakistan but on the other hand, the very person who was the first to oppose the visit of Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru to Lahore on 29th October, was a party, should suffice to expose the inherently uncompromising attitude of Pandit Nehru on Kashmir issue and his determination to hold it by force. In one of the meetings, Sardar Patel was also present; so was Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. It was in this meeting that Sardar Patel showed his great realism and practically offered Kashmir against Hyderabad. The incident deserves to be reproduced in the words of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali himself:

"Sardar Patel, although a bitter enemy of Pakistan, was a greater realist than Nehru. In one of the discussions between the two Prime Ministers, at which Patel and I were also present, Liaquat Ali

1. Ismay, p. 445.

Khan dwelt at length on the inconsistency of the Indian stand with regard to Junagarh and Kashmir. If Juragarh, despite its Muslim ruler's accession to Pakistan, belonged to India because of its Hindu majority, how could Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, be a part of India simply by virtue of its Hindu ruler having signed a conditional instrument of accession to India? If the instrument of accession signed by the Muslim ruler of Junagarh was of no validity, the instrument of accession signed by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir was also invalid. If the will of the people was to prevail in Junagarh, it must prevail in Kashmir as well. India could not claim both Junagarh and Kashmir. When Liaquat Ali Khan made these incontrovertible points, Patel could not contain himself and burst out: "Why do you compare Junagarh with Kashmir? Talk of Hyderabad and Kashmir, and we could reach an agreement."[1]

It was, however, agreed to refer these proposals to the two Cabinets. According to Mr. Hodson, the Pakistan Prime Minister had compromised on the objectives with which he came to Delhi—complete withdrawal by both sides, an impartial interim administration and a plebiscite under independent auspices—but was willing to negotiate in the hope of gaining more. But what was the result of the spirit of compromise and accommodation shown by the Pakistan Government? Pandit Nehru and his government was determined to frustrate all efforts aimed at an equitable and fair solution. Two hours after Mr. Muhammad Ali's air-craft took off, a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet attended by Lord Mountbatten was held and this time, the pretext put forth, to wriggle out of the compromise arrived at, was that non-Muslims coming from Azad Kashmir had revealed distressing stories of atrocities. In his report to his Sovereign, Mountbatten said:

> "This was one of the most disastrous and distressing meetings it has ever been my lot to preside over. It appeared that all the efforts of the last few days towards reaching an agreement on Kashmir were to come to naught—a circumstance which, in its turn, would surely tear to pieces the agreements on other matters, and, generally, the closer co-operation which had been obtained.
>
> The trouble had originated in a visit which Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh had paid to Jammu the previous day. The reports which they had brought back, together with independent reports that Pandit Nehru had received, had served to embitter

1. Mohammad Ali, p. 299.

and infuriate the leading Ministers of my Government that they were now thinking in terms of fighting out the issue, and not holding a plebiscite, rather than of continuing negotiations.

These reports were threefold in nature, First, it was alleged that there were large concentrations of would-be invaders, including tribesmen, in specified places in West Punjab near the Jammu border. Secondly, it was alleged that Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan had, on leaving Delhi, gone out of his way to encourage more raiders to enter Kashmir, and had made speeches to the effect that Pakistan would never give up Kashmir, Thirdly (and this affected Indian Ministers perhaps more than anything else), there were stories, which had by now become almost commonplace, of the raiders having indulged in the most ghastly atrocities, including the wholesale murder of non-Muslims and the selling of Kashmiri girls.

Pandit Nehru declared that, in these circumstances, he would certainly not talk to Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan at Lahore about a plebiscite. All the Ministers were insistent on the most violent offensive military action being taken."[1]

## INDIA WANTED TO INVADE PAKISTAN

As the reader very well knows and as has been quite impartially shown in this book, the atrocities committed by Hindu and Sikh gangs on Muslims in the districts of Reasi, Udhampur, Jammu and Kathua were so overwhelming both in horror as well as their extent that the atrocities committed on Hindus and Sikhs in the liberated territory pale into insignificance and yet the historian Nehru should have been the person not to take a balanced view and to allow the sympathies that the sufferings of non-Muslims evoked in his heart, to destroy not only an agreement to which Mr. Menon was a party but by doing so, also destroy a golden chance of solving the Kashmir problem in its very infancy before the attitude of both sides had hardened but also thus pave the way for a new chapter of co-operation and understanding in the sub-continent.

The Indian leaders then decided to create a cordon sanitaire, or demilitarized zone between the West Pakistan border and Kashmir State so that any movement in the area, obviously from the Pakistan side, could be immediately bombed. Mountbatten opposed the proposal which was thereupon sent to the Joint Planning staff; Mountbatten saw to it that they returned an adverse verdict. Mountbatten is then reported to

1. Hodson, p. 462.

have tried on the level of his Conference Secretary in India and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali in Pakistan for what Mr. Hodson calls a conciliatory gesture from Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan but it was not possible because, according to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, as claimed by Mountbatten, the Pakistan Prime Minister had meanwhile visited Sialkot and got first hand accounts of the harrowing tales of torture, rape and wanton destruction of lakhs of Muslims at the hands of Hindu—Sikh militants in Jammu. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali is also reported to have told Lt. Col. Erskine Grum that he had accompanied Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to Rawalpindi where the latter had put before the Azad Kashmir leaders the outline of the draft agreement on Kashmir but that they had unanimously and immediately condemned it out of hand. They were also claimed to have told the Prime Minister that they were not willing to consider any terms which did not include the complete withdrawal of Indian troops and the setting up of an impartial administration before the plebiscite.[1]

On 9th December, a meeting of the Joint Defence Council was held in Lahore. Both Mountbatten and Nehru attended. The first two hours were spent in mutual accusations. Mr. Nehru insisted that as a first step the Pakistan Government should withdraw the "raiders" and take steps that no one entered thereafter. Naturally Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was unable to do so because the people of Pakistan could not support such a step. He told Nehru that he could do so only if he had something concrete to offer to his people and by this he meant a promise by India of the complete withdrawal of her forces and the setting up of a neutral administration or a coalition Government. According to Lord Mountbatten:

> "Pandit Nehru's answer to this was that he could not undertake to withdraw all the Indian troops from Kashmir. If he did, the State would be at the mercy of the armed men of Poonch, who would overrun it. Chaos would ensue, and troops would have to be sent back again to restore the situation. He did not retract his offer, however, to withdraw the bulk of the Indian troops, leaving behind only small detachments to ensure the maintenance of law and order."[2]

This was to be the last effort without third party intervention of the two countries for a solution of the problem—for a long time to come. According to Mr. Hodson, orders had been issued to the Service Chiefs by the Indian government to prepare a plan for the invasion of Pakistan. Mountbatten attempted to change the thinking but did not succeed. He

1. Hodson, p. 464.
2. Hodson, p. 465.

then requested Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister, to fly out to the sub-continent to meet the two Prime Ministers, but he declined to come on the ground that he could do nothing specific. Pandit Nehru also addressed a letter to him at the suggestion of Mountbatten and in return the Labour Prime Minister advised moderation. The invasion plan had been chalked out because of the liberation forces mounting pressure on the Uri sector which, however, died down within the next few weeks and according to Lord Mountbatten, the threat to invade West Pakistan consequently cooled down.

India then approached the United Nations and it is possible that this step was taken on the persuasion of Lord Mountbatten who would have naturally not been happy on an Indo-Pakistan war. Such a war was bound to sully further his image at home. It was a misfortune that the Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council did not reach the sub-continent until after the departure of Lord Mountbatten. Had it come earlier, Lord Mountbatten might, after all, have been of some assistance.

## THE PARTITION PLAN

Before his departure back home on 21st June, 1948, Mountbatten made his last effort for a solution of the Kashmir problem. It is better to reproduce his own version:

> "Despite the fact that previous meetings between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan had not resulted in an agreement on the Kashmir problem being reached, I hoped, at the end of May, that a solution would be found at such a meeting during my last month in office.
>
> These hopes were based on the facts that an agreement between India and Hyderabad seemed about to materialise; that the time which had elapsed since Kashmir became a bone of contention between the two Dominions had resulted in a cooling of tempers and a desire, particularly on the part of the Government of India, for a settlement out of court; and that Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan was due to come to Delhi for a meeting with Pandit Nehru.
>
> The solution of the Kashmir problem which I would have backed, had Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan come, would have been based on the partition of the State. At my request, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Mr. V. P. Menon had worked out a compromise which

they said the Indian Cabinet would accept if Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan put it up. It was my intention to have suggested to Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan that he should put this forward as a proposal. I had never dared to have it raised before, because both sides had been clearly committed to an 'all or nothing' policy; and, once the partition proposal was put forward, and if it failed, it obviously could never be raised again." But no agreement was reached between India and Hyderabad. Tempers rose again in India—though not to the extent which was to have been expected on receipt of the news that three Pakistan Army battalions had been sent into Kashmir. And Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, because he fell ill, did not come to Delhi."[1]

Comments Mr. Hodson:

"That two such powerful and committed exponents of India's case should have accepted a solution by partition in May 1948 is indeed an important historical fact. *The partition maps were all marked up, and discussed between Pandit Nehru and the Chief of Army Staff*".[2]

In 1949, differences arose about the interpretation of certain provisions of the UNCIP resolutions regarding demilitarization and its timing. The dispute was as usual manufactured by India to avoid its implementation. It is interesting to point out that the Government of India was not prepared even to accept the interpretation given by the Commission itself—the authors of the resolutions. The Commission, therefore, proposed that the differences be referred to arbitration. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee were thoughtful enough to address a joint appeal to Pandit Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan for acceptance of the proposal. Pakistan agreed but India rejected it.

## ROBERT MENZIES PROPOSES A PLAN

Public opinion in Pakistan was critical of the Commonwealth, largely because it dove-tailed all that fell from the lips of Pandit Nehru and partly because of its failure to persuade the latter to adopt a just and reasonable attitude on the Kashmir issue. The only non-white members of the Commonwealth then were Pakistan, India and Ceylon. Britain was naturally keen to keep India in the Commonwealth not only because of its size and resources but also because of the extensive market it provided for the British-manufactured goods. Another reason was that after the liquidation of the British empire, the only effective way of maintaining British pres-

1 & 2. Hodson, pp. 471 and 472.

tige and influence in the World councils, was to keep the freed or about to be freed Asian and African countries tied with Britain in the name of Commonwealth and certainly India, by the sheer weight of its size and resources, and the fame, her leaders, Gandhi and Nehru, enjoyed in the world, was far more important than Pakistan. That is why Mr. Philip Noel Baker, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations who had in the initial Security Council debates on Kashmir taken a fair and impartial attitude and described the Kashmir issue as "the greatest and gravest single issue in international affairs", was over-ruled at home and a new line, in keeping with Indian wishes, adopted in March, 1948.

A conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was called in January, 1951. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan informed the British Prime Minister as well as other participants that unless the Conference agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue, he was not prepared to attend it. The practice had been not to discuss, even informally, disputes involving members of the Commonwealth. This was done with the object of avoiding a rupture in the body because there were several inter-Dominion disputes, for instance those between India and Pakistan and between South Africa and the Asian members. It was being asked in Pakistan as to what was the use of the Commonwealth and how could cohesion be brought about if inter-Dominion relations continued to border on enmity? Much could be said on both sides. India was opposed to the stand taken by Pakistan and, therefore, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan could not leave for London on schedule. The Commonwealth then had a great and far-sighted leader in the person of Mr. Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister. He was able to persuade his colleagues including Mr. Nehru that an informal discussion on Kashmir ought to be held in order to make it possible for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to attend the conference. It was only then that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan flew to London. During informal discussions, Mr. Menzies proposed that in order to solve the question of demilitarization, either a Commonwealth force or a joint Indo-Pakistan force or a local force to be raised by the Plebiscite Administrator, be stationed in Kashmir till the holding of a plebiscite. The proposal had the support of all the Prime Ministers but again Pakistan accepted while India rejected it. These proposals and their acceptance by Pakistan and rejection by India was revealed at a press conference in London by Liaquat Ali Khan. Mr. Nehru who had gone to Paris where the United Nations was in session and where he was lecturing the world on the so-called 'moral values', got a bitter press throughout the world, so much so that one British newspaper stated that the British public opinion which had been accustomed to giving Nehru an ovation and bravo, each time he came to London, had given this round to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

## BOGRA—NEHRU ACCORD

In June, 1953, Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra, Prime Minister of Pakistan had a meeting with Pandit Nehru in London where both had gone to attend a conference of the Commonwealth leaders. It was decided to hold further talks to reconcile their different interpretations of the UNCIP resolutions. The next meeting took place in Karachi on 25th, 26th and 27th of July, 1953. Pandit Nehru was given a most memorable reception by the people of Karachi which should have convinced him that a just solution of the Kashmir problem was bound to open a new horizon of friendship and good-neighbourly relations and result in close collaboration both in the economic as well as external fields but in his public speeches Pandit Nehru spoke practically nothing of Kashmir and instead stressed the so-called basic unity of the people inhabiting the two countries. Whether it was really appropriate to have said so at such a stage and on his very first visit to Pakistan, is arguable; may be, it was intended to create a favourable climate in the two countries especially India but unfortunately a section of public opinion in this country took exception to this theme and instead of building up mutual trust and a climate of confidence, it only helped in confounding the confusion. It was lost sight of that any just and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem must necessarily mean the transfer of the State or at least of a large chunk of it to Pakistan and no government in the neighbouring country, after the initial folly of grabbing it, can do so without creating a favourable public opinion, because not only is such a political climate a pre-requisite for arriving at any such agreement but it is also essential to keep the government taking such a decision in power. After all no politician in power can, in this essentially human world, be expected to commit harakiri with wide open eyes.

However, it seems that Pandit Nehru had agreed to these talks and chosen the last week of July for his visit to Karachi with his eyes fixed on the implementation of the decision already taken to dismiss and imprison Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. We have it now from Mr. B. N. Mullik, then Director of the Indian Intelligence that it had been already decided to remove Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. What then were the intentions of Pandit Nehru in entering into, what appeared at the time, meaningful negotiations, with Pakistan? May be, it was to prevent Pakistan from seeking a Security Council debate on the Kashmir issue in the light of the happenings in Srinagar; may be, as some writers have suggested, it was to prevent Pakistan from armed intervention in Kashmir on the plausible ground to save Muslims from the brutalities of the Indian army; or may be, Pandit Nehru having now come face to face with the reality of the aliena-

tion of Kashmiri Muslims, en masse, due to their leader's impending dismissal and imprisonment, had a twinkling vision of light and realised the imperative need for a just and equitable solution and chose to do so with Pakistan, the party that alone mattered for him. Whatever may be the truth, the presumption that it was intended to prevent armed intervention by Pakistan, must be ruled out because Pakistan had neither the will nor the resources to do so.

The next meeting of the Prime Ministers was fixed for October but, as was expected, the events in Srinagar deeply stirred public opinion in Pakistan. From Karachi to Chittagong people came out in the streets demanding urgent and strong action. Mr. Bogra, therefore, asked Mr. Nehru to advance ahead their scheduled meeting. At first Pandit Nehru wanted to have it in early September but on the insistence of Mr. Muhammad Ali, it was held on 16th August, in New Delhi. The communique issued at the end of the conference contained the following paragraphs:

> "The Kashmir dispute was specially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain "preliminary issues". It was decided that these issues should be considered by them directly in order to arrive at an agreement in regard to this. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator.
>
> In order to fix some kind of a provisional time-table, it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues, referred to above, should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken. With this purpose in view, committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. On the Plebiscite Administrator's formal appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and

Kashmir Government, "he will examine the situation and report on it". He will then "make such proposals" as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite "in the entire State", and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor."

The one concrete result of the Delhi conference was the agreement for the appointment of a new Plebiscite Administrator by the end of April, 1954. Nothing was said about the neutralisation of administration. It appears in between the lines, as was confirmed later, that Pandit Nehru had proposed the holding of regional plebiscites which would have meant that each country was to get at least a part of the State. Mr. Muhammad Ali was convinced that a solution of the problem was possible and it seems he was prepared to trust the words of the Indian Prime Minister. He had several times publicly responded to the ego of Pandit Nehru by calling him an elder brother and it is possible that on his part, Pandit Nehru thought that Muhammad Ali, being a Bengali and hence not so emotionally involved in Kashmir as any politician from West Pakistan, it was easier to settle the dispute with him. Unfortunately, there was strong public reaction in West Pakistan against the communique and all sorts of allegations began to be hurled on the poor Prime Minister. Strong exception was taken to several aspects of the agreement such as the replacement of Admiral Chester Nimitz by a new Administrator, possibly Asian, the keeping out of the United Nations and the possibility of zonal plebiscites. It is not known whether the American government also brought its pressure against he replacement of Admiral Nimitz. The truth remains that Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra was not allowed a free hand either by the Governor-General and his Cabinet or by the mercury-natured public opinion in West Pakistan with the result that his enthusiasm died down soon afterwards. In course of an exchange of letters, Pandit Nehru repudiated the commitment about the return of refugees to their homes under the pretext of "practical difficulties". It meant that lakhs of Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir from the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Reasi and Udhampur were sought to be excluded from their right of franchise. Since the plebiscite was sought to be held on regional basis, it was apparent that the objective was to ensure continued occupation of these districts. In his letter dated 3rd September, 1953, Pandit Nehru told Mr. Bogra that since the final decision necessarily rested on the co-operation of the two Governments, it was necessary that instead of looking towards the United Nations for imposing a decision "against our will", they agreed among themselves.

By the end of December, 1953, Pakistan signed a military treaty of Mutual Assistance with the United States which was expressly restricted

to Communist aggression only. It did not bind the United States to come to our aid in case of aggression by India but the practical result was that military hardware began to flow in and as a result, Pakistan completely passed into the American sphere of influence. A storm of protest was raised in India, spear-headed by Pandit Nehru himself. A protest-Day was officially observed and all sorts of accusations were hurled from press and platform against the two countries; even sinister motives were attributed, despite American assurances, both public and private, that the arms were meant only for defence against Communist aggression. President Eisen-hover offered a similar treaty to India which Nehru condemned as "adding insult to injury ". He was emphatic that there was no danger to the sub-continent from the North. On 9th December, 1953, in course of a long letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he wrote that the American military aid had a direct bearing on the Kashmir issue and advised Pakistan to keep aloof from power blocs. He also claimed that the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Azad Kashmir would make no material change now that Pakistan could, armed with American weapons and fast-going means of transport, enter the State at will. An experts' meeting was held in Delhi at few days later to discuss the question of demilitarization. Pakistan was represented by Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Mr. Muhammad Ayub, Mr. Aftab Ahmed Khan, Major General K.M. Sheikh and Lt. Col. Muhammad Iqbal. India was represented by Mr. M. G. Desai, Mr. Vishnu Sahai, later Governor of Kashmir, V. Shankar and Brigadier Maneck Shah. Instead of discussing demilitarization, the Indian delegation insisted that the question of American military assistance be discussed first. The Committee, therefore, called off its meeting without entering into its agenda. On 29th March, 1954, Mr. Bogra wrote a long letter to the Prime Minister of India explaining that the military assistance from the United States had nothing to do either with the inter-Dominion dispute over Kashmir or the right of self-determination of the poeple of Kashmir. On 13th April, 1954, Pandit Nehru now broke his August commitment for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator in April 1954, taking the excuse that the situation had changed due to the American military assistance; with this, the inter-Dominion talks on Kashmir came to an end for a long time to come.

## THE UNHELPFUL MILITARY PACTS

In retrospect, it seems that the American military assistance did Pakistan more harm than good. No doubt it resulted in the modernisation of our armed forces but this by itself is no consolation. The national objective of liberating Kashmir which was, until recently, the principal justification for maintaining such a huge army and at such an enormous

cost while the great majority of our people suffer from hunger, disease and illiteracy, could not be achieved; far from it, today it is more distant than it was in 1953. At home it encouraged the Army to dismiss the civil governments and impose its own rule. It began in 1958 just when the country was preparing for its first general elections. Organised political activities, as understood by the phrase, remained prohibited upto 1969 and the first popularly elected government took office 13 years later, only after East Pakistan had been separated, the Junta-led country, humbled and the remainder of Pakistan in real danger of disintegration. It was the Field Marshal's rule that strengthened in East Pakistan, the feelings of non-association with the government and thus enabled India and Russia to bring about, through internal subversion and external aggression, the separation of that wing. His rule also led to the elimination from the Army of a number of capable Generals and in the promotion of a number of unworthy favourites better known as "Darbari Generals"—the name aptly given to them by Air Marshal Noor Khan. The Army's entry into civil domain, also brought down the efficiency of the armed forces. The surrender in Dacca and the surrendering General, Niazi's military salute to his Indian counterpart,[1] is a festering wound that we all, shall carry to our graves—so long as it is not avenged and our national honour vindicated. I have no doubt that we—all of us, including our brothers and sons in the Army—are capable of this miracle.

On the external side, Pakistan was isolated from the Afro-Asian world to which it rightly belongs and instead Pandit Nehru not only got the opportunity to consolidate his and his country's position in the two continents but was able to use the American military assistance and our consequent membership of SEATO and Baghdad Pact as a justification for continued occupation of Kashmir; it must be frankly admitted that a good number of countries as well as large sections of unwary, public opinion the world over, was easily hoodwinked by the crafty Brahmin. Pandit Nehru's greatest ambition perhaps had been to emerge as the leader of Afro-Asia; this was his weakness. A strong public opinion in the two continents on Kashmir would have had much greater effect on him than whatever friendly pressure might have been exerted by the Anglo-American bloc. By joining the Western military alliances, as a price for the American military assistance, we were taken far away from the main-stream of the rising tide of Afro-Asian nationalism with the result that we were unable to beat Mr. Nehru with his own stick.

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1. Witness to surrender, p. 211.

Perhaps it is remembered that Pakistan and the United States gave conflicting statements about the effect and purport of the Mutual Assistance programme, embracing the arms aid. While the spokesmen of the United States always said that it was meant only for defence against Communist aggression, Pakistan spokesmen said that it was meant for defence against any aggression. This conflicting interpretation appears to have been the result of a mutual agreement that while the official US position would be that it was meant for Communist aggression only, the Pakistan position would be that it was meant against aggression from any side.

These pacts estranged us from Soviet Russia to the extent of deep enmity so much so that Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, on a visit to India in 1955, broke the convention well established by visiting foreign Heads of States or Governments, of not visiting Srinagar, partly because of the territory being disputed but largely borne out of a desire not to offend Pakistan. He declared in a speech at Srinagar that Kashmir was a part of India. Dawn, writing on 27th June, 1958, lamented:

> "Never would Russia have used her Veto and actively participated on the side of Bharat in the matter of Kashmir if Pakistan had not aligned herself so closely with the Anglo-American bloc."[1]

From now on, Russian Veto in the Security Council was always available to India just for the asking. The Americans then established a base at Badber near Peshawar which was completely in their control so much so that even entry to the base depended upon their sweet-will. High altitude spying was partly conducted from here and the U-2 spy plane, flown by Mr. Power which was shot down on Soviet territory, had flown from this base. This spying had been going on without the knowledge of the Pakistan Government but whatever the position, the fact remains that because of our entry into military pacts, Russia abandoned neutrality and supported perpetuation of Indian occupation. On the contrary, the Anglo-American bloc was luke-warm in its support to Pakistan and the fact remains that the newly acquired influence was used to "keep Pakistan quiescent over Kashmir"[2]. It was because of this influence that Pakistan Government was prevented from approaching the Security Council till 1957, an interval of four years which so adversely affected our case. The Anglo-Americans had to take a position in the Council and if they had taken a strong stand for Pakistan, they feared a worsening of relations with India which they were absolutely keen to avoid and if they

1. Sarwar Hassan.
2. Sarwar Hassan.

had failed to take a just and honourable stand in support of Pakistan because of their policy to keep Pandit Nehru in good humour, public opinion in Pakistan would have surely made it miserable for their government to continue its association with the Military Alliances. So the western strategists thought of the best via media, namely, to prevent a resumption of the debate in the Security Council. Since by entering into these pacts Pakistan had itself invited Anglo-American influence to an extent where no initiative was possible without their prior clearance, the debate could not be resumed for over four years. The Pakistan delegation headed by Malik Feroz Khan Noon which participated in the 1957 Security Council debates, was of the opinion that the silent interval had considerably weakened our position.

When we look at the American military assistance and our entering into the western-sponsored military pacts from the point of view of what has been stated above, it appears that the decision was neither wise nor timely. Pandit Nehru's views on Military Alliances were too well known and if Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra honestly believed, as he was then credited to believe, that Pandit Nehru was really in a frame of mind to settle the dispute with Pakistan, then it was really surprising that the government chose upon a course of action which she knew would not only antagonise him but also provide him with an easy pretext to stage a volte face and wriggle out of the 16th August agreement. It had been the experience of the Pakistan Government from commitment to commitment, from agreement to agreement and from year to year that they were dealing with a man who was really not desirous of solving the Kashmir problem except on his own terms and that it was his habit to repudiate solemn agreements on Kashmir on one pretext or another and yet he should have been provided with a pretext which was also plausible in the eyes of large sections of uncritical public opinion the world over. The least that could be done was to have stayed action until the current negotiations reached either a fruitful end or had met the same fate at the hands of the unpredictable Pandit which was the fate of many other agreements entered into with him. After the death of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, until the take over by Mr. Bhutto, foresight in the foreign policy remained a cry for the moon.

### "DAFTARI"

During the premiership of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, there were a few meetings between the two Prime Ministers. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was himself a very capable man and has served this country in a most dedicated manner, worthy of emulation by anyone but his inherent shortcoming was that he came from Services and couldn't have the dash and

foresight that go with trained politicians. For instance, he was invited to Peking by Mr. Chou-En-Lai but could not avail of the opportunity despite his not so vulnerable position in the Parliament while Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy availed of the opportunity only a few days after becoming Prime Minister although in a House of 75 members, his party had only 11 members. For a civil servant, however capable, two and two either make four or zero but for a politician, they sometimes do make five and this is the basic difference between the approach of a politician and that of a civil servant. The latter goes only by cold calculation but the former also goes by intuition. He is therefore capable of taking risks. Despite being cognizant of the capabilities of Chaudhry Muhammad Ali to the extent of having publicly praised him, Pandit Nehru could not mentally reconcile himself to a civil servant becoming the Prime Minister of the neighbouring Pakistan. Therefore, he used to call him a "Daftari". He was even discourteous when Chaudhri Muhammad Ali went to meet him in London during a meeting of the Commonwealth leaders at which the latter played a prominent role; Nehru lacked even the ordinary courtesy of receiving him at the gate; instead he sent his daughter though after the meeting, he did come out to bid him farewell. Nothing was expected out of these meetings and nothing came out.

With the introduction of Martial Law in October, 1958, there was a further hardening of the Indian attitude. In 1960 was signed the Indus Water Treaty for which Pandit Nehru came to Rawalpindi. He spent a day or two at Nathiagali. President Ayub discussed the Kashmir issue with him and to begin with, even satisfied his ego by praising him for the glorious role he had undoubtedly played in the struggle for freedom from British rule. The President then told him that of all Indian leaders in sight, he alone could solve the problem and that he saw no man of stature to succeed him. The President prophecied that he (Nehru) was likely to be succeeded "either by a crook or a Communist" who would further widen the breach rather than bring the two countries closer. He also told Pandit Nehru that Kashmir was a blot on his otherwise glorious achievements and that he owed it to himself as well as to posterity to bring about an amicable end of the dispute. In reply Pandit Nehru claimed that the issue had died down long ago; that it had been forgotten by the people and that it was only the Pakistan Government which was keeping it alive. Upon this, the President told him, in his characteristic forthright manner, that Kashmiris would never forget the issue; if they forgot it, the people of Pakistan would not forget it; if they forgot it, the Pakistan Government could not forget it and even if she forgot it, the Pakistan Army could never forget it. Then, pointing to a map at hand, he told Pandit Nehru that important railway junctions, the G.T. Road which

was the life-line of West Pakistan, the Irrigation Head-works and important Cantonments were all, only a couple of miles away from the cease-fire line and that no Army could allow such a situation to persist. Pandit Nehru was then reported to have softened a bit and invited President Ayub to Delhi on a date convenient to both, to have further talks. Unfortunately, that day was destined never to dawn.

## HARRIMAN-SANDYS INITIATE A DIALOGUE

In 1962, Indo-Chinese relations took a serious turn. After Chinese forces' entry into Tibet, traditionally an autonomous outlying region under the suzerainty of the Chinese government, the first cracks in their relations made their appearance. Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal Budhist Head was induced by Indian intrigues to "seek shelter" in India. Thousands of Tibetans were also instigated and lured to follow him. In India they were made a peg for a world-wide hate-China campaign which gave the Chinese their first real taste of the Indian interpretation of 'Panj Shila'—the five principles founded on non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The growing economic development and closer integration of Tibet necessitated the construction of a network of roads. At that time a vast area to the west of Tibet and the north of Leh lay unoccupied. Indian military posts were not far from Leh: she now ventured upon to open new posts farther north, which brought them in conflict with the Chinese both here as well as in NEFA, Assam. It may look ridiculous but nevertheless it is true and has been confirmed by foreign writers also that Pandit Nehru ordered his Army to demolish the Chinese posts in forward areas. This naturally provoked a clash with the Chinese Army. Naturally and expectedly they retaliated both in NEFA as well as Ladakh and inflicted a most humiliating defeat on the Indians. An Indian army officer referring to the Chinese counter-attack, said later: "they came like ants". A number of Indian soldiers were killed and a larger number taken prisoners. The Chinese rapidly advanced towards Gauhati, the capital of Assam and Leh, the district headquarter in Ladakh, thus occupying thousands of square miles. The demoralisation in India was so great that civil administration, even dozens of miles behind the retreating Indian forces, totally collapsed; the District Magistrate of Tezpur was afterwards dismissed for having run away from his post of duty. The Chinese, having taught the Indians a lesson which they are likely never to forget and which incidentally also gave them an opportunity to demonstrate their military power, ordered a unilateral cease-fire as well as withdrawal. This greatly enhanced her prestige abroad and frustrated the Indo-Western propaganda, accusing her of being land-hungry. Sometime later, the Chinese returned the prisoners as

well as the captured arms and ammunition. Tauntingly, they polished the hardware before its return to the Indian warlords.

From the very beginning Pakistan told the world that the Indian accusation that the war had been started by China was untrue and that it was India which started the war by attacking forward Chinese posts, thus compelling her to retaliate. The late Mr. Fazl-ul-Qadir Chaudhri, then Speaker of the National Assembly, went to Europe and addressed press-conferences and meetings in London, Paris and other places defending the Chinese action. China has always remained grateful for this support.

Pandit Nehru now realised, but alas only temporarily, the compelling need for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan and the consequent urgency of resolving the Kashmir dispute. While Indian army was suffering defeat after defeat, causing great demoralisation in all walks of life, there was a growing demand in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir for immediate military action in Kashmir, but alas, President Ayub again chose to act like a statesman rather than a politician and allowed the God-sent opportunity to be wasted. He placed statesmanship above the dictates of patriotism. Indian leaders are cunning; Mr. Chavan, then Defence Minister, spoke of President Ayub, in the Lok Sabha, as "a great soldier" and sure enough, the arrow successfully struck the victim and achieved the desired object. When pressure mounted further, the President, who had meanwhile taken to the Northern regions, apparently to inspect defences but rather to be away from the scene of mounting public demand, returned back. He called a meeting of the National Assembly which met in camera on Friday, the 23rd of November for 2½ hours. It was reliably learnt that the President rejected the demand for a war with India and informed the House that bulk of the Indian army was still on the cease-fire line and the West Pakistan borders. He also told them that Kashmir was no doubt important but that Pakistan could not be sacrificed for Kashmir and that the country's security always came first. There can be no dispute at all with this reasoning because if Pakistan lives, Kashmir will also live and can always be claimed. The question however was as to whether the moment when Indian forces were also engaged with the Chinese and had not as yet been fully armed and equipped and when defeat at NEFA and Ladakh had terribly shaken and demoralised not only the Indian army and the man in the street but also its political leadership, did not provide us with a golden opportunity to strike the enemy and try to achieve our objective. Thus the issue involved was altogether different. It seems that the best opportunity for liberation of Kashmir that came our way since the early phase of the war in 1947, was lost and wasted away. I have not read it

anywhere in print but it is a fact that in the very beginning of the border war, President Ayub gave an assurance to the United States that he would not activate the Cease-fire line. This was done without consultation with his cabinet or the Army High Command. Even Ch. Zafrullah Khan, then Pakistan Representative at the UN, sent a written as well as verbal message through Mr. Justice Javed Iqbal that it was the opportune time to strike India and liberate Kashmir.

The debacle of his troops stunned Pandit Nehru who stretched out his hands in the direction of West not only for military assistance but also for air protection. At that time, all that was publicly known was that only arms and ammunition had been requested for and no mention was made of the air umbrella. The letter sent by Pandit Nehru to President Kennedy remained a tightly-guarded secret. Its copy was not kept in the foreign office where such correspondence normally remains but in the office of the Prime Minister. We are grateful to Mr. Sudhir Ghosh who lifted the curtain and told an excited Lok Sabha that President Kennedy had told him of Mr. Nehru's urgent request for air cover and that he had to accede to it. The Shastri Government denied the allegation until a copy of the letter, also preserved in the American Chancery at New Delhi, was shown by Ghosh to a few prominent members.

Says Mr. Ghosh:

> "Then something fell from his (Kennedy's) lips which was perhaps unintentional. He indignantly said that only a few months earlier when Mr. Nehru was overwhelmed by the power of Communist China, he made a desparate appeal to him for air protection and non-alignment or no non-alignment, the President had to respond. He added sarcastically that Mr. Nehru's conversion lasted only a few days. He was impressed to see the speed with which the Prime Minister swung back to his original position with regard to the United States."[1]

The American Government was strongly of the view that mere military assistance could not make much difference as long as the armies of Pakistan and India were locked in confrontation in Kashmir and elsewhere, thus making a solution of the Kashmir problem imperative. Mr. Averell Harriman, United States' Assistant Secretary of State and Mr. Duncan Sandys, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth relations, therefore came to the sub-continent and had several meetings with Pandit Nehru and President Ayub to initiate talks for a solution of the dispute. Pandit Nehru also seems to have been told that the American Congress

1. Sudhir Ghosh, p. 312.

may block military assistance programme which the President wanted to initiate because of her dispute with Pakistan and also that the removal of Mr. Krishna Menon from the cabinet was equally necessary because far from treating China as an enemy, he publicly held the view that Pakistan was India's enemy No.1. President Kennedy seems to have sincerely desired to get the Kashmir dispute resolved so as to consolidate non-Communist forces in Asia. As usual, he ordered a study of the issue by his experts. In a subsequent meeting when he read the report, he is claimed to have asked his advisers: "Is Pakistan interested in Kashmir or the Kashmir issue?" As a first step, Pandit Nehru had to eat a humble pie by altogether removing Mr. Krishna Menon from the cabinet. After several talks in Rawalpindi and Delhi, the following joint communique signed by President Ayub and Pandit Nehru was simultaneously released from the two capitals:

> "The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship.
>
> In consequence, they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement.
>
> These will be conducted initially at the Ministerial level. At the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub."

Mr. Duncan Sandys and Averell Harriman had perhaps their first taste of the subtle working of the Brahmin mind. Mr. Sandys told President Ayub that the draft of the joint communique was discussed in a cabinet meeting, attended by senior Ministers, one or two Central Secretaries and the two envoys. It was first given to Mr. Nehru who read and re-read it several times and after a considerable pause, passed it on to the next man who acted like-wise; it was still in circulation several hours later when Mr. Sandys lost patience and protested against this mysterious attitude. Even their predecessor Lord Mountbatten came to the same conclusion, for, according to Leonard Mosley, when on 10th May, 1947 M.B. showed the revised partition plan received from London to Nehru, who reacted violently, "Mountbatten looked at him with bewilderment and distress". "I thought that I knew Nehru's mind".

Mountbatten told the author years later, "but the Hindus are strange. You can never tell".[1]

Now that the United States and Britain considered an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement necessary, to meet, what they thought, a Chinese threat, they brought friendly pressure on India. On one occasion, U.S. Ambassador Galbraith making an unannounced call on the Indian President on 15th November, told him : "Ayub is the best man on your side". There followed a two-hour discussion on Kashmir. President Ayub, on his part, warned the United States that they were dealing with a country which had a "long history of broken pledges". Russia was against a rapprochement on Kashmir. So, they "raised their eye-brows in displeasure" and her Ambassador, Benediktov, called on Rada Krishnan frequently and told him on one occasion: "We may have to revise *our* policy and thinking on Kashmir if you are going to discuss it with Pakistan."[2]

## BHUTTO—SWARAN PARLEYS

As a result of the communique, it was decided to hold ministerial-level talks. The first round took place in Rawalpindi on 27th December, 1962. The Pakistan delegation, led by Mr. Bhutto, included Mr. Agha Hilali, High Commissioner in India, Mr. Nazir Ahmed, Secretary Defence, Mr. Agha Shahi, Mr. Shafqat, Director General Foreign office, Brigadier Pirzada, Mr. Ghulam Ishaque Khan, Chairman, WAPDA, Mr. M. Ayub, Ambassador to Bonn and Mr. A. H. Qureshi, Secretary Ministery of Kashmir affairs. On the same day, the American Ambassador delivered a letter from his President to President Ayub.

The Indian delegation was led by her Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. That she was not at all desirous of entering into any meaningful negotiations, is borne out not only from their subsequent failure but is also testified to by Indian authors. Says Mathai:

> "When a Government has to start interminable negotiations with a foreign government on a ticklish problem which is neither easy of solution *nor wished to be solved*, the man to be looked for is Swaran Singh. With his infinite patience and *inexhaustible capacity for* endless talk, Swaran Singh was a marvellous success in the negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue."[3] This is also confirmed by Major Datta.[4]

1. The Last Days of British Raj, p. 128.
2. Major Datta, pp. 118/119.
3. M.O. Mathai, p. 239.
4. With Two Presidents, p. 112.

On the 26th evening, it was announced simultaneously from Rawalpindi and Peking that the two Governments had reached an agreement on the demarcation of their boundaries in the Northern region. The credit for the agreemert was publicly attributed to General N. A. M. Raza, Pakistan's Ambassador to Peking and Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra, the Foreign Minister. The brief announcement stated:

> "Pakistan and the People's Republic of China have reached complete agreement in principle in regard to the alignment of the common border of China's Sinkiang and of the contiguous areas, the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan."

General N. M. A. Raza told me that he received an urgent message from the Foreign office directing him to request the Chinese Government for the signing of the boundary protocol and that the request was immediately acceded to by Mr. Chou En Lai who was awakened at night and conveyed the Foreign office message. According to General Raza, the Chinese Prime Minister immediately acceded to the request and the protocol was signed at midnight. Six days later it was discovered in Islamabad that instead of making a river as the boundary, it had been fixed on land across the river on the Pakistan side which was strategically a folly, in so far as Pakistan was concerned. A second message was now given to Mr. Raza pointing out this fact and directing him to request the Chinese Government for an alteration in the protocol. General Raza told me that he immediately went to Mr. Chou En Lai and told him that the Pakistan Government considered itself bound by the agreement as signed but that they would be grateful if it was amended and the river was fixed as boundary between the two countries. Mr. Raza also told me that Mr. Chou En Lai did not wait even for a second in accepting the proposal, asked Mr. Raza to make the necessary alteration and immediately signed it. Such was the greatness of Mr. Chou En Lai.

A detailed communique was issued on the next day. It was also announced on 26th October that a Chinese trade delegaticn would arrive in Karachi on 28th December. The Indian delegation expressed surprise over the joint communique while public opinion in Pakistan welcomed it as a great achievement. However, the wisdom of the timing of its release is arguable. Was it intended to bring pressure on the Indian government? Was the motivation of the two countries in its timing, complimentary? To me it seems that the announcement was ill-timed. India had entered into negotiations not out of a voluntary desire to settle the Kashmir issue but because of her dire need for arms and equipment which only the United States could offer; let it be said in fairness to Mr. Kennedy that he

was honestly striving to use this opportunity as a lever with India to secure concessions on the issue of Kashmir, without of course, doing so crudely so as not to give offence and destroy the undercurrents. As the United States government was then too much committed against the Communist regime in Peking, it needed no particular wisdom to foresee that such an agreement would antagonise her and push her nearer to the Indian line. Once again, when the chances of a solution had brightened, despite our inactivity, undiplomatically we damaged our Cause.

On Friday, March 26, 1965, Marshal Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of China and Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister Pakistan signed a boundary protocol in Rawalpindi. It marked completion of the demarcation carried out in pursuance of the boundary agreement signed two years ago. Marshal Chen Yi described the event "as a great achievement."[1] The documents and maps simultaneously released, showed that Pakistan had not ceded to China any portion of the territory under its control; on the other hand, an area of 750 sq. miles, lying between the main watershed of the Karakoram range and hitherto controlled by China, was ceded to Pakistan; there was to be no dislocation of population because the areas which came to Pakistan were very sparsely populated.

The Indo-Pakistan talks ended on 29th December and the joint communique stated that these were to be resumed in New Delhi on 16th January. Mr. Swaran Singh had two meetings with President Ayub. He was assisted, among others, by G. Parthasarathy and Mr. Gundevia. In their inaugural addresses, leaders of the two delegations reiterated the official stand of the two governments. Sardar Swaran Singh told reporters in Rawalpindi that India's attitude was not rigid and that she might agree to a plebiscite if it was "mutually considered" and that these talks are the most suitable way of settling the Kashmir issue."[2] The New York Times wrote:

> "The initiative for an India and Pakistan rapprochement ought properly to come from Mr. Nehru.........A move now from Indian side, one giving more indication that India could be willing to modify her intransigent attitude on Kashmir might break the ice............ It is India which has failed over the years to live upto her agreements to settle the disagreement on Kashmir by a plebiscite. ...... To be fully realistic, India must now realize that it is her future and not Pakistan's, that is immediately at stake."

1. Pakistan Times, March 27, 1965.
2. Pakistan Times, 27th December.

The Christian Science Monitor Boston, the Washington Post, the New York Herald Tribune, the Sunday Star, Washington, the Daily Express London, the Daily Telegraph London, the Observer London, the Yorkshire Post, the Financial Times London, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Canberra Times, General Anzliger, Germany, the Hersfelder Zeitung, Schewerte Zeitung, A. V. C. Spain, Twentsche Courant, the Hague, A Noite of Brazil, Alakhbar Baghdad, Al-Hayat Beirut, As-Safa Beirut, the Weekly Al-Hawadis Beirut, Kehan International and several other newspapers the world over commented on the talks in the same strain and called upon India to make concessions to Pakistan. For instance, the Daily Express London in its issue of 3rd December said:

> "In the case of Kashmir, there is no escaping the fact that if a peaceful settlement is to be reached in negotiations, India will have to make the lion share of the mutual concessions. This is not only because the moral superiority of Pakistan's case is widely acknowledged outside that country's borders, it is basically because India is the beneficiary of the status quo and thus negotiating, must necessarily involve concessions on her part."

The next round of talks was held in Delhi on 16th January, 1963. The Pakistan delegation was led by Mr. Bhutto while the Indian delegation was led by Mr. Swaran Singh. The delegations had a 45-minute meeting at the President's house and later the two foreign Ministers conferred for about an hour. Mr. Bhutto laid a wreath at the Samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi and later called on President Radha Krishnan and Mr. Nehru with whom he had a 45-minute discussion. In a statement, Swaran Singh said that his country attached "highest importance to a just and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem". On 17th, Mr. Bhutto demanded that India come forward with concrete proposals. There were several meetings on the 18th. It was however authoritatively stated that partition with cease-fire line as boundary was not suggested. Meetings continued till the 19th. A communique issued after four days of talks announced that discussions were to be resumed in Karachi with a view to find an "equitable and honourable solution of Kashmir and other related problems". On his return to Karachi, Mr. Bhutto said that he did not have anything spectacular to report. He however said that the detention of Kashmiri leaders was discussed in some context. The next round of talks took place in Karachi, beginning on 8th February. While at Delhi the talks remained largely confined to Pakistan proposals for a plebiscite, at Karachi, these centred round partition of the State. As usual, India had nothing substantial to offer. The British High Commissioner Sir Morrice James and the U.S. Ambassador Mr. Walter P. McConaughy met leaders of the two delegations to lend their good offices in narrowing

down differences. In course of parleys at Karachi, according to knowledgeable circles, "India gave a clear indication of their preparedness to consider the main principles on which a partition formula could be acceptable to Pakistan as an alternative to a plebiscite".[1] The paper quoted these circles to say: "unless a partition formula takes into consideration the composition of the population, safe-guarding of economic and strategic interests of Pakistan and is acceptable to the people of Kashmir, it would not be acceptable to Pakistan". Around midnight between the 10th and 11th of February when the talks were dead-locked, Sir Morrice James and Mr. Walter P. McConaughy called on Mr. Bhutto to discuss the trend of talks and prospects of its out come. The next round was held at Calcutta, beginning on 9th March, while Karachi was the venue of the final round held in May when the talks were finally broken off, again by India. The foreign office declined to reveal to this writer for purposes of this book, the actual proposals about partition that had been put forth by India, but during those days, it was rumoured that India had broadly hinted her preparedness to consider withdrawal from the present cease-fire line in Kashmir valley upto Wular Lake which is nearly 50 miles beyond the cease-fire line and which would have given Pakistan the bulk of Baramula district. India would have retained the bulk of Kashmir valley including Srinagar city and the Zojila pass which links Srinagar with Leh. A clear disadvantage was the division of Kashmiri-speaking Muslims which would have brought about serious social problems because of inter-marriages and economic inter-dependence. It is possible that India was prepared, under foreign pressure, to offer further concessions because the Times of India wrote at the time that the Indian delegation should give its final offer which naturally meant that actually India was bargaining hard and had yet to make its final offer. After the September, 1965 war when Mr. Bhutto, in a public statement, offered to resume direct talks from the stage where they were abandoned in May, 1963, Sardar Swaran Singh was quick to reject the offer saying that these talks had been held "under duress" which means that the concessions offered then, no longer stood good as they had been offered under Anglo-American pressure.

A member of the Pakistan delegation, a Deputy Secretary in the Government of Pakistan, held a Doctorate in Geography. It was as a geography expert that he had been included. This writer was told by a reliable source that when India offered to withdraw upto Wular lake, one of her delegates told our delegation that with Wular in their hands, the uninterrupted flow of water from Jhelum stood ensured. The geography expert was reported to have advised his delegation that Wular *was the source of river Jhelum*. Actually it is more than 50 miles away.

1. Pakistan Times, 12th February, 1963.

## KENNEDY-NEHRU BREACH

When Indo-Pakistan talks ran into difficulties, an effort was made by the United States and Britain, particularly by Mr. Kennedy, for the appointment of a Mediator. A search was made for a mutually acceptable person. India was agreeable to the appointment of Lord Mountbatten, but Pakistan wouldn't touch his name. The names of Bunker and Eugene Black were also considered but India was not willing to accept them. Ultimately, while the search was still on, Mr. Nehru abruptly called off the efforts, accusing Pakistan of collusion with China and the employment of Chinese experts in training guerillas. The accusation was entirely false but it is possible that men like Mr. B. N. Mullik, manipulated the manufacture of false intelligence reports to that end so as to mislead Mr. Nehru and sabotage the chances of a solution of the Kashmir problem. Personally, this writer is strongly of the opinion that Pakistan ought to have accepted Lord Mountbatten as a Mediator because while on the one hand, she was not bound to accept what he may have ultimately proposed because a Mediator is not an arbitrator whose award is binding but only a go-between whose job is to narrow down differences and bring about a mutual reconciliation, on the other, he was the only person in the world who could have persuaded Nehru to see the light of reason and offer substantial concessions to Pakistan. The impression widely shared in this country that Mountbatten is an enemy of this country and would have necessarily damaged her interests, is not the whole truth because the situation in 1963 was entirely different from what it was in 1947. Mountbatten did harbour personal enmity against the Quaid-e-Azam on account of the latter's inability to satisfy his passionate longing to become the Joint Governor-General of the two countries and was therefore led to play a partisan role to damage Pakistan. With the death of the Quaid-e-Azam, the personal element that counts so much in human affairs, was already absent from the situation. The British interests at the time of partition demanded the appeasement of India at the cost of Pakistan in order to bring her into Commonwealth but in 1963, much water had flown down the Thames; the Indo-Chinese rupture had made peace between India and Pakistan the top-most requirement of the Anglo-American global strategy especially because of Pakistan's military manpower and the need to release the armies of the two countries from mutual confrontation so as to strengthen the northern defences. However, the most important factor was the acute awareness of a history-conscious man like Mountbatten that he stood condemned as a partisan in the matter of partition. Not only Pakistanis but even prominent compatriots like Ian Stephens, Lord Birdwood, and Leonard Mosley have, in their books, affirmed the Pakistani accusation that he played a pro-Hindu and

anti-Muslim role in the matter of partition. No one, it may be pointed out, would like his name to be smeared or be accused of bad faith or injustice. That is quite inherent with the thinking of every man and woman. It was quite natural for Mountbatten to have realized when the glamour and charms of the Viceregal lodge and the prospect of any further rise had ended and when he was leading a retired life, only awaiting for the inevitable, of passing away into history, that after all, it was better to leave behind a better name, above controversy and it was for this reason that in the opinion of this writer, if the Pakistan leadership had shown foresight and vision, they would have accepted Mountbatten as Mediator because there was every reason to believe that he alone, of all the people in the world, would have made a serious personal effort, in the interest of his own good name, to persuade his friend, Nehru, to offer reasonable concessions to Pakistan and he was the one man whom India could not have just ignored because Pandit Nehru is on record to have told the world about him at the time of his departure in June, 1948, that he "worked for the interests of India as any Indian would have done". However, it is possible that the Pakistan leadership was aware of these implications and possibilities but dare not accept his name for fear of popular indignation. If it was really so, it is really sad that better judgment was permitted to be subordinated to the fear of popular resentment.

It is customary for us in Pakistan to monopolise truth and justice and to condemn everyone who does not fully agree with us. We condemned Kennedy as pro-India and anti-Pakistan. Given below is the inner story as revealed by one who knew it at first hand, Mr. Sudhir Ghosh, who says:

> "The President did send Secretary Rusk to New Delhi in the first week of May 1963 to try to come to an understanding with Mr. Nehru about a mediator in the Kashmir conflict.
>
> This time the Americans were touched by the warmth of the treatment they received from Mr. Nehru............ The Americans went away very happy because Mr. Nehru reacted favourably to their proposal of mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, which he had rejected at an earlier date when President Kennedy offered the services of Mr. Eugene Black as mediator.[1]...... A vigorous search was made during May, June and July of 1963 for a mediator. While the search was going on, Mr. Nehru withdrew everything, he had ever offered to Pakistan as a gesture..............

1. Sudhir Ghosh, pp. 318, 329.

(In Washington) I soon discovered that Mr. Nehru's statement in Parliament unilaterally cancelling the idea of mediation in the India—Pakistan dispute over Kashmir had upset the President. He had expected that Mr. Nehru would at least consult him before withdrawing something which, according to the understanding of U.S. Secretary of State, as the Secretary told me on 4th September, *was a commitment. This was the end of any possible Nehru—Kennedy co-operation in international politics.........................*

After that time the prospect of a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan of the Kashmir dispute became more and more dim. There was nothing that men of goodwill could do in that situation. It seems so hopeless. I, however, tried my hand at it once again in March—April 1964, a few weeks before Mr. Nehru's death. I got his clearance to go to Moscow and Washington for a third time to see if some joint U.S.-Soviet action in the India—Pakistan situation was possible."[1]

## THE TASHKENT AGREEMENT

For three years, men of goodwill could do nothing to bring the two sides to a conference table. In the meantime passed away Pandit Nehru who was not only primarily responsible for this running, festering sore but also the best Indian leader who could offer substantial concessions without losing his ground at home. Shastri, who succeeded him, was essentially a weak leader who lacked the capacity to take unpleasant decisions, unpleasant from the point of view of the public opinion at home.

A year after Nehru's death, when the two countries clashed in September 1965, a new and at the same time, very important development that took place, was that Soviet Union gave up its extremely pro-India role and assuming the role of a Mediator, invited the two leaders to a conference at Tashkent.

Mr. Bhutto who went to Moscow in the last week of November with a message from his President, described his talks with Soviet leaders as "extremely useful and profitable". These centred round the Russian invitation. A formal invitation from Mr. Kosygin arrived towards the end of November and the conference began on 5th January. President Ayub and Premier Shastri arrived on 3rd January 1966. Those travelling with the President were Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

1. Sudhir Ghosh, pp. 318, 329.

Mr. Ghulam Farooq and Mr. Altaf Gauhar. Before leaving for Tashkent, Mr. Harriman, special representative of President Johnson met him at Peshawar and delivered a message from his President. The British High Commissioner Sir M. James also met the President at Peshawar. Mr. Harriman arrived direct from New Delhi where he had a meeting with Shastri. Hundreds of press and television correspondents from all over the world flocked to cover the conference. Special arrangements had been made to facilitate the despatch of news.

The inaugural session was held on the 4th attended by full delegations. In his inaugural address Mr. Kosygin welcomed the two leaders and expressed Soviet friendship for both the countries. The two leaders then spoke briefly, reciprocating his sentiments. Afterwards they had a brief meeting for 15 minutes in search of an agreed agenda which failed because India was allergic to formally putting Kashmir on the agenda while, for all intents and purposes, this was the principal question on which not only hanged the future of war and peace but which was the cause of the war that had taken them to Tashkent. The conference therefore continued without a formal agenda though, ironically from the Indian point of view, it remained centred round the question of Kashmir. A sordid example of international hypocrisy! There is no doubt that the working of the Hindu mind must have baffled the great Soviet leaders just as it had baffled Dixon, Graham, Kennedy, Harriman, Sandys and even "Pandit" Mountbatten. On 5th the two leaders met privately for an hour. On the 6th there could be no meeting between them as India persisted with its claim that Kashmir could not be discussed while Pakistan insisted that this was the principal issue between the two countries. Mr. Kosygin had two private meetings with President Ayub and one with Mr. Shastri. According to a Soviet spokesman "the totality of the problems was discussed during these talks". On the 7th the two leaders had two meetings, one in the morning and the other in the evening. Pakistan delegation made it clear that there could be no agreement on the issue of "war and peace" unless a Kashmir settlement was arrived at. Premier Kosygin had a luncheon meeting with Mr. Shastri, followed by a meeting between Gromyko and Swaran Singh.

The Pakistan delegation including the President offered their Jumma prayers at Tilla Shaikh Jamia, Tashkent. An address of welcome was presented by the Shaikhul Jamia to which the President made a brief reply. About 5000 local Muslims attended the prayers. It was learnt on 8th January that India had offered a No War Pact which was rejected by Pakistan because without a just and honourable settlement of the Kashmir issue, Pakistan could not commit itself to such a Pact. There was no

meeting between the two leaders on this day. Mr. Bhutto and Swaran Singh had separate meetings with Mr. Gromyko. On the 9th Mr. Kosygin stepped into the dead-locked conference with vigour and conferred separately with President Ayub and Premier Shastri. He had two meetings with each. The President hosted a dinner for Mr. Kosygin. From press reports it was apparent that since the beginning of the Conference the discussions had centred round the Kashmir issue.

To begin with, Mr. Shastri was not even prepared to commit himself to the withdrawal of his forces from Hajipir Pass, Teetwal and Kargil, mainly on the excuse that their continued occupation was necessary to prevent a repitition of what he called the "infiltration" of guerillas. Ultimately he had NOT only to abandon this position but also enter into a discussion on the Kashmir dispute. President Ayub is on record to have said that Premier Shastri, far from taking any strong or arrogant position, as was later claimed by Time Magazine, spoke of his weak position as Premier and his inability to take decisions at the moment which were unpleasant from the point ofview of the public opinion at home. The President is also on record to have said that Mr. Shastri was in constant touch with his wife and sought her advice on day to day developments!

It should be said to the credit of Mr. Kosygin that he played his part as a mediator very carefully and unostentatiously though, at the same time, effectively. He must have done some plain speaking especially with Mr. Shastri. The Summit concluded on the 10th. A Declaration was signed by the two leaders as also by Mr. Kosygin as a witness.

It reaffirmed their obligation under the U.N. Charter, "not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means"; it announced their agreement for the withdrawal of armed personnel, not later than 25th February, 1966, resumption of diplomatic relations, repatriation of the prisoners of war, agreement to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchanges, to have meetings on matters of direct concern and the setting up of Joint Bodies to report to their Governments what further steps should be taken to this end. This was an indirect agreement to resume talks on Kashmir but India avoided a direct commitment as is apparent from the paragraph on Kashmir which runs as under:

KASHMIR

"They considered that the interests of peace in the region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and, indeed, the

interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It is against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides put forth its respective position."

## WAS SHASTRI MURDERED ?

The communique was hailed all over the world and Russia was praised for its unique initiative. Mr. Kosygin worked into the early hours of Monday to break the dead-lock. President Ayub expressed Pakistan's "tremendous admiration" for the Soviet initiative. It was a great tragedy that Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri died of heart failure on 11th January, a few hours after the signing of the Declaration. He was 61. His death brought gloom as it was rightly feared that his successors may not be necessarily aware of all that happened during the secret talks and even if aware, may wriggle out of behind-the-scene understanding arrived at. President Ayub and Premier Kosygin saluted the bier and shouldered it from the gun carriage to a Soviet plane. The gesture touched Mr. Chavan so deeply that he bowed respectfully before President Ayub and embraced him. Mr. Ghulam Farooq and Mian Arshad Hussain accompanied the body to New Delhi and represented Pakistan at his State funeral.

In India there was foul propaganda by hostile elements that Mr. Shastri had been murdered! A booklet has since appeared on the subject captioned: Was Shastri murdered? All sorts of ingenious presumptions and assumptions have been resorted to in order to create a suspicion that he died an unnatural death. Surely, the Soviet leaders ought to have learnt to what depths of ingratitude and irresponsibility can elements of Indian society go, just to score a point.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not associated in the later round of talks because of his insistence that Kashmir being the subleta causa, the Conference should tackle it instead of confining itself to incidental matters like the withdrawal of forces to their peace time positions, vacation of occupied territories and exchange of prisoners which were of no permanent significance and would, in course of time, come in the natural way. As President Ayub thought otherwise, he chose to ignore the Foreign Minister who on his part and as a shrewd political negotiator could not reconcile himself to the line taken by the President. This caused an unfortunate breach between them which led, ultimately, to the latter's exit from the Cabinet. It goes without saying that while Ayub's down-fall began at Tashkent, the agreement helped in the stupendous growth of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the leader of his country, symbolizing in his person, our national assertion for survival against the Indian policy of hate Pakistan.

There is no doubt that the removal of Mr. Bhutto was decided upon in Tashkent but it had to be postponed until after a year because of adverse reaction against the Agreement in the Western wing, particularly in the Punjab.

The Declaration disappointed a large number of people. There were spontaneous demonstrations in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Gujrat, Muzaffarabad and several other places. In Lahore, police resorted to firing. The number of dead was not disclosed but those injured were more than a dozen. The campaign was spear-headed by students who claimed that the victory won in the battle-field had been lost on the negotiation table. Those arrested included Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, Sardar Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Malik Hamid Sarfaraz, Chaudhry Inayatullah, Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha, late Khawaja Muhammad Rafique, Mian Manzar Bashir, Khawaja Siddiq-ul-Hassan and Chaudhry Kaleem-ud-Din. A silent demonstration was staged at Karachi on the same date. The number of arrests exceeded five hundred. Some demonstrations were led by the widows of the September martyrs including Begum Aziz Bhatti and Begum Shami. Apart from a Radio address, explaining the Declaration and assuring that his Government was irrevocably committed to secure the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, President Ayub undertook a whirlwind tour of the western wing, addressing select gatherings to explain his view point. After some time the agitation died down but his popularity was never to be the same again.

That no secret clauses were attached to the Tashkent Declaration and that Pakistan, far from having renounced its claim to Kashmir, as then alleged, had all alorg emphasised its just solution as a prerequisite for restoration of peace between the two countries, is beyond any doubt. It is possible that the politicians' approach which Mr. Bhutto suggested may have paid better dividends than the Statesman's approach adopted by President Ayub but it is unfair merely for that reason to condemn the latter or ridicule him for his attitude. It needs to be emphasised that the most important aspect of the Tashkent meeting was that Russia had, for the first time, since she involved herself in the furnace, that the Indo-Pakistan relations are, given up, at least apparently, her partisan attitude and adopted a neutral posture. This was by itself a great diplomatic achievement for Pakistan and people at the helm of affairs on whose shoulders rests the ultimate responsibility for historic decisions, could not be expected to take what would have appeared to the Russians, an arrogant and negative attitude. That would have eliminated the sympathy of the powerful hosts and instead of encouraging them in the new role of mediators, such an attitude would have pushed them nearer to

the Indians. Certainly that would not have been in the interests of Pakistan. That nothing came out of the subsequent negotiations or of the hopes raised by the Declaration because of a variety of reasons, was no fault of the President or even of the Russians.

How was it that the Russians temporarily substituted their extremely pro-India policy with that of even-handed diplomacy? In the tussle for supremacy in the Communist world, with or without further objectives, the sheer weight of Chinese numbers, their marvellous capacity for self-discipline and self-reliance and the startling progress achieved by her in a short span, seems to show that the future leadership of the Communist world is her destiny. It was India's chauvinism that brought China and Pakistan closer; otherwise at one time President Ayub had offered joint defence to New Delhi as price for a just solution of Kashmir. With the removal of Nehru from the scene, Russia may have feared a possible weakening of the central authority and therefore may have felt it all the more important to wean away Pakistan from its close affinity with China. It seems to have been realised that only a just solution of the Kashmir problem could bring about a climate of real peace and good neighbourliness in the sub-continent. However, the sudden death of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shashtri, the ascension to power of the more resolute and powerful Indira Gandhi, the gradual fading away of the lustre and prestige of Ayub and the combination of vicious circumstances which brought about, by far, the closest collaboration between India and Russia culminating in the separation of East Pakistan, ultimately dashed the hopes that the energetic Soviet initiative had created.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE SEPTEMBER WAR

*CHAPTER XXXI*

# The September War

## CEASE-FIRE LINE ACTIVATED

On account of the unbroken spell of lull on the cease-fire line for almost over 15 years, the troops had developed a sort of phobia with regard to its sanctity. This came to light particularly in an incident at Thub in Bhimber when a group of soldiers who were asked to bring water from a pond in the no-man's land, were found hesitant on the plea that it involved the crossing of the line. Another incident involving some minor activity across the cease-fire-line at Bagsar, again in Bhimber, also revealed its existence. This was perhaps one of the reasons why the Army High Command felt it necessary to encourage minor pinpricking in order to re-emphasise its artificial nature. It is also possible that India's continued intransigence and the contempt shown by her leaders for efforts made by Pakistan and mutual friends for a peaceful solution of the dispute heightened by her abrupt discontinuance of the Swaran—Bhutto talks, also contributed to the new policy.

While the number of complaints about cease-fire violations by India in 1962, lodged by Pakistan was 538 which got reduced to 283 in 1963, they rose to 1464 in 1964. In 1965 Pakistan complained of 189 violations by India in January, 224 in February, 325 in March, 335 in April, 434 in May and 480 in June, making a grand total of 1987 in the first six months alone. Indians filed a much larger number of complaints and the truth remains that they were largely on the defensive because it suited their convenience. It is also a fact that the number of casualties on the Indian side was comparatively higher. There was hardly a week when a serious incident did not take place. In the beginning, this activation of the line did not attract much attention abroad but this was not to be; as the nature of incidents and the number of casualties increased, it began to hit headlines around the world with the result that the dormant conscience of the world public opinion again began to surface itself. Some leading

papers such as the New York Times, The Times of London, The Washington Post, The La Figaro Paris and The Asihi Shimbun Tokyo came out with editorials calling upon India and Pakistan to settle the dispute.

## GUERILLAS ENTER GULMARG

The Pakistan Army then had some able Commanders; one of these was Lt. Gen. Akhtar Hussain Malik. A wing headed by him was pressing the President, after the Rann of Kuchh encounter, to take a bold step in Kashmir so that the World powers got interested in its solution. It seems even a cool-headed and hesitant person like President Ayub had become sick of the Indian intransigence and was therefore receptive. The initial plan seems to have been to send six battalions of trained troops into occupied Kashmir but Mr. Shuaib, the Finance Minister, was unable to commit the requisite funds and therefore much lesser numbers had to be employed. The plan was to send guerilla bands via Hillan to Gulmarg and thence to the heart of Kashmir valley, from Muzaffarabad into Teetwal and from other places to Rajauri and Mehndar. A group of Gilgit Scouts was to descend from Skardu side to block the road to Leh. The group that was to operate in the heart of the Kashmir valley, consisted of 660 men and was commanded by Col. Mansha Khan. He was assisted by Major (since Major General) Abdul Qayoom, a Kashmiri-speaking Signals Officer from occupied Kashmir. About 150 came from Mujahid ranks, inferior in training and aptitude to Jawans of the regular army. *They received about a month's training at Mong (Poonch) and thence moved to Hillan in Haveli tehsil, a distance of about 60 miles which they had to trek on foot. No transport was made available. Each soldier had to carry 86 pounds of load,* comprising a pair of green shalwar and kameez, a blacalava cap, spare socks, P.T. shoes, uniform jersy, blanket, medical kit, *cooked rotis for seven days,* four grenades,an ammunition jacket, 6 sten-gun magazines, 1 pound of explosive, rusk-sack, 2 bundoliars, water-cap and extra ammunition for light machine guns. *Each platoon, consisting of 33 men, was armed with 4 old-type light machine guns, 3 (303) rifles and a sten gun.*

It was intensely but deliberately propagated by India that the guerillas were not only trained by the Chinese but were even directed by them from behind the Cease-fire-line. Pandit Nehru claimed, even as far back as January 1964, that Chinese military experts were training the Pakistan special group commandos. Let it be clearly stated that this allegation was entirely false and that no Chinese Military officer was at any time involved in the training of these guerillas. Guerilla warfare has always remained an important branch of the army anywhere in the world and it does not need Chinese experts to impart training. Even India has a large Commando force and one may rightly ask as to who

trained them if Chinese are the only people who knew the art? The accusation was concocted to win the sympathy of the anti-Chinese lobby in the United States.

Reaching Hillan on 30th July, the group rested till the night of 31st July. The local people extended whatever hospitality they could afford within their limited means, apart from providing guides. The intensive pin-pricking on the Cease-fire-line for several months had, apart from raising the morale of our troops, demoralised the Indian troops who had almost given up patrolling and instead entrenched themselves in their well-provisioned picquets.

On the night falling between 31st July and 1st August, the guerillas who were fully aware that they were going behind a defence line, manned by more than a hundred thousand soldiers, resumed their trek under cover of trees until they reached the 10,000 ft. high Nilkanthi; quite unusually, the whole area was blanketed by thick fog which made it safer to cross over to Gulmarg through the 14200 ft. high, Chor Panjal gali. The ground was covered by snow and the ascent was very difficult. Two persons were injured as they fell down while negotiating devilish boulders. Here an unexpected situation had to be faced in that a group of Bakarwals and Chaupans whose presence had not been anticipated, was grazing cattle. As a precautionary measure, they were initially rounded up but were released soon afterwards, as they were found willing supporters. They offered milk, fire-wood, kerosene oil, meat and even bread for which they were duly paid.

## SATTARA, THE CHAUPAN

It was here that Sattara, the Chaupan, a Kashmiri-speaking youth who was grazing a big herd of cattle, volunteered as a guide. He was followed by Gaffara, another teen-aged Kashmiri-speaking chaupan. They rested for the day and next morning moved to Khag forest area, two miles beyond Tungmarg. It had another concentration of Bakarwals who were plagued by acute factionalism. On a complaint of his opposite faction, the Guerillas arrested a Muqadam on the accusation of being an informer. As he was not properly guarded, he ran away and informed the nearest Indian post of their presence.

This changed the whole complexion of the plan because the force had yet to be dispersed, allocated targets and move in their vicinity; the entry of guerilla bands into Teetwal, Mehndar, Rajauri and Kargil had yet to take place so that all could simultaneously strike their targets at Zero hour on 9th August, the 12th anniversary of the dismissal of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Again, it was a Kashmiri-speaking milk-vendor at Tungmarg, Shaaban Joo, who was attracted by the unusual movements

of the Indian Army and over-heard their hush-hush talk about the presence of guerillas two miles away; he ran to the forest area at great peril and informed Col. Mansha Khan of the fresh arrival of enemy troops and their preparations to move forward. By now it was the 4th of August. Finding that they had been discovered before Zero hour, Col. Mansha contacted the Operational Headquarters for instructions but the Code message went corrupt. After waiting for several hours, a direct message was given and at 3 P.M, he was told to use his own discretion. It was day time; so they moved to Drug forests near the Tungmarg nullah.

The illiterate and simple-looking but mentally alert Sattara was given a bundle of printed posters, a few Pakistani coins, an empty cigarette packet and a match box, both Pakistan make, as marks of identification and sent to Srinagar to contact............not only to inform them of their presence but also to request for 14 trucks. *They had no prior information; they had never been consulted; they had not been taken into confidence.* Meanwhile, four companies were already heading towards Srinagar via Panzu (Badgam), parallel to the main road while two companies under Captain Nisar of the S.S.G. remained at the Drug Forest base. When Indian troops moved towards the Ferozpur nullah, the guerillas had, thanks to the advance information given by the milk-vendor Shaaban Joo, withdrawn about a mile and taken a safer position in the locality. Indians were the first to open fire which killed a lame Kashmiri guide, Noora, who was on horse-back. The attack was beaten back; Indians retreated, leaving 12 of their comrades dead. The guerillas, who lost one man, captured two 3"-mortars, a few L.M.Gs., rifles and 2 small wireless sets. Of the two companies at the base, some deserted after the incident and the remainder left behind were about 120 men. The deserters mainly belonged to the Mujahid Force.

By now, the entry of the Guerillas was fast becoming known. Sattara, who knew the leaders by face but was unknown to them, took into confidence Khawaja..................,a prominent political worker somewhere who was personally known at Srinagar. When they reached Srinagar, a meeting was already in progress. Informed of the situation,.....................are reported to have been skeptical about the utility of a force of 660 men, behind a line manned by over a well-armed 100000 soldiers. Hurried consultations took place after which they were sent back accompanied by one of their confidents.............. to seek confirmation of what had been conveyed to them because even ..................had no personal knowledge, but by the time they arrived at Tungmarg, the base had dispersed. When Sattara was sent to Srinagar, four companies commanded by Captain Farooq (now Colonel), Captain Hashmi and Captain Zia were sent with him. They came to GoguldUUr, which is 32 miles from the Cease-fire line. The shelling on the base at

Wan-was (Drug Forest range) took place on 5th August. From here they went to Kandahome. From here two companies went towards Chrar Sharif, the resting place of Kashmir's patron saint, Sheikh Noor-ud-Din. The companies of Captains Shafi and Farooq which remained behind at Kandahome, were well received by the local people and supplied with necessities of life. In the evening Indian soldiers arrived in 3 lorries. They killed Master Ghulam Rasool Mattoo, aged 22 years and the son of Abdul Khaliq Bungri, also aged about 23 years. From here the guerillas covered another 6 to 7 miles to reach Rathsoon (Badgam tehsil) where they had to negotiate the fast-going Beeroo nullah. About 300 local Muslims formed into a line, from one end to the other. They acted as a support wall for the guerillas to cross the stream. It was necessitated by the load carried by the guerillas and the extremely fast flow of the nullah which is 21 mile beyond Kandahome and descends from the famous Toshi-Maidan, a conventional battle-ground. At Rathsoon the local inhabitants, apart from giving them a heart-warming welcome, made a present of fifteen breads per head. They next went to Galwanpura, about 7 miles beyond Srinagar.

## GUERILLA ACTIVITY

The targets given to the guerillas were the Srinagar air-field, Police station Badgam, the bridge on Doodh-garga, the Militia HQ, the PRP HQ, the Rear HQ of the army, ammunition depot at Srinagar and the Khreuh petrol dump. Each company was divided into 5 groups of 20 each and given an area of 5 to 10 miles as its operational area. They blew off the bridge at Doodh-ganga which brought traffic between Jammu and Srinagar to a halt for several days. The Police station at Badgam was also destroyed while the HQrs of the Militia and the PRP were slightly damaged. The air-port could not be damaged as it was heavily guarded. A group did reach there when Nanda and Indira were taking off; in a small encounter, a guerilla lost his life. As the element of surprise had been already lost, the Indian armed personnel had been alerted. Mr. Gulzari Lal Nanda, Home Minister said in New Delhi on 11th August that one officer and seven jawans of the Army and 21 members of the Police force had been killed since 5th August while 27 had been injured. On 8th August, a platoon commanded by Captain Farooq of the Baluch (now Lieutenant Colonel) was hiding in the vicinity of the Doodh-ganga bridge when a D.I.G. of the Kashmir Police along with some other officers, appeared on the scene. According to Reuters, a group wearing green shirts and shalwars were surprised by the police party and questioned about their identity whereupon one of them, (Arif to be exact), whipped a sten-gun from under-neath his shirt and shot down the D.I.G. Two police

officers were injured and in the ensuing confusion, the guerillas made good their escape. It was the same group which later burnt down the Doodh-ganga bridge. On 13th August, the companies under Shafi and Farooq crossed the river near Awantipura and inflicted some damage on the Brigade HQ (rear) and entered Srinagar city from its eastern side. A few went to a Khanqah. This area has a considerable non-Muslim population and it seems that the Indian army somehow came to know of their presence in the area, but not of the exact hiding place. The Indians combed the area and surrounded the Khanqah. There was an exchange of fire during the ensuing night, whereupon the Indians set the Khanqah on fire, resulting not only in its destruction but also in the death of two Kashmiri boys (guides) who got trapped inside and were burnt to death. The Indians then burnt down the entire Muslim area of the Mohallah, making thousands homeless and destitute.

This merciless conflagration in Bata malinu, consumed 437 houses and 3 mosques. It made 4000 people homeless. A Sikh too got burnt in the fire; the charred body of a woman was discovered from the debris on the next day. The Mohallah was vacated en masse at 11.45 a.m. on 14th August. The Indian soldiers fixed hoses and soaked a few houses with petrol before setting the area on fire, while themselves standing guard on all points of entry and exit, so that no passage was allowed after the dead-line. These details were given by a foreigner who was in Srinagar.[1]

This extremely savage action was deliberately resorted to in order to frighten away Muslims elsewhere too, especially in the city, from giving shelter or other assistance to the guerillas and yet, not only were Farooque, Shafi, Mansha and most of the men under their command, able to evade capture for over two months, due to the shelter given by Muslims, but were also able to cross back into Azad Kashmir. When one keeps in mind the fact that between Doodh-ganga and Teetwal, a distance of 90 miles, the area is almost wholly inhabited, one can easily visualise the total support given to the guerillas by the local Muslims.

The company headed by Captain Nisar laid 12 ambushes and conducted 15 raids including one on Dak-bungalow Panzu and another, on Magham. He was killed on 13th August during an ambush on the Khag village Military post but had the satisfaction, before death, of being told that the O.C. along with 30 members of the O group had been killed. 3 weapon carriers and one jeep fell into their hands which, however, were of no use as it was not safe to use metalled roads. In the Magham raid, 8 vehicles were destroyed and some Indians killed. They dominated the

1. The Pakistan Times, 26th August, 1965.

area almost for 30 days. Nisar who stands buried in the vicinity was posthumously awarded 'Sitara-e-Jurrat'. The companies under Captain Zia and Captain Hashmi had their biggest encounter with the Indians at Gogjipatri in the Chrar Sharif area in which almost two Indian companies were wholly wiped out. They were able to capture several L.M.Gs, rifles, two wireless sets and some 2" mortars. They destroyed 8 vehicles and harassed the Pulwama—Srinagar and Pulwama—Islamabad roads. They were the last to pull out from Kashmir and that too in October, 1965. On the 24th or 25th of August, a helicopter was brought down by a group personally commanded by Colonel Mansha; it, however betrayed their location; ambushed soon afterwards, the guerillas lost 8 men, including Subedar Muhammad Afsar Khan. One Subedar Ayub was awarded 'Tamgha-e-Jurrat' for one of the operations on Srinagar—Badgam road. With his men, he was able to trap two Indian companies and destroyed 12 vehicles, killing a number of the enemy. The Subedar was wounded in the encounter; Saleem, SSG driver was killed while bandaging him. He was buried in the vicinity which is 3 miles from Badgam. A Havildar from Gilgit was specially praised for his great valour in the operation. A brave man, he attacked a military post at Weingham during day-time, inflicting several casualties. He brought 17 rifles, 3 L.M.Gs and 2 pistols. A Patwari was also killed in the encounter. Sometime later, the Havildar, whose name is not known, was killed in the same area and lies buried there. In the vicinity of Pattan is a triangular road; a group of guerillas got trapped here between two enemy columns. One opened heavy shelling, apparently on the guerillas but actually hitting their own column, on the other side. It was later learnt quite reliably through a doctor posted in the local C.M.H. that the shelling had caused casualties, both dead and wounded, among their own compatriots. A large number of villages around the air-port in Srinagar, Badgam, Magham, Khag and Bala Mahuru were burnt down by the Indians either on suspicion that they had been sheltering the guerillas or with a view to terrorise them. At Magham, 6 girls including a Pandit girl, were abducted by the Indian soldiers, raped and later killed.

The group operating between Dras and Kargil and known as Tariq, was so bold that it nearly demolished the Wagul bridge, about 12 miles from Srinagar on the Leh road on the 17/18 August. Their leader Ghulam Murtaza was awarded Sitara-e-Jurrat. The Qasim and Khalid groups operated in the Kishanganga area. They moved through the Rajdiangan pass and reached Bandipura. It looks incredible but, nevertheless, it is true and on this we have the testimony of Lt. Gen. Kaul.[1] The Khalid group came through Keran and encircled Handwara.

1. Confrontation with Pakistan, pp. 24—27.

It destroyed the Kazilpur bridge and attacked Chaukibal. They entered the headquarters of a Kumaon battalion and killed its C.O. Lt. Col. Goray. Kaul calls the attack daring. Babar Group was active in the Chhamb and Khalidar area. About Ghazi group which raided Narain camp and reached Budil, Gen. Kaul admits:

> "One of its parties tried unsuccessfully to reach Ramban to cut the Jammu—Srinagar road. They reached Rajauri, Thana, Mandi, Mehndar and caused havoc in these areas."[1]

The guerillas killed Captain C.N. Singh in early August in an action on the Galuti bridge. Major Prem Das was killed in an attack on the Brigade HQ at Mehndar.[2]

## ZOONI, THE BOAT-WOMAN

Col. Mansha Khan, the guerilla Commander, who hails from the liberated part of Poonch district, and belongs to the Sudhan tribe, has been all praise for the co-operation and assistance received by his men from the local inhabitants. In Badgam area, a group iucluding Mansha Khan, was hungry since two days. A local Muslim got some rice from some acquaintance, himself being poor, and his wife cooked it for the group. While returning back, long after cease-fire, Mansha Khan and some of his men reached a lone place on river Jhelum in the neighbourhood of Sopore. There was no bridge to cross over but they found a shapely but lonely young boat-woman in her boat. Zooni, the boat-woman, volunteered to take them across, free of any charges and took all 30 of them, in 6 groups, to the other side. *She also kept the secret.* At one place in the Badgam area, another village maid, Bakhti, kept watch for several hours, on the approach of the Indians. Admittedly, they were carrying rations for seven days only and admittedly, they were away for about two months. How did they feed themselves if it were not for the local Muslims who provided them with the necessities of life; how is it that they remained undetected for so long and were able to cross back safely into Azad Kashmir? There is no doubt that this was possible only with the active assistance of the local people. Col. Mansha told this writer that an important part of the operation was to train Kashmiri youth in the use of fire-arms and explosives at the base camp so that the sabotage and harassment movement could be extended as far as possible. He also told this writer that with the setting up of the base camp in the Khag forests, several Kashmiri youth from the surrounding areas did

1. Confrontation with Pakistan, p. 24.
2. ——Ibid——, p. 27.

volunteer for military training but the programme could not be continued because the centre was discovered too early.

Col. Mansha Khan stoutly refutes the propaganda, deliberately indulged in by India, that Valley Muslims did not support the guerillas. In his 50 page report to the GHQ, which this writer has had no opportunity to go through, he has given details of the all out support he received from local Muslims.

Of course, they merely gave shelter, provided them with the necessities of life and guides but did not rise in armed revolt. But one may legitimately ask: How were they expected to rise in armed revolt or start an extensive sabotage movement at any time? The students of contemporary history would testify that no armed revolt or internal sabotage is possible without outside support and without a foreign base. Did Pakistan ever provide them with a base? This could be done without getting directly involved, by utilising the services of leaders and workers from the Azad Kashmir political field, some of whom would have loved to help on account of their initiative, dash and dedication to the Cause. On the contrary, even flowering youth who crossed into A.K. in search of dynamite, bombs, arms and even for training, were not only put in jail but almost brutally treated in Interrogation centres like the now notorious Dulai sub-Jail and the FIU-controlled Muzaffarabad fort. When this writer took office as a Judge, the Muzaffarabad jail was full of them and the High Court was flooded with their habeas corpus petitions. Even those declared white, were detained. Mr. Zafar Iqbal Rathore, then S.P. Kashmir Intelligence deserves everybody's gratitude for a drastic change in this thoughtless policy. An Intelligence officer, largely responsible for this sad state of affairs and a politician, whose mutual support was born out of identical views on the subject, ultimately condemned each other as foreign agents: It was a fitting retribution for undeserved hatred against a section of God's noblest creation.

Colonel Mansha, Captain Nisar, Captain Farooq and Ghulam Murtaza were awarded 'S.J.' while Havildar Muhammad Ayub and another J.C.O. from the S.S.G. were awarded 'T.J'. A large number of guerillas and officers including Captain Shafi, Captain Zia and Sepoy Ashraf who killed a Sikh sentry on Doodh-ganga bridge by a swift recourse to his pencil pistol, were awarded 'Distinguished Service Certificates'. Among the more important guides, apart from Sattara, were Abdul Ghaffar Rishi of Badarkote, Baramula, Abdus Sattar Khandey of Badgam, Pir Ghulam Nabi Kaich, Abour Razzaq of Badgam, Muhammad Naik of Chanpura Tangmarg and Abdul Ahad Lone of Chhaugan Gagrian; they deserve special mention for their undoubted courage and total dedication.

On 8th August, a new radio station, "Sada-e-Kashmir" (Voice of Kashmir) came on the air. The Radio was run by Major General (then Major) Mujibur Rehman, Khawaja Gh. Ahmed Kashafi, Khawaja Ahmed Shamim and Khawaja Taus Banhali. Two stray voices were picked up for broadcasts. It appealed for world support. The A. K. President, Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, welcomed the active resumption of the war of liberation and pledged total support to the Revolutionary Council. The news made banner headlines all over the world and several newspapers made favourable comments. The Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Chavan, called off his south Indian tour and returned to New Delhi where a series of cabinet meetings were held, attedded also by General Chaudhry, Chief of the General Staff. Mr. U-Thant, the U.N. Secretary General expressed his "deep concern" on the deteriorating situation. In a protest note to the Government of Pakistan on 10th August, India claimed the entry of 1200 guerillas. According to Reuters, Srinagar was sealed off on 11th August. Mr. Nanda and Mrs. Indira Gandhi flew to Srinagar on 12th August. On the same day India appealed to the United Nations to persuade Pakistan to withdraw the guerillas. On 13th August a New Delhi spokesman admitted the death of 41 soldiers. On 14th August, India made a general attack on Azad Kashmir and captured two posts in Kargil. The same day, General Chaudhry had a meeting with General Nimo. A foreign visitor who was in Srinagar till August 14, told a correspondent of the P.P.A:

> "Curfew remains imposed all night and many localities have been evacuated of the civilians. The air-port has been encircled by the Indian army and I saw 12 tanks around the air-field. In short, I would say that in Kashmir today we have a perfect case of courage against brute force. If one were to believe the Indian version that all the people fighting Indian imperialists were Pakistanis, that country deserves congratulation for its organisation and efficiency. You must have noticed that the Indians have not been able to give the details of the captured. They have not been able to photograph more than 10."[1]

Kashmir Government announced an individual reward of Rs. 500 for civilians giving information leading to the capture of a guerilla; collective rewards were also announced. These went unheeded. Reuter reported from Jammu on 18th August that about 1500 villages in the border area had been placed on night curfew for two months. All India Radio admitted on the same day that the guerillas burnt down the Sunarbhal

1. Pakistan Times, 18th August, 1965.

bridge on Kargil road about 20 miles from Srinagar. On the same day newsmen were conducted around an area from where the guerillas had attempted to enter Srinagar. The newsmen were also told that the guerillas "might be re-grouping at Badgam" about 10 miles from Srinagar. On the same day, the All India Radio gave the figure of guerillas at 3000 to 4000 men. The B.B.C. quoting its special correspondent in New Delhi, said on the 18th of August:

> "There are signs that guerillas are a force to be reckoned with. There are several hundreds of them in and around Srinagar."

Mr. D.P. Dhar told Reuter in Srinagar on 19th August that there had been "isolated cases of support" for the "infiltrators" from local people. He even claimed that the "infiltrators" had "sniped at him on several occasions near Srinagar, more than a week ago". By now the guerillas had entered parts of Poonch and Rajauri and were pressing towards Mandi, Mehndar and Budhal. At the United Nations both Amjad Ali, of Pakistan and Parthasarathi of India were in touch with U-Thant.

## INDIA INVADES AZAD KASHMIR

According to Reuters, a spokesman of the Kashmir Government said in Srinagar on 23rd August that the guerillas made hit and run attacks on Indian Security Forces in different parts of Kashmir on Sunday night and that "saboteurs" were also believed responsible for several activities, 9 miles south-east of Srinagar. The spokesman admitted that the Police station in the Yusmarg area, 35 miles south-west of Srinagar, was attacked for the third time in a week and that the attackers had disappeared into nearby forests, after a four-hour attack. He also admitted that a band of 40 guerillas had on Sunday night attacked Indian Security Forces, guarding a vital bridge, north-west of Srinagar. Blitz, Bombay admitted in a report from its Srinagar correspondent that leaflets supporting the revolutionary movement were distributed in thousands all over the State. Mr. K. T. Mazurov, Deputy Prime Minister of the U. S. S. R. flew to New Delhi on 23rd August and had a 90-minute meeting with Mr. Shastri, about the situation in Kashmir. On 24th August, Indian Army in the Chhamb sector shelled Awan, a village in Gujrat district on Bandar nullah killing 20 and injuring 15. This caused indignation in Pakistan resulting in country-wide demonstrations demanding retaliatory action. U-Thant summoned General Nimo on 24th August on, what a statement called, "very serious and dangerous" situation there. On 24th August, an Indian spokesman admitted that two incidents had taken place a day earlier and

1. The Pakistan Times, 27th August.

also revealed the use of police dogs in the hunt for guerillas. On 25th August, Sikh troops supported by artillery attacked two 8000 ft. and 9000 ft. high isolated hill posts in Teetwal sector and captured them.

On 27th August, Indians captured Pir Sahiba post in Teetwal. They also attacked a post on the Uri sector and crossed the line at Bedore. On 28th August, an Indian spokesman gave uptodate Indian casualties as 122 soldiers killed including 10 officers, 31 policemen killed and anything upto 100 civilians killed. Reuter reported from Srinagar that the guerillas killed one Police constable and wounded another on 28th August when they attacked a police post a few miles south-west of Srinagar. Mr. Chavan said in Srinagar on August 28 that the Indian army "found itself in a disadvantageous position in the present upheaval in Kashmir because of non-cooperation by the local people."

Meanwhile Kashmir continued to dominate the world press. The Times London, the African Standard, Nairobi, the Al-Hayat, Beirut, the New York Times, the Al-Akhbar Cairo, the Daily Telegraph London, the Glassgow Herald, the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Guardian Rangoon carried editorial comments urging an early solution of the Kashmir problem and also high-lighted the support enjoyed by Pakistan in occupied Kashmir. In the Cylonese Parliament, two members raised a discussion on Kashmir and expressed support for the people of Kashmir. They condemned the detention of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah.

## PAKISTAN ARMY COMES TO A.K. HELP

After a series of serious violations of the Cease-fire line for over two weeks and to check further advance by India, the Pakistan army came to the help of the Azad forces and on Wednesday, September 1, crossed the Cease-fire line in Chhamb Sector. The same evening in a broadcast to the Nation, President Ayub revealed a part of the conversation he had with Mr. Shastri when they met in Karachi on 12th October, 1964. It is reproduced below:

President Ayub: The biggest obstacle in Indo-Pakistan relations is the question of Kashmir.

Premier Shastri: I do not think myself strong enough to carry through the solution of the issue with my people at this moment.

President Ayub: As Prime Minister of India, it is your duty to build public opinion in favour of a satisfactory solution. You might be criticised for it by some elements but the bulk of the Indian people will thank you for relieving them of a great anxiety.

Premier Shastri: I agree but I need time for that.

Commented President Ayub: "Instead of using time to build up public opinion, Mr. Shastri allowed himself to be forced into making an ill-conceived attempt to integrate held Kashmir with India and later to launch an all-out attack against Azad Kashmir."[1]

A group of guerillas entered village Gagrian in Mandi area of occupied Poonch with a mostly Kashmiri-speaking population of about 10000. It links Poonch with Baramula by a mule track. Among the important posts in the surroundings are Gali, Kath, Panjal, Sauji, Chhamber Kinari, Pral kote, Chharkan Khet and Chakyala. Led by local guides, a group of guerillas was on move at a gali to take up its position before the D-day when on account of a death in the neighbourhood, about two dozen women passed in front of the military post. Having observed the movement of unfamiliar faces, the Indian soldiers surrounded the ladies; one of whom, Mst. Sarba Bibi, raised an alarm and simultaneously they started pelting stones to break off the encirclement. This attracted the attention of the guerillas and D-day or no D-day, they could not resist the impulsive compulsion to open fire which helped the women, to save themselves from the clutches of the Indian soldiers. This was the signal for attack in the sector. After the Indians had successfully held their ground for 13 days, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Lone, a volunteer from the village, succeeded in blasting off a part of the post. This caused general confusion; Indians abandoned the post which was connected with a bank of river Poonch by a rope. While the Indian soldiers were moving downward, the Muslims cut off the rope; several soldiers were taken unawares and came down rolling and died. One enemy soldier who remained behind, killed a local volunteer and was himself done to death. When the supplies and ammunition captured at the post was being evacuated, Indians opened fire from the neighbouring picquets, killing three local volunteers. The guerillas next attacked Sauji Dhana Post, situate at a considerable height in the midst of Gagrian Saujian. Being the HQ post in the area, it was well-stored and well-defended. The Indians held it for about 17 days. The local people cut off their line of communication and the coolies deserted their posts. Here, again, a local volunteer,

1. DAWN, 2.9.1965.

Khawaja Ghulam Rasul alias Sain son of Wali Muhammad blasted off part of the post and got killed in the action. In the confusion thus caused, the guerillas were able to inflict casualties on the enemy and captured the post. The attack was led by Naib Subedar Ali Muhammad on horseback and was directed by Col. Munir from his HQ at Moolsir in the Dhok forest. Next, they captured the Kath Panjal post. Here also four local volunteers lost their lives. Next the guerillas captured Batla Hill and Chamber Kinari posts. The retreating Indian soldiers killled 17 civilians, some of whom were bayoneted. In addition, they picked 14 Muslims from Mandi and forced them to carry their supplies to Bedar Balnai where, after being brutally wounded with bayonets and guns, they were shut in a house which was set on fire. Amongst those burnt alive, were Khawaja Ghulam Ahmed son of Lassa Joo Nanbai, Khawaja Muhammad Abdullah Sheikh, School teacher, Khawaja Maqbool Ahmed Nanbai and his son.

The most important Indian military base in the Mandi area, was Chakyala Chowki which was manned by a large number of troops. They burnt a number of shops and houses, the College buildings, the mosque and the civil HQ before abandoning it. The guerillas were able to reach, at one end, places like Kalai—Poonch bridge which is 25 miles away from the Cease-fire line and at the other end, Ferozepur nullah which is 25 to 28 miles from the Cease-fire line. It was the local population which guided them and carried their loads. After cease-fire, the majority of guerillas remained stranded due to the loss of the Haji Pir pass. Again it were the local Muslims who gave them shelter and hid them, in times of danger, in their huge earthen pots meant for storing grain or in heaps of grass and guided them through treacherous, mine-infested routes to Azad Kashmir.

Both during and after the war, Indians let loose a reign of terror. As many as 25 persons including Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Lone, Khawaja Sana Ullah Lone, Khawaja Muhammad Zaman Lone, Sheikh Abdul Hamid, Khawaja Feroze Din, Kemal Sheikh, Syed Amir-ud-Din, Syed Ghafoor Shah, Khawaja Aziz Darwaza and Hashmat Ali Bhatti were killed in Gagrian Saujian alone. The local Lambardar, Khawaja Abdus Samad Lone, was dragged to the grave-yard and after being tortured with acid, forks and bayonets, was removed to a hillock and rolled down. The body was then dragged for about 7 miles to that point in the forest where the guerillas had earlier set up their HQ. After taking out his eyes, he was left to die by inches. Dozens of Muslims from the village were thrown into prison.

A prominent social worker of Sarva Seva Sangh of India, Mrs. Vimla Devi Thakaur toured the State towards the end of 1967 along with Mr.

Abdul Ahad Fatimi, Editor weekly Budhan Tehreek and four Hindu workers. In her report she said:

> "The sad pathetic story of Mandi's destruction by the Indian army in August 1965, the subsequent mopping up operations and victimization of poor people out of political prejudice, indiscriminate and ruthless use of the Defence of India Rules, inhuman torture of people in Interrogation centres and the reign of terror prevailing in the area, are the things which may sound incredible and yet they are true. There is no law and order in the Poonch district and no hope of justice and sense of security among the people. Many sensational stories about the abuse of Defence of India Rules and torture in Interrogation centres were narrated......But I had never heard of the cases like these: Mr. Karamat Ullah, a very well known and rich person of Darhal who received the Indian army on behalf of the villagers, was arrested and told that he would be released on giving Rs. 6,000 to military officers. He went to his home and brought that amount which he handed over to the officers concerned. Despite this, his wife and daughter-in-law were arrested, taken to the police station and raped by the officers of the Kumauon Regiment No. 11. After three days, both the ladies were shot. Then came the turn of Karamat Ullah himself. He was tortured and humiliated in a number of ways. His clothes were taken away and chilli powder was inserted in his rectum and also a bamboo was inserted in his throat. He was kept groaning for hours.
>
> Similarly, another Muslim of the same village, Amanullah, who was much respected by his people, was tied upside down by the Army officers. His wife and daughter-in-law were raped in the Police station for three days in the presence of his son who was tied down to a post in the same room. All the three were shot and their dead bodies were thrown into a stream. Amanullah was later murdered, lest the news should escape the valley and reach the people.
>
> Likewise, an old peasant woman was brought to the Army Camp and raped. In the end petrol was sprinkled on her and then set on fire. There are eye-witnesses who saw the unfortunate woman running to her village. She became unconscious and fell down midway. The villagers, however, managed to extinguish fire. The poor woman could survive only for five days. Captain Kundan, Commissioner of Rajouri has himself seen the woman dying."[1]

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1. Dawn, Karachi, 10.1.1968.

Lord Bertrand Russel in a cable on 1st September told Mr. Shastri:

> "All progressive opinion is deeply anxious about the Indian violation of the cease-fire line and the statement in Parliament. I understand the difficulties but urgently appeal for cessation of your military initiative felt to be aggression."

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi after a six-hour meeting with Mr. Bhutto at Karachi said:

> "We support the just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provocation. We reaffirm the stand of the Chinese Government that the question of Kashmir must be solved in conformity with the commitments made to the people of Kashmir by both India and Pakistan and also in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir."

A similar statement was issued in Peking. Mrs. Gandhi, Minister for information and Broadcasting, said on arrival in Srinagar on 4th September that India wants to settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan "once and for all". The Security Council met on 5th September and in a resolution called for an immediate cease-fire but said nothing about the cause of the war.

In the Hajipir area, India began with an attack on Bharat-Gali. It was continuously shelled for seven days; on 25th August, 20000 shells were fired within 12 hours on one feature alone. The attack came on 26th August. It was defended by only a 10C men, most of whom were Mujahids. They did not answer Indian firing until they were only 50 yards away. The Indians had to retreat in panic leaving behind about 150 killed. The second attack came on 27th. They lost around 300 persons. One Azad platoon had 22 killed, out of a total of 25. Even these three were wounded. Indians were, however, able to capture the post. Bedori had been attacked simultaneously. It was defended by only one company and after a heroic battle, was also lost to the Indians.[1] They next attacked Khora Nakka on the morning of 29th and captured it. Between this place and Rawalakot, now stood only the Tauli Pir height, but the 10 Baluch, which was holding Sheru ka Dhara, stood in their way. Indians made several attacks, first on 30th August and then on the 7th, 8th and 21st September but were beaten back. In the encounter on the 21st, they lost over 200 dead. In the Haji-Pir area, our troops were almost without any piece of artillery. 12 pieces arrived on 31st August. The Indians

1. Brigadier Gulzar.

next attacked Chand Tekri and later, Ziarat and were able to capture both. At Chand Tekri, the defenders had only one 25-pounder gun; they were out-numbered by 1:25 in man power, 1: 36 in artillery and with no M.M.Gs., mortars or R.Rs. Again there was only a company of 100 men to defend it. India launched a three-pronged attack. A front, 65 miles long in this area, had been defended by two weak battalions, weak in the sense that they had no supporting arms and most of them consisted of Mujahids.

Even after the September Cease-fire, India continued to shell our positions in this area. It was after the signing of the Tashkent Agreement which provided for the vacation of conquered territories, that she ceased fire in this sector though she had been unable to make any further headway. Col. Chishti had been transferred to Rawalakote soon after the September Cease-fire to cover the area from Pir Kanthi to Tatapani as Commanding Officer of 47 Light Regiment.

Pakistan, therefore, put into effect, its plan for counter-attack. The plan was to capture Akhnoor, the Indian Army's main supply route in the State, in order to prevent the despatch of substantial armour to Kashmir Valley and also ensure the safety of the Grand Trunk Road passing through Gujrat. It was hoped that once these objectives were achieved, the local population, assisted by the infiltrating guerrillas, would rise in revolt. The ultimate objective was the liberation of the State.

The plan for a thrust from Chhamb, distinct from the guerrilla operation already launched, which was the brain-child of Malik Akhtar Hussain, had, I understand, been initially drawn up and submitted to the GHQ in 1960—62 by Major (now Lt. Gen.) F.A. Chishti while BM of the 102 Brigade at Kotli. It was then the only Pakistani Brigade in AK; its task was to prevent India from reaching Gujrat via Munawar Gap and in case of war, capture Akhnoor. That is how he submitted the above plan and also suggested the shifting of the Brigade to Bhimber and putting the Brigade already posted there in suspended animation. The suggestion was accepted and a Pak. Brigade was moved to Bhimber.

In mid July, 1965 the 28 Medium Regiment with Major F.A. Chishti as 2—IC. was ordered to Kharian for operations in Kashmir. Major Chishti deployed his Unit at Padhar, about 6000 yards behind the Cease-fire line. On 15th August, it had a grim artillery duel with Indian forces which were concentrating in the Deva area to prevent, what Lt. General Kaul claims, "further Pakistani infiltration". The shelling not only killed Brigadier B. F. Masters of the Enemy forces but also compelled them to

abandon their forward piquets.[1] Subsequently, some of our people who had infiltrated in the area between Beri Patan and Laliyani, got trapped in a precarious position. But for the Artillery cover from the 28 Medium Regiment which enabled their rescue, they would have suffered badly.

On 1st September, the 12 Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, launched a lightening attack on Chhamb, across the Cease-fire line. The attack was led by the American Patton tanks. In this attack about 200 guns were deployed and the plan was to move on for the capture of Akhnoor. The Artillery Jawans wrote Allah-o-Akbar on some of the bombs. Major Chishti opened his account from Padhar with 24 medium guns, each shell weighing 100 Lbs which meant bombs weighing 30 maunds bursting at the same time. The Indian Air Force destroyed one gun and killed and wounded three men. Chhamb was captured the same day, in a matter of few hours.

Within four to five hours, the Indian positions at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pandit and Munawwar were captured. Similarly, Moel and Burejal were also captured simultaneously. Dewa was in their hands by 1400 hours. The attack was made by 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 A.K. Brigade, 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry. 5 A.K. and 19 A.K. did a really wonderful job. 5th A.K. contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Mehra while the 19th A.K. inflicted a crushing defeat on the well-fortified Indian position Patrara which was captured. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hamid Khan continued the momentum of attack by asking his soldiers to continue the advance. The famous and authentic incident of the capture of 53 other ranks of the 6 Sikh Light Infantry took place on the same day. Lt. Col. Nasirullah Khan Babur, later Major Gangeral and Governor of N.W.F.P., of A.O.P. while in the air, saw a collection of Indians trekking in a nullah. He landed his heli-copter nearby and with the help of his companion, Capt. Akbar, rounded up 53 Indian soldiers. No officer was with them; they had deserted them and run away in their command vehicles.[2]

By now the 7th infantry Division commanded by Yahya Khan had moved to Gujrat and simultaneously with the capture of Chhamb on the very day of launching the attack, Akhtar Hussain Malik was stripped of his command, removed and placed under the operational command of Yahya Khan. It was a most wreckless decision for which President Ayub and General Musa can never be forgiven by posterity. It was a deliberate insult aimed at the victorious General and the men under his command and bound to demoralise them. The details of the operation and the

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1. Confrontation with Pakistan, p. 27.
2. Brigadier Gulzar.

story of his removal can be read in the recently publsished book, September 1965, by Brigadier A. A. K. Chaudhry, H. J. A tough soldier and an intelligent man, Yahya had, over the years, been lost to the pleasures of life. Once again, three most precious days were lost, as we lost them in Baramula, and it was on 4th Septamber that he ordered resumption of the advance. In the matter of wars, even moments are decisive and surely, three days spread over 72 hours was a lot of time to have enabled India to stop its fleeing army on the Akhnoor sector, rush in reinforcements, complete its plans for the invasion of Lahore and thus, not only wrest the initiative from our hands but also seek fulfilment of her long-cherished goal to destroy this country. Had Akhtar Malik been allowed to continue the advance and execute his own plan which aimed at containing the stronger resistance pockets while continuing the advance, there is perhaps little doubt that Akhnoor would have fallen, which would have not only safe guarded our frontier on the Sialkot sector but also helped us in threatening Jammu city and liberating a large chunk of Jammu province. The result of the war may thus have been altogether different. He was deprived of the initiative and later transferred to Rawalpindi only because it was unthinkable and intolerable for a Dictator and his Commander-in-Chief that a General, under them, should become popular in the country by inflicting crushing defeats on the Indians. Akhtar told his brother, Ali, that he was removed because, on account of his success, the President "got cold-feet."[1]

Had Akhtar Malik been continued in his duty and had he succeeded, as was most likely, in capturing Naushehra, the strongest Enemy cidatel in Jammu and Kashmir, he would have been the only General in Pakistan with a spectacular victory to his credit and it would then have been very difficult for President Ayub, to ignore his claim to the office of the Commander-in-Chief, after the retirement of General Musa, which was quite near. Ayub didn't want to appoint a Punjabi to the post. Will all his goodness and greatness, it must be said in fairness to history that his regime was largely and essentially a Pathan-ridden administration.

Punjab which undoubtedly is the heart of Pakistan, is, despite the noblest patriotism of its general mass of people, an object of abuse and ridicule in the other provinces. As truth is nobody's monopoly, there must be some truth on both sides. It is important to bridge the gulf; the sooner we do it, the better for all.

On the night falling between 2/3 September, Major Chishti who had moved to Chhamb on the 2nd, was summoned by Brigadier Amjad

1. Interview with the author at Mangla.

Chaudhri H.J. and asked to take his Regiment across river Tavi to deploy it in Pallanwalla area but on enquiring from where to cross, the Brigadier merely shrugged his shoulders. No reply was also forth coming when the Brigade Commander was asked as to where our forward positions were? Chishti, however, knew the area well as he had studied it before having submitted his plan. On 3rd he crossed Tavi at the Indian bridge site when it was under unobserved shelling and employed his guns at Pallanwalla. When he returned from a hill feature, he received a message from Brigadier Amjad Chaudhri asking him to return to Chhamb immediately. The Unit had to recross the bridge and was attacked by 2 Indian Migs. On returning to Chhamb he was told by Major Anwar-ul-Haque of the Infantry that he had gone too far ahead. Here the Unit was ordered to fire at a *feature which was hardly 800 yards from the position which they had earlier abandoned on orders*. On the 4th, the Unit moved to the same position again and from here to Khor and then to Jaurian. One gun was destroyed at Khor by Indian air attacks. Major Chishti remained at Jaurian till Cease-fire and was promoted Lt. Colonel while still posted here.

After crossing Tawi, Jaurian was attacked on 5th September and captured the same day. A large number of Indians were taken prisoners. Considerable quantity of arms and ammunition also fell into our hands. 15 AMX tanks captured at Chhamb were employed in action at Jaurian. The plan for the capture of Akhnoor had to be abandoned because on 6th September, in the early hours of dawn, India invaded Pakistan.

It is factually true[1] that soon after the defeat of the Indian army in the Rann of Kuchh in March 1965, the Indian government had moved a large number of its troops to the international boundary. One armoured Division and two (independent) armoured Brigades moved on the morning of September 1. The decision must have been taken earlier. 6 Indian Mountain Division started leaving its location in central India during the last week of August. 4 Sikh reached Ferozpur on 28th August and 9 Horse left Saugar on 2nd September. 67 Indian Infantry Brigade left Jodhpur on 1st September; 3 Madras left Dharchilla on 30th August and 5/5 G.R. was out of Babina by 1st September. The 1st armoured Division was already in Amritsar.

## INDIA INVADES PAKISTAN

There was no regular Pakistan Army defending the border. There were some Rangers who took the initial surprise on-slaught valiantly. *Most of them including one of their gallant commanders, Major Arif Jan, died heroically. No one left his post of duty; not one was taken a prisoner. Perhaps, no awards came their way.* By the time the invaders reached the banks of the B.R.B. canal, the defenders had readied themselves; there was to be

1. Brigadier Gulzar Ahmed, p. 77.

no further advance. The attack was launched from three sides. On the Wahgah side, they advanced upto the road bridge at Batapur which was blown off by the defenders just in time on the midnight of 6/7 September when Indian tanks were hardly six hundred yards away. On the Burki side, it took the 7th Indian Infantry Division three days to capture Burki village which was held by only one company of the 7th Punjab under Major Aziz Bhatti. They withstood nine successive attacks in the course of three days and having been constantly pounded by all that the enemy Divisional artillery and armour could throw at it, the defence remains an example of great heroism. These handful of men had no concrete bunkers to protect themselves, no deep dug in trenches and no supplies. Their ammunition could not be replenished except at night and under very hazardous conditions.[1] Major Aziz Bhatti declined to be relieved and died valiantly on his post of duty. He was posthumously awarded 'Nishan-e-Haider', the only one awarded in connection with the September war. Major Aziz Bhatti was a Kashmiri by descent. His grandfather migrated from Baramula and settled in Gujrat district.[2] Within a few days, the Pakistan army was able not only to blunt the invasion but also push them back in some places into their own territory and capture the border town of Khem-Karan. Its capture was denied by India right upto the time of cease-fire; she made several frantic but fruitless attempts to recapture it. A large number of Indian soldiers were taken prisoners. India also attacked Sialkot. The plan was to capture Wazirabad so that Lahore could be encircled and our supply line blocked. A great tank battle ferociously raged at Chawinda for several days which resulted in frustrating Indian plans for a forward thrust. India also crossed the international boundary at Khokhra Par and again she made a miserable failure; on the other hand, Pakistan Rangers, assisted by Hur volunteers, captured the Muna Bao Railway station and a vast area upto and including the Kishan-garh fort, deep inside Rajasthan.

The Pakistan Air Force played a highly effective and inspiring role. According to News-Week dated 20th September, 1965, the air strength of the two countries was as follows:

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1. Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge, p. 121.
2. Aziz Bhatti Shaheed, p. 21.

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|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan: | F-86 Sabre Jets | ... | 100 |
| | F-104 Star Fighters | ... | 50 |
| | B-57 Bombers | ... | 30 |
| | C-130 Transport | ... | 4 |
| | Canberra Bombers | ... | 50 |
| | Total | ... | 234 |
| India: | C-119 Transport | ... | 25 |
| | Hunter Jet Fighters | .. | 150 |
| | Vampire Jet Fighters | ... | 100 |
| | Gnat Jet Fighters | ... | 100 |
| | Canberra Bombers | .. | 80 |
| | Canberra Photoplanes | ... | 8 |
| | Viscount Transport | ... | 5 |
| | Mig 21 Fighters | ... | 6 |
| | Illyushin Transport | ... | 2 |
| | Antonov Transport | ... | 24 |
| | Mystere Jet Fighters | ... | 100 |
| | Total | ... | 600 |

Mr. Peter Preston of "the Guardian" London in a despatch published on September 24 under the headline "Pakistan Victory in the Air" stated that Indo-Pak losses in planes were 10 : 1 and that "the PAF had complete mastery on the air during later days of the fighting". He accepted the Pakistan claim that it had lost only 14 planes which included three that

were presumably hit by their own ground-fire. The special correspondent of the London Times wrote that "the co-ordination of the strike air force and units on the ground was clearly a model" and that "air-crafts were frequently switched from one ground target, to another while in the air and gave support within minutes of its being called for". He also stated that camera gun-film had confirmed the destruction of 173 Indian tanks.

For the first time the Arab world came out unanimously in support of Pakistan. A normal Summit meeting was in progress at Casablanca in the third week of September. Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din, the Central Information Minister met several Heads of State, the conference passed a resolution expressing concern on the Indo-Pakistan war and called for the implementation of U.N. resolutions on Kashmir. Two Kashmiri leaders from U.K., Mr. Syed Hassan Mutuhar, Chief Representative of the Muslim Youth Association in Europe and Raja Muhammad Azam Khan of the U.K. Kashmir Muslim Conference also flew in and presented a memorandum seeking support. It was for the first time that the Egyptian bloc within the Arab League came out with such a statement. The declaration caused anguish in India and Swaran Singh was almost heckled in Parliament and compelled to reveal that Nasser had told India that but for his presence at the conference and the efforts made by him, it would have come out with a categorical denunciation of India and unreserved support for Pakistan.

## THE CHINESE ULTIMATUM

As already stated, the Chiang regime had taken an anti-Kashmir and pro-India line in the Security Council. It was because of personal friendship between Nehru and Chiangs which seemed to the latter more important than principles. With the coming into power of the Communist party, friendship, at leadership level, continued to be cultivated. However, for many years China chose to avoid a clear stand on the issue. We used to be surprised why was China displaying disinterestedness in the political future of as vast a territory as Jammu and Kashmir which had long borders with its outlaying provinces, Sinkiang and Tibet? India's importance due to the sheer weight of her size and

resources or the international prestige of Pandit Nehru, could not, by themselves alone, have been responsible for this Policy of Silence. It is possible that Pakistan's pronouncedly pro-west foreign policy which existed even before her entry into Defence pacts, was one reason; yet another reason perhaps was the early Chinese experiment of following the Russian lead in its foreign relations but the main reason probably was that the Chinese had no experience as yet of the working of Brahmin mind and their state-craft as "enshrined" in Chankaya's Artha Shastra. At the same time, successive governments in Pakistan failed to make a serious effort to cultivate Chinese friendship. The credit for breaking the ice must go to Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra who as Prime Minister had many a fruitful meetings with Mr. Chou-En-Lai at Bandung during the first Afro-Asian conference. The thread was resumed and strengthened by Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy when he visited China soon after assuming the reigns of Premiership. However, it was left to the genius of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to bring about such close co-operation and co-ordination between the two countries, that China has not only taken an outright principled stand in favour of Kashmiris right of self-determination but has also given full moral and material support to strengthen Pakistan's territorial integrity and political independence.

Strangely enough, many an event took place in rapid succession leading to the present Pak-China friendship. The first was the emancipation of China from Russian hegemony towards late fifties. The breach has since continued to widen due to the latter's continued determination to hold on to the vast Chinese territories it is occupying and its consequential efforts to thwart her growth at home and prevent her emergence as a World Power. This necessitated for China a fresh look on her foreign relations with the result that she rapidly came out of the isolation to which Russia had deliberately quartered her.

The next event was the Indian-engineered revolt of Dalai Lama. Tibet has generally been under the political suzerainty of China. In late fifties when China sent in her troops, India seduced the Lama with thousands of his followers, financed and managed a world-wide hate-China campaign. This opened their eyes. Their greatest shock, however, came in 1962 when Nehru ordered his troops to evict them from posts they were holding in areas the Chinese call the southern part of Tibet.

It must be said in fairness to the Chinese that even the Census Commissioner of undivided India, in 1941, put the area of Jammu and Kashmir at 82,258 square miles only. Even this was a unilateral claim because during the hey-day of the British empire, there was no real border between Ladakh and Tibet or between Ladakh and Sinkiang. Vast tracts of land remain, even to this day, desolate and uninhabited. To talk of any defined borders in such an area, would thus seem to be unreal. The Indian military adventure left China stung. Naturally, it was now time for her to understand the compulsions that had driven Pakistan to enter into defence arrangements with the United States which brought in military hardware. The truth of the explanations given earlier about these compulsions, began to dawn upon Peking. The result was that gradually, Pakistan and China began getting closer. China gave up her silence on the Kashmir issue and gradually moved, step by step, until she finally came forward irrevocably in favour of Kashmiris right of self-determination. The position now is that even when Pakistan is silent, it is Peking which continues to remind the world of the disputed nature of Indian occupation by pledging support to the people of Kashmir in their struggle for Self-determination.

On 17th September, China gave an ultimatum to India to stop all its intrusions on the Sino-Indian and the Sino—Sikkim boundary and return the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized live-stock. India was given three days to dismantle military installations on the Sikkim-China border. "Otherwise," the ultimatum said, "India would face grave consequences". China then extended its ultimatum by three days. It caused worry in Washington, Moscow and London and the possibility of the spread of Indo-Pakistan war to other areas, was not lost sight of.

How did the Chinese come forward with their ultimatum? Soon after the Indian attack on Lahore, President Ayub secretly flew to Peking via Karakoram and had discussions with the Chinese leaders. It was a result of these discussions that China issued its ultimatum. The only direct China-USA contact then was at the Ambassadors level at Warsa. It is admitted even by Indian authors like Mr. Sudhir Ghosh that India sought help and intervention of the United States and consequently the

American Ambassador at Warsa "warned the Chinese Ambassador of the grave consequences of an attack on India," which meant that if she intervened in the war, the United States will have to come in also. The general belief in Pakistan is that China was not deterred by the American threat and was ready for a limited operation at least in the border areas and that it was the Pakistan Government which prevented the Chinese action. It was also widely rumoured that China had asked Pakistan NOT to agree to a cease-fire for at least two to three days, presumably to enable it to "activate" the Indo-China borders at the expiry of the ultimatum but that the Pakistan Government was not favourably inclined. The true facts are not yet authoritatively known. In November, 1969, a group of Military Attaches stationed at Rawalpindi paid a visit to Muzaffarabad. At a dinner given in their honour at the Guest House, this writer got introduced to the Chinese Attache; we had a friendly discussion participated in by several officers including Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Pandit, Secretary to the President. At the end of the discussion, this writer asked the Chinese Attache if he was prepared to answer a question? Without committing himself, he wanted to know what the question was? When I put these rumours to him, the diplomat replied diplomatically that he could not answer the question but would only like to say that China was a dependable friend of Pakistan and that she means what she says.

## THE SECURITY COUNCIL AWAKES

Meanwhile efforts had been going on at the United Nations for an immediate cease-fire and important world leaders like President Johnson, Premiers Wilson and Kosygin sent several communications to President Ayub and Premier Shastri. India was ready for a cease-fire just after it had become plain that the capture of Lahore or a thrust towards Wazirabad was out of the question and that is why her Chief delegate Mr. Chagla told the Council that her country was ready "now and here" for a cease-fire. As the Security Council was simply concerning itself with a cease-fire, without any concrete steps for the holding of a plebiscite, the Pakistan Government was naturally not prepared to accept this position She was in the beginning represented by Mr. S. M. Zaffar, its Law Minister, who was new to the intricacies of Big-power-

politics and the art of international diplomacy. It seems that our permanent representative, Mr. Amjad Ali informed the Government that the presence of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, was imperative.

Mr. Bhutto was, therefore, sent to the Security Council at a time when it appeared poised against Pakistan. The Johnson administration had strained relations with Pakistan as it was not happy with her growing friendly relations with Peking and the posture of independence that it had adopted in its foreign policy. It was also an unfortunate coincidence that the Chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Goldberg, was a Jew. Mr. Shastri had special words of praise for his role in the Security Council. The Jews have hatred for Pakistan ingrained in their blood because of her unflinching loyalty to the Arab Cause. Malayasia was represented by a Madrasi Brahmin, Mr. Radha Krishna Ramani. Both worked against the interests of Pakistan. Ramani traced the partition of the sub-continent in a manner as could be expected of a member of the Indian National Congress but certainly not of a representative of an independent foreign country. Pakistan was also threatened with economic sanctions. To focus world opinion, particularly in Malayasia itslef, on its anti-Pakistan stand, Pakistan first re-called its High Commissioner and some days later broke off its diplomatic relations with that country. It had a salutary effect as it generated strong wide-spread protest in Malayasia against its stand and thereafter its representative took a rather apologetic attitude.

It has remained to be mentioned that the Indian Navy, despite being stronger than the Pakistan Navy, did not come out of its bases. Pakistan Navy inflicted considerable damage on its important base at Dwarka near Somnath. At the end of the war, it was revealed that a large number of Indian merchant navy had been brought to the harbour at Karachi. It is generally believed that President Soekarno had ordered a considerable part of his naval fleet, including submarines, to assist Pakistan in the war. Indonesia then had, perhaps, the third largest Navy in the world. She supported us openly and there were several demonstrations against the Indian Embassy in Jakarta; the embassy building and furniture were damaged. Two Indonesian journalists were externed from New Delhi and in retaliation, India's Press Attache at Jakarta was banished

from that country. On 19th September, an anti-India rally at Semarang, central Java, by some 25 thousand youth, burnt an effigy of Mr. Shastri.[1]

Mr. U-Thant paid a lightening visit to the sub-continent and met Mr. Shastri and President Ayub. In the Security Council Mr. Bhutto made a great speech, hailed by foreign correspondents as the greatest ever made in the Council. At the end of his speech, he dramatically showed a telegram from Rawalpindi, asking him to inform the Council that Pakistan had accepted the cease-fire resolution which became effective from 3 O' clock on the night falling between 22nd and 23rd September. There had been assurances behind the scene by President Johson that the United States would support efforts for a solution of the dispute. An important development that may have also influenced the Pakistan Government in accepting the cease-fire call was that for the first time since Russia began supporting India on the Kashmir issue, she adopted a posture of neutrality. It was hoped in Pakistan that if Russia really used her influence with New Delhi, there was every likelihood of the Kashmir dispute being solved through her good offices. Pakistan received a good press throughout the world and there was hardly a newspaper of note which did not high-light the importance of solving the Kashmir issue and the fact that Kashmiris did not want to remain with India.

## THE FAILURE OF THE OBJECTIVES

It is clear and must in fairness to history be admitted that Pakistan's objective was to force a solution of the Kashmir problem. She did not succeed in achieving it because of failure to achieve spectacular victory in the battle-field. The failure can be traced largely to the eclipse of Akhtar Hussain Malik, immediately on the fall of Chhamb when the victorious army under his command was advancing towards Jaurian. That was a psychological moment to achieve our objective because with the unexpected and quick fall of Chhamb, the enemy was in a disarray, thousands of non-Muslim refugees fleeing to Jammu had crowded the main roads, the troops defeated at Chhamb were running in confusion and causing demoralisation but the President chose to change the command and the new Commander, despite all his intelligence, was concerned more with

1. Pakistan Times, 26th September, 1965.

the joys rather than the rigours of life and wasted two precious days which enabled the Indians to consolidate their defences and thus the initiative gained at Chhamb was foundered on the pride and jealousy of the President and his Commander-in-Chief. It may be revealed that a highly placed source in occupied Kashmir confirmed that after the fall of Chhamb, the road to Jammu lay open.

There is equally no doubt that the Indians also failed in their objective. They were not able to capture Lahore or to reach Wazirabad so as to cut off West Pakistan into two, threaten Rawalpindi, and occupy the long strip of land lying between the two. The Indians hoped that by doing so, they could bring Pakistan on its knees and if the intention was not to force the unity of the two countries for fear of international repercussions, at least it was to compel Pakistan to renounce its claim to the Jammu and Kashmir State, as a condition precedent to its withdrawal from West Pakistan. That was why Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Minister for Information and Broadcasting, told reporters at Srinagar airport a few days after the start of the revolt that India was determined "this time" to finish the Kashmir issue "once and for all". The huge war-machine that she had built up especially after 1962 by exploiting with the Americans the imaginary danger of a Chinese attack and the endless flow of Soviet military hardware had unbalanced Indian leadership. The American assistance had led to the widening of military roads in the Ladakh region, the installation of powerful RADARS to detect the approach of aeroplanes and the arming, at American expense, of two mountain Divisions. The capture of Junagarh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Hyderabad and Goa, the successful engineering of a revolt in Nepal, the forcible occupation of more than 2/3rd of the Jammu and Kashmir State and the repudiation, with impunity, of her commitments to the United Nations for the holding of a plebiscite, had all contributed to a false sense of strength and superiority among the political and military leaders in New Delhi. That is why when the Defence Minister, Mr. Chavan informed the Lok Sabha on the morning of 6 September that the Indian Army had crossed the international boundary and was marching towards Lahore, the entire House burst into a hysteria, unprecedented anywhere in the world. Mr. Chavan was given a prolonged standing ovation and members wildly embraced each other, as a mark of great rejoicing. It goes to the

standing credit of the out-numbered Pakistani troops and also in part to the American military equipment that these hopes were dashed to the ground and the dream of the conquest of Lahore and the consequent results sought to be achieved, remained a distant cry.

The attack on Lahore, however, brought the Pakistan advance in the Akhnoor sector to a stand-still because the Patton tanks and larger pieces of artillery had to be withdrawn from the sector for the defence of Lahore and Sialkot. Armoured units are the teeth of an army and without their deployment, any substantial advance against a modern army is unthinkable, especially in the plains like the Akhnoor sector.

How were the Indians able to advance upto the B.R.B. canal and elsewhere in the Lahore sector? Why, after all, did the front line defence consist entirely of the Rangers, who, apart from being ill-equipped, are no match against a trained regular army? Their main task is policing of the border during peace times and to check illegal crossings or smuggling. May be, sometime, someone possessing inner knowledge comes forward to reveal the whole truth, but it needs to be stated that the Government explanation then and afterwards that it was a part of their strategic plan and that she was cognizant of the possibility of an Indian attack in this sector, did not impress anyone in the country. It has already come to light that at the time of the invasion, the number of troops even on defensive positions, miles behind, was insignificant. There was no one at hand, or with the needed equipment to destroy bridges so as to halt the advance of the enemy tanks. Same was the case in the Sialkot sector. It was rumoured then that the USA had, at some level, conveyed an assurance that India would not violate the international boundary which meant that the war was going to be localised in Kashmir State. If the rumour is correct, it is really strange that the Pakistan Government should have placed implicit faith in the assurances of a government which had a pronouncedly pro-India bias and was publicly hostile to this country since she drew closer to China.

It may also be noted that Pakistan, apart from being a member of the SEATO and CENTO, had a Defence treaty with the United States and it would have been unthinkable for the Indians to invade Pakistan without a prior clearance from Washington. The British newspaper, Daily Express,

claimed that the invasion had taken place with the prior approval of the notorious American Intelligence Agency, C.I.A. and that the latter had assured her of a speedy victory. The report was denied by Washington but it had also denied American complicity in several other rash ventures around the world.

Soon after crossing the international boundary, Indian news media announced the capture of Lahore. Even the B.B.C. broadcast the "news" of its capture on the strength of the A.I.R. Indian newspapers published special supplements on 6th September claiming the capture of the Lahore Railway station, the Mughalpura suburb and even the march past of its Sena on the Mall, Lahore. Men and women of my generation must be vividly remembering the pre-partition "specials" of the Lahore Hindu Dailies, which played no mean part in the creation of Pakistan. We remember them with gratitude. A popular joke in New Delhi for years after partition about Milap, Pratap, Vir Bharat etc. was that they had rendered great service to the country, so much so that they helped to divide the Bharat Mata! Meanwhile listening into Pakistan Radio was banned in several States including Kashmir and Utter Pradesh. This brings to my mind an interesting anecdote. Mr. Shaida Hussain Zaidi, one-time Senior Vice-President of the Allied Bank, told this writer that sometime after war, he went to Saharanpur (U.P.) where he learnt that during the early days of September war, the Lahore station of Radio Pakistan was blowing very loudly from the shop of a Muslim Pan-vendor. It attracted several caste Hindus, one of whom angrily and aggressively asked the extremely intelligent Pan-vendor as to why had he tuned in, the Lahore station of *Radio Pakistan*? With great presence of mind, the Pan-vendor cut back, "Maharaj, this is not *Radio Pakistan*. It is Lahore Radio Station and as you know, Maharaj, our brave Sena has already conquered it on 6th September."

The Security Council became active only after news reached the world capitals of Pakistan's thrust in the Chhamb sector. Meetings were called hurriedly and resolutions passed calling for an immediate cease-fire but nothing was said about the cause of the war. With the blunting of the Indian offensive on the Lahore sector and the chances of a Pakistani advance into East Punjab becoming brighter, there was a flutter of diplo-

matic activity especially in Washington, London and Moscow. The Big powers were still concerned only with a cease-fire and cold shouldered Pakistan's claim that something must also be done to solve the Kashmir dispute. Then came the Chinese ultimatum which shook the three capitals because the danger of the widening of the war was now really looming large. No Big power wanted to go to war, perhaps not even China, but the ultimatum could still not be ignored because if China were to do nothing after such a declaration, her prestige abroad was bound to suffer, particularly in the Afro-Asian world. Since these powers had failed to compel Pakistan to accept a mere cease-fire, threats had begun to be hurled both directly and indirectly for the imposition of an economic blockade. The Chinese appearance almost neutralised the threat; the Council became reasonable and passed a resolution which not only called for an immediate cease-fire but also provided for a four-power Commission to visit the sub-continent for the solution of the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Bhutto in his characteristic way termed the first two resolutions as India resolutions and the last one as the China resolution.

The Daily Express London published, on 24th September, a report from its special correspondent Mr. Frank Melville, who reported, after having personally visited Sialkot, that the Indian army on the front consisted of four Divisions, one armoured, which fought a non-stop battle with two Pakistani Divisions, one armoured, and that 420 tanks of both sides were involved. According to the paper, 30,000 Indian troops met 9,000 Pakistanis and 400 guns fired hundreds of thousands of rounds of all calibres from two hundred pounders (8") to 25 pounder field batteries and the losses on both sides were: Indian tanks 120 to 125 destroyed, many damaged, between 3000 to 4000 dead at a conservative figure; Pakistani tanks destroyed, 44 and admitted losses 400 to 500 dead.

At the end of the war, the area held by Pakistan was: Akhnoor sector: 340 sq. miles, Sub-sector Lahore: 1 sq. mile, Sub-sector Khem Karan: 36 sq. miles, Sub-sector Suleimanki—Fazilka: 40 sq. miles and Sub-sector Mirpur Khas in Rajasthan: 1200 sq. miles. The area occupied by India was: Kargil sector=10 sq. miles, Teetwal subsector=2 sq. miles, Uri—Poonch sector=170 sq. miles, Lahore sector=140 sq. miles, Sialkot=100 sq. miles and Rajasthan, Mirpur Khas=24 sq. miles.

After the Tashkent Agreement, when Indians withdrew from the Haveli tehsil, they dismantled all Government buildings except the Veterinary Hospital and carried away their doors, windows, almirahs and wooden roofings. The Veterinary Hospital at Kahuta, was spared, out of religious regard for Gau-Mata, the mother cow. It is gratifying to know that a people who hold in contempt, solemn international commitments and who have no regard for human values, at least do have some regard for cow!

It has been admitted by Kaul that when Maj. Gen. Nitranjan Prasad was ambushed by Pakistan soldiers near Ichhogil canal on 7th September, he ran away, leaving behind 12 men and four jeeps: one contained his papers which fell into the hands of the Pakistan Army. According to Kaul, the Pakistan Radio broadcasts about this incident and the publication of the contents of the diary earned him so much notoriety that he was relieved of command and retired from service. That Gen. Chaudhry, the Indian Army Chief of Staff was considering withdrawal of the Indian Army so as to take new positions behind Beas, is revealed by Kaul who says:

> "Government should by now be aware that in the midst of this grim crisis, on 10 September Army Chief Chaudhry asked Harbaksh Singh whether our forward positions should not be readjusted and established behind the Beas as the enemy Armoured Division might break through. This would have meant pulling back our corps in this area nearly 40 miles from the front line, evacuating vital areas like Ferozepure, Khem Karan, Tarn Taran, Khalra, Wagah, Amritsar and Dera Baba Nanak........."[1]

Unfortunately, this break through was never achieved. It is useful to quote Kaul about our failure to break through the Indian defences in East Punjab so as to have been able to move on to Delhi. Says Kaul:—

> "The Pakistanis had obviously come with over-confidence and the basic presumption that the Indian forces would withdraw in the face of their determined attack. Although they had made a reconnaissance a day earlier, they had obviously not studied the

1. Confrontation with Pakistan, p. 38.

ground on which they had to operate carefully, nor had they cleared many mined approaches on which their tanks had to advance later.

Moreover, their infantry failed to continue following closely behind the armour, because of our shelling, and to assist the armoured assault. Their Pattons took cover in the nine-feet high, thick-standing sugarcane and cotton crops where their visibility was reduced to 1000 yards or less—within our tank range— and lost their extra advantage. In concentrating thus, they also presented themselves as sitting targets, a situation of which our tanks, recoilless guns, and bazookas took full advantage.

If only they had dispersed and used the guns of their tanks with uninterrupted views they would have done much damage to us. Many tanks got bogged down in the soft soil in the low-lying areas in our territory. The low Patton tanks, weighing about 45 tons each, carrying a 90-millimetre gun with a range of 3000 yards, with infrared driving capability which can provide visbility up to almost a hundred yards at night, and with a speed of about 30 miles an hour, did not fare well as the Pakistanis failed to employ them properly. They were not given enough room to manoeuvre and the Pakistani crews were often not quite familiar with their tanks, which had hardly done any mileage.

Many of them, when captured, had run as little as 300 kilometres, a standard totally inadequate for troop training. Tank crews need long and detailed training. Some of these Pattons, when captured, appeared so new that even the original US marking on them had not been erased. They had been obviously lying in the cotton wool.

The gun histories of the captured Pakistani tank crews showed meagre gunnery training. The weapons system of a Patton relies on a computer, which controls guns for effective firing. The crews did not feed correct information to their computers, with disastrous results. Thus the Patton electronics which should have been an asset, became a liability.

We had organized improvised defences in this area. The Pakistanis could have outflanked us, but instead of dispersing they came in concentrations, again presenting excellent targets in the very lines of approach along which we had sited our defences. Thus, despite its superior equipment, Pakistan paid a heavy price for its poorly trained crews whose morale cracked up when all did not go well, who got jittery in the face of our fire and abandoned their battleworthy tanks in many cases. We had a field day as the Pakistanis fell into our hastily organised traps. They could have avoided them, but in their folly plunged headlong into them."[1]

It was announced in the Indian Parliament, that she had suffered 12500 casualties, 2700 killed, 8400 wounded and 1500 taken as prisoners.[2] An Anglo-Indian member challenged these figures and stated that the losses were much higher.

Indians have repeatedly claimed that the capture of Lahore was not their objective and that their troops had crossed the international boundary line only to open a second front so that the push beyond Chhamb/Jaurian could be stopped. Certainly this is not the whole truth. Apart from the by-now infamous invitation haughtily extended by General Chaudhry to his senior officers to join him at a "chhota peg" party in the Lahore Gymkhana scheduled for the evening of 6th September and the appointment in advance of an Urdu-knowing senior Indian Civil Service officer, Mr. Ashwani Kumar, as Administrator-designate of Lahore, we now have the admission of Doctor Radha Krishnan, the then Indian President whose Private Secretary, Mr. Datta, has revealed in his recent book that Radha Krishnan told him that when he was returning home after a visit to Ethiopia, soon after the September war, President Nasser had asked him at the Cairo air-port why had they not captured Lahore? Doctor Radha Krishnan told his former Private Secretary that the truth was that Lahore could not be captured because Pakistanis fought like lions on the BRB canal.[3]

Several meetings were held in the last week of October. In its characteristic way, India chose, now, that the fighting had ceased, to stage a volte face and came forward with the preposterous claim that Kashmir was an integral part of India and the Council could not discuss it. Mr. Bhutto was privately sought to be persuaded by the Soviet representative from not bringing up the Kashmir issue in his speech but, as was

1. Confrontation with Pakistan p. 39.
2. Ibid.
3. With Two Presidents, p. 146.

expected, he rejected the suggestion and was reported to have told him that if he was stopped from doing so, he had instructions to announce the withdrawal of Pakistan from the United Nations. It had a salutary effect because Peking was not a member of the United Nations and Indonesia had withdrawn in protest when Malayasia was made a member. The withdrawal of Pakistan would have inflicted a serious blow on the world organisation as three of the major powers from Asia would have been out of it. One of the allegations against Mr. Bhutto brought by his ill-wishers was that he had in this matter, exceeded his mandate but the important point is that he did not announce Pakistan's withdrawal from the United Nations; because of his perfect understanding of the international game of power politics, he employed the threat successfully in the service of his country and the Cause it cherished. India boycotted his speech as well as the discussion on Kashmir. Swaran Singh walked out of the Council chamber as soon as Mr. Bhutto began speaking on Kashmir. It was on this occasion that Mr. Bhutto reminded the Security Council members of the news from Srinagar and published in world press, that school girls and children were parading city streets, denouncing Indian occupation and chanting slogans of "Indian Dogs Get Out"; added Mr. Bhutto, "they have not left Kashmir, but they have left the Security Council". There was a country-wide uproar in India and Mr. Bhutto was accused of having abused her.

Mr. Arsene Usher, the Ivory Coast delegate told the special correspondent of the Pakistan Times on October 29 that Russia and United States were blocking the introduction of a resolution because they wanted paragraph 4 of the September 20 resolution which had called for a settlement of the Kashmir problem, to be left out while France, Jordan and Ivory Coast insisted on its inclusion. It needs to be noted that the September 20 resolution had been passed unanimously. At last the Council passed a resolution on November 5 tabled by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malayasia, the Netherlands and Uruguay calling for a time table for the withdrawal of troops along the Indo-Pakistan frontier to the positions they held before the fighting began in September. It also re-affirmed the Council's September 20 resolution which called for a political settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Soviet Russia and Jordan abstained: the former in the interests of India and the latter, in the interests of Pakistan.

## THE UGLY EFFECTS

The Chinese ultimatum apart from its international repercussions, had the direct result of preventing the spread of war to East Pakistan.

India was poised for an attack on the Eastern wing, with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman already waiting to bring about its secession. He even advised Governor Muniem Khan to declare East Pakistan independent. It was only after the Chinese ultimatum, that the Indian Defence Minister gave a public assurance in course of a statement in parliament that India was not going to attack East Pakistan.

The September war had other ugly repercussions for the country, apart from the loss of life and property that is the natural result of wars. It played a significant role in the separation of East Pakistan. Firstly, it brought home to the Muslims of East Pakistan that they were militarily at the mercy of India and that their defence lay in West Pakistan. The realisation that it was the Chinese intervention which had prevented their homes from being run-over by the Indian army, must have naturally shocked them. Secondly, the Pakistan Army was considered invincible and the general belief in both wings was that in case of a war between the two countries, it was inevitably destined to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indian Army but when at last the opportunity came, far from liberating Kashmir, the very existence of Pakistan fell into jeopardy. It is true and must be acknowledged that they fought heroically to save Lahore or prevent the Indian advance from Sialkot but all the same, it was clearly established that modern wars were different from those of the bygone days. The Pakistan Army, it must also be noted, was better equipped than the Indian Army but was certainly out-numbered. It was unable to make any significant advance on the Lahore—Amritsar road.

It is believed by some quarters that the war was brought about by the American Intelligence Agency, C.I.A. It is no doubt true that President Ayub had become unpopular with the Johnson administration for his independent foreign policy evidenced by Pakistan's drawing closer to the People's Republic of China. He had begun to be described in the world press as the Asian Degualle. Efforts were also made to win over Mr. Bhutto, the Foreign Minister who was credited, both nationally as well as internationally, for the rapid shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. It is claimed that during an interview with a high US dignatory, the latter held his hand and told him that he could be given any amount anywhere in the world if he did not stand in the way of the American policy. Mr. Bhutto is said to have freed his arm and told him that he was not a merchandise on sale. It is stated that the Johnson administration wanted to weaken the President so as to be able to remove him from the scene and it was for this reason that it was thought necessary to weaken the Pakistan Army which was considered as the main-stay of his power. These circles claim that the C.I.A. won over some important officials to

facilitate an Indo-Pakistan war in order to damage the Army and thus weaken its hold. It is claimed that when a senior official went to the President with a plan for infiltration in Kashmir, the President remained silent for a while and when the official asked as to what he was thinking, the President is rumoured to have retorted "I am thinking as to whether I should shoot you or send you to a lunatic asylum". The President was against an Indo-Pakistan military confrontation as, in his view, India was militarily much stronger than Pakistan. Besides, he is also stated to have been of the opinion that a war with India, five times the strength of Pakistan, was unwise and irresponsible. The rumours say that the C.I.A. agents then started building up the "leadership qualities" of Gauhar Ayub in the eyes of his father. It is claimed that after they succeeded in making the President believe that his son really had great potentialities as his successor, the die for an Indo-Pakistan war was again cast and this time the President was persuaded to believe that with even little success in the military field, which according to them was inevitable, the succession of Gauhar Ayub could be positively ensured. It is thus that, according to these rumours, the C.I.A. finally succeeded in bringing about the Indo-Pakistan war. It has been already stated that a rumour widely current then was that the American administration had, directly or indirectly, given an impression to the Pakistan Government that the war would remain localised and that the international boundary would not be violated by India. God knows what the truth is but I have thought it advisable to put them on record so that they are available to posterity which may be able to unravel evidence in support or against their reliability. It is also stated that Khan Abdul Wali Khan told the President after the war that he was on the way out and that the war had been brought about by the C.I.A. to weaken his military arm to facilitate his exit from the political scene.

Yet another effect of the war, was that the fear of a military confrontation with Pakistan which had dominated the thinking of Indians, high or low and got ingrained in their blood since one thousand years and which was of immeasurable psychological advantage to Pakistan in its disputes with India, also faded away. The war gave Indians a new national confidence in the military field. Even Jai Parkash Narain who had been advocating a dialogue with Pakistan for the solution of Kashmir and who had always acknowledged the disputed nature of Kashmir, told a meeting in Delhi after the war, that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that there could be no negotiations on it with Pakistan.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE OCCUPIED SCENE (I)

*CHAPTER XXXII*

# The Occupied Scene (I)

## NATIONAL CONFERENCE GETS INTO POWER

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was in New Delhi when tribesmen entered Muzaffarabad. He was flown to Srinagar in the morning of 25th October to consult his colleagues and returned in the evening to support the Maharaja's "request" for accession. The acceptance of the "request", was followed by a discussion on the character of civil administration. On the demand of Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan, the State Premier, Pandit Nehru wrote down the following conditions under which military help had been extended:

1. The State had acceded to India in defence, foreign affairs and communications.
2. Internal administration was to be democratised and a constitution, on the pattern of Mysore, was to be drawn up.
3. Sheikh Abdullah was to be taken in the Administration and made responsible for it *along with the Prime minister*."

Next day, Nehru confirmed it in a letter to Mahajan.[1] It was only after the tribesmen had retreated and Indian forces had occupied the territory beyond Uri, that Sheikh Abdullah was actually associated with the administration. As, in keeping with the Hindu technique, the condition that most interested Sheikh Abdullah was kept vague, both the disciples came down to Delhi for the Guru's interpretation. In a conference held at Pandit Nehru's house and attended also by Sardar Patel and V. P. Menon, the Sheikh's demand to be made Prime Minister was rejected by Patel. He was, instead, made Head of the Emergency administration while Mahajan was to continue as Premier.[2] The truce was temporary as both

1 & 2. Looking Back, pp. 155 & 156

hated each other. Mahajan, as quoted elsewhere, thought of Sheikh Abdullah as a rabid communalist who was moved only "when Muslim interests were involved". Sheikh Abdullah had no better opinion about his adversary and publicly accused him of complicity in the massacre of Muslims in Jammu. The first open clash came in early December when Sheikh Abdullah ordered the transfer of Lala Chet Ram Chopra, Governor Jammu. Mahajan had to yield, after initial opposition, because of his opponent's political position. For some time they were not even on speaking terms. Towards the end of December, on a visit to Jammu city, Sheikh Abdullah, with previous arrangement, stayed with a Muslim family but after a day or so, was persuaded to shift to the Government Guest House. Both then had a joint meeting with Hari Singh to discuss the political situation. Mahajan states that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah suggested independence as a way out and that Hari Singh nodded in agreement.[1] When Nehru's emissary, Mr. Achhut Patwardhan brought them face to face, Sheikh Abdullah asked Mr. Mahajan to leave the State and also accused him of complicity in the killing of sixty to seventy Muslim soldiers of the State Army at Naushehra.

Sometime later Sheikh Abdullah demanded the abdication of Hari Singh whereupon Nehru's personal emissary, Brij Lal Nehru, advised the Maharaja to abdicate. In the first week of March 1948, Mahajan was summoned to Delhi and told in a meeting attended also by Ayyengar and Sardar Patel, that a proclamation appointing Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah as Premier *had* to be issued. The appointment of a Muslim as Head of the State administration, was obviously necessitated by the deep impact of Pakistan's counter-plaint, which presented the Kashmir case in its true perspective, namely, the historical Hindu-Muslim confrontation. Consequently, it was on the 5th or 6th of March, 1948 that Sheikh Abdullah took over as Prime Minister. Says Mahajan:—

> "In the correspondence that followed......... We wanted to hold the Prime Minister of India strictly to his promise. He was trying to back out of it on the ground that the circumstances had completely changed since that promise was made..........For the Maharaja, the Sheikh had neither affection nor goodwill.......After I left, Sheikh Abdullah also thought that it would be much easier for him to drive out the Maharaja. Events proved that he was right".[2]


The first cabinet comprised of Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad as Deputy Prime Minister, Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Revenue and P. W. D. Minister, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq, Pandit Shyam Lal Saraf,

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
1. Looking Back, p. 164.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 174.



Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was grief-stricken when the news of sad demise of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was communicated to him at Muzaffarabad on May 27, 1964. Mr. K. H. Khurshid President of Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is sitting with him.



Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah addressing a public meeting at Liaquat Garden in Rawalpindi on May 25, 1964



Major-General (Hon.) Abdul Rehman, A. K. President (1969-70)



President Khan Abdul Hamid Khan being interviewed by a foreign correspondent (1964—1969)



Dr. Salaamuddin Niaz, Law Minister (1971-72)



Kh. M. Iqbal Butt, ex-A. K. Minister



Mr. Muhammad Shafi Saraf, ex-M.L.A.



Mr. Liu Shao-Chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, talking to a delegation of Kashmiris which called on him in Rawalpindi on March 27, and handed over a memorandum to him on behalf of the people of Jammu and Kashmir

Pandit Girdhari Lal Dogra, Sardar Budh Singh and Col. Pir Muhammad Khan, a Muslim Conference leader from Jammu. Among the Deputy Ministers were, Mr. Mubarak Shah and Pandit Durga Prasad Dhar. Several party leaders including Soofi Muhammad Akbar, Pir Maqbool Gilani and even semi-literate but trained volunteers like Sultan Galadar were appointed District Administrators with sweeping, undefined powers.

With the retreat of tribesmen, a reign of terror was let loose against the pro-Pakistan elements. A so-called Cultural Front under Sadiq started a venomous anti-Pakistan campaign through plays, pamphlets and poems, giving a highly distorted and exaggerated account of the atrocities committed by the tribesmen. A so-called Peace Brigade was also set up comprising National Conference workers and all types of anti-social elements. It was practically an organisation of thugs with the only difference that they had the government's permission to do as they liked. They could arrest anyone and torture him in any manner, they thought amusing. Anyone ever connected with the pro-Pakistan movement or suspected of sympathies for the liberation movement was arrested without warrant and arbitrarily put in interrogation centres, police lock-ups or district jails. At one time the number of detenus in Srinagar jail alone was around 3000. Among those arrested were Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, Maulvi Muhammad Amin, Mr. Abdul Ghani M.L.A., Mir Abdul Aziz, now Editor weekly Insaf, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Naqshbandi, D.F.O., Khawaja Bashir Ahmed, Naib tehsildar, Agha Nasir Ali, Under Secretary Revenue, Sheikh Muhammad Anwar, Assistant Accountant-General, Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, M.L.A., Khawaja Saif-ud-Din Mattu, Secretary of the State Assembly, Ch. Faizullah, SDM, Ghulam Muhammad Jabir, a journalist, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, and Mr. Amir Khan, Sub-Inspectors of Police.

جادو وہ جو سر چڑھ کر بولے

It was amidst this repression that the annual session of the National Conference was held in Srinagar in October 1948. Pandit Nehru personally 'graced' the occasion. A large number of leaders and workers belonging to Congress, the Socialist wing and the Communists from all over India participated as special invitees. In his speech, Pandit Nehru reaffirmed that the only purpose for which the Indian army had entered the State was to clear it of the 'raiders' and that it was India's cardinal policy that the State people should decide through an impartial plebiscite whether they wanted to accede to India or Pakistan. It was also in this meeting that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah praised Indian intervention, severely criticised what he called the tribal invasion by Pakistan and then addressing Pandit Nehru, recited the following persian verse:

من تو شدم تو من شدی
من تن شدم تو جان شدی
تا کس نہ گوید بعد ازیں
من دیگرم تو دیگری

**Trans:**

I have merged myself in Thee,

And thou hast merged thyself in Me:

Verily, I am thy body and thou art my soul;

Let no one sayeth henceforth,

That we are two different Beings.

Meanwhile , the economic conditions were fast deteriorating. Necessities of life were very scarce; the rock-salt was sold at the rate of Rs. 20/- a seer and six seers of inferior rice was selling for eleven rupees. A quantity of tea, rock-salt and rice was imported from India but it was very meagre and its distribution was entrusted to National Conference workers who passed it on to the black-market. It was in this situation—on the one hand, people were longing for a satisfactory meal and a cup of green salt tea, and on the other hand, there was deafening propaganda that it was in the interests of Kashmir to join India—that the following sarcastic but beautiful verse, reputedly composed by Mahjoor, our Poet-laureate, rapturously echoed from one end of the Valley to the other:

زو جان ونده با ہندوستانس
دل چھوم پاکستانس سیت

**Trans:**

While I would "sacrifice"
My very Being for India,
My Heart throbs for Pakistan!

The Indian soldiers committed atrocities on a large scale which is by itself characteristic of an occupation force and tears to shreds India's tall claim that she had sent troops to defend the life, honour and property of the State people. It is no use enumerating hundreds of incidents because

the reader can well judge for himself what must have happened in remote villages where administrative machinery is only nominal and political awakening also not so vocal as in the urban areas, by just mentioning a few glaring incidents that came to light in Srinagar, capital of the State, under the very nose of the State Government and the Indian High Command.

Six soldiers of the Patiala Tiger Regiment were posted near the Silk factory, Rambagh octroi post. In early November 1947, some Muslim peasants accidentally came across dead bodies of two Muslims that had been thrown into the gutter and hastily covered. They bore several bullet wounds. The news spread fast and a huge procession, carrying them on cots, began parading main roads, raising angry slogans against the high-handedness of the Indian army and demanding its immediate withdrawal from the State. It was a ghastly scene. There was hardly a man or woman in the sea of humanity who was not sobbing. The procession moved to Amira-kadal bridge, then HQ of the Emergency Administration. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad and Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Kara succeeded in preventing an imminent clash with the Army by promising to bring the culprits to justice. However, in another part of the city, thousands of people went to the Jamia Masjid to offer prayers for the deceased. The Indian Army opened fire, killing two Muslims and wounding several dozens of them. A curfew was immediately clamped down which remained in force for several days. Lt. Gen. Sen, the Indian Commander, is on record that no action was taken against those responsible for the killings though he confesses that whenever he met Sheikh Abdullah, the latter expressed grief and indignation over the killings.

In the first week of December, a Muslim Lambardar of Charpura, a Srinagar suburb, was murdered in the presence of Mr. Shams-ud-Din, Head-Constable incharge police post Barzala by six soldiers but no action was taken. About a hundred houses in Khushipura Zenakoot, near Srinagar, were reduced to ashes and several Muslims were killed. Human skulls could be seen on the spot for several days. According to a statement made by Sheikh Aziz-ud-Din, a retired D. I. G. Police, several women from village Charpura complained to him in January 1948 of rape by Indian soldiers; some were pregnant.

Every town in the Valley had large numbers of soldiers stationed permanently to overawe the population. The towns of Baramula, Bandipura, Sopore, Handwara, Shopian, Gulmarg and Islamabad had been turned into cantonments. Free movement had become extremely difficult not only for Muslim women but even for Pandit girls, even in Srinagar, leave alone the countryside. Musammat Zooni,-front-paged by the Indian press

in November 1947 as the 'Heroine' of the National Conference Volunteer Corps, was raped by six Indian soldiers in the Srinagar Red Cross Hospital at Sathu bridge. A pandit girl, the daughter of a professor and an uncontested beauty queen of her college, was forcibly carried away in Srinagar by some Indian army officers. The girl returned in a wretched condition. Her father committed suicide. Testifies Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz:

> "Some day when people of Kashmir attain freedom, an enquiry shall have to be made into the conduct of the Indian armies while they remained in occupation of the State. Many harrowing reports of the atrocities which they were said to have perpetrated on the people have been published. It is difficult to say how far they are correct and founded on facts. But from personal knowledge I can say that some soldiers did not certainly behave well. They resorted to acts of arson, rape, loot and murder. If undisciplined and unorganised Muslim tribesmen are condemnable for what they did, the trained Indian soldiers who were members of a regular Army deserve harsher criticism."[1]

## THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT

Immediately after the entry of tribesmen, Muslim personnel of the State Army stationed at Badami Bagh cantonment was dis-armed and imprisoned; their dependents had to undergo great hardship. At the same time, a section of Muslim officers and youth in the city who had been longing for active participation in the revolt, set up an underground organisation composed of two wings, one, dealing with political matters and the other, with sabotage. As happens in underground movements, the composition of the sabotage wing was kept secret and none of its workers could identify more than two persons. The HQ of the guerilla wing, as it came to be known, was set up at Surun (Poonch) under Captain Mannan. A training centre was opened in the house of an S. D. O. P.W.D., at Srinagar. Training in the use of fire-arms and explosives was imparted by Mr. Jahangir Khan whose name figured prominently in the Kud conspiracy trial. The recruits aged between 18 and 25 years; each trainee had to take an oath neither to shirk any sacrifice, nor divulge any secret, no matter what the cost. The mark of identification was a red pen. Among those who were associated with either of the wings were, apart from Captain Mannan and Jahangir Khan, Alamgir Khan, a brother of Jahangir Khan, Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, later Law Minister, A. K. Government, Mir Abdur Rashid, Khawaja Sanaullah alias Daddy, Khawaja Ali Muhammad, Mr. Ghulam Naqi, Dr. Nazir-ul-Islam, Mirza Nazir Hussain,

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1. Freedom Struggle, p. 337.

Mr. Muhammad Rafique Shahmiri, Mr. Habibullah Beg, Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Muhammad Aslam Khan, Haji Jalal-ud-Din, Mr. Abdur Rahim Waza, Ghulam Nabi Lala, Ghulam Qadir Butt (Overseer), Raja Feroze Khan, Raja Atta Ullah Khan, Khawaja Abdul Ghani Vige, Khawaja Lassa Joo Sheikh, Khan Sahib, Badgam, Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din, Badgam, Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Bazaz, Subedar Attaullah Khan, Muqarrab Khan, Mehraj-ud-Din Pandit, Muhammad Sultan Vige, Zia-ud-Din Bazaz, Agha Allauddin, Ghulam Nabi Wani, Khawaja Inayatullah Kakroo, Mirza Ghulam Muhammad Zaildar Islamabad, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Draboo, Dr. Abdul Majid, Raja Inayatullah, Habib Ullah and Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Pukhta. According to the account given by Mr. Alamgir Khan, Khawaja Sanaullah who arranged, at great peril, for the safe exit to Azad Kashmir of most of its members after the Indian intelligence got wind of its existence, played a most notable role in its working.

Khawaja Ali Muhammad and Raja Attaullah Khan of Zachaldar were in contact with interested quarters on this side of the Cease-fire line while Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, Mir Abdur Rashid and Mr. Jahangir Khan took up the difficult assignment of smuggling arms, ammunition and explosives. The arms generally consisted of revolvers, Sten-guns and hand-grenades. These were carried on horse back and carefully hidden in boxes used for the export of apple. The last consignment consisting of seven hundred bombs was buried in a field belonging to Brigadier Rehmatullah Khan, the father of Air Marshal Asghar Khan. The house was in occupation of a servant whose name couldn't be traced. An ex-serviceman from village Khor (Pattan), he was a member of the underground movement. He was arrested and subjected to all sorts of torture and indignities for well over 48 hours but did not reveal anything. It was only after his wife was stripped naked in his presence by a Sikh Havildar but before she could be ravished, that the ex-soldier could bear it no longer and agreed to point out the hiding place. Hundreds of arrests followed; these included Brigadier Rehmatullah, Raja Allah Dad Khan, Col. Abdur Rehman Khan, Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, Mir Abdur Rashid, Khawaja Ali Muhammad, Mr. Ghulam Naqi, Mr. Ghulam Nabi Lala and Mr. Ghulam Nabi. Doctor Nazir-ul-Islam and Mirza Nazir Hussain abandoned their homes and came to Pakistan. Haji Jalal Din of Chrar sharif was removed to Red fort Delhi for interrogation. Some of them including Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, Mir Abdur Rashid, Khawaja Ghulam Qadir Butt, Khawaja Ali Muhammad and Mr. Ghulam Naqi were tried in what is known as the Srinagar Bomb case. The latter two were however able to escape from the Central jail Srinagar and crossed over to Azad Kashmir. Srinagar central jail has always been one of the heavily-guarded jails in the sub-continent but after the State's fraudulent accession to India, the guards had been reinforced. It was therefore quite

natural that the dare devil escape of the two prisoners should have electrified the whole Valley and led to suspension and dismissal of several officers.

Political prisoners were detained without trial. The only trial except that of the Kud prisoners was that of these 22 patriots who were accused of conspiracy against the 'lawful' Government, contravention of the Explosives Act and fifth-column activities; 18 were sentenced to various terms of hard imprisonment ranging from 13 to 27 years. The prosecution examined 55 while the Defence 150 witnesses. The star prosecution witness...approver Maqbool...when produced in the Court, dramatically undressed himself and showed to the hand-picked Judge, Lala Mulk Raj, the two dozen or so injuries inflicted by the Police for extracting a "confession". The Judge maliciously and illegally handed him back to Police instead of remanding him to judicial custody, even without recording his statement.

The underground workers burnt down the Dak-bungalow at Rakar, Islamabad. Dr. Abdul Majid, Abdus Salam Kochak and Abdul Majid Kochak were tried by a special Court and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Captain Allah Dad Khan, 2nd Lt. Ehsanullah and Lt. Ghulam Muhammad Dar, accused of aiding the underground movement, were court-martialled and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. On the death of the Quaid-e-Azam, Janaza prayers were offered all over the Valley. In Srinagar, Police clashed with the congregation and arrested several persons including a drill-master Ghulam Qadir who was so mercilessly beaten that he died a few days later.

## ATROCIOUS SENTENCES AGAINST TEENAGERS

In the Hindu Praja Parishad agitation, even agitators who burnt down police stations in Samba, Udhampur, Ranbirsinghpura and Jammu were not sentenced to more than one year's imprisonment, although some were charged with sedition, and criminal consipracy. The nominal sentence of one year, however, shocked the delicate hearts of many a leader and newsmen in India but they did not have a word of sympathy for the hundreds of Muslim political prisoners, some of whom were sentenced to twenty-seven years' imprisonment. They included the following teenagers who spent five years in prison:

1. Abdul Ghani, son of Ghulam Qadir, Mohallah Baba Yusuf, Sopore, 7th class student. Age thirteen years.

2. Ghulam Ahmed Soofi, son of Abdul Khalique Soofi, Main Market Sopore. Age 12 years.

3. The son of Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Tilwani, Jauria Masjid, Sopore, 9th Class student. Age sixteen years.

4. The son of Ghani Baba, Mohallah Baba Yusuf, Sopore. Age fourteen years.

A thirty-five year old school teacher was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. His family of seven members, with no earning hand, was left starving and his children had to abandon their education. This is only one of several instances of this nature.

## ABDULLAH'S FIRST TASTE OF INDIAN "SECULARISM"

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had supported the State's accession to India largely in the hope that the State would get a better deal from India not only because he found himself ideologically closer to the Congress but more so because of his implicit, though misplaced, faith in the integrity and sincerity of Pandit Nehru. Sardar Patel never had any genuine regard for any Muslim nationalist. He was tolerated merely as a necessary evil. Even Pandit Nehru who was never tired of proclaiming to Kashmiris, his personal friendship for him, considered him essentially a communalist.[1] However, in the larger interests of India, Nehru wanted to leave him untouched so long as he unreservedly supported the State's accession to India. It is interesting to note an example of the working of the Bureaucracy in the East: Both Nehru and Patel deputed several officers to Srinagar for an on-the-spot investigation on the political and administrative situation; while those sent by Nehru gave pro-Abdullah reports, those deputed by Patel invariably reported against him.

In January 1949 the senior most Indian Intelligence Officer on the spot reported that the Sheikh had, in his interview with foreign correspondents, Davidson and Ward Price, mentioned independent Kashmir as the best solution of the problem. Mr. Karanjia of the Blitz who had an interview with the Sheikh, secretly gave a similar report. On coming to know of the report, Sh. Abdullah demanded immediate withdrawal of the officer and threatened to jail him if the demand was not accepted. His successor had also to be withdrawn on the ground that he had been sent without prior clearance. His enemies seem to have repeatedly charged that his support for accession to India was not sincere and that it had been forced upon him by the tribal attack in order to save his own skin. Nehru thereupon sent Mr. Mullik, then Assistant Director, Indian Intelligence for a secret enquiry. Mr. Mullik made a favourable report which was immedia-

1. Mullik, p. 9.

tely circulated by orders of Nehru to all Indian embassies, the Central ministers and the Provincial governors. Mr. Mullik said:

> "......Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, had genuine feelings of friendship for Pandit Nehru and identity of views with him; whereas towards M. A. Jinnah he entertained only feelings of fear, distrust and repugnance. Hence, the accession to India was not a fortuitous decision brought about by the fear caused by the unprovoked invasion of the territory by Pakistan raiders, but was based on ideological grounds; and so when India was partitioned and Kashmir had to choose between India and Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah, would have chosen India, while insisting on a special status for the valley."[1]

At the same time, ugly realities began surfacing up, bringing Sheikh Abdullah under great strain because his support came mainly from Muslims whose feelings he could ill-afford to ignore. The massacre of Muslims in Jammu, their forcible eviction to Pakistan, evidence that even Hari Singh and Mahajan whose legal and moral duty as rulers was to prevent it, were a party to it and yet the confidence they enjoyed in New Delhi, naturally shocked him; the brutalities committed by the Indian Army not only in border areas but also in cities like Srinagar and the misbehaviour of its Commanders with his political wing also raised suspicion. Again, ever since the Central Government took over the department of Communications, no Muslim had been recruited. The Kashmir government set up a local Militia, which was pre-dominantly Muslim because of their majority in the population. Its development as an effective military force was stoutly obstructed. Hardly a few rifles were made available. The lent officers from India acted not as servants of the State government but as agents of the Indian government. In June 1948, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmed Ashai, Registrar, Kashmir University, reported to him after a tour of India that Muslims were living in fear of life, honour and property, that they were at the mercy of R. S. S. gangs and that the government was treating them as second class citizens. This report by such a close confident as Mr. Ashai and a man of his great insight and wisdom, must have opened his eyes and helped in surfacing the growing sense of insecurity about the future of State Muslims. However, he was not opposed to the State's accession to India but the change brought about was that, apart from publicly airing his fears, largely to assure a highly critical public opinion at home, that he was no Indian agent but their leader who was cognizant of their post-accession problems, he thought that a limited accession alone could ensure a safe future for Muslims. It was not unnatural to have arriv-

1. B.N. Mullik, p. 12.

ed at this conclusion because in a country where Hindus could kill Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest Hindu of all times, simply because he raised his voice against wide-spread killing of Muslims in Delhi, what was the guarantee that the future of Kashmiri Muslims was really safe? Besides, apart from Pandit Nehru, who else was there in the Congress hierarchy, for a long time to come, who could really be trusted to be just and fair? Indian leaders did not appreciate his point of view and therefore the breach began widening. This ultimately led to his dismissal and imprisonment in August, 1953.

## HARI SINGH ABDICATES

We have already seen that Sheikh Abdullah had voiced the demand for the abdication of Hari Singh as early as February 1948. He threatened New Delhi that if Hari Singh was not prepared for voluntary abdication, he should then be prepared to face an inquiry on charges of Muslim genocide in Jammu. It would have been more dangerous than abdication. India had to choose between Abdullah—the Muslim leader and Maharaja—the Hindu ruler. The Security Council had already rejected the binding nature of the Instrument of Accession. Kashmir was making head-lines the world over. In the larger interests of India, Hari Singh was therefore successfully persuaded by Patel and Ayyengar in May 1949 to abdicate in favour of his son. He spent the rest of his life in India, not visiting the State he ruled, even once. It is said that in Bombay when Hari Singh and Kak once came face to face while taking an evening walk, the latter told him that his advice was rejected when all the cards were intact and now that nothing had been left, it was no use to look back and with these words he is said to have resumed his walk.

After abdication, Hari Singh lived mostly in Bombay, confining his interest and activities to racing. He maintained a large stud and sold about one to two dozen horses a year. Some of these were sold as far away as the United States. He neither talked about politics nor met any press representative. The underground apartments of the palaces at Jammu contained large quantities of old-stock wine which he managed to get regularly at Bomaby.[1]

The Srinagar palace was later converted into a tourist hotel. He, however, declined to part with the keys of four big iron safes, lying somewhere in the palace, probably in an underground apartment. Impatient and, perhaps, mystified by his father's persistent refusal to part with the keys, Karan Singh engaged a firm, on payment of rupees twenty five

1. Weekly Sawaira, Delhi quoted by PK., 14-11-1959.

thousand, to break open the safes, expecting to recover the dynasty's fabulous hidden wealth but alas, three were found totally empty while the fourth one yielded gold weighing 360 tolas only which was valued then at rupees twenty thousand only.[1] Hari Singh died in Bombay in 1961. In accordance with his will, his ashes were scattered over Jammu from air.

Yet another interesting anecdote may be noted here. Mirza Afzal Beg addressed a rally of peasants in Islamabad towards the beginning of 1948. Defending his party's pro-India policy, he told them that Kashmir was like a farm which needed a sturdy bull to plough it and that of the two available oxen, India was doubtlessly stronger. Years later, when he was advocating an impartial plebiscite, he happened to address a meeting at the same place and after he had spoken for a few minutes bringing home the unreliability of India, a peasant stood up to enquire whether he remembered what he had said at this very stage in 1948! With great presence of mind, Beg replied, "Yes", adding, that at that time the other ox (Pakistan) was very weak and in infancy but that over the years it had become strong and powerful, while, at the same time, the other one had turned unhelpful.

## THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PROCRASTINATES

By the middle of 1950, India completely lost hope of winning an impartial plebiscite. The pro-Pakistan sentiment had become almost universal in so far as Muslims were concerned, and the very fact that Pakistan had not only not collapsed as predicted by many a prophet of doom but had even survived the colossal influx of refugees at its very inception, created a favourable impact. Some of Sheikh Abdullah's closest friends like Pir Maqbool Gilani, Kh. Ghulam Ahmed Ashai etc. etc., had definite leanings towards Pakistan. The problem with India, however, was that it was committed to a plebiscite and bound by U. N. resolutions. Therefore, it was decided to stage the fraudulent drama of bringing a Constituent Assembly into being in order to rubber-stamp the Maharaja's Instrument of accession. Admitting that it was convened "to counter the proposal for a plebiscite", B. N. Mullik proceeds to say:

> "The idea of calling a constituent assembly was originally Gopala Swami Ayyengar's; but the Sheikh turned it to his advantage and pursued it relentlessly."

A special Convention of the National Conference held in Srinagar in October, 1948 passed a resolution affirming the State's *provisional* accession

2. Weekly Amar Jammu, quoted by Insaf, 21-7-1960.

to India but in between the lines, conditioned its support to a final accession, on India accepting the pattern of relationship as envisaged in the New Kashmir pamphlet which, as already noticed, visualised Kashmir as a largely autonomous unit.

The Assembly consisted of 75 members. The nomination papers of all opposition candidates were rejected.

The first step was the abolition of the hereditary rule and its substitution by an elected Head named 'Sadar-e-Riyasat'. As a concession to Hindu sentiments, the Assembly elected Karan Singh to the office on 17th November, 1952. Next, the Assembly decided to have a separate flag and restricted the use of the Indian flag to formal occasions. It discarded the Dogra flag and replaced it with the National Conference flag which consists of a piece of red cloth with a white plough in the centre. It had already appointed a Basic Principles Committee with Afzal Beg as Chairman and Mir Qasim, Girdhari Lal Dogra, D.P. Dhar and Harbans Singh Azad as members. The Committee produced its draft in March 1952. The delay was being seriously resented to in New Delhi. They wanted an immediate confirmation of the Instrument of Accession but as a politician, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah knew that it was impolitic and inexpedient to accord confirmation without getting a prior reciprocal approval for the State's special status within the Union which he felt was necessary to ensure the safety, security and well-being of its Muslim majority.

It was under these circumstances that the Praja Parishad began its agitation for full integration and in the alternative, for the merger of Jammu province and Ladakh in East Punjab. The Jan Sangh, apart from providing funds and sending volunteers to sustain it, started an agitation in Delhi in support of its demands. It was this agitation that accelerated, more than anything else, the parting of ways between Pandit Nehru and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah.

## ABDULLAH DOES SOME PLAIN SPEAKING

It was in this background that addressing a public meeting at Ranbirsinghpura, Jammu, the Dogra stronghold, on 10th April 1952, Sheikh Abdullah came out with a scathing attack on Indian communalism:

> "We want to join India without any kind of mental reservations but how can we do it as long as we are not convinced about the complete elimination of communalism in India? We are prepared to welcome application of India's Constitution to Kashmir in its entirety, once we are satisfied that the grave of communalism has been

finally dug in India; of that we are not clear......It is all very well for people in India to think that communalism in the country has been finally eliminated but no one can deny that the communal spirit still exists in India. Many Kashmiris are apprehensive as to what will happen to them and their position if, for instance, something happens to Pandit Nehru. We do not know. As realists, we Kashmiris have to provide for all eventualities. That is why I say those who want Kashmir to lose its separate identity are talking without any conception of the practical realities that face us today... ...If there is no special status for Kashmir in the Indian Constitution, how can we go to Muslims in Kashmir and convince them that India does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Kashmir?......... We have acceded to India in regard to defence, foreign affairs and communications and not in respect of other subjects because we wanted some kind of autonomy for ourselves in internal matters.

If there is a resurgence of communalism in India, how we are to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow up Kashmir?"[1]

Addressing a workers meeting in Srinagar on 12th July, he said:

"We have to see how many Muslims were there in the Operational Command and the Administrative Command of the State Forces at the time we acceded to India and how many are there now. How many Muslims have been recruited during the last six years and how many non-Muslims."

In another address he explained why educated Muslims are inclined towards Pakistan:

"I had told my people that their interests were safe in India but educated unemployed Muslims look towards Pakistan because while their Hindu compatriots find avenues in India open for them, the Muslims are debarred from getting Government service. When I point out these difficulties, I am dubbed as a communalist."

These speeches which created quite a storm of criticism in India and a pleasant surprise in Pakistan were neither unexpected nor extraordinary. It was neither "a staggering disclosure of the inner working of Sheikh Abdullah's mind and a strange and sinister statement calculated to strengthen the hands of Pakistan" as Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee inter-

1. S. Vashisht, p. 88.

preted them in his usual fashion nor "ammunition for Pakistan propaganda" as a Delhi newspaper would have its readers believe. Sheikh Abdullah was not a creature of India. He was a leader of people in his own right. How could he shut his eyes to what was happening around?

It was as a matter of political strategy that New Delhi gave Sheikh Abdullah a free hand in internal affairs during early years because the State's future was uncertain. The possibility that a plebiscite may, afterall, have to be held, made it imperative to pretend 'generosity' for the time being.

## THE BREACH WIDENS

The Dogra nobility bosomed an age-old rivalry for administrative supremacy with Kashmiri Pandits who, though small in numbers or perhaps because of it, are the State's best organised community. Sheikh Abdullah attempted to win them over. He nominated their President Shiv Narain Fotedar as a member of Parliament. He gave them two seats in a Cabinet of nine. This generosity, however, brought no dividends. The Pandit community itself was faced with many a grave problem. Their administrative monopoly was on the wane. The more ambitious and adventurous among them migrated to India, perhaps to become Katjus, Kauls, Kunzrus, Nehrus, Saprus, Takrus and Wanchoos but due to the changed circumstances, had to face economic distress and even regional prejudices.

In addition to almost virtual control of the provincial administration in Jammu, the Praja Parishad had its men right in the Cabinet. Finance Minisiter Girdhari Lal Dogra was the son-in-law of Prem Nath Dogra, the Parishad President; Deputy Minister Sameyal was the younger brother of another top Parishad leader, Rago Nath Sameyal. Sheikh Abdullah tolerated them because, firstly, their dismissal would have exposed the myth of so-called "secularism" which he was painfully propagating to his Kashmiri Muslim kinsmen and, secondly, their successors might have proved worse.

The delay in stamping the fleeing Hindu Ruler's fraudulent accession with indirect "popular" approval and the Basic Principles Committee report, actually drafted by Mr. B. P. L. Bedi and translated into Urdu by Mr. Kazmi, the Director of Education, which provided for a parallel President, Flag and Constitution, incensed New Delhi as well as large sections of Hindus in and outside the State. The Pioneer, Lucknow contemptuously condemned it as the "Constituent Assembly of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah". Since two years Sheikh Abdullah had been pleading for a special

status but it was at Ranbirsinghpura that he denounced the idea of Indian constitution's full application as "unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy". India was not agreeable; she had not conspired for such a small price. Said the Pioneer:

> "Indian blood and Indian treasure have been poured into Kashmir without a stop......the plea that Kashmir has acceded to India only in respect of some subjects cannot satisfy the aspirations of the Indian people."

Said the more sophisticated, HINDU, Madras:

> "The Indian constitution should be applied to Kashmir in its entirety because of India's strenuous and costly obligations in the State."

It is an irony of fate that in the fifties of the twentieth century when emphasis was being properly laid on decentralisation, Indian leaders should have thought it advisable to erect a Fascist centre on the plea of unifying a 40-crore humanity of divergent colour, creed, culture, language and geographic environment.

While Sheikh Abdullah was against the full application of the Indian constitution, Hindus were ardently in favour of its total application. The Hindu-Muslim clash was more conspicuous on the question of the Ruling family's future. While Muslims fervently demanded its complete liquidation, Hindus were traditionally wedded to its continued existence as a "national" institution; they even wanted the return of Hari Singh. They also made an issue of the confiscation of Jagirs without compensation, as most of the Jagirdars were Hindus.

The gulf continued to widen as each mistrusted the other. The differences became so acute that a high official of the Central Finance Ministry who had flown to Srinagar on official business, was lodged in an uncomfortable suite at the Regina Hotel. In the evening, when he sought an interview with Sheikh Abdullah, he was informed on telephone by his Assistant Private Secretary that "Hazrat Quaid-e-Azam Jenab-e-Sher-e-Kashmir" being busy with higher matters of State, regretted to be indefinitely unavailable. Next morning, a protocol officer "politely" requested him to make his own arrangements as other guests had to be accommodated. He returned to New Delhi by the first available flight.

The Hindu-Muslim clash found its way into the State Legislature which met for its summer session on 11th May. Karan Singh got a cold reception from Muslim members when he came to deliver his inaugural

address. The customary vote of thanks was moved not by the Premier but by a junior member, Sayed Mir Qasim. Ghulam Rasool Rainto, Abdul Ghani, Assad Ullah Mir, Abdul Ghani Trali and Ghulam Rasool Kar severely criticised his address. While Rainto charged him of having purposely omitted to mention the National Militia and "the immense good work done by it", others accused him of having deliberately forgotten to pay tribute to Sheikh Abdullah's 'inspiring leadership'. The non-Muslims interpreted it as a deliberate insult to their sentiments.

New Delhi thereupon devised a three-dimensional plan:

(1) To encourage Hindu extremists in order to keep him engaged.

(2) For the time being, try to bring him round to a compromise.

(3) To prepare for his eventual dismissal.

To make sure of their footing, India sought to weaken him by creating disruption in his Party. First they tried their hands on the Revenue Minister Afzal Beg, Sheikh's ablest lieutenant who chose to stand by his leader. Bakhshi was the second natural choice. He was already popular in New Delhi. It was not without reason that the usually-informed Times of India described Sheikh Abdullah as "a man who needs rest". Immediately after his Ranbirsinghpura speech, Sheikh Abdullah was summoned to New Delhi with the probable object of nipping the "evil" in the bud, but simultaneously Ayyengar flew to Jammu where he had a long meeting with Prem Nath Dogra, also attended by Karan Singh. Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, refused to come down to Delhi. Meanwhile, internal security measures were tightened and a meeting of high Army officers also attended by Air Force officers from Delhi was held in Srinagar.

Soon after the Ayyengar-Dogra meeting at Jammu, the Praja Parishad came forward with the demand for full integration of the State or, in the alternative, for the separation of Jammu and its merger into East Punjab. Yet another dissenting voice was raised through the Lama of Ladakh who made the impossible demand of one-third representation in the Constituent Assembly, the establishment of an autonomous territorial unit comprising Ladakh and Muslim Kargil. To create an impression that the demand was not Delhi-inspired, he threatened that if his demands were not accepted, Ladakh would consider the possibility of joining Tibet.

## THE DELHI AGREEMENT

After the completion of its report by the Basic Principles Committee, a delegation consisting of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakhshi, Beg and Dogra

went to Delhi to thrash out the details of the relationship between the State and the Centre. After several days of parleys with Indian leaders headed by Pandit Nehru, an understanding known as the "Delhi Agreement" was signed and later ratified by the Constituent Assembly. It disappointed large sections of the Party. In Srinagar, the immediate reaction was so vehemently critical that a workers' meeting was hurriedly convened to favourably interpret its provisions. A wave of despair went round the Valley. The salient points are:

(1) The decision to abolish hereditary Dogra monarchy was accepted by New Delhi.

(2) Indian Citizenship Act was made applicable to the State, but the State Legislature was empowered to regulate the rights and privileges of permanent residents especially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property and appointment to Services.

(3) The right of State nationals who had gone to Pakistan or A. K. in 1947 or earlier, to return to their homes, was acknowledged.

(4) Indian President was empowered to declare a State of Emergency in case of external danger, but in case of internal disturbance, the power could be exercised only at the request, or with the concurrence, of the State Government.

(5) President of India was empowered to grant reprieve and commute death sentences.

(6) India agreed that confiscation of jagirs without compensation shall permanently stand.

(7) The State was allowed its own flag which was the flag of the National Conference Party.

(8) The jurisdiction of Supreme Court was extended in certain matters.

(9) It was agreed that Jammu and Ladakh should have cultural and regional autonomy.

In the Indian Parliament during the debate on the Presidential address, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and Mr. N. D. Chatterjee speaking on May 20 and 21, respectively, asked: 'in view of Sheikh Abdullah's recent speeches that the State had acceded to India in three subjects only', "how then did

members from Kashmir sit in the Union Parliament?" Pandit Nehru did make a reply but neither he nor the contingent from Srinagar had the courage to tell them straight away that 'accession' of the State in three subjects did not mean a sale of these subjects. It only meant their transfer to the collective sovereignty which is brought into existence by all the surrendering units, acting in their collective capacity. This collective sovereignty is, therefore, nothing but a sum total of that part of sovereignty which the component units have reciprocally transferred to their collective existence for the greater interests of them all. In case of India, this collective sovereignty vests in the Parliament and therefore, if Kashmir joins India, she becomes an essential part of the Central Sovereignty as exercised by the Indian Parliament. Dr. Mukherjee and Mr. Chatterjee not only did not 'understand' how Kashmir was entitled to such a right but argued that the State had forfeited the right even to sit in a House which enjoys sovereignty over her three most vital subjects.

What worried India was neither the question of Dogra dynasty's liquidation nor the non-payment of compensation to landed aristocracy. If they could agree to the forced abdication of Hari Singh who risked his throne for Hindu India and the stormy confiscation of Jagirs by a single executive decree, they would not now displease Sh. Abdullah just for their sake. Their fears sprang from their lack of trust in the Sheikh.

To this may be added the new slogan that emanated from him. Addressing a public meeting in Srinagar on April 26, 1952, he said: "The 'Constituent Assembly' would decide whether to accede to India or remain independent or join Pakistan". Here it must be remembered that the U. N., Pakistan and India have recognized State inhabitants right of self-determination only to the extent of accession to India or Pakistan. Thus Sheikh Abdullah gave quite a new dimension to the Kashmir issue. Wrote the Times of India, "Some day the Atom bomb which Sheikh Abdullah plans to hurl, may explode in his hands and then there will be no independent Kashmir and there may also be no Abdullah."

## PRAJA PARISHAD AGITATION

Before partition, the two principal political parties of Jammu Hindus were the Rajya Sabha and the Hindu Mahasabha; both played a rabid anti-Muslim role. Prem Nath Dogra, a Dogra Brahmin from Jasmergarh town and a retired Wazir-e-Wazarat (S. D. M) entered active politics in 1946. His involvement in the Jammu Muslim massacre, was so notorious that on his first visit to Jammu, Pandit Nehru did not deem it expedient to grant him an interview. With an eye on Muslim opinion in the Valley, its leaders adopted the non-communal name of Praja Parishad.

By 1952, the party had an excellent organisation. It had scores of paid whole-time workers. It was in close touch with the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh. Publicity material was printed in India by interested quarters and smuggled into the State. Although Prem Nath was the principal figure in the movement, its main local strength came from such influential Hindus as Ganga Ram, a former Home Minister, Nichint Singh, formerly, Head of the Maharaja's Guards and Karan Singh's maternal uncle, Ratan Singh, a fomer I.G.P., Janak Singh, a former Premier and, most important of all, Prince Karan Singh and his mother Tara Devi. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's contention that Parishad consisted of a few disgruntled individuals and that it lacked general popular support, was not correct. It did command the support of a vast majority of State Hindus.

In the century-old Dogra rule, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was the first Muslim Prime Minister. He did not enjoy even the thousandth part of the co-operation which the Dogras had been extending to his predecessors.

Karan Singh's arrival in Jammu on 27th November, 1952—his first visit since his 'election' as Sadar-e-Riasat—was chosen by the Parishad High Command as a suitable occasion to demonstrate their strength. Business was suspended all over the province. Students absented themselves from their classes and the Parishad newspapers, 'Ranbir,' 'Chand' and 'Amar' published special articles inciting hatred against the Government.

By December, 1952, the whole of Jammu province was ablaze. Business remained suspended for about a week. In Jammu city, the demonstrators damaged the furniture and files of many an office. The popular slogan of the movement was the following:

Ek Desh main Do Nishan,
Ek Desh main Do Vidhan,
Ek Desh main Do Pradhan,
Nahin Challengae, Nahin Challengae.

**Trans:**

Two Flags, two Constitutions and two Presidents in a single country, shall not be permitted.

Samba, situated on the Pathankote—Jammu road and 32 miles from Madhupore in East Punjab, was the scene of worst rioting. It was here that Police was fired at, causing several casualties. It is the nerve-centre

of Dogras and the only place where Dogra House commands absolute influence. It is the home-town of the then Deputy Minister Baldev Singh Sameyal and many leading Parishad leaders. In 1947 Hari Singh and his Parishad collaborators selected this very town for initiating their infamous Muslim-killing plan. Here—, thanks to the arbitrary and uneven laws of the Dogra House which permitted the Dogras to keep arms even without getting licences—almost every home had a rifle. Samba tehsil which then had a population of about 55,000 Hindus, had also a sizable number of stenguns, bren-guns and large quantities of explosive substances, which Hari Singh distributed, free of cost, in 1947. They formed the vanguard of the Parishad movement and, in times of need, its private army. Thousands were ex-soldiers. Therefore only highly mechanised troops could disarm them and restore normal peace conditions. But wherefrom could Srinagar Government get such troops? The State Army had already been gifted away to India and integrated with the Indian Army. Besides, it was almost cent per cent Hindu in character. The 'National Militia' was no more than a police force. The Indian Government had many fears about its ultimate use and, therefore, was at pains to keep it untrained. The Police was clearly unable to face such a situation. The police force which was serving in Jammu province was also overwhelmingly Hindu.

Following the arrest of Prem Nath Dogra, some Parishad leaders visited New Delhi and were reported to have conferred with interested quarters. They seem to have been asked to postpone the movement in view of its likely repercussions at home and abroad. Even in the seventh week of its agitation, planned protest meetings and processions, in defiance of the Government ban, were a common sight. About a thousand persons were arrested. Volunteers from East Punjab and Delhi poured into Jammu and courted arrest as 'locals'. After the State Government took measures to check their entry via Pathankote, the more adventurous entered via Bhadarwah from Kangrah in East Punjab.

Income from the Custom House at Pathankote, and earnings from Government transport, operating between Pathankote and Srinagar, had been listed among the principal sources of revenue in the budget for 1952-53 but the agitation led almost to a suspension of traffic. In addition to the loss of revenue, heavy expenditure had to be incurred in meeting the disturbed situation which also necessitated preventive measures in the Muslim Valley. The highly skilful organisation of the movement showed that it was run by persons who had long experience of political agitations. Not a single Parishad leader had any such experience. The agitation was directed from a Control Headquarter in East Punjab.

The popular support attracted by the Movement throughout India convinced Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, but alas, temporarily, that India was secular only in name and that as part of India, the Muslims of Kashmir did not have a safe future. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji, founder-President of the All India Jan Sangh, who crossed the Madhupore bridge on May 8, 1953 in defiance of a ban, was arrested and placed under house arrest in Srinagar. An old man, suffering from several ailments, he died on 23rd June, 1953. His death in detention brought forth an outpouring of abuse in north India; Dr. P. C. Roy, the Congress Chief Minister of West Bengal sent an insulting telegram to Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah demanding to know how his Government had allowed him to die while under house-arrest?

## MAULANA AZAD ADVISES SHEIKH'S DISMISSAL

Mr. Mullik States that Pandit Nehru was receiving regular reports from D. P. Dhar and Karan Singh, obviously exaggerated, which shows that they were working jointly for his removal. Mr. Mullik also states that Pandit Nehru dropped several hints to Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah to visit New Delhi. He then sent a formal invitation which also went unheeded. In May, 1953 the Prime Minister visited Srinagar for over a week. At the end of the N.C. annual session which discussed the Basic Principles' Committee report and which he attended, Nehru invited Conference leaders to his residence and spoke to them for several hours about the so-called 'secularism' and the importance of Kashmir's partnership with India for the survival of 'secular democracy'. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah remained un-moved and the same night Mr. Nehru told his Security officer, Handoo of "the Sheikh's folly and his betrayal of India, inspite of all that the latter had done for Kashmir in the fateful days of 1947 and thereafter".[1] Pandit Nehru then sent Maulana Azad who did his utmost to persuade him to be moderate in his criticism of Hindus and advised him not to take the matters to the extreme but without any success. On his return to New Delhi, Pandit Nehru was advised his dismissal "before he committed any more mischief".[2]

Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic leader of the United States who visited the Sub-continent sometime in 1953, spent a few days in Srinagar and Gulmarg where he had prolonged discussions with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. What transpired in these meetings, has not so far been officially revealed but it is likely that independence of the State or at least of its Muslim majority areas with an international guarantee by Big powers as well as immediate neighbours, may have been discussed

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1 & 2. Mullik, p. 37.

as one of the alternate solutions. Mr. Stevenson then came to Rawalpindi and expressed, to the officials of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, a desire to meet Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. This writer was told by Chaudhry Sahib that the MKA officials who met him, offered a meeting on the condition that one of their representatives remain present during the talks! Chaudhry Sahib rejected the condition but expressed his willingness to meet him alone; it was quite natural as it was derogatory to his status and insulting to his patriotism to meet a foreign dignatory under the surveillance of the MKA. No meeting therefore took place.

There seems to be no doubt that highly exaggerated versions of the Sheikh—Stevenson talks were conveyed to Pandit Nehru. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, D. P. Dhar, Karan Singh, Girdhari Lal Dogra and Shyam Lal Saraf were already hands in glove with New Delhi; Mr. Mullik, the Intelligence Chief, had developed a strong personal hatred against Sheikh Abdullah largely on account of the latter's fierce individualism; the Army leaders were also on bad terms with him. In this connection one may mention the expulsion from the State of Brigadier B. M. Kaul who was later humiliated by the Chinese at NEFA. The forces under him at Udhampur were responsible for the abduction of women from a Gujjar tribe and when it came to the notice of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, he demanded his immediate recall and threatened to arrest him if his request was not acceded to. Despite strong pressure exerted by the Army High Command to the contrary, he had to be recalled immediately and posted elsewhere in India.

What, afterall, was in the mind of Sheikh Abdullah on the eve of his dismissal? Mr. Ian Stephens who had a long session with him, says:

> "The impression left on my mind after my three hours in a poplar-bordered Srinagar garden with the Prime Minister of Indian-held Kashmir, on my part, again, rather silent hours—was of a courageous, forthright, vigorous man; intelligent, though without great intellectual range; —gifted with strong personality, and therefore probably an inspiring leader of the downtrodden.
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> He was obviously non-communal, whole-heartedly so. He spoke with pride of a pleasant reality I had noticed: that in and around Srinagar, no doubt because of his Administration's efforts, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims mingled in cordiality. Preeminently he appeared to me a Kashmiri patriot: full of zeal to improve his countrymen's plight; preoccupied with the Vale, the centre and motive of his whole political life; little concerned with the rest of the sub-continent's affairs.

(His) exclusive preoccupation with his homeland in disregard of the gigantic changes shaping elsewhere, no doubt partly explained his crucial decision in 1947 to join India—a decision which had swayed the lives of millions. His imprisonments, too, must have been a factor; he had been cut off, in fast-changing times, from discussing new political trends, or from meeting most of the nationalist Muslims then turning away from the Congress. *It emerged, from what he said, that he did not at first take the idea of Pakistan seriously, nor expect her, when eventually created, to survive. Many others, better placed, misjudged likewise.* I remember peering out at the time over the chaotic political scene from my editorial chair in Delhi, and feeling very dubious.

Evidently he thought now, if not before, that in many Hindu Congressmen a facade of secular tolerance hid an actual communalism as narrow as any in Pakistan: indeed, perhaps worse, because of the caste system.

I saw in him a man of pluck and enlightenment, standing for principles good in their way; a victim, like so many of us, of the unique scope and speed and confusion of the changes in 1947, and now holding a perhaps uniquely lonely and perplexing post."[1]

## DISMISSAL AND IMPRISONMENT OF ABDULLAH

Sheikh Abdullah was advised by friends like Ashai and Beg to reshuffle his cabinet and drop Bakhshi, Shayam Lal Saraf and D. P. Dhar but he chose to delay the action. Meanwhile, this group acting in unison with Karan Singh and Mullik, was not idle. The Intelligence concocted a story that Sheikh Abdullah had established liaison with the Pakistan Government through Pir Maqbool Khanyari and that an emissary was scheduled to meet him at Tangmarg. After the return of Maulana Azad, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai offered to visit Srinagar to hold talks with him but was told that it would serve no useful purpose. At last, Sheikh Abdullah vainly asked Shyam Lal Saraf to resign. Meanwhile, a senior intelligence officer, Mehra, had been already posted at Srinagar. More units of the Central Reserve Police were also sent in. Pandit Nehru personally sent Brigadier Kaul to inform Lt. Gen. Atal, the Corps Commander at Udhampur and the Divisional Commander in Kashmir, of his decision to remove Sheikh Abdullah and to get ready for action. Mullik quotes Nehru as having told him:

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1. Horned Moon, pp. 210—213.

"He hoped that the change would be effected peacefully, but he warned that we must be prepared for the worst, because the Sheikh undoubtedly had a large following in the Valley and over this matter the pro-Sheikh group would be supported by the pro-Pakistani elements also."

On 9th August, when Sheikh Abdullah had gone to Tangmarg, the plan was put into operation. At 11 O'clock, Central Minister A.P. Jain who was to execute the plan, phoned from Srinagar to get the Prime Minister immediately on the telephone. He was attending a party at Hyderabad House. Informed by secret service, he sent Kidwai in advance and followed him a few minutes later. The Prime Minister's house was converted into a control room, Nehru and Kidwai sat upstairs and Mullik and Mathai downstairs. At midnight, orders for the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and his arrest were issued by Karan Singh but Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad refused to take oath till the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. There was some interval and both Nehru and Kidwai got worried because they felt that if Bakhshi refused to take oath, India could well be accused of having contrived to restore the hated Dogra rule. At last, at 4 a.m., Bakhshi was persuaded to take oath.[1]

## THE SHEIKH HAD NO LINKS WITH PAKISTAN

It may be emphatically stated that the allegation about a rendezvous between Sheikh Abdullah and Pakistan Intelligence at Tangmarg is a total fabrication. Wasn't Sheikh Abdullah shadowed by Indian spies right from October 1947? Wasn't the ring tightened since his Ranbirsinghpura speech? Didn't Sheikh Abdullah know it? If someone from Pakistan had to see him, why choose the lonely and sparsely-populated Tangmarg instead of a busy city like Srinagar? If it was so easy for an "emissary" to reach Tangmarg, after crossing the Cease-fire line, it was no problem at all to go to Srinagar. How was it possible for such an emissary who must, in view of the importance given to the meeting by Mr. Mullik, have been an important man, to take the risk of landing on occupied soil and further, to assume the safety of a meeting with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and a safe return to Azad Kashmir? Again, if the Indian Intelligence knew that an emissary from Pakistan was going to meet him in Tangmarg, what a golden chance to destory Sheikh Abdullah and internationally beat Pakistan, by letting him meet the Sheikh and then arrest him as soon as he left the house? If Sheikh Abdullah could be arrested in order to prevent him from meeting a spy, as Mullik would have the simple reader believe, it was much easier, convenient and helpful to arrest the spy. This not

1. B. N. Mullik.

only shows the absolute falsity of the accusation but also shows lamentably how politicians in the East are led by their nose by their Intelligence Service and how they fail to weigh the "information" supplied by it.

As already stated Sheikh Abdullah had no contact with the Pakistan Government and half-hearted efforts at the highest level to persuade him to see the writing on the wall, had actually failed. During the initial debates on Kashmir at the United Nations, a meeting attended by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Mr. Janki Nath Zutshi and some others was held to find out an agreed solution of the problem and the very fact that Mr. Zutshi also attended it, shows that it was held within the knowledge of the Government of India. In 1950 when the Security Council was debating Kashmir in Paris, Sir Zafrullah one day, by chance, came across Sheikh Abdullah in the corridors of the chamber and while passing each other, made the following remark:

اب تو کچھ ہوش میں آؤ

Trans:

It is now time for you to awake.

Sheikh Abdullah did not make any reply. A few days later, Mr. K.H. Khurshid who was then doing his Bar-at-Law at London was summoned by the Foreign Minister and asked to meet Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah to find out if he could still be persuaded to see the light of reason. Mr. Khurshid had a meeting with the Kashmir leader who asked him whether he had the authority to enter into negotiations and whether the understanding that the two may ultimately arrive at, was binding on the Pakistan Government? Mr. Khurshid told him that he had no such authority and that he would have to discuss the matter with the Foreign Minsiter; when he did so, no authority was forthcoming. It may also be disclosed that when Col. Adalat Khan returned home in 1950 after retirement, he had a meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and suggested on his own, that contact may be established with the Sheikh but the Premier dismissed the suggestion saying that his attitude was immaterial. The Prime Minister may have been thinking of the presence of the Indian occupation Army; from that angle what the Prime Minister said might be justified, but what is relevant for purposes of this discussion is that the Pakistan Government was not interested in establishing contact with him. What was done at Lake Success or Paris was due to the personal initiative and insight of Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan.

Sheikh Abdullah had not become pro-Pakistan; the change in the situation was that he had now experienced the bitter truth that Indian secularism

was a fraud to perpetuate Hindu rule and that there was no guarantee that she would stick even to Article 370 of its Constitution which had guranteed a special status for the State. That he was right is proved since his dismissal when, year after year, India eroded it by strengthening her grip even on internal administration. He now began to realise that if a real danger could loom large over Muslims during the life time of his Hero, Nehru, there was every possibility of their physical liquidation in future. The tragedy with Pandit Nehru was that he had been surrounded largely by men like Mullik, Shastri, Desai, Jain, Dhar, Handoo etc. who appeared determined to humiliate Sheikh Abdullah and this was possible only if the breach between him and Pandit Nehru was irreparably widened. In this they succeeded largely because Nehru trusted them but partly also because their reasoning and reports had a pleasing appeal to his basic traits of Indian imperialism. At one stage, even Mr. Mullik laments that had the far-sighted Rajgopal Acharya been the Central Home Minister, deterioration of relations between New Delhi and Srinagar could be prevented. That Mr. Acharya was an Indian patriot of the highest order has never been doubted and if Sheikh Abdullah had been pro-Pakistan, how could then, one may ask, Mr. Acharya's being Home Minister, prevent the breach? This should be treated as an admission on the part of the Director of Indian Intelligence that the accusation of his being in league with Pakistan was utterly unfounded.

## THE CIVIL REVOLT

The telephone wires of Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Begum Abdullah and several other leaders and officers became dead. Assembly members, Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Wani, Khawaja Abdul Qadoos Azad and Khawaja Saeed Ahmed were arrested from a hotel. At about 9 a. m. a closed car carrying Sheikh Abdullah, piloted by two military police jeeps and followed by two more jeeps crossed Amira Kadal bridge on way to Udhampur. Simultaneously, when a procession, about one and a half mile long, reached there, hundreds of men from the Police, the Militia and the Home Guards threw away their caps and joined the procession which first made for the ancestral house of Bakhshi and after putting it on fire, came to the Regal cinema, also owned by him. Several Government offices and vehicles were also burnt down. In the Red Square, across Amirakadal, Machine-guns had been fixed at several vantage points. With the announcement of the imposition of section 144, the Army started firing; the first casualty was a 15-year old boy. Mehtab Singh, a shopkeeper, who had earlier distributed sweets, was standing near the shop of Dr. Balwant Singh when a boy of 16 years heckled Brigadier Bilimoria and demanded to say "Pakistan Zindabad". The procession had in the meantime massed in the area. The Brigadier obliged but as soon as the boy had gone a few

yards, he was fired at from behind but the bullet hit Mehtab Singh who died on the spot while the boy disappeared in the procession. Another boy of about the same age caught hold of an Indian Subedar and snatched away his revolver.

When the news of the dismissal and detention of Sheikh Abdullah became known, people all over the Valley and Dodah came out in the streets demanding withdrawal of Indian troops and the holding of a plebiscite under U. N. auspices. Party leaders and workers including legislators, doctors, lawyers and businessmen as also a large number of officials including Khawaja Ali Shah, the Commissioner and Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Chicken, a Deputy Commissioner, were arrested. A large number of people were killed and a still larger number wounded. On his release from jail in 1954, Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg stated in the State Legislative Assembly that about 1500 persons had been killed while Mr. Mullik puts their number at 60. As no official or unofficial enquiry was instituted, it is difficult to give exact figures. In Srinagar, a large number of dead bodies are claimed to have been burnt by the Army. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, a N. C. worker was killed by D. P. Dhar, who was personally leading a Reserve Police detachment.[1] An underground War-Council was set up to conduct the passive, non-violent movement. Among its members were Begum Abdullah, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Butt, Khawaja Ghulam Hassan Kant and Saeeda Begum, a sister of Khawaja Ali Shah. There were several demonstrations by women at Srinagar, Islamabad, Baramula and Sopore. It is estimated that arrests exceeded ten thousand; they included about a hundred women. It is admitted even by Mr. Mullik that the law and order situation remained substantially disturbed for three to four weeks. In fact, a complete 18-day strike was observed by traders, students and transport workers. Hundreds of government employees who abstained from duty, were put under arrest. The Indian Government and its agents had been claiming that Sheikh Abdullah had lost the confidence of his people; that this propaganda was utterly false, may be judged from the fact that only once in 1946, when there were demonstrations at some places against the arrest of Nehru by the Maharaja's Government, two youth got killed in south India and even in the biggest ever movement launched by the Congress, the Quit India movement of 1942, the total number of arrests in the whole subcontinent did not exceed 80,000. When these figures are compared with the self-acknowledged killing of sixty persons and the arrest of over seven thousand people in a population that did not exceed 25 lacs, one can easily see the intensity of feelings stirred by Sheikh Abdullah's imprisonment and the depth of the people's hatred against India. Although the move-

1. Javedan, 3rd January, 1973.

ment subsided after a month or so as is bound to happen with any unarmed, non-violent movement suppressed with force and pitched against a trained Army, the discontent of the people and their irreconcilable hatred against India, did not diminish and found expression in the shape of hand-bills, posters and the appearance of volunteers at Friday congregations at Khanqah-e-Moallah, Hazrat Bal, Jamia Masjid and religious congregations all over the Valley. They defied the ban on public meetings and delivered anti-Government speeches to court arrest and thus kept the movement for freedom alive. The 9th of every month was observed as "Abdullah-Day" when demonstrations against Indian occupation and for accession to Pakistan were held all over the Valley and Dodah. Nehru was accused of practising fake secularism.[1]

## MRIDULLA SARABHAI

Maulana Masudi, General Secretary of the National Conference who remained loyal to his leader though he had been pleading for moderation in attitude towards India, went to New Delhi and with the help of Mridulla Sarabhai, a campaign was started for the release of Sheikh Abdullah. Miss Sarabhai, a spinster all her life, was a friend of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Apart from having been one of the two General Secretaries of the Indian National Congress during the momentous days of 1946-47 when Pandit Nehru succeeded Maulana Azad as Congress President, she had also been, at one time, a Secretary to Mahatma Gandhi. An intimate, personal friend of Pandit Nehru, it was her sheer patriotism that made her adopt what appeared to the Indian public opinion an extremely biased pro-Abdullah attitude. Having known the Kashmir leader since over a dozen years, she was personally aware that the Sheikh had not turned pro-Pakistan and that the breach had been brought about largely by anti-Muslim forces at work at New Delhi and Srinagar. She suffered humiliation and was at one stage removed from Delhi and put under house arrest in Gujrat but nothing deterred her from pursuing a course she believed to be just and righteous. She never lost hope that with proper amends, Sheikh Abdullah could still be persuaded to support the State's accession to India. Some of her statements received wide publicity abroad and were quoted by the Pakistan delegation in the Security Council debates with the result that a campaign of vilification went on against her at home and her conduct became the subject of several debates in the Indian Parliament. That she destroyed her own political fortune by standing behind a friend, is by itself a standing tribute to her character.

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1. B. N. Mullik.

The dismissal and imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah dwelt a stunning blow to Indian occupation. Almost every newspaper of note the world over, apart from giving coverage to the news from Srinagar which had been clamped under the strictest censorship, editorially commented on the immorality of the Indian stand and demanded the immediate holding of an impartial plebiscite. Pandit Nehru was unable even to face his own men and remained confined to his house for forty eight hours. During this period, he visited neither Parliament nor his office in the Central secretariat. *He dare not visit Kashmir for the next four years for fear of reprisals although since 1947 he had been visiting it at least half a dozen times a year.*

The reaction in Pakistan was naturally very strong and spontaneous. A meeting of the Muslim Conference High Command was immediately convened which decided to observe the 16th of August as 'Kashmir-Day'. Business remained suspended throughout Pakistan; the Government declared it a public holiday. Huge processions were taken out from Chittagong to Khyber participated by millions of Pakistanis, expressing solidarity with the people of Kashmir and urging active intervention. The Karachi procession was led by Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan and some Central Ministers.

## THE SHEIKH AS PREMIER

Sheikh Abdullah remained in office for about six years. It was a period when conditions were unsettled, the future was uncertain and forces pulling in different directions, were also at work. New Delhi did not wish to strengthen his hands; therefore, not only were sufficient funds not forthcoming for speedy economic development but several obstructions were placed to block whatever was being done to improve the lot of the people.

For the first time, a Prime Minister was seen touring villages on foot or horseback; moving among the people, speaking to them in their language and inviting criticism of his policies and actions. The Indian Government and Bakhshi regime later accused the ex-Premier of nepotism and corruption. Undoubtedly there was corruption and nepotism but it was wrong to accuse him of personal involvement. In fact, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad and Shyam Lal Saraf were the fountains of corruption.

He abolished hereditary rulership and made the office elective. He gave the State a parallel President, a parallel flag, a parallel parliament and a parallel Constitution. Hari Singh was expelled; his entry was permanently barred. Its importance can be judged only by those who have some idea of Kashmiris innate hatred against him and his dynasty. He

confiscated jagirs without any compensation, whatsoever. The State got its first University; 35 per cent of the budget was spent on education. Special tribunals consisting of National Conference workers were set up to "settle" accounts between money-lenders and their debtors. The reader can well imagine what lot must have fallen to the money-lenders at the hands of politically-oriented, arbitrary-powered executive tribunals!

In 1947, the number of Muslim gazetted officers was hardly 30 per cent but by the middle of 1953, it had reached 50 per cent. For the first time since 1819, the State had a Muslim Inspector-General of Police, a Muslim Accountant-General, and a sizable number of local Muslims as high Police officials and Deputy Commissioners. Some of them were arrested soon after his dismissal.

As a possible precaution against the merger of Jammu province in East Punjab, Sheikh Abdullah created a new Muslim majority district in this province by grouping the tehsils of Kishtwar, Ramban and Bhadarwah with an area of 4,162 square miles; the population of Muslims and Hindus, in the new district, per 1951 census, was 1,75,600 and 82,200 respectively.

His Government established a National Militia. For the first time in four centuries, thousands of Kashmiri-speaking Muslims had the opportunity of military training. However, Indian Army which had been entrusted with its training, kept them ignorant of the use of heavy fire-arms because on account of being inherently dishonest about Kashmir's future, India did not look at it with ease.

## REFUGEES TREK BACK

It will be recalled that lakhs of Muslims had been driven out of their homes in 1947-48 and had to take shelter in Pakistan or Azad Kashmir. Most of them were resettled on evacuee properties and with the cooperation of the locals, coupled with their own hard work, they were soon able to make rapid advance in all spheres of public life; some of them have since risen to high offices. However, thousands were still living in tents at Mansar and Kala. They came from Rajauri, Reasi and Mehndar. Towards the middle of 1949, a movement for return started on a small scale which gained momentum by the end of 1950. A fair estimate of the returnees is about a hundred thousand. Sheikh Abdullah's Government resettled them on their abandoned properties, advanced taqqavi loans and appointed a special staff to look after their problems. The influx alarmed New Delhi and Sheikh Abdullah was asked to cooperate in stopping their entry on the excuse that they were a security risk. He could not agree.

How could a government claiming to be secular, stop its own inhabitants, forcibly thrown out by murderous gangs, from returning to their homes? The Indian Army, thereupon, resorted to barbarous tactics to prevent their return. Cattle, cash, ornaments and other belongings were confiscated; the returnees were mercilessly beaten and even fired at. The area was heavily mined, causing innumerable deaths. A large number of women driven back into Azad territory, narrated heart-breaking accounts of their experiences, with the result that the return movement soon died down and it happened only two months after the signing of the Delhi agreement, a widely publicised article of which provided for their free, unhindered return to their homes.

Before the dismissal of Sh. Muhammad Abdullah, a vernacular Indian daily published a three-scene cartoon; in the first one Sheikh Abdullah was overpowered by a tribesman and sought Pandit Nehru's help to throw him out. In the second one, the Sheikh was shown asking for Nehru's help to banish Hari Singh; and in the final scene, he was shown asking Pandit Nehru to leave him alone!

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE OCCUPIED SCENE (II)

*CHAPTER XXXIII*

# The Occupied Scene (II)

## BAKHSHI AS PREMIER

In the new Cabinet formed by Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad were included Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq, Sardar Harbans Singh Azad, Pleader, Pandit Shyam Lal Saraf, Girdhari Lal Dogra and Mr. Ghulam Nabi Saugami. In a broadcast, he announced the following concessions:

1. The State purchase of paddy, maize and wheat, to feed urban areas, was completely abolished, which gave relief to the peasantry.
2. Salaries of all government servants were substantially raised.
3. Education was made free upto M. A. and compulsory upto the primary classes.
4. A permanent ration system was introduced in the towns.
5. Wages of labourers and work-charge government employees were also raised.

Bakhshi was essentially a practical man. He came from a poor family and did not therefore have the benefit of a high education. It was through sheer dint of hard work, intelligence and loyalty to Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, that he rose to the highest seat of power and what is creditable, managed to stay there for well over ten years with great confidence. The Sheikh developed him as a strong-arm against his enemies and by the natural law of retribution, had to bear the consequences. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah is on record to have said after his release in 1958 that when a few weeks before his arrest, the question of the State's future was being discussed in the Party Working Committee, *it was Bakhshi who had urged the acceptance of Dixon proposals, envisaging the direct accession of AK to Pakistan, Jammu to India and a UN-supervised plebiscite in the Valley.* He

threw himself whole-heartedly on the side of India and did his very best to cement this unnatural union. On his first visit to Baramula as Premier, he told a select meeting of Muslim elders that he needed their cooperation; that if and when a plebiscite was held, he knew they would vote for Pakistan but what was the use of non-cooperation till then? He told them that he had services and scholarships to offer, enormous development funds for improvement of their economic well-being and in return, he needed their support. This argument he must have advanced at other places too; whether it was a strategy or a practical plea, it did succeed and although their love for Sheikh Abdullah and their desire to accede to Pakistan far from having decreased, continued to gain strength, Bakhshi, did get their support against Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and D. P. Dhar who were now, planning his over throw. It must be said to his credit that he had the political skill to exploit the situation created by the dismissal and imprisonment of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, to secure large funds for economic development.

He established Engineering and Medical Colleges at Srinagar, an Agricultural Research Institute at Pampur and several similar institutions at important centres. Primary schools were opened at a distance of two to three miles each and a Middle or High School at a distance of not more than five miles. Several new departments such as the Social Welfare and Block development were opened. A large number of seats were secured in the technical colleges and universities of India for the State students whose education was also officially sponsored. Rice and other food stuffs were imported and sold at subsidised rates. A power-house was built at Gandharbal which is now supplying electricity almost to the whole of the Valley. A scheme for the widening of roads in Srinagar and its beautification was put into effect. It necessitated the demolition of a large number of houses, particularly in congested areas, considered a stronghold of the pro-Pakistan movement. No protracted acquisition proceedings were resorted to; instead Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad himself moved from door to door, doing a little haggling with the onwers and ultimately paying on the spot, more than the market value of the property. In some cases even fancy prices were paid. Among the main roads built in Kashmir valley are those connecting Srinagar with Gulmarg, and Srinagar with Leh at one end and with Teetwal via Sopore and Handwara on the other; another road, built on the right bank of Jhelum, connected Baramula with Uri. Similarly, important towns were linked through metalled roads. The pace of development was even greater in Jammu province particularly with regard to roads and bridges beacuse of its inaccessible terrain and the special consideration that New Delhi had for the territory. In Srinagar were built Bakhshi Stadium, Tagore Hall and Nehru Park. Two new suburbs, Jawahar Nagar and Karan

Nagar were also constructed. Beautiful parks were laid in different towns of the Valley. He also introduced several festivals such as 'Jashn-e-Kashmir' which is held in August, 'Jashn-e-Bahar' held in April, "Shab-e-Shalamar' and 'Shab-e-Nishat'. The latter two were held in the Mughal gardens of the same name. The festivities attracted thousands of people.

Despite his genuine and whole-hearted support of the Indian political objectives, a large number of Hindus were unhappy perhaps because his administration did not generally hesitate from safeguarding Muslim interests in the matter of Services, Scholarships and Developmental activities. It is even otherwise an integral part of politics in the East to find fault—genuine or imaginary, with the man in power in any situation and try to prejudice his ultimate authority. It was therefore part of the game that some Hindu leaders from Jammu as well as Srinagar frequently complained to Pandit Nehru that Bakhshi was attending more to the needs of Muslims and that he did not care for them. At last Nehru summoned both sides for a face to face meeting. Bakhshi took the stand that Muslims being in a majority, it was his duty to ensure that their share in the administration and development was not denied but at the same time he referred to his role in the political tussle and cited the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah and hundreds of others as well as the suppression of pro-Pakistan elements, as proof of his bonafides. Suddenly, he then accused the non-Muslim leaders present in the meeting of non-co-operation. Upon this, one of them stood up and with folded hands, made an extraordinary revelation! Said the man:

> Bakhshi Maharaj! it is unfortunate that of all people, *you* should have accused *us* of non-co-operation. Since the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah, you have been saying your Eid prayers in Jammu and since the number of Muslims attending the prayers is very small, we have been sending Hindus to these congregations who joined you in the prayers to build up their size so that *you* may not be embarrassed!

## KASHMIR POLITICAL CONFERENCE

We have already noticed the rapid advance of Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Kara, Advocate and his emergence as a legendary underground leader in the Quit Kashmir movement. He was included in the Emergency Administration but when the cabinet was formed a few months later, with Sheikh Abdullah as Premier, Kara was left out, perhaps because of the inclusion of his brother-in-law, Sadiq who was at the same time senior of the two. This would have been understandable but for the growing neglect to which he was subjected thereafter. He is an extremely shrewd and hard-working politician.

Kara therefore gradually drifted away from his Party and in June 1953, formed the Kashmir Political Conference which openly advocated accession to Pakistan. It was a great victory for Pakistan that a man of Kara's qualities of leadership and experience of political agitation should have been won over to the Cause. He was eminently capable of organising an ENOSIS-type sabotage movement and yet this did not happen. The causes still remain shrouded in mystery. He received financial support from an underground organization in A. K. and in one case, a sum of rupees one lakh in Indian currency, which was reportedly handed over to him personally by an agent at a pre-appointed place in Bombay, fell into Indian hands, as being under close watch, he was immediately arrested. On 19th June 1953 the Party took out a huge procession in Srinagar which raised Pakistan Zindabad slogans. It was the first massive pro-Pakistan demonstration since Indian occupation and sent up the blood-pressure of leaders at New Delhi. Kara and some of his colleagues, Pandit Ragho Nath Vaishnavi Advocate, Muhammad Amin Nahvi, Ghulam Ahmed Mir, Abdul Latif, Advocate, Malik Ghulam Nabi Hamdani and Pandit Shyamlal Bachh were arrested on 20th June. Kara was released in December 1954. Bakhshi vainly tried to win him over.

## THE GANGSTER RULE : INDEPENDENT TESTIMONY

The so-called Peace Brigade which had been brought into being to victimise and harass the pro-Pakistan elements and had been publicly praised by Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and his supporters, now began paying 'attention' to his Democratic National Conference and Indian critics of the Bakhshi regime. On 10th November, 1954, Mr. Ashok Mehta, a member of the Indian Parliament and a top leader of the Praja Socialist Party who later became Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission as well as a Central Minister, was attacked in Srinagar; so was Shrimati Vasanti Shroff, a lady worker accompanying him; her shawl and purse as well as a blanket belonging to another member of the party were snatched away.[1] Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Masudi M.L.C. and a member of the Democratic National Conference, was attacked and injured at Pulwama on 25th August, 1958. Mr. Balraj Puri, another Socialist leader, was manhandled at Jammu on 25th October 1958 and expelled from the State. That Kashmir had been gradually converted into a vast prison, is borne out even by independent observers. Among them was Mr. S. M. Bennet, a Conservative member of the British Parliament who along with Mr. Tomney, a labour M. P. visited occupied Kashmir in 1957. Describing their visit, in the course of a speech delivered at Caxton Hall, London on July 10, 1958, Mr. Bennet said:

1. Hindustan Times, 12th November, 1954.

"......I will tell you frankly that I was treated almost as a political prisoner from the moment that I arrived. I was never allowed to talk in Jammu to a single individual; even when I went on a walk in the cool of the evening I was accompanied by an official; and I wasn't even allowed to stay in Jammu town itself, but was politely put up in a Guest house outside the town. When I went up to Srinagar I was similarly put in a Guest house, away from the city, and when I asked them whether I could go into the town and speak freely to the people I was told that I could not, for the sake of my own 'protection', because if I did, the local population would be so indignant that they might well maltreat me! I also asked if, as similar facilities had been offered to me in Azad (Free) Kashmir, I could go to some of the prisons and in particular if I could interview Sheikh Abdullah, but I received a firm refusal to both requests.

Outside too, and carefully though I was watched, there were moments (which were never matched, I must add, on the other, the Pakistani side of the armistice line), when individuals did press little bits of paper, crumpled up, into my hands when they thought no one was looking, making some really pathetic appeal to let their troubles and their problems be ventilated, and sometime amounting to a direct plea to the Western World to intervene."

The entry of Mr. Bazaz's Voice of Kashmir, Delhi was banned in February, 1955. Mr. Bazaz was himself arrested in Delhi on 8th September 1955 under the Preventive Detention Act and released after a year. He had set up the Kashmir Democratic Union which was campaigning from Delhi for a plebiscite as well as the restoration of civil liberties. It held a convention in Delhi in early 1953 which demanded the handing over of the State administration to Admiral Chester Nimitz and the abolition of the permit system which had been introduced since 1948 to govern travel between India and the State. Another group working for a just solution of the Kashmir dispute in order to bring about lasting reconciliation between the two countries was the Delhi-based, End Kashmir Dispute Committee, headed by Mr. Lakhan Pal. He was also subjected to abuse, harassment and frequent incarceration.

The periodicals 'Free Thinker', 'Piam-e-Nau', the 'Nawa-e-Muslim' and 'Aastana' were also banned. 'Free Thinker' was edited by Pandit Shyam Lal Yachu and Comrade Mir Noor Muhammad and published from New Delhi. Foreign correspondents were not allowed to enter Kashmir even as late as 1957. Correspondents of 'Daily Telegraph' and 'Daily Express' London failed to obtain the necessary permits. Mr. George Evans of the Daily Telegraph withdrew his application as a

protest, after waiting for 18 days. Comparing this state of affairs with that obtaining in Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir), he wrote in the issue of the paper dated the 21st October, 1955:

> "The most striking contrast is that while Mr. Nehru's government excludes observers from Indian occupied Kashmir, whom it suspects might voice criticisim of conditions there, no such discriminatory censorship is applied on this side of the cease-fire line."

He quoted Secretary General of the Government, Khan Abdul Hamid Khan (who later became President), as having told him:

> "We do not bar any one from entering even if we know he is coming to find fault. No doubt criticism can be made as about any country in the world, but we believe we had achieved much to be proud of. And certainly we have nothing to hide. You are free to go anywhere you like and observe for yourself."

> "Permission to enter Azad Kashmir is necessary but it seldom takes more than few hours to get it. The day after applying I drove un-conducted across the frontier."

Mr. Richard Greenough of the Daily Mail, London who visited Srinagar in the first week of February 1957 had a strange experience. Says he:

> "Two recent demonstrations of mob violence against myself and another British correspondent here were carefully 'fixed' by a high quarter of the Kashmir Government; I have good grounds for believing. Demonstrations were intended to impress on me the pro-Indian feeling of the people here and also the degree of hatred and bitterness felt against the British, the United Nations and the West generally for favouring the Pakistan request for a plebiscite. They were also intended to try to scare me off talking to those who oppose integration with India. They undoubtedly exist, stifled though they are."

Stephen Harper of the Daily Express London wrote in the paper's issue of 5th February:

> "I had scarcely arrived in Srinagar, the capital, last week when a mob swarmed round my car. They shouted 'Murder him—we don't want British reporters here'! Car doors and canopy were ripped off. Hands grabbed and tore at my clothes. Little baskets of Charcoal—carried around for heat—were poured over me and burned my face.

Today I discovered that the mob gathered as a result of a telephone call from a Government official to the home of the brother of the puppet Premier Bakshi."

Mr. Aneurin Bevan, British Labour Party leader, was in Srinagar on 8th April, 1957. Deputations of the Plebiscite Front and Kashmir Political Conference acquainted him with the lack of civil liberties, represssion of opposition and incarceration of a large number of their members. They also told him that a majority of Kashmiris stood for accession to Pakistan and demanded a free and impartial plebiscite.[1]

A ban on the holding of public meetings in Srinagar was defied on 7th March 1957 by a large number of people, some of whom were arrested. On 12th May seven persons who formed themselves into a procession and started a demonstration in the heart of the city were arrested under Rule 50 of the Security laws. A ban had also been imposed on the holding of public meetings within a radius of 10 miles in Anantnag district.

## BEG'S ASSEMBLY SPEECH ON AK RADIO

Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg was released in November, 1954 on account of ill health. He made an historic speech in the Legislative Assembly dealing with Indian betrayal of the State, Nehru's repudiation of solemn international commitments for the holding of a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite and the reign of terror. Like other speeches delivered on the floor, his also was tape recorded by the local station of the All India Radio. A few months later, an announcement was made by the Azad Kashmir Radio Trarkhel and repeated over several days calling upon its listners to tune in on a given date and time when to the surprise of everyone, this record was on the air. Srinagar Radio station and the Assembly building were immediately surrounded by the Central Reserve Police but to their dismay, the original record was there. What actually happened was that the record was brought here by workers of the underground movement and after being re-taped, was sent back and it was only after information reached that it had been replaced, that the announcement was made from the Azad Kashmir Radio. Mr. B. N. Mullik has claimed that the entire record of the intelligence net operating in certain parts of Kashmir was removed by his agents from one of the posts in Azad Kashmir. It may not be untrue, but it may also be disclosed here that at one time during the fifties, the underground movement was operating in the Valley so effectively that interested quarters on this side of the

1. Times of India, 9th April, 1957.

Cease-fire line were told that the top-most secret political file in the office of the Kashmir Prime Minister could be made available if the concerned people could be paid a sum of one lakh rupees. That the deal did not come through was because the people over here thought that it was too high a price for the possible benefits to be derived from the file.

Soon after his release, Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg founded the "Plebiscite Front" with himself as President. Within the next two weeks, its branches sprang up all over the State. This provided the followers of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah as well as the pro-Pakistan political workers with a much-needed public platform. Within a few months, the Valley witnessed a mass upsurge against India and a non-violent movement for accession to Pakistan. Beg was re-arrested in 1955.

## THE STATE OF ECONOMY

The economic situation had been deteriorating since the State's unnatural accession to India. Cost of transporting goods from north India had considerably increased due to the lengthening of distances. The influx of seasonal winter labour to the plains had abruptly stopped due to Muslim massacre in East Punjab and Delhi. The exports had lost their traditional markets. There was food scarcity. In July 1951, a hungry mob led by Khawaja Abdul Khalique, M.L.A., looted the Government Food Depot in Sopore. A month later, another riot took place in Kupwara where military camps were burnt. A strategic bridge was also blown up. Scores of suspects were sentenced to imprisonment. In 1952, inferior quality rice was sold at Rs. 34 a maund, and paddy at Rs. 24 a maund. This was the record price of the two commodities since the great famine of 1870. Rice is the staple food of Kashmiris. The scale of rationing in the towns was six seers of paddy per month per head, which meant 3 chhataks per head per day. The situation was so grim that even well-to-do families had to be content with a one-time rice-meal. The general public was living on maize, while in the villages, the number of those living on fruit was by no means small. A Kashmiri, on an average, uses more salt than perhaps any individual human being; salt-tea is his national beverage. Kashmiris use only rock salt. In 1948 when the rock-salt stocks emptied, sea-salt was imported from India but Kashmiris would not touch it. India then imported seventy-two thousand eight hundred maunds of rock-salt from Italy. It came to 1½ seer per head which was hardly sufficient for three to four months. It must have cost something like six lakh rupees in foreign exchange. Its retail price was two seers a rupee, but, if imported from Pakistan, it could be sold at seven seers a rupee. The Khewra salt-range is only two score miles from the State border.

Kashmir witnessed two devastating floods in 1957 and 1959. The State Assembly was informed that in the 1959 flood, the loss suffered was rupees ten crores; 185 persons including 20 Indian soldiers were drowned. The loss of timber was put at Rs. two crore. The Assembly was further informed that 14000 houses had collapsed and 16000 had been partially damaged. Two lakh acres of culturable land covering 1287 villages was adversely affected. The damage to the Mahura power-house was so extensive that it remained inactive for several months.[1]

The Assembly was also informed that border with Azad Kashmir had been sealed because of bomb explosions in Srinagar; that there had been 78 raids from Azad Kashmir and that in 1957 three groups, in possession of bombs, had been arrested. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad told the State Assembly that there were 74 border incidents in 1958 and 115 in 1959; 12 persons were killed and 28 injured in 1958 while 24 persons were killed and 22 injured in 1959.[2] Mr. Girdhari Lal Dogra told the State Assembly that "we are getting less than we deserve" from the Central Government.[3]

## SHEIKH ABDULLAH'S FIRST RELEASE

After the formation of the Democratic National Conference by Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and D. P. Dhar, soon after the March 1957 'elections', the so-called Peace Brigade thugs who had been let loose on the pro-Pakistan sections since its formation in 1947 and whose goondaism was particularly relished by Dhar and Dogra, were now directed against the new dissidents. Their public meetings were disrupted, the top leaders heckled and insulted and their followers beaten up and harassed. Finding the position unbearable, the D.N.C. demanded the release of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and his colleagues, for two reasons: firstly, to attract public attention, as they had been largely ignored by the Muslim masses and secondly, in the hope that in case of his release, the Bakhshi Government would get wholly involved with him, thus bringing them relief. Sheikh Abdullah's letter to the Security Council and the extremely adverse World press reaction against Mr. Krishna Menon's rhetorics in the Council, spot lighting the continued detention without trial of the man around whom India had built its Kashmir case since 1947, compelled New Delhi to release him on 8th January, 1958. The primary consideration, of course, was to silence a critical world and preserve, as far as possible, the fast shattering image of Nehru's over-trumpeted moralism, but nearer home, the release may have been intended to bring the warring supporters in Srinagar together by confronting them with the man, they considered a

1. Times of India, Bombay, 14th August, 1959.
2. Hindustan Times, 18th February, 1960.
3. Statesman, 12th March, 1951.

common enemy and whose liberty was bound to frustrate their hopes of power. Declining the Government offer either to be air-lifted or provided with a State car, he hired a taxi and dashed to Srinagar, several foreign correspondents joining him in the way; so did Mridula Sarabhai. It was bitter cold, January being the coldest month. There had been a heavy snow-fall, yet nothing prevented almost the entire mass of the people living in areas through which he passed, on his way to Srinagar, to flock to the road to give him an unprecedented welcome.

What were his latest views on Kashmir's future? The following speech delivered at Hazrat Bal has been selected as generally representing his state of mind:

> "Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah today called upon Pandit Nehru to "stand by his promise" to let four million people of Kashmir decide their future.
>
> Addressing a largely attended post-prayer congregation at Hazrat Bal shrine near Srinagar he said that relations between Bharat and Pakistan were embittered because of Kashmir. Every country in Asia wanted this matter to be settled peacefully but "now that India has got a foot-hold here, she is going back on her promise."
>
> Sheikh Abdullah said "accession of Kashmir is not to be decided by rhetorics of Krishna Menon or by gun and bullets. Kashmir does not belong to Krishna Menon or Nehru or Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad. It cannot be disposed of by India or Pakistan, U.S.A. or USSR. The people who alone can decide its future are the people of Kashmir—four million men, women and children, Muslims and Hindus who inhabit this land."

Several unsuccessful efforts were made while he was in jail to take him back to the Indian-fold in return for power. It has been a peculiar practice with the Congress to win over individual Muslim leaders by bribe or temporary power and glory. Having fathered a political movement and undergone imprisonment and other hardships for over a dozen years, the longest of any top ranking Indian leader, it appeared at the moment that he could not be made to depart with his principles in order to gain power. He then started touring Kashmir valley and some parts of Jammu where he was received by large cheering crowds, raising anti-India slogans. He visited Baramula, Sopore, Bandipura, Islamabad, Shopian, Handwara, Bij-bihara, Udhampur, Kishtwar, Dodah and Bhadarwah, emphasising the right of the people to Self-determination. He also explained at great length how India had marched in, just only to help repel the "tribal invasion" but she had in fact done so to occupy the State.

He did not go to New Delhi nor was any formal invitation extended because a stream of visitors including Jay Prakash Narain and some Central Ministers who met him, found no opening for a dialogue. India was prepared to install him back into power or even to make of him a martyr in furtherance of its so-called secularism but this was not yet possible for several reasons: Kashmir issue was internationally very much alive; the American military aid had improved Pakistan Army's capabilities; there having been no direct confrontation between the two armies, the Pakistan Army generally enjoyed the reputation of an invincible force vis-a-vis its Indian counterpart; the hollowness of Nehru's friendship and the bitterness engendered by his betrayal was still too fresh in his mind and above all, there was the dominant fear of a total rejection by people of any compromise with India, short of accession to Pakistan. Therefore, he concentrated all his energies towards the mobilisation of public opinion particularly in the Valley and Dodah district. Despite the goondaism of the Peace Brigade, the repression let loose by the Government and large sums clandestinely distributed to instigate opposition, he succeeded in raising the tempo of political activity. The fear caused by the presence of the large Indian Army and the brutalities perpetrated by it especially in August 1953, was fast eroding. For the first time the slogans of 'Pakistan Zindabad' were fearlessly raised in public meetings and the photographs of Quaid-e-Azam displayed on arches raised in connection with his visits.

A new revolution was sweeping over the State; the Indian government was breathlessly and with horror watching the scene. The realisation had dawned that the pre-release reports that "he was no longer a problem but an enigma", had been typical of Indian reports on Kashmir, highly coloured and entirely false and that by detention, the man had only risen higher in the eyes of his people. Before his arrest, the people loved the man but largely hated his politics; now they loved not only him but also his politics and this is what made him more formidable than before. The Indian government therefore decided to re-arrest him and the Central Intelligence Agency was entrusted with the responsibility of preparing the ground. On 21st February 1958, a group of Razakars were provoked by the Intelligence men to attack the National Conference office at Raj Bagh resulting in the death of one worker; 30 others including some Razakars were injured; a National Conference jeep was burnt; a wireless-fitted police vehicle as well as some shops from which stones were hurled, were damaged. Using it as an excuse, a large number of political workers hostile to India were arrested. It created a chain reaction as a result of which demonstrations and hartals were staged condemning the represssive policy and demanding the withdrawal of the Indian army. The Ramazan Eid fell on 1st April 1958. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad and his Ministers, remained in Jammu and dare not join the Eid prayers at Srinagar.

Over a lakh of Muslims said their prayers at the Eid-gah where Sheikh Abdullah made a strong speech demanding implementation of U.N. resolutions on Kashmir and an end to repression.

## THE KUD CONSPIRACY CASE

According to Mr. Mullik, ground work for instituting a conspiracy case against Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Begum Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, Pir Maqbool Gilani, Pir Maqbool Wilgami, Khawaja Ali Shah, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmed Ashai and scores of others had been started in 1956 and therefore the release of Sheikh Abdullah came to him as a shock. No human being normally wishes the destruction of his labours and Mr. Mullik and his associates were no exception. In league with Karan Singh, D.P. Dhar, Girdhari Lal Dogra and the anti-Abdullah lobby at Delhi, led by the Law Minister A.K. Sen and with the blessings of Pandit Pant, the Home Minister, they successfully manipulated the re-arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on April 30, 1958 and also succeeded in securing a go-ahead directive with regard to the institution of the case. There was no evidence directly linking him with any conspiracy either to over-throw the State Government by force or to take Kashmir out of the Indian Union, also by force, as alleged by the prosecution. The whole case against him was built around his letter to the Security Council and the mystery surrounding its receipt at New York. By the end of March, 1958, the material consisting of 1600-page dossier had been prepared. According to Mr. Mullik, Pandit Nehru used to call a meeting at his house almost every evening attended by Sen, Setalvad, the Attorney General, Nair, the Legal Remembrancer at Srinagar, Balbir Singh and Mr. Mullik of the Intelligence Service. Mr. Setalvad later withdrew, pleading want of time, but perhaps it was an excuse by the eminent lawyer to avoid association with what actually was a political persecution. After these meetings had lasted for four to five weeks, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad was summoned for consultations. Let it be recorded in all fairness to the departed leader that the general belief that he had been responsible for launching the case, was utterly false and on this point we have the testimony of Mr. B. N. Mullik who says:

> "Bakhshi at this stage declared that whatever might be the strength of the evidence against Begum Abdullah, he could not agree to her prosecution. Muslim opinion in Kashmir valley would not excuse him for dragging this lady, who was known as "Madar-e-Meharban", to the courts. I argued that without her in the trial we would miss one of the main connecting links with Pakistan and this would greatly weaken our case; but on this question Bakhshi would not budge and Pandit Nehru also agreed with him."

## THE TRIAL

On 21st May, 1958, a complaint was filed against 25 persons, in the Court of the Special Magistrate, Jammu under sections 121-A and 120-B of the Penal Code and Rule 32 of the Security Rules. In addition, five persons described as Pakistanis were entered as absconders; another 40 persons were mentioned in the report though not included in the charge-sheet. Sheikh Abdullah was included through a supplementary complaint filed on 23rd October, 1958. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad, an ex-Judge of the Patna High Court, one of the top criminal practitioners in India, was appointed Senior Counsel on the spot. At Pandit Nehru's request, G. S. Pathak, a member of the Indian Upper House and Mr. Gopi Nath Dikshit, a leading Advocate from Delhi, assisted Mr. Prasad. Mr. Dinglefoot, a British lawyer of international fame appeared as Chief Defence Counsel but as the prosecution was still at the committal stage, he left his Junior, J. O. Kellock at Jammu. Several local lawyers also appeared for the defence, but the main brunt was borne by Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, a co-accused and Mr. Abdul Latif, Advocate. Meanwhile, Pir Maqbool Gilani had succeeded in taking refuge in Pakistan.

The prosecution opened its case in April, 1959 and closed it on 17th June, 1960 after examining 229 witnesses and exhibiting nearly 300 documents. The examination of the accused took seven months while arguments consumed another seven months. On 25th January 1962, the Special Magistrate committed all the accused to the Court of Sessions for trial under Section 121-A, punishable with transportation for life and Section 120-B, punishable with death or transportation for life.

## WHAT NEHRU THOUGHT OF ABDULLAH

زاہد تنگ نظر نے مجھے کافر جانا
اور کافر یہ سمجھتا کہ مسلمان ہوں میں

*Trans* : The short-sighted Believer *thinks* I am an Unbeliever,
While the Unbeliever *believes*, I am a Believer.

Before the start of the trial, differences arose between the panel of counsel and the Law Minister about the introduction of politics in the case; the latter wanted to avoid it but the lawyers said it was unavoidable. A conference was therefore held at the Prime Minister's house on 15th April, 1963 to resolve the matter. During discussions Pandit Nehru suddenly

burst out and gave expression to his inner most and hitherto unknown opinion about Sheikh Abdullah.

Says Mr. Mullik:

> "Then suddenly to our utter surprise Pandit Nehru started talking bitterly against Sheikh Abdullah's communalism. He traced the Sheikh's history from 1930 onwards and mentioned how he had started his career with the Muslim Conference, which was an out and out communal organisation. He said that as a result of pressures from outside and also seeing the development of the States People's Movement in the rest of India and for purely tactical reasons and probably under the advice of some of his more liberal followers, the Sheikh had converted the Muslim Conference into the Political Conference to give it a non-communal appearance. At this time Pandit Nehru suddenly looked at me and enquired whether I had not come across some information of possible British connivance in that movement. I replied in the affirmative. He continued his talk against the Sheikh and mentioned all his communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the Valley. But, as soon as he became the Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his anti-Hindu activities. In contrast, he praised Bakhshi and Sadiq for their completely non-communal outlook and said that these two were really secular minded persons who required all support from India. *Pandit Nehru said that all trouble in Kashmir was due to the Sheikh's communal outlook and it was he who was not allowing the State to settle down to peace and stability. The Sheikh always talked about the rights of the Muslims forgetting that the Hindus also formed nearly 35 per cent of the population of the State and he never showed any consideration for them.* Pandit Nehru mentioned that politically he and the other Indian leaders had to go along with the Sheikh for a considerable period & they had also helped him and played him up hoping that by coming in contact with secular India, where Muslims and Hindus and persons of all other denominations were living together and enjoying a peaceful life, Sheikh Abdullah would be able to get rid of his communalism; *but communalism was a disease with him and he could never get rid of it and is based on the fact that Kashmir valley had a Muslim majority.*"[1]

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1. My Years with Nehru.

## BAKHSHI QUITS

In 1963, several Chief Ministers and top Congress leaders holding key positions in the Government were asked to resign from Government jobs and return to organisational work. This is known as the 'Kamraj plan' after the name of the then Congress President, Mr. Kamraj. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad also tendered his resignation and although it is widely believed that the men, Nehru had in mind for sacrifice, included Bakhshi. Mr. Mullik is emphatic and I see no reason to disbelieve him on this point that Bakhshi could not be persuaded to continue in office. He showed his preference for field work in northern India where the Muslim minority is largely inhabited. May be, he wanted to improve the Hindu-Muslim relations and thus make his own humble contribution to the betterment of the latter's lot or may be, having tasted power at the provincial level for over 16 years, he felt tired of his surroundings and wanted to jump into the arena of central politics. The Working Committee was not prepared to endorse his decision to quit. Most of them were his loyal supporters but, one reason for their strong opposition may have been the absence of a successor from the right wing. The Central Government and Karan Singh wanted Sadiq to succeed him but this was not acceptable to Bakhshi and therefore Khawaja Shams-ud-Din, a relatively junior Minister from Islamabad and a protege of Bakhshi was chosen as his successor. Bakhshi Abdur Rashid, General Secretary of the Party and Bakhshi's nephew was a strong contender against Sadiq and enjoyed the support of a large majority of the legislators. An immature youth, his candidacy appears to have been canvassed merely to push Sadiq out of the arena. After his resignation, Bakhshi spent several months in Delhi idling time because the Congress High Command now seemed to have no use of him. It is probably this factor, more than anything else, that has contributed to the belief that he was one of those whom the plan envisaged to contrive out of power.

## THE THEFT OF MOE-E-MUQADDAS

The Hazrat Bal shrine in Srinagar houses what Kashmiri Muslims believe to be a piece of hair of the Holy Prophet (May peace be upon him). It is claimed to have been brought to Bijapur in 1635 A.D. by one Syed Abdullah who claimed to have been a Mutawali of the shrine at Medina. It is fitted in an erect position in a quartz container. The bottom is held in a silver cap which cannot be removed and the top of the hair is slightly curve. The container is constructed like a Thermometer tube, opaque on one side and the Holy hair can be seen only from the side opposite. At the top of the container there is a cylindrical lid tapering to an end. The container is mounted on a long silver base;

both these parts are fitted into the main cylinder containing the Moe-e-Muqaddas but can be removed easily. The overall length of the tube, its lid and the base is about five inches and this whole object is used for exposition. It is kept in a gold embriodered narrow bag fastened at one end by a thin string. This bag is wrapped up in a piece of green velvet and kept in a walnut box. Large silver trappings called Galtani were fitted to the base when it was brought out for exhibition. The silver cap and round base, the Galtani, the narrow bag, the piece of velvet and the walnut box have been with the Holy Relic ever since it came to Hazrat Bal in 1700 A.D.[1] The walnut box containing the Holy relic and the silver trapping are kept in a wooden shelf mounted on a wooden table. This is kept in the centre of the room about five feet square with only one wooden door in front which is kept double-locked all the time. There is a long passage in front of this room and this ends in the glass-fronted door. There is also a glass door at one side of the passage. Normally, male pilgrims sit at the front door and women at the side. Double-locks mean that two Nishan-dez—the persons who display it to visitors—keep the keys but generally both the keys are with one man. The door could be forced open with very little effort; the wooden shelf had only a small lock which could be broken in by hand while the walnut box was not kept locked.

## CIVIL LIFE PARALYSED

It is exhibited to the devotees only on ten days in a year, each one connected with some event in the Holy Prophet's (Peace be upon him) life. There are also private exhibitions. The last day when it had been publicly shown, was 20th December, 1963 by the senior Nishan-dez, Khawaja Rahim Bandey. In the evening of the 26th, it was privately shown to someone by the same person and it was claimed to have been placed back at the proper place. There was no one at the shrine after midnight because of intense cold. In the morning of 27th December, 1963, Rahim Bandey found that the side door had been broken open and both locks of the inner door had also been forced open. The lock of the front door had been forced open from inside and the wooden box containing the Holy Hair had been taken out from the small wooden shelf and the small bag containing the tube with the Holy Hair inside had been removed, leaving other articles in the shelf. What happened then may be described in the words of Mr. Mullik himself:

> "The news about the loss of the Moe-e-Muqaddas travelled like wild fire throughout the snowbounded Kashmir valley. Large crowds started collecting at the mosque from early morning and by

1. Description by Mullik.

the afternoon, thousands of people were marching through the streets of Srinagar, protesting against the theft, demanding its immediate restoration and asking the Government to punish the perpetrators of the crime. The town observed a spontaneous and complete hartal. There was no doubt that the sentiments of the religious people of the valley had been deeply hurt due to the sacrilege committed in respect of something which they held to be highly sacred and dearer than even their lives. In these circumstances, the police and the local authorities found it difficult to control the crowds, because any action by them could have further exasperated the people. Unfortunately, Bakhshi Abdul Rashid, General Secretary of the National Conference (nephew of Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad), arrived there in a jeep and, with good intentions but in his usual tactless and brusque manner, told the crowd to disperse and not to create any trouble and further added that, as on previous occasion, the Holy Relic was sure to come back, as there was nobody in the world who could remove the Relic permanently from its place of rest. Far from soothing the disturbed feelings of the crowd, Abdul Rashid's presence served like a red rag to the bull, and the crowd attacked him. He was rescued with difficulty by the police; the crowd then in its anger went to a hotel and a cinema house owned by Bakhshi Abdul Majid, brother of Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, and set fire to them. When the police tried to intervene, the crowd attacked the police also, set fire to Kothibagh Police Station, whereupon the police had to open fire killing three persons. The incident somehow or the other turned the anger of the entire Kashmiri population against the Bakhshi family and the Kashmir Government. A rumour was set afloat that the Bakhshi family was responsible for this outrage. No doubt some interested parties were bent on destroying Bakhshi's image for ever in the valley. It was *normally* inconceivable that Bakhshi, who had done so much for the improvement of the Hazrat Bal mosque and who himself held the Moe-e-Muqaddas in high respect, would do anything which might amount to showing disrespect to it. And, though the crowd dispersed later in the evening, large crowds again assembled the next day and a continuous hartal was observed in Srinagar and many other parts of the Kashmir valley for many days at a stretch from December 27."[1]

Describing the state of mind of Pandit Nehru, Mr. Mullik says:

"In the evening I was called by the Prime Minister to whom I reported all that I had been able to gather till then. He was visibly distressed

1. My Years with Nehru.

and said that the Holy Relic must be recovered. He wanted to be kept informed three or four times a day about the development, and he said that he would not mind even if he was roused from his bed at night if there was anything serious. He enquired from me if he himself should go to Kashmir to appease the people, but I dissuaded him saying that unless the Moe-e-Muqaddas was recovered, his going there might produce an adverse effect."[1]

Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad was in Delhi; so was D. P. Dhar, but Sadiq and Mir Qasim were in Srinagar. Shams-ud-Din was in Jammu. He hurried to Srinagar the same evening but dare not leave his house for fear of demonstrators who had completely taken over the city. Bakhshi hurried back within a few days. A senior Deputy Director of Intelligence along with a team of investigators was flown to assist the local investigation staff, but they were unable to trace the Holy Hair. So, on 1st January, Mr. Mullik flew in personally and on the previous night Pandit Nehru had in a broadcast told the Muslims of Kashmir that he was sending Mr. Mullik and assured them not only that the Government would do everything possible for the recovery but also punish the culprits. Says Mr. Mullik of what he witnessed in Srinagar:

> "What I saw in the town was something which I had never seen before in thirty-five years of my executive service dealing with law and order. Everything was closed: offices, Schools, shops, cinemas, restaurants. An Action Committee had automatically been formed and come to the forefront with Maulvi Muhammad Farooq at the head. (This is the person Bakhshi Saheb had appointed two years earlier as the Mir Waiz). Langars (eating places) had been set up at various places in the town, volunteers of the Action Committee were stopping vehicles from passing and enforcing the hartal; large crowds were coming from villages carrying food, bedding and even fuel for warming their bodies. There was no end to the streams of people and all the main roads were blocked by thousands of people and the smallest procession was at least a mile long, covering the entire width of the road including the footpaths. The temperature was raging at night to several degrees below the freezing point and during the day it was no warmer; the sun never came out and it was raining and snowing all the time. All play grounds and other places of meetings were frozen with several inches of solid ice on the surface and yet three public meetings had been held the previous day collecting between fifty to seventy thousand people in each meeting. The people remained seated on the ice with snow falling from the top, hearing the speeches of the Action

1. My Years with Nehru.

Committee members for hours at a stretch. A vehicle, to be able to come out on public roads, had to carry a black flag given by the Action Committee. Without such a flag, the vehicle might be burnt and destroyed. The black flag ensured that the vehicle would not be attacked, but it did not denote a permit to move about. All military vehicles had been taken off the road rather than hoisting the black flags. The Ministers were virtual prisoners confined to their houses with police guards protecting them. All public institutions and offices were guarded by armed police. It was clear that the Government writ did not extend even to its own offices as they were closed and most of the staff were also amongst the crowd. It was the Action Committee which was ruling the city. The Committee regulated the hours of hartal, fixed small periods when groceries and vegetable shops could be opened for the convenience of the people, determined routes of processions and their timings and places of meetings. Every wall of the city was full of posters issued by the Committee and every house had a black flag..............."

The theft sent a wave of deep indignation throughout the State and provided the Muslims with a rallying point against Indian occupation. All factions of political opinion, who did not generally see eye to eye with each other, forgot their differences and pooled their energies to give vent to their feelings. Of course, the most notable role was played by Maulana Muhammad Saeed Masudi who was the real brain behind the popular movement. It was he who was largely responsible for bringing warring groups together on a common platform, named the Awami Action Committee with the young Mir Waiz Farooq as Chairman. A young man of hardly 25 years, he was a close relative of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and had been appointed to the office of Mirwaiz-e-Kashmir, lying vacant since Maulana Yusuf Shah came to Pakistan in 1947, by the Bakhshi Government. Until the recovery of the Holy Hair, the Committee was acknowledgedly running a parallel government. From the 30th of December onwards when the demand for the immediate release of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and the holding of the promised plebiscite were officially taken up by the committee, the essentially religious movement took a pronouncedly political form. A demand was also made that a commission of inquiry consisting of Pakistan and other Muslim countries be appointed to inquire into the theft. On the 28th December, a large crowd surrounded the local station of the All India Radio to protest against the false version given about the police firing, a day earlier. It was with great difficulty that popular leaders were able to maintain peace. Mr. Mullik had several meetings with the Action Committee members but this was being done only to keep them from taking any extreme step.

## MYSTERIOUS RECOVERY

At one stage when the government of India thought of imposing President's rule, Home Secretary Vishvanathan flew in with a large team of officers. What prevented it was Karan Singh's being the Sadar-e-Riyasat. A section of its own officers reminded New Delhi that taking over of administration by Karan Singh was bound to infuriate the people and bring forth an accusation that the theft had been officially engineered to contrive the reimposition of the hated Dogra rule. Kh. Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq was then approached to take over the administration but he declined to do so until the Holy Hair was recovered. At last at 5 p. m. on the 4th of January the Moe-e-Muqaddas was claimed to have been found in a wooden box inside the Hazrat Bal shrine. The man to discover it must have been some intelligence worker because it was Mullik who got information of its recovery. He rushed to the shrine and brought it out carrying it on his head.

Mr. Mullik says that the telephone line which was dead since morning, revived, "as if by magic" when he put a crash call to Nehru to convey the news. He was later told by his President that "during this entire period", Nehru "used to be in an extremely distracted and disturbed state of mind and used to come to him more than once a day and express his great anxiety the turn events had taken in Kashmir". Two days later, on 6th January, Nehru had a stroke at Bhubaneshwar. "There was no doubt", admits Mullik, "that this Holy Relic episode had taken a heavy toll on his failing health."

The Moe-e-Muqaddas was placed in a hall of Sher Garhi Police Station which was converted into a prayer hall. Meanwhile, the room housing the Holy Hair at the Hazrat Bal shrine was speedily repaired and this time iron gates were fitted and adequate steps taken for its protection. The next public Deedar Day fell on 6th February, 1964 on the occasion of the Urs Charyar. Afraid that the failure to hold a public exhibition would strengthen the suspicion of the people about its authenticity that was now worrying the Government, the Holy Hair was taken in a procession first to the Guest House and then to the shrine on 10th January. It was snowing all the time. The people, however, were not satisfied about its being the genuine one; the general belief was that the Intelligence Service had put up a fake hair to mislead the people. The belief began to gain ground and ultimately by 20th January, 1964, the Action Committee came out openly for a satisfactory identification. A demand was also made for withdrawal of the armed Punjab police from Srinagar and incidents were reported when Indian soldiers and policemen had been

heckled by groups of students. Friday, the 25th January, witnessed a bloody clash between groups of processionists and the Punjab Armed Police in several parts of the city in which seven persons were officially admitted as dead. Hundreds of people including Maulvi Muhammad Farooq and other prominent members of the Action Committee were arrested on 28th and 29th January. A powerful group of N.C. leaders, in a statement, supported the Action Committee demand for the holding of a special 'deedar' to identify the Moe-e-Muqaddas as well as the holding of a judicial inquiry into the circumstances leading to the Friday police firing.

## THE IDENTIFICATION

Contrary to the advice of his on-the-spot officers, the politician Nehru realised that although a public 'deedar' involved grave risk, yet continued refusal would deepen the popular suspicion of the recovered relic being fake. He despatched Shastri to hold a public 'deedar' and replace Shams-ud-Din with Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq.

Realising that the detention of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was the prime factor behind the non-let-up of the agitation, even weeks after the recovery of the Holy Hair, Shastri, on arrival in Srinagar, broadly hinted, on instructions from Nehru, about his impending release. Simultaneously he also announced the acceptance of the demand for a special identification. His demand that only Ulema be chosen to determine its genuineness was accepted but as a reciprocal concession, the selection was left to the Action Committee. Their number was to be fourteen and the identification had to take place publicly at the Dargah on 3rd February, at 2 p. m. Despite repeated demands by Shastri, the panel was not disclosed right upto 2 p.m. when Action Committee members transported them to the shrine. They had been previously collected unannounced so that the Government may not use its immense resources to win them over. They were men of honour, known for their integrity and piety and it was normally unthinkable that they may give a deliberately wrong opinion, but then, the stake was so great that it had to be ensured that the government had no opportunity to resort to any corrupt practice. Maulana Masudi, known for his incorruptibility, was negotiating with Shastri on behalf of the Action Committee.

> The first to give the verdict was Faqir Mirak Shah, "the holiest of the holy men in Kashmir", who uttered the single word, "Haq", meaning right.

It still remains a mystery as to who was responsible for the theft? Those who can be credited with some inside knowledge state that the

conspirary was hatched by late Pandit Durga Prasad Dhar, a communist. The plan was to take it to Uri Sector of the cease-fire line, kill a Muslim and then stage-manage its recovery near the cease-fire line, to invent a story that it had been stolen by a Pakistani agent who was killed in the process of smuggling it to Pakistan. The intention was to create hatred against Pakistan in the Kashmir valley. Dhar reportedly employed Ghulam Qadir Gandarabali, the notorious DIG of Police, Bakhshi Abdul Rashid, one Abdur Rashid Khan and Raja Sarbaland Khan of Uri. Winter was at its peak on the night it was stolen. Abdur Rashid Khan, an employee of the Agricultural department admitted during police investigations that he had stolen it but the Indian intelligence did not reveal as to who had sent him, to whom he gave the Holy relic and how, from whom and where was it recovered? Of course, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad had nothing to do with it.

## CASE WITHDRAWN

The impact of the theft of Moe-e-Muqaddas was very great. It electrified Muslims as never before and sharpened their hatred against New Delhi domination. The world at large had also witnessed how unreal and unenduring the so-called identity of secularism between Kashmir and India was. It also demonstrated to the world beyond any doubt whatsoever that Pakistan remained the dominant political longing of its overwhelming Muslim population. Pandit Nehru who was responsible, more than anybody else, for the sufferings of Kashmiris resulting from his imperialistic policy to keep it by force, in order to encircle and weaken Pakistan, also seemed to have realised, like some of his officers, the need for a reorientation of Kashmir policy. He was not prepared, not even now, to allow the holding of a plebiscite, whether overall or regional nor was he prepared for a partition that could result in the transfer of any substantial Muslim majority area to Pakistan; what he seemed to be prepared to do now was to win over Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah at least on some of his terms and bring him back to power. But since a moratorium on the Kashmir issue needed Pakistan's blessings and since without her agreement there could be no internal or external peace with regard to Kashmir and since Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah also seems to have felt the need for a prior understanding between the two countries, Pandit Nehru appears to have thought of utilising the Sheikh as a bridge, to achieve, at least temporarily, some rapprochement.

Nehru though not well, insisted upon hearing from Mr. Mullik, a detailed report of the happenings and meanwhile, kept the Defence Minister waiting for 1½ hours. Mr. Mullik told him that "from the spectacle" he had seen, it seemed to him "that Kashmir was not a part of India" and that "though there was no reason to blame the State or the Central

Government", the "simple issue had taken such terrific proportions due to political motivations." He advised "a new reorientation of Kashmir policy" whereupon Pandit Nehru said that he was convinced that "a rethinking was essential."[1]

The conspiracy case had now been pending for nearly five years and the Government had spent more than three crore rupees on its prosecution which is by itself an unprecedented record both from the point of view of expense as well as the time consumed by a political trial. The protractedness of the trial was itself a proof that the case rested on no credible evidence and the demand for its withdrawal and consequent release of the accused was being increasingly voiced not only throughout the world but also in India.

The Observer London dated 16th September captioned its correspondent, O-Denovan's despatch as "Sheikh on trial but India in the dock"; the Sydney Morning Herald wrote on 25th September that the trial "must surely rank as one of the most disgraceful perversions of justice for political ends that the Commonwealth has seen."

In addition to a large number of M.Ps, Jay Prakash Narain and Rajgopal Acharya also demanded its withdrawal. So did Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad. On 5th April, 1964, Mr. Sadiq, issued a statement that the case would be withdrawn immediately. It may be said in fairness to the departed leader that the statement was issued without prior clearance from New Delhi. On the next day, a conference was held at the Prime Minister's House attended by members of the Emergency Cabinet Committee, Gulzari Lal Nanda, T. T. Krishnamachari, Shastri, A. K. Sen, Mullik and several Secretaries. What Pandit Nehru told this meeting needs to be reproduced because it is a confession of the failure of his Kashmir policy. Says Mr. Mullik:

> "The Prime Minister started by saying that, even after fifteen years of association, if Kashmir still remained in such an unstable state that even on a simple issue like the Moe-e-Muqaddas, the people could be so provoked as to rise in defiance of the government, then in his opinion, a new approach had to be made and a radical change in our thinking about Kashmir was called for. He said that he felt disappointed that after all that had been done for the people of Kashmir, they were apparently still dissatisfied and though much of this dissatisfaction was due to a certain amount of mis-government, all of it could not be ascribed to these causes. *He also felt that Sheikh Abdullah still had a strong hold on the people of Kashmir and in the changed circumstances, no political settlement in the valley could be thought of without bringing him in.*"[2]

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1 & 2. Mullik.

## SHEIKH ABDULLAH RELEASED

The case was thereupon withdrawn and almost six years after his re-arrest on 30th April, 1958, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was released from the Central jail Jammu. Laments Mr. Mullik:

> "All his erstwhile opponents fell head over heels in welcoming him back, called him the Lion of Kashmir, and even the Praja Parishad, his avowed enemy, welcomed him."

This time he did not hurry to Srinagar immediately but after attending a reception arranged by all political parties including the Praja Parishad, which was represented on the committee by Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, he spent several days touring Udhampur, Batote, Dodah, Kishtwar, Bhadarwah and Ramban, emphasising that amity between India and Pakistan was a prerequisite for the peace and development of the two countries and that it was possible only if the Kashmir problem was solved to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, India, Pakistan and Kashmir. He also advised people to forget the bitterness of the past and think in terms of a better tomorrow. Meanwhile, several foreign correspondents had come from New Delhi to be with him on his historic entry into Kashmir Valley. According to the correspondent of the Sunday Star, Washington, "nearly a million cheering peasants lined Abdullah's 80-mile approach across this fabled vale of shimmering rice fields and blossoming lilacs with a steady roar of "We want Plebiscite"...near the university, thousands of screaming students filled the road, chanting demands for a plebiscite."[1]

## SH. ABDULLAH IN PAKISTAN

Soon after his release, he was invited by Pandit Nehru for talks which continued for several days. He was "warmly" received and treated as a State guest. Accompanied by Jay Prakash Narain, he had a meeting with Rajgopal Acharya at Madras. He also held meetings with leaders of different shades of public opinion. While still in Kashmir, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister, had publicly invited him to pay a visit to Pakistan. This invitation was formally conveyed through Mr. Arshad Hussain, the Pakistan High Commissioner in India when he met him in New Delhi. It was Sheikh Abdullah's first formal meeting with a representative of Pakistan. Pandit Nehru supported the idea of his visit to Pakistan. Consequently, a special PIA aircraft flew him to Rawalpindi to a welcome, unprecedented in the history of the city.

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1. Sunday Star, Washington, 19th April.

On entry into Rawalpindi space, the plane was escorted by a red-painted heli-copter. Another heli-copter hovered the airport, filming the crowd; as the procession wended the nine-mile route, it circled over the route taking photographs. It was for the first time that filming was done by heli-copter on the visit of a dignatory. The Times of India wrote that Sheikh Abdullah must have been "gladdened on the Hero's reception he received in Muslim Pakistan". He was accompanied by Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Maulana Masudi, his son Dr. Farooq, Khawaja Mubarak Shah, Sheikh Abdul Rashid, Comrade Muhammad Shafi, Pir Abdul Ghani and Mr. Naqshbandi. He held a question-answer meeting with pressmen soon after his arrival at the President's Guest House. Mirza Afzal Beg said in an interview to Radio Pakistan that the solution of the Kashmir problem must reflect the aspirations of the people of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah accompanied by Beg and Masudi called on the President in the evening and remained with him for 20 minutes. Mr. Bhutto was also present. Sheikh Sahib had brought flowers and strawberry from Srinagar for the President. He addressed a huge public meeting at Liaquat Garden after evening prayers on 25th May. According to the Pakistan Times, it was attended by over two lac people including thousands of burqa-clad women. On the dais were also seated Mr. Bhutto, Mr. Habibullah, Mr. Khurshid Ahmed, Ch. Muhammad Afzal Cheema, and Raja Hassan Akhtar, President of the West Pakistan Muslim League who presented a cheque for Rs. one lac on behalf of the inhabitants of Rawalpindi division. The money was immediately handed back to Mr. Hassan Akhtar as Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah announced the creation of a Refugees' trust for the welfare of poor children of Jammu and Kashmir nationals. Ch. Ghulam Abbas presided over the meeting which was also addressed by Beg and Masudi. Qureshi Muhammad Yusuf presented an address of welcome.

In course of his speech which preceded those made by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and Beg, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan said that India and Pakistan were no longer the only parties to the Kashmir dispute and that China was also a party which could not be ignored! He therefore pleaded for "vigilance". A chit from the Pakistani ministers on the dais immediately went up presumably requesting him not to proceed further with his theme of Chinese involvement. Why did Chaudhri Sahib deem it appropriate to focus attention on Chinese interest in Kashmir? Opinions naturally differ and this writer isn't in a position to venture any definite opinion as yet. Addressing the meeting, Beg, in a veiled reference to the plea for "vigilance" said that it was ironical that those who had spent the best part of their lives in jail in the service of their people and for whom "the Sun had already begun to set", were being advised vigilance.

This writer has been told by Qureshi Muhammad Yusuf who was acting as Sheikh Abdullah's unofficial Secretary while here that the latter had a midnight meeting with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas at his residence which lasted till 2.30 a.m. He also met Mir Waiz Sahib at his residence next morning before leaving for Muzaffarabad. They had a 45 minute meeting. Mir Waiz Sahib later said in a statement that his meeting "with the Sher-i-Kashmir" was "the happiest occasion for him during the past 17 years of exile". He paid tributes to Sheikh Abdullah for "his determined fight to secure the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir" and describing his mission "both important and delicate which concerned millions of lives", he called for "whole-hearted cooperation of every right-thinking person".

Sheikh Abdullah was also given a civic reception. He had another 3½ hours meeting with President Ayub on the 26th morning. On 27th the President called a special meeting of his cabinet to brief his ministers about the nature of talks. On the 26th evening, addressing a crowded press conference at the President's Guest House, attended also by a large number of foreign correspondents, Sheikh Abdullah made the important announcement that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India had agreed to meet in New Delhi in the middle of June to discuss the Kashmir question in the light of his talks with the two leaders. He said that he had brought no formula but various ways and means were under discussion and he expressed the hope that a solution satisfactory to all would emerge. He also announced that he had found sympathy in both the Capitals about facilitating free movement of trade and people across the Cease-fire line.

According to Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, in his long meeting with President Ayub, Sheikh Abdullah told him that Pandit Nehru had told his Cabinet in his presence that it was necessary that the Kashmir issue be solved in his life-time; that he had told Sheikh Abdullah that whatever solution he may propose, consistent with the larger interests of India, it would be acceptable to him, provided it was first accepted by President Ayub. He also told President Ayub that he should be trusted as a Muslim to which the President replied that there was no question of not trusting him but stressed that the interests of Pakistan should be kept in mind. To this Sheikh Abdullah was reported to have replied that it was strange that both India and Pakistan wanted him to keep their interests in view but both forgot that the basic question was the interest of the people of Kashmir. President Ayub is also reported to have told him that Pakistan belonged to no-one; that it was a homeland for all Muslims and that it was therefore the duty of every Muslim to ensure that its interests were safe-guarded. Beg stayed back with the President for another three-hours. Mr. Qureshi

also told me that the talks with President Ayub and other Government leaders were tape-recorded. Mr. Manzoor Qadir told this writer when he came to Muzaffarabad in 1971 in connection with a murder appeal that he had been specially summoned by the President and had a three-hour meeting with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in which they discussed the Kashmir issue and the Indo-Pakistan relations in considerable depth. He was emphatic that confederation between India and Pakistan was not mentioned by the latter.

On the 27th morning Sheikh Abdullah left for Muzaffarabad to begin a tour of Azad Kashmir from where he was to go to Gujrat, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi and Dacca. He was accompanied by a group of foreign correspondents, including Mr. Chauvel of La figaro, Paris, Mr. Rawle Knox of the Daily Telegraph London, Mr. N. Maxwell of the London Times and Mr. Thomas Brady of the New York Times. Khan Habibullah Khan and Mr. Amanullah Khan Niazi, the Minister and Joint Secretary, M.K.A., Hafeez Jullundhari, and a large number of friends and admirers also accompanied him. It took the more than two mile long procession more than six hours to reach Muzaffarabad. He was received at Kohala by Mr. K. H. Khurshid, President, Azad Kashmir Government and taken to Muzaffarabad in a much expanded procession. The capital of Azad Kashmir had been turned into a sea of humanity and it was not possible to move about in a vehicle. To describe the welcome as unprecedented would be only a modest expression of what it really was.

## NEHRU'S DEATH EXTINGUISHES THE FLICKER OF HOPE

It came as a most stunning blow when the All India Radio announced at about 2.30 p.m. that Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru had passed away in New Delhi at 2 p .m. at the age of 74. Sheikh Abdullah burst into tears; all receptions were cancelled. The public meeting he was to address, became a condolence meeting. He returned to Rawalpindi the same night and had a long dinner meeting with President Ayub. Next morning, a special plane of the PIA flew him back to New Delhi along with Mr. Bhutto and Mian Arshad Hussain.

On the morning of 27th May, Mr. Prabodh Chandra, Speaker of the East Punjab Legislative Assembly and a refugee from Lahore proper, rang up Agha Shorish Kashmiri from Amritsar to reach Wahgah. They were close friends since pre-partition days. The Chattan building was owned by his father Lala Pindi Dass and was run as Vira Hotel in 1945. Agha Sahib told this writer that he went to the border and brought Prabodh Chandra to his home; that Prabodh tola him that he had brought

a letter from Pandit Nehru for Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and that it pertained to the negotiations on Kashmir which the latter was conducting with President Ayub. Agha Sahib also told this writer that Prabodh told him that he too may pray for the success of the negotiations and that there was a hope of the problem being solved. After taking a bath, Prabodh went to bed for a short rest as he had travelled from Delhi by night but by the time he awoke, the All India Radio had broadcast the news of Pandit Nehru's death. Prabodh, therefore, returned to New Delhi without delivering the letter, the contents of which remain unknown.

It is still not known exactly what were the specific proposals that were to come up for discussion at the Summit meeting but about one thing there is no doubt: the resumption of traffic on the Jhelum Valley road at the Cease-fire-line. Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Maulana Masudi, Mubarak Shah, Naqshbandi and Comrade Shafi told dozens of their acquaintances that an agreement for the opening of the road to facilitate travel was agreed upon by both the governments. It would have been a great achievement as it would not only have helped in releasing the tension that has been building up since 1947 as thousands of people on either side stand forcibly separated from their near and dear ones, but could have also created a better climate for the solution of the Kashmir problem.

The death of Pandit Nehru at a moment when at long last, a thaw in the Kashmir problem was in sight, was most tragic and deeply touched the heart of every one in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Was it really a sign of his inherent greatness that his death was mourned as much by those whom he had so terribly wronged as by his own people? Although fully in the know of the negotiations and the commitments made by his predecessor regarding the new line on Kashmir, Shastri, being essentially a weak person, was unable to take unpleasant decisions, unpleasant from the point of view of the fanatically anti-Pakistan sections of the Congress and thus the light, however dim, that had so hopefully appeared in the otherwise dark horizon of the sub-continent, got so hastily extinguished and the two countries were thrown so wider apart that we have had two wars so far and who knows when a third one may be sparked off.

## MAULVI MUHAMMAD FAROOQ

In June 1964, Maulvi Muhammad Farooq launched a new political party named the Awami Action Committee. Unfortunately, a section of the city Muslims construed it as an attempt to set up a parallel platform and a challenge to the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. The first clash between rival groups took place in Srinagar on 26th June. There were

clashes at six places. Several persons from both sides were injured. In December, 1964, Sheikh Abdullah and Maulvi Farooq arrived at a compromise and the latter announced at a public meeting that he had been congratulated by President Ayub and Mr. Bhutto as well as by his uncle Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah for the patch-up. Both pledged to work together to secure the right of Self-determination for the people of Kashmir.[1] A protest meeting held in Srinagar on 15th January, 1965 against the application of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution was addressed by both the leaders. Black flags were hoisted throughout Kashmir and public meetings held to condemn the systematic stealing away of the State's autonomy. 32 persons were detained in Srinagar in January, 1965 following a clash with the Police after the dispersal of a public meeting addressed by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah's activities were reviewed at a high level meeting in Delhi attended by Shastri and Nanda.[2]

1. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 27th December 1964.
2. Indian Express, 19th January 1965.

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1. [illegible], 27th December 1964.
2. [illegible], 19th January 1965.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE OCCUPIED SCENE (III)

# CHAPTER XXXIV

# The Occupied Scene (III)

## ENQUIRY COMMISSION AGAINST BAKHSHI

Determined to settle its score with Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad and damage his image or whatever was left of it, both inside and outside the State, the Sadiq Government brought him before a special one-man Commission consisting of Mr. Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, on charges of corruption. Initially there were 77 charges, alleging misuse of power "to obtain pecuniary and other benefits for himself and members of his family". It met in Jammu on 22nd February 1965 when Mr. Surindra Nath, the Intelligence Chief presented the charge-sheet. Mr. Khambata and Mr. Khana, lawyers from New Delhi were engaged for the prosecution. The Government incurred monthly expenses of Rs. 60,000. Bakhshi was represented by Mr. B. Sen of Calcutta who was assisted by two senior and eight junior lawyers including Mr. Balram Basin. Of the 77 initial charges, only 38 were referred to the Commission. Mr. Ayyangar submitted a 1300 pages report which said that there had been no malpractices between 1953 and 1957 but that from 1957 to 1963, 15 charges had been proved. He found that he had received Rs. 54 lacs as bribe, out of which 33 lacs had been received by him personally. Bakhshi then moved the High Court which quashed the proceedings, holding that the matter was not one of public interest and that the setting up of the Commission was malafide. The Kashmir Government went in appeal to the Supreme Court which set aside the order of the High Court. Chief Justice Sarkar held that acts of Ministers which affected public well being, were definitely matters of public importance.

Bakhshi, it is true, was personally involved in graft but it is also true, that he died a poor man. His earnings went either into the coffers of his relatives or the feeding of poor sections of his political wing and hundreds of widows and orphans. It was not without reason that his funeral proces-

sion was the biggest in living memory and for the first time, hundreds of women broke from tradition, by accompanying the dead body to the graveyard. About four years after his resignation, he borrowed rupees three thousand from an officer to fulfil his promise of meeting the expenses of a widow's daughter's marriage.

The first to get their affidavits in support of the charges of corruption against him, recorded and attested, were his two most trusted Pandit subordinates, G. K. Raina, once a Rs. 25/- monthly private employee whom Bakhshi raised to the position of Transport Commissioner and P. N. Wanchoo, Chief Engineer. Both made millions under his patronage.

Years after his death, the families of Sh. Abdullah and Bakhshi were linked in marriage. Sheikh's wife's brother's son was married to the grand daughter of Bakhshi. When Sh. Abdullah who was now Chief Minister, entered their house with the bridal procession, Bakhshi's son-in-law garlanded him with a necklace of gold coins; in front was a huge portrait of Bakhshi; Sh. Abdullah took out the necklace and hung it around the portrait. Almost everyone, including Sh. Abdullah, were in tears.

## SHEIKH ABDULLAH GOES ABROAD

On 5th February 1965 Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah accompanied by his wife and Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg left for Haj and a limited foreign tour.

From here he went to Cairo. The attention he received at this pro-India capital, shocked the official circles in New Delhi. He was treated as a State Guest. The Al Gamhouria described him as "the leader of the liberation movement in Kashmir". Two chauffeur-driven limousines with Presidency number-plates were placed at his disposal. A third Secretary of the foreign office looked after him and arranged his interviews with a number of important officials including the Premier. He had a long interview with President Nasser.

A day or two after his arrival, Sheikh Abdullah took a Pakistan Embassy car to visit the Presidential palace to sign the visitors' book; it broke down in the way and he had to take a taxi to complete the journey.

From Cairo the party flew to London on 7th March. He was welcomed by thousands of Kashmiri nationals and their supporters at the air-port in response to a programme chalked out by a reception committee headed by Chaudhry Muhammad Yusuf of Ratta, Mirpur. During his two-week stay in Britain, he addressed meetings at

Nottingham, Birmingham, Glassgow, Sheffield, Bradford and London. He appeared on the British television and also gave a talk on the B. B. C. Home Service. He met a group of Conservative M.Ps, including Mr. Duncan Sandys, at a lunch arranged by Mr. John Tilney, an Under-secretary in the Conservative Government. From London he went to Paris and thence to Algeria where also he was accorded a VIP treatment.

## ABDULLAH—CHOU-EN-LAI MEETING

On 27th March, 1965, at the end of a dinner given by him in honour of the visiting Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, at Karachi, Mr. Bhutto disclosed that the People's Republic of China had invited Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah to visit China. There is little doubt that the idea originated with Mr. Bhutto. Sheikh Abdullah who was then at Algiers and had had two meetings with President Ben Bella, called on the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou-En-Lai, on 31st March. Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg and the Chinese Ambassador to Algeria, Mr. Teng Tay were present during the interview. The news of the meeting was first flashed by Radio Peking. In India, Mr. Shastri told an highly excited Parliament that Sheikh Abdullah would not be allowed to visit China. Swaran Singh said that it was "extremely unusual for China to invite Sheikh Abdullah through the Pakistan Government. This in itself is very unusual and a matter of concern". Sheikh Abdullah told a press conference at Algiers on April I that the Chinese Premier had reiterated China's support for Kashmiris right of Self-determination. Sheikh Abdullah thanked the Chinese Premier for the invitation and promised to avail of it "as soon as conditions permitted". The meeting hit banner headlines the world over.

Commenting on Indian reports that India might cancel Sheikh Abdullah's passport, Mr. Bhutto told pressmen that Sheikh Abdullah was not an Indian citizen; that he actually needed no passpor t to establish his credentials and that in any case, Pakistan was prepared to grant him requisite travel documents. After a five-day stay, Sheikh Abdullah flew to Saudi Arabia on 3rd April. On 7th April, during an hour-long interview at Jeddah, King Faisal told them that nobody should expect Saudi Arabia not to support the right of Kashmiris to decide their destiny. In Mecca, Sheikh Abdullah attended the world Muslim Congress which was inaugurated by King Faisal and chaired by his brother, Prince Abdul Aziz. It set up a committee comprising Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Dr. Fazlur Rehman of Pakistan, Dr. Fadil Jamali, a former Iraqi Premier and Amin-al-Hussaini to render help to Muslims fighting for their Self-determination.

## RETURN AND RE-ARREST OF ABDULLAH

Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External affairs—the same Madrasi woman who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment in the I.N.A., revealed in the Indian Upper House on 19th March 1965 that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and Begum Abdullah had described themselves in their applications for passports not as Indian nationals but merely as Kashmiri Muslims. The revelation created an uproar resulting in a sweeping condemnation of the government from press and platform; demands were voiced for cancellation of the passports. Meanwhile, there were elements aborad who wanted Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah not to return to the Indian soil but instead form and Head, a government in exile. The Chinese invitation unnerved India so much so that its highly clever Foreign minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, publicly alleged "the existence of an international conspiracy against India" linking Indonesia, China and Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah was ordered either to return back immediately or face banishment. He needed no one to tell him that his field lay amongst his own people. Had he chosen to keep out, he might have initially been a cause of greater headache to New Delhi but there is no dobut that it would not have been a wise decision. A great number of Kashmiri Muslims would have migrated to Pakistan. He was bound to raise the tempo of public opinion for a strong policy on Kashmir and since this would not have been to the liking of the Ayub government and the foreign influences operating in this country, a show down between them was inevitable which would have most grievously damaged not only Kashmiris' struggle for self-determination but also Pakistan's claim to the territory.

So, along with Beg and his wife he returned to New Delhi on the morning of 8th May 1965. Immediately on landing, he was arrested and flown to Otacamund in the Nilgiri Hills to be interned there—2000 miles away from Kashmir. Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg was kept in a Delhi jail while Begum Abdullah was interned in Delhi; she was neither allowed to meet her husband nor permitted to proceed to Srinagar. When the news became known in Srinagar, there were spontaneous demonstrations. Police opened fire four times in Srinagar alone. There were disturbances in Sopore, Islamabad and other places. Forty persons were killed and 300 injured.[1] Mr. Gulzari Lal Nanda admitted in the Indian Parliament that a 3-day hartal had been observed in Kashmir. The number of arrests rose to several hundred and even the Kashmir government whose Information media could hardly be considered credible in the matter, put their number on 10th evening at about 200.

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1. Dawn, 10th May, 1965.

On 9th May, 1965, a fifty thousand strong public meeting held at Jamia Masjid to protest against his re-arrest was addressed among others by Maulana Masudi, Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Kara and Mubarak Shah. While returning home, the jeep carrying Maulana Masudi and Kara was stopped by the Indian Armed Police, the two leaders were dragged out and so severely beaten that Kara lost two teeth while Maulana Masudi who lost four teeth, became unconscious. The driver, Karim's right arm was fractured. Afzal Beg was transferred to Srinagar jail in August 1965. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah fell seriously ill in January, 1966 and was shifted to Kodiakanal in the Madras presidency. Mr. Tom Stacey, a British journalist was arrested at the Nil Giri Hills on 11th May for having interviewed Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. He was removed to Delhi and released after experiencing 3rd degree torture.

## MYSTERIOUS FIRES & HINDU INTELLECTUALS' TESTIMONY

Soon after the recovery of the Moe-e-Muqaddas, Shamas-ud-Din was replaced by Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq, a known leftist who, ironically, belonged to a rich family. A refined person who was known for his gentlemanliness, his was undoubtedly the first liberal government since the National Conference came into power. The so-called Peace Brigade which had acquired the reputation of a body of thugs, with no regular duty to perform except to operate as a terror gang on payment of Rs. 30/- a month out of which one anna was deducted as some tax on account of which they were popularly nick-named as 29—15 and at whose hands, Sadiq and his followers had also suffered when they went into Opposition against Bakhshi in 1957, receded into the background. Kashmir will remain grateful to him for their eventual disappearance. Sadiq also allowed restricted political activity which had not only a good effect alround but also brought him good name. He continued in power till 1971 when he died at the Medical Institute Chandigarh. He was succeeded by Mir Qasim, President of the State branch of the Indira-led Congress and was, like Sadiq , an Aligarh educated, leftist. He continued the policy of liberalisation initiated by Sadiq and was not wanting to defend the rights of his co-religionists whenever there was a public need to do so.

It appears that some elements inside the State, supported by the Jan Sangh, its para-military wing, the R. S. S. and their supporters, want to convert the occupied territory into a Hindu majority area but on account of the majority of Muslims in Kashmir valley and Dodah district and with a political wing of Muslims, however weak and helpless, in the seat of civil power and depending for its support on their own co-religionists, it has not been possible so far to eliminate them physically as done in East Punjab

or Jammu province. The economic strangulation and the denial of opportunity as evidenced in this book may have also been resorted to in order to encourage migration to Pakistan but it seems that the Kashmiri Muslims' characteristic trait, inherited from their Brahmin ancestors, of hesitation to plunge into the unknown, at least was handy to frustrate this plan. Therefore, a highly mischievous plan of burning down Muslim localities was put into operation in the Valley which consumed thousands of houses and rendered a large number of people homeless. There were dozens of incidents and in all part of the Valley. The situation was so grim that even the Indian National Congress had to appoint a Fire Enquiry Committee which, to protect Hindu extremists, blamed the State government for its inefficiency. The incidents began in 1966 and continued upto 1969 when, on account of their extremely adverse popular reaction, Kashmiri leaders appear to have done some plain speaking in New Delhi.

Two Indian intellectuals, Mr. T. N. Zutshi and Mr. E. P. Menon visited Srinagar in August 1966 and toured the Valley. In a report to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister and some prominent men, they said:

> "The fact is that an organized group has been at work since 1947 with a well thought out programme of driving the Muslims out of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir or at least from a major part of it. Even the Central government appears incapable of taking any step to stop their nefarious activities and establish permanent peace in the State. Being satisfied with their success in Jammu province, these people have now turned to Kashmir proper and have selected the district of Dodah for their activities. In the face of this conspiracy to drive out all Muslims from Jammu and Kashmir, it is natural that the Muslim population should look towards Pakistan as their one hope. The question arises as to who is responsible for creating this pro-Pakistan sentiment in the Muslim population of the State? At least one clear answer to this question is that the group which has made it difficult for the Muslims to live in the State is wholly responsible for it. Had the policy of the Jammu and Kashmir Government been directed since 1947 towards ensuring safety of Muslim life and property as well as of the majority status of the Muslims of the State, the political realities not only pertaining to Indo-Kashmir relations but to the situation prevailing in India and Pakistan in this connection would have been entirely different and the impact of this would have been of quite a different nature on the political situation in the entire East."[1]

1. Dawn, Karachi.

Perhaps a more shrewd and realistic comment from the chauvinistic land, has never been forthcoming. Master Tara Singh told a public meeting in Srinagar in October, 1966, "Both Sikhs as well as Kashmiri Muslims are victims of Hindu Congress tyranny and both should join hands to wage a joint struggle". He met with a delegation of the Plebiscite Front. In Srinagar, in October 1967, the Plebiscite Front passed a resolution calling for a judicial probe into the award of citizenship certificates to thousands of non-Muslims who had been and were being settled, to reduce the Muslim majority into a minority. The Indian Integration Council met in Srinagar in June 1968. Mrs. Gandhi presided. Mrs. Subadhra Joshi who had been doing commendable work for exposing the origin of anti-Muslim riots and the support it was receiving from officials as well as a large number of Congress men, demanded a ban on Jan Sangh and R.S.S. She said that whenever Mr. Golwalkar, the R.S.S. Chief went on secret missions, there had been communal riots a few days later and that the recent riots in Meerut, Allahabad and Calcutta had been preceded by his secret visits. Mr. J.P. Narain said that many problems relating to national unity were the creation of the Central as well as the State Governments. A former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Gajandra Gadkar urged the imposition of death penalty on those committing communal riots but the Government of Mrs. Gandhi was in no mood to offend the militant sections of the Hindu community.

In October, 1969 a bill making evacuee property available to non-Muslim refugees was adopted by the Srinagar Assembly resulting in widespread agitation. The contention of Muslims was that since Muslim refugees living in Pakistan had not abandoned their homes voluntarily but had been forcibly driven out and since they had a right to return to their homes, the bill was not only unjust and illegal but also violated U. N. resolutions on Kashmir which enshrined in categorical terms their right to return to their homes.

## ELECTIONS IN OCCUPIED KASHMIR

Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad held two "elections" to the State Assembly in 1957 and 1962. In 1957 there arose acute differences between him and the Communist wing of the party, grouping together Sadiq, Dhar, Dogra and Mir Qasim, about the distribution of tickets which were temporarily resolved through the intervention of New Delhi but the elections over, the rupture was complete; Sadiq group gave up the Party and formed the 'Democratic National Conference' with Sadiq as President and a top communist intellectual, Mr. Moti Lal Misri, a talented young Pandit from Srinagar, and five years my class-mate, as General Secretary. It is apparent that Sadiq group chose to remain in the Government until after elections

only to ensure that they were not deprived even of the few seats that had been allotted to them; they also knew that if New Delhi was compelled to choose between them, she would unhesitatingly choose Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad. Out of a total of 76 seats, the National Conference pocketed 68 while the remaining eight went to the Yovak Sabha and Praja Parishad. In the Valley the nomination papers of 11 candidates belonging to the Praja Socialist Party were rejected. 35 seats were 'won by Bakhshi's N.C', uncontested. There was polling for 8 seats only in the whole Valley.

In the 1962 elections, National Conference pocketed seventy seats. Both the elections were boycotted by the Plebiscite Front and other Muslim opposition parties partly because the majority of their leaders was in jail but largely because the Government was pronouncedly determined to prevent their effective participation. Commenting on these elections, Mr. Alastair Lamb who had the opportunity of visiting Srinagar and making his own assessment, has said:

"Like the elections for the Consembly in 1951, they could hardly be described as having been completely free. Baskhshi Ghulam Muhammad would probably not have won a free election, that is to say, an election away from the umbrella of the Indian army, at any point during his tenure of office and he took good care to avoid this particular risk. The elections of 1957 and 1962 were carefully managed and the opposition groups like the Muslim Conference and the Plebiscite Front were unable to participate effectively. These elections on any objective analysis cannot possibly be interpreted as a valid substitute for the kind of plebiscite advocated on several occasions by the Security Council of the United Nations...... By the end of 1963, the majority of foreign observers of the Kashmir scene had little doubt that a plebiscite would lead to a clear call for the transfer of the entire State from India to Pakistan."

Commenting on the elections held from time to time, New Age, Delhi wrote:

"The elections in Kashmir need to be judged by standards different from those applicable to the rest of India. This is apparent from even the briefest stay in Srinagar where double rows of barbed wire protect every Government building, not to mention the armed guards with bayonets on the ready. The concept of a fair and free poll is scarcely relevant in this stifling and coercive atmosphere. The main opposition consisting of those unreconciled to Kashmir's present status in India, was precluded from participation. Its

leaders from Sheikh downward are in jail, its newspapers are under ban, while its Headquarter—Mujahid Manzil, is under government custody."

Mr. Ghulam Rasul Rainzu, Speaker of the State Assembly, later Home Secretary, was defeated in the 1957 elections; a supporter of Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, his defeat was contrived by Sadiq group. Sadiq was offered ministership but he insisted on the inclusion of his colleagues, Girdhari Lal Dogra and Mir Qasim as well. Bakhshi was willing to include either of them but Sadiq insisted on the inclusion of both. Krishna Menon vainly advised Sadiq, as a 'friend', to agree to the terms offered by Bakhshi. The latter therefore excluded all the leftists.

In February, 1967, for the first time, direct polls were held for elections to the Indian Parliament. Until then, the six member Lok Sabha contingent was nominated by the Indian President on the recommendation of the State Legislative Assembly . Mr. A. M. Tariq, a one-time clerk in the daily Khidmat, and Mr. Tirath Ram were elected to the Rajya Sabha. The Opposition boycotted the elections.

In 1968, bye elections to the Constituencies of Safa Kadal and Badgam were boycotted on an appeal issued by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. 98% Muslim voters abstained from voting. At one important polling station, only three votes had been cast.

The first post-accession elections held were for the election of the 'Constituent Assembly' in 1949. India has always been making a lot of noise about the so-called free elections in the State. Here is the testimony of Mr. Mullik, Director of Indian Intelligence:

"Nomination papers of most of those who could form an opposition (Consembly elections) were rejected, a pattern which was followed in several subsequent elections. So practically all Constituencies returned candidates unopposed."

This was to be the pattern of subsequent elections till 1977. The fifth 'free' election was held in 1972. How free these were, may be determined from the following authentic story:

As a result of a compromise between himself and Indira Gandhi, a long-time friend, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah returned to power in 1975. In a house of 75, he had the support of only three members. The members of the Congress Assembly Party in the State legislature were unhappy as they had no hand in the compromise and elected him leader of the House

on a direction from Indira Gandhi. With the passage of time, their opposition became vocal and they sought his removal. The climax came when a large number of members, comprising Muslims as well as Hindus, waited upon the Prime Minister at her New Delhi residence. After hearing them for a short while, she cut short the discussion and said:

> "Why do you ask *my* permission to remove him? I had no direct hand in getting you elected. Go to the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police in your districts *who* got you elected! Get *their* permission!"

Immediately, she sprang up to her feet, turned her back, contemptuously telling her Secretary in attendance to serve them with a cup of hot tea and imperiously left the room.

## IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER WAR

## THE NEW GENERATION GETS IN

The greatest headache of the politically alert sections of my generation was how to get the new generation—our children—involved in the struggle for the State's accession to Pakistan. Some of them were infants at the time of partition and most of them were born later. They had no personal knowledge of the epic struggle Muslims launched for its establishment or the one launched for securing basic political, economic and religious rights, by their preceding generations in the State. Just as Indian Hindus' lack of vision in arriving at a respectable agreement with Muslims to safeguard their rights and remove their fears, ultimately led to the partition of their Bharat Mata, similarly, the same lack of vision even after partition, both in India as well as Kashmir, inducted the new generation into the epic struggle. We thank them for their unintended generosity.

The frequent and organised anti-Muslim riots in India, the economic distress of Muslims and their reduction to a political nonentity, non-recruitment of Muslims into centrally-administered departments, inability of the State administration, for fear of offending the Hindu Establishment at New Delhi, to bring Muslim representation in Services at par with their population ratio, continuation of the Dogra policy to keep Kashmiri Muslims away from the Army, a deliberately-pursued policy of discrediting and defaming their leaders, one after the other, Sheikh Abdullah, Bakhshi, Masudi, Beg, etc, the arrogance and ruler-phobia of Indian civil as well as military officers as if Kashmiri Muslims were a subject race and the repression and terror let

loose even on slight dissent, contributed more than any other factor, to the indoctrination of the new generation. As it was brought up amidst these bitter surroundings, the feeling of being enslaved got ingrained in their blood. The opening of a university in Srinagar in 1948, resulted in turning out hundreds of graduates every year. Most of the Muslim graduates remained unemployed. By 1965 their number rose to thousands. Thus by 1965 a whole new generation of youth appeared to be poised to plunge into the struggle. The Algerian's successful struggle for freedom, the Vietnamese war against the mighty U.S.A. and the knowledge that after all, India was militarily insignificant as compared to France or the U.S.A., was re-assuring.

It was just in time that a few hundred ill-trained guerrillas crossed the Cease-fire line. Their surprise and unobstructed entry, the rapid defeat of Indians in their fortified positions at Chhamb and Jaurian, the air superiority of PAF and the Chinese ultimatum electrified Muslims. On 29th September, thousands of students, after adopting the following resolution, marched in a procession to present it at the U. N. HQ Srinagar:

> "We shall fight in the schools, we shall fight in the colleges, we shall fight in the streets, we shall fight in the villages, we shall fight in the towns, but we shall never submit before the Might of Indian imperialism. Either we shall perish or justice will triumph."

On 7th October a handgrenade was thrown on student demonstrators, injuring several students; to add insult to injury, 70 students were arrested. The occupation forces set fire to the whole block of six shops from Book Corner to the Friends Hotel and Restaurant—mostly frequented by students. Police opened fire in Srinagar on October 10 to disperse a mammoth crowd of angry demonstrators, protesting against the arrest of Maulvi Muhammad Farooq and others. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed. According to Reuter, D. P. Dhar, Home Minister conceded to reporters the death of one person in the firing. Said Mr. Dhar:

> "There has been evidence that some armed Pakistani infiltrators had sought hiding places in the town and were continuing their subversive activities directly or through their paid agents. Some handgrenades and explosives had been captured by Indian Security Forces from some Pakistani agents who gave shelter to raiders and that there was evidence that certain elements were maintaining close liaison with these radiers."[1]

1. Pakistan Times, 10th October.

On 12th October, there were two violent clashes in Srinagar between pro-Plebiscite demonstrators and the Police, resulting in the killing of three demonstrators and injuries to a large number. A handgrenade was hurled at a police party, killing one policeman and injuring a civilian. Islamabad observed a complete hartal. Mr. Sadiq flew to New Delhi and went straight to the Prime Minister's house for a conference. On 13th October, the demonstrations continued and there was hartal in Srinagar, Shopian, Bij-Bihara, Sopore, Baramula and other towns. A person injured by handgrenade a day earlier, died in the hospital. Mr. Klaus Natorp, foreign Editor of the leading German newspaper, Frank-Furter All-Gemeine[1] wrote from Srinagar that 10,000 people, mainly students, took part in the demonstration before Hazratbal mosque on Saturday afternoon demanding a plebiscite and that there was a clash with units of the police who were stoned by the students. According to Mr. Klaus, police opened fire resulting in 22 casualties. He also testified that at least 30,000 policemen and soldiers had turned Srinagar into a huge army camp; a 24-hour curfew was imposed and 400 people, mostly students, were arrested. The New York Times carried a news from its Srinagar correspondent that the girl students of the city had for the past two weeks been staging demonstrations shouting 'Indian Dogs Go Home', 'Long Live Pakistan' and 'Long Live Chou-En-Lai'. The trouble started in the morning assembly when Principal of the Government College for Women, Miss Mahmooda Ahmed Ali sharply criticised Pakistan and President Ayub over the Kashmir war. The girls protested and in retaliation, the Principal and several Professors pulled the hair of several girls and slapped them. Outraged, over a hundred girls marched to the Red-Square shouting pro-Pakistan slogans. The news spread fast and thousands of students from other institutions spear-headed by those from the Engineering and Medical, Colleges joined them and paraded the streets, demanding withdrawal of Indian Army and accession to Pakistan. On 14th October, the old State Secretariat building, Shergarhi, was set on fire which raged for two hours causing extensive damage. The B.B.C. called it, by far, the boldest attack. One block was completely burnt down. The B. B. C. also reported that the Indian army was burning villages on the pretext of search for the guerillas. Special correspondent of Reuters, Mr. Michael Neale, cabled from Srinagar on October 16 that Srinagar Police wielding steel-tipped staves broke up two student demonstrations, led by girl students as they continued their agitation for a plebiscite. There were two lathi charges, one outside the Medical College and the other outside a Government High School resulting in several casualties. Several students were arrested. The students had boycotted their classes now for the 12th day. The correspondent also reported that groups of anti-India students

1. 10th October, 1965.

stopped foreign correspondents in the streets and handed them straps of paper reading "our demand is plebiscite", "We want direct accession to Pakistan", "We shall die and live for Pakistan". An official spokesman admitted in Srinagar the same evening that two persons had been injured in an explosion near a mosque. Mr. J. Anthony Lukas of the New York Times was able to have a secret meeting with a leader of the girl students. Wrote Mr. Lukas:

> "She is 18-years old and very shy; kneeling on a Kashmiri rug, this morning, she blushed through her gauze shawl as she poured the visitor a cup of tea. Yet only five days ago she stood on the stage of Jamia Mosque here and shouted 'Indian Dogs Go Home', 'Long Live Pakistan'. For two weeks she and other Muslim girls at the college have played significant roles in the new wave of agitation that has been sweeping this Himalayan city. In a cramped upstairs bedroom, the girl was brushing her long black hair by the window. At first she was too shy to talk despite repeated encouragement from her father, a paunchy merchant in Astrakhan caps. Then in a sudden rush of girlish enthusiasm she poured out her story. We Muslims here are tired of the Indian rule, she said. We want to be with Pakistan."

The leading French newspaper, Le Monde's New Delhi correspondent wrote in a despatch[1] that Srinagar city looked like an "entrenched camp" and that "at every crossing there stood soldiers and regular police force." The paper wrote:

> "A manifesto published by the students compares Indian police with Gestapo and declares the situation in Kashmir worse than in a Nazi concentration camp, and goes as far as saying that Eichmann's tragedy is being again enacted in Srinagar. The manifesto eventually finds inspiration in the words of Mr. Bhutto who lately announced Pakistan's determination to fight India for a thousand years, if need be and concludes that the youth of Kashmir would be ready to fight the war for one thousand years against the present regime in the country."

There were further demonstrations in Srinagar and several parts of Kashmir valley on 20th October in violation of a ban on the assembly of more than five persons. 11 demonstrators were arrested. On the morning of 21st October, according to PTI, 26 leaders of the pro-Pakistan movement including Maulana Masudi and Ghualm Mohi-ud-Din

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1. 13th October, 1965.

Kara were arrested in the early hours of dawn under the Defence of India Rules. A meeting of the Plebiscite Front held in Srinagar on 21st October, according to AFP, called upon Kashmiris to continue their struggle for self-determination. A large number of youth were arrested, some of whom were placed in Interrogation camps. For instance:

> "A 20-year-old student, Salim Anwar, was kept for two months at the infamous Interrogation centre in Jammu near Satwari. One of his family members managed to see him and found to his horror that his wrists were swollen. He told him that he was kept standing for days with handcuffs on in such position that he could not even move his body. He also stated that he was ruthlessly beaten by the CRP guard and was in half-swooned state when he heard the CID people talking '"if this student dies due to torture we shall shoot him and we will say that he had tried to run away."
>
> Similarly, another was heard saying, he explained, that, "we would keep live electric wires near so that we could say later that he electrocuted himself."
>
> An 18-year-old student of Islamia College, Srinagar, Muhammad Manzoor, was tortured at another Interrogation centre, Gupkar-16. He was made to lie on gravel with his naked body and live cinders of charcoal were kept in his armpits. Needles were thrust under his nails to force the student to say something.
>
> Iqbal Shahmiri was tortured at the same Interrogation centre for days together. He explained that his belly was tramped by sentry guards which resulted in intestine swelling. He was later released on parole on medical grounds.
>
> Habibullah Soofi of Amar Singh College was tortured at another Interrogation centre known as Bagh-i-Mehtab. He was made to stand round-the-clock and put to starvation for a week.
>
> A young girl, Shahina Tajia of Government Women's College, Srinagar, was kept for 12 days at the Bagh-i-Mehtab Interrogation centre, and was subjected to round-the-clock interrogation. She was one of the patriots who stood the beating and fire brigade water in Lal Chowk. She was picked up at the instance of Miss Mahmuda.
>
> Another girl student, Sharifa Qureshi, was placed under house arrest for two months and her name was struck off from the College roll."[1]

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1. The Pakistan Times, 31-12-1966.

In March, 1966, several arrests were made in Srinagar including those of Mr. Muhammad Yasin Sadiq, Sheikh Muhammad Hussain and Mr. Ghulam Rasool Beg, acting Presidents respectively of the Plebiscite Front, the Holy Relic Committee and the Awami Action Committee. On 16th May, 1966, when Sadiq visited Baramula, a grenade exploded just a few steps from him. One person was killed on the spot and 30 injured. The death toll, according to Reuter, rose to three by the next day. In another incident, the Polytechnic Institute Srinagar was reduced to ashes. Mr. Sadiq told press correspondents that the agents were equipped with assassin's pistols, three of whom were allegedly seized. 15 persons were arrested.

In April, 1967 Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was shifted to New Delhi and at the same time interned within the four walls of his prison house. The same month when Begum Sheikh Abdullah returned to Srinagar after a forced absence of three years, she received such an unprecedented and emotion-charged welcome which according to THOUGHT New Delhi, 'even Deities' would envy.[1] In October 1967, according to Reuter, 64 workers of the Plebiscite Front were arrested in Kashmir in one week. Among them was Mufti Muhammad Bashir-ud-Din, the Grand-Mufti of the State.

Maulana Masudi and Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Kara were released in December 1967. Two Indian soldiers were killed on the outskirts of Srinagar on 30th October, 1965. A handgrenade was stated to have been thrown on them. 35 persons were arrested. Air India cancelled its flights for Srinagar from 7th October. Kashmir government suspended the publication of Martand and Nawa-e-Kashmir as well as of four weeklies including Roshni and Naujawan. Sardar Sant Singh Teg of Baramula and President of the All Sikh Party, blamed Hindus for the situation. The Economist London wrote on 28th October 1967:

> "There are large military camps in and around all the main cities. Armoured troops perform regular duties in all urban areas and are invariably called in to deal with the civil disturbances. Kashmir looks like an occupied territory."

In March 1967, 23 prominent men were arrested and detained in the Mehtab Bagh Interrogation Centre. Among them were four College teachers. Gulzar Muhammad Khan, Shahzad Khan, Nasrullah Khan, Ahmed Ghani and Rustam Dar of village Hai Hama, tehsil Handwara were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for political activities.

In January 1970, Sheikh Abdullah presented a cheque for Rs. 50,000 to Mr. Sajjad Haider, Pakistan High Commissioner for relief of East Pakistan

1. Weekly Insaf, 3rd August 1967.

cyclone-hit people. This amount had been collected in Srinagar a few days before. While he was still in Delhi, he was served with a notice prohibiting him from returning to the State. A similar notice was served on Mr. Afzal Beg. When it became known in Srinagar, there was a State-wide protest. Business was suspended, processions taken out and public meetings held condemning the action of the Government and demanding its immediate withdrawal. There were several clashes between the demonstrators and the police. According to official accounts, the number of arrests was 350. 50 persons, 20 of them seriously, were injured when police tear-gassed and lathi-charged a big procession in Srinagar. According to Radio Pakistan, 7 persons including two students were killed and 200 injured when police opened fire at several places in Srinagar on 9th January. The number of arrests in Islamabad district alone was stated to be about 500. Pakistan officially informed important foreign countries of the situation. In the movement resulting from the prohibitory orders passed against Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, three Muslims were killed and 27 injured in Gulmarg. According to AFP, by the 19th, the number of arrests had reached 450. Radio Pakistan announced on March 15 that two persons were killed and 17 injured in Srinagar when a crowd stopped a van carrying political prisoners and demanded their release. It also said that one Brigadier Mehta ordered the firing. In May 1967, 150 persons were arrested under the DIR, out of whom 138 were accused of conspiracy and subversive activities.[1]

## THE DISCRIMINATION CONTINUES

A memorandum presented to Mr. Chavan at Srinagar,[2] disclosed that of the 2252 gazetted posts, Muslims held 924 while Kashmiri Pandits held 638, Jammu Hindus 601 and Sikhs 89. He was reminded of the 1961 census figures: Muslims 68%, Kashmiri Pandits, 1.5%. It also stated that in the Central departments Muslims were conspicuous by their absence. He was also reminded that according to the 1961 census, literacy in the State was 11% only while the Indian national average was 24%.

15 Muslims and five local Hindus including Mr. Balraj Puri, led by 90-year old Mr. Muhammad Akbar Khan staged a symbolic Dharna outside the residence of the Chief Minister at Srinagar demanding that the Indian Home Minister visit Jammu to redress the wrongs suffered by Muslims at the hands of Jan Sanghis during recent riots. The memorandum spread on 11 pages was captioned "Real side of the picture". It regretted that not one newspaper in India had a Muslim correspondent in Kashmir and that

1. Daily Tameer, 30th May, 1967.
2. Hindustan Times, 20th July, 1967.

since March, 1966 only 45 Muslims had been appointed to the gazetted cadre as compared to 91 non-Muslims. Another memorandum presented at Jammu in September 1967 pointed out that in 1966 out of a total number of 235 seats available in Medicine and Engineering, only 104 were allotted to Muslims and that in the Engineering University, Muslims got 77 seats, Pandits 66, and Jammu non-Muslims 67 while in 1967, Muslims got 45 seats, Pandit 32, and Jammu non-Muslims 39 seats. It also complained of the absence of Muslims in the Central services and pointed out that these were being exclusively manned by Pandits whether it was the Indian Airlines Corporation, the Income Tax department, the offices of the A.G., Geological survey or the Central Excise etc.

It further pointed out that all Secretaries to the Government were non-Muslims and that the same was the case with the Trade agencies functioning at Pathankot, Amritsar, Culcutta and Bombay.[1]

## PARVEEN HANDOO

A small incident relating to the conversion of a Pandit girl to Islam in 1967 led to wide-spread blood-shed. A Kashmiri Pandit girl, Parmeshwari Handoo, a sales-girl in the local Departmental Store, embraced Islam on 20th July, 1967. On 28th July, she married Ghulam Rasool Kant, a fellow employee. Hindus became restive and formed an Action Committee. About 8000 collected in the Lal Chowk, damaged government transport and injured four constables. Several houses in the old city were burnt. In the resultant riots, two persons were killed and about 300 injured. The city was clamped under curfew and scores of persons, mostly from the Plebiscite Front were put behind bars. The Government arranged for her mother to live with her for 36 hours to induce her to return back to her religion and family but one can't legislate for one's heart. Love seemed to have transcended all other human relationship. Obviously the Hindus had no case because according to municipal records, the girl was above eighteen years but as happens in such cases, a false claim of minority was advanced. The Government thereupon referred the matter to a Court. The so-called "secular" government was faced with a grim dilemma. However much it might have wanted to hand over the girl to the Pandit community, as happened years ago in Delhi when a Hindu girl embraced Islam and married Sikandar Bakht, then personal Assistant to Delhi's Chief Minister Dr. Sushila Nayyar and now a Central Minister, the performance could not be repeated in Srinagar for obvious reasons. So the girl had to be allowed to live with her husband. Mr. Balraj Madhok of the Jan Sangh hurried to Srinagar and in course of a

1. Pakistan Times, 21st September 1967.

speech at Shital Nath advised Muslims to migrate to Pakistan. His highly provocative speech brought Muslims to the streets. In Jammu, Hindus took out a long procession on 25th August and raided Muslim shops, burning some of them. The procession looted Farida, Chand, Taj and Paristan Hotels. Two Muslims from Karan Nagar Srinagar, were kept tied up for a whole night in a court-yard of the Food department and handed over to the police in the morning. A chowkidar, Abdur Rehman of Yarabal was killed during disturbances but his body remained untraced. The dead-body of a Muslim was found abandoned near Shamshan ghat. The body of a Muslim boy was found in the Ratan Rani hospital. Inflammatory posters had been sent from Amritsar by Mr. Roop Kishan, M.L.A.

For his failure to give them public support, Mr. D. P. Dhar became unpopular with his own community and resigned towards the end of September, 1967. He was subsequently posted to Moscow and was responsible for the Indo-Soviet military Co-operation pact, to facilitate the separation of East Pakistan. The reckless attitude of Hindus may be judged from the following statement issued on 21st September 1967 by Mir Qasim, then President of the State Congress:

> "The communal harmony in Kashmir was disturbed by the Hindus according to a well planned conspiracy. The role which the Muslim community played during the recent Hindu agitation was quite constructive in comparison with that of the minority community. The Pandits will have to mend themselves and change their attitude. It was Mr. Balraj's venomous speech which forced the Kashmiri Muslims to take out processions and hold demonstrations as a mark of protest and they burned the effigies. It is evident that there is a move to convert Muslim population of the Valley to Hinduism but I will openly say that it has given a serious set back to the conception of secularism in the country. Those powerful elements who disturbed the communal peace recently in Ranchi and massacred hundreds of Muslims deliberately, now want to create a similar situation in Kashmir. It is therefore in their own interests to stop this barbarism and change their outlook."[1]

Gashi Ram, Chairman of the Hindu Action Committee alleged in a speech that Hindu children rounded up in the agitation were given a Tilak mark of their urine while some others were prodded by live cigarette-bits to disclose the number of girls in their family.

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1. Hindustan Times, 22-9-1967.

## THE AL FATAH

To avenge the voluntary conversion of Parveen, some Hindus were guilty of committing disrespect of the Holy Quran in the Girls High School Srinagar. Muslim students boycotted their classes and took out a procession. With the spread of the news in the town, the entire business was suspended and thousands joined the students' procession. At Maisuma, Police opened fire, killing six persons on the spot. Four of them were: (1) Muhammad Anwar, student S. P. Higher Secondary School, Dodi Kadal, (2) Nisar Ahmed Jan, B.Sc. student S. P. College, (3) Bashir Ahmed, ex-Forester (4) Mistri Abdul Ahad, mechanic, Basant Bagh. Among the injured were Shaukat Hussain Tramboo, student, Ghulam Nabi, driver, Abdul Ghani Shora, Abdul Ghani of Sopore, Abdul Majid, Fida Ahmed, a nine-year old student, Ghulam Ahmed driver, Noor Ahmed student, Ghulam Muhammad Butt, Abdur Rehman Butt, Ghulam Mustafa driver, Abdur Rashid Qazi and Ghulam Hassan, student. The procession which was led by Anwar Ashai and Nahid Kabuli was taken out on 3rd October 1967.

On 7th October, a foot-ball match was played in the local stadium, Srinagar, between Kashmir University and East Punjab University. Kashmiris scored the first goal which was soon equalled. The Punjab team having played foul, a melee broke out. A constable of the Central Reserve police fired with a sten-gun, killing six persons on the spot. Those injured included a woman and a police constable. Among those killed were Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Kadoo, Assistant Engineer from Gandharbal and Abdul Aziz, a political worker while two students, Nazir Ahmed and Abdul Ghani were severely wounded. 30 police-men including a D.I.G. were injured.

Towards the end of May, 1968, a Hindu Muslim clash took place at the Srinagar Engineering College. Muslim students took to streets and were joined by their elders. In a clash with the police, several students were injured, one of whom later died on 2nd June. Two barracks of the old hostel were burnt down and a third one damaged. Six police officials including an S. P. and S.D.M. were injured. 13 persons were arrested in the beginning. The number of Muslim students in the College was 448 out of a total of 1123. The scuffle apparently started during the screening of a film in the College premises over a seat in the hall, but according to Mr. K. S. Khosla, the D.I.G, it originated out of rivalry over a Pandit girl. The college was closed for 12 days.

According to Reuters 50 persons were arrested on 18th May for sticking large size posters and for inscribing slogans against the Indian

government on the walls of buildings in Srinagar. The correspondent called it a city of posters and slogans.[1] Another group was arrested by the D.I.G. for pelting stones at police and military vans. On 12th May, three persons were killed and 11 injured by police firing in village Balusa near Srinagar when police tried to disperse a gathering. In February, 1970, two bombs burst in Jammu city; the first one exploded near a bridge in the neighbourhood of a College resulting in the death of three persons and injuries to 28 others. The second one exploded in a primary school damaging the building but causing no human loss. The Kashmir University which had been closed on account of student demonstrations was further closed for 9 days in May. According to a report published in daily 'Khidmat'[2], three Indian soldiers tried to burn shops in Kohar Bazaar, Amirakadal on 27th May and the shop-keepers gave them a beating; 20 persons were arrested; the police resorted to a lathi charge to disperse the mob. The I.G.P. claimed that an Army driver was forced down from a civilian bus and beaten by people near the airport on 29th April.[3]

The Peoples Daily, Peking carried a news item circulated by the Chinese News Agency that Kashmiri students staged rallies on 14th July to voice their protest when Mrs. Gandhi arrived in Srinagar and that these meetings and demonstrations continued for the 15th and 16th as well and that several students were arrested. It also said that Mrs. Gandhi was heckled in a public meeting she addressed on 15th July.[4] According to Reuter, Kashmiri students shouting anti-Indian slogans stoned the Government Information Office, Army vehicles, shops and buses in Srinagar on 23rd July; that police used tear-gas and that groups of about 80 to 100 students yelled "Long Live Pakistan" and "Down with India" as they rampaged through different areas of the city. The students demanded that India should fulfil her international obligations and allow the holding of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite. The report further said that according to the students they were protesting against the death of a student in police custody and that shop-keepers closed down their business as a mark of solidarity.[5] The explosive situation that prevailed may be judged from the following despatch published in the Times of India:[6]

> "The danger in Kashmir today is not so much from outside as from within. This was highlighted by the arrest of 16 pro-Pakistani extremists and 21 Naxalites in the State recently.

1. New Times, 27th May 1970.
2. Khidmat, 28th May 1970.
3. Morning News, 7th June 1970.
4. Pakistan Times, 22nd July 1970.
5. Pakistan Times, 24th July 1970.
6. Times of India, 10th July 1970.

According to reliable sources, the die-hards in the four organisations are trying to enlist the support of the Kashmiri youth for establishing cells for internal subversion.

The Naxalites here have made common cause with the pro-Pakistani extremists. *Two of the students arrested in Sopore several months ago were Kashmiri Pandits who, along with others, were heard raising pro-Pakistan slogans.*"

In January 1971, more than 300 political workers were arrested in the Valley on charges of sabotage. It was claimed by Mr. Ghulam Hassan Shah, the D.I.G. at a press conference addressed at what he termed to be the "Al Fatah Headquarters" in Barson, 14 miles from Srinagar on the Srinagar-Jammu National High-way, that 227 members of the "gang' had been arrested. He also claimed that besides directing the operations inside Kashmir, the group was sending coded messages and microfilms about vital military and civil installations to the Pakistan High Commission at Delhi. He identified a certain Mr. Ghulam Rasool Zaheer as leader of the group. It was also claimed that considerable quantity of arms and ammunition including 7 rifles bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory marking of 1960, 1,303 rifles with 25 rounds of live cartridges, 1 portable type-writer and maps showing vital military and civil installations had been seized. The discovery of a training centre in a remote jungle was also claimed. It was further claimed that the guerillas ran a "Friends Cafeteria" in the Jammu region, exclusively staffed by the guerillas to provide cover and accord transit facilities for members. It was also claimed that a photo studio in Srinagar was used for developing and printing the photographic material.

According to the D. I. G. out of a sum of Rs. 1,78,000/- "looted" from Pulwama and the University Bank, the double-storey Guerilla HQ which "had safe surroundings, observation points and easy escape routes" and which was defended by "a 900 ft. long and 25 ft. deep trench in front", was constructed on a piece of land purchased with rupees five thousand. A tunnel had yet to be constructed to link it with the bank of Jhelum. As per D. I. G., a warning electric lamp was installed at the front for signals and no member could enter the house unless it was lit. The DIG testified that at the time of the swoop, "one of the two saboteurs then present in the building risked his life amid flying bullets in an exchange of fire and broke the cover glass of the warning lamp to put it out of order to warn other members about the danger". He also stated that apart from the "contractor and his munshi" whom he identified as Zaheer and Abdullah, their 'servant' Assadoo who pretended to be illiterate but actually was a graduate, also lived there.

According to the D. I. G., the whole plan had been master-minded by Mr. Zafar Iqbal Rathore, First Secretary of the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi who previously held the post of S. P. Kashmir Intelligence at Rawalpindi. Other names mentioned by the D. I. G. were Brigadier Asghar, Colonel Bashir, Colonel Alvi and Major Tufail of the Pakistan Army.

It was in this climate that Iqbal Day came up for celebration in 1971. A grand function was organized by the students in the University Hall, presided over by the State Governor Mr. Vishnu Sahai. A chorus had been secretly prepared by the students of the Physics and the English departments. As soon as the Governor took his seat, a dozen boys and girls came on the stage and to the agony of the Governor and other Indian officials, started the chorus, which sang:

"We will get freedom......Some day, Some day."

Hundreds of boys and girls in the Hall joined them with rhythmic clapping. After a few minutes, when someone from a corner shouted: *Which Day*? the Hall roared with the cries: "Some day, Some day". The effect was electric. Within moments, almost the entire audience was on its feet, dancing and chanting the refrain line:

"We shall get freedom......Some day, Some day."

When the Governor rose to speak, he was greeted with angry shouts of shame, shame.[1]

Despite every possible effort, the urge for freedom continued to grow, especially among the youth who are the generation of tomorrow. On the demand of Hindus, a University as well as a Medical College were opened in Jammu; it was interpreted by the Muslims as an attempt to reduce the importance of the Kashmir University; while the latter had no arrangements for the teaching of law, the law faculty of the Jammu University refused admission to Muslim students from the Valley. This created further resentment and in retaliation, the Muslim students demanded not only the opening of LL.B. classes at Srinagar but also the renaming of the Gandhi Memorial Hall as Iqbal Hall. Sensing the angry mood of the students, the Government immediately started LL.B. classes.

Earlier, on persistent demand from Muslims who were still not adequately represented in the Services, the Kashmir Government had

1. Syed Nazir Gilani, weekly Inquilab.

fixed their Service quota, which had adversely affected the Pandits, especially in the matter of promotions to the gazetted cadre. The Kashmiri Pandit civil servants who have been dominating the administration since the Sikh conquest, took the matter to the Supreme Court of India which ruled that the Kashmir Government order offended the Fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and was therefore untenable. As a result of the decision, 180 Muslims holding gazetted ranks were demoted and the reader can well imagine the commotion it must have caused throughout the Valley. Hatred against India was growing and it was becoming increasingly clear not only that the Muslims had no future in partnership with Hindu India but also that the leaders at the helm of power, were unequal to the demands of the situation and had failed to give protection to the Muslims.

## INDIRA—ABDULLAH AGREEMENT

After the Municipal elections which were won by the Plebiscite Front, negotiations began between Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and the Indian Government. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was represented by Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg while the Indian Government was represented by Parthasarathy, perhaps, a son of Gopalaswami Ayyangar. By now Pakistan had lost the 1971 war as a result of which not only had East Pakistan been separated, a puppet cliente State established in Dacca by New Delhi and West Pakistan had been saved from being over-run, mainly by the intervention of President Nixon who sent the Atomic monster, Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, to put teeth in his intervention.

The armed separation of East Pakistan as well as the Indian inroads on the western Front, operated as a most demoralizing factor in Occupied Kashmir. At least a section of the people, including the leadership of the Plebiscite Front, felt that Pakistan could no longer be expected to liberate Kashmir by force and this led them to the error of seeking a settlement with New Delhi. It is really unfortunate that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah should have thought it fit to again support a runaway rulers' accession to India especially after a bitter experience of several years that Indian Secularism was a fraud and that the salvation and security of the Muslims of Kashmir lay only in accession to Pakistan. It was forgotten that political movements for freedom are long drawn out battles and temporary set backs, however serious, cannot be allowed to seal the fate of a people or a country. It should not have been lost sight of that no international boundaries are permanent and no Power, however great or powerful, can ultimately succeed in depriving a people of their freedom. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and his colleagues chose to ignore the unalterable lessons of History and took a short-sighted view of the situation.

As a result of the negotiations, an agreement was signed between the two sides in New Delhi on 13th of November, 1974. It is reproduced below:

> "The State of Jammu and Kashmir which is a constitutional unit of the Union of India, shall in its relations with the Union, continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
>
> The Residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the State. However, Parliament will continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian national flag, the Indian national anthem and the Constitution.
>
> Where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with adaptations and modifications, such adaptations and modifications can be altered or repealed by an order of the President under Article 370. Each individual proposal in this behalf to be considered on its merits but provisions of the Constitution of India already applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or modification are unalterable.
>
> With a view to assuring freedom to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to have its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, personal law and procedural laws, in a manner suited to the special conditions in the State, it is agreed that the State Government can review the laws made by Parliament or extended to the State after 1953 on any matter relatable to the Concurrent List and may decide which of them in its opinion needs amendment or repeal.
>
> Thereafter appropriate steps be taken under Article 254 of the Constitution of India."[1]

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's recommitment to the State's accession to India within the frame-work of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which guarantees, on paper, the State's internal autonomy but which carries no sanctity in the eyes of the neo-colonialists at Delhi, came as a rude shock to the Muslims because they cannot countenance Indian control of the State, not only because of historical, economic and religious reasons

1. The Pakistan Times.

but also because of their bitter experience of discrimination since 1947. Sheikh Abdullah, it ought to be emphasised, has never been pro-Pakistan and there is not even an iota of evidence that he ever supported accession to Pakistan. After several experiences, immediately after 1947, he, however, appears to have thought that independence for the whole State or at least for Kashmir Valley plus the Muslim majority district of Dodah, with the agreement of India and Pakistan, guaranteeing its territorial integrity and a U.N. commitment to that end that could bind the Super Powers to it, provided not only a reasonable solution to an emotion charged issue but was also, according to his lights, in the inetrests of the inhabitants of the territory as well. His dismissal in August 1953 piqued his pride and the fact that despite commanding confidence of the legislature, he could be dismissed and imprisoned even by Nehru, whom he adored and eulogized, revealed how unreal and unfounded the Indian secularism and how misplaced his faith and loyalty in its leaders, was? Kashmiris Right of Self-determination, in the context of acceding to one or the other country, which he considered a fool-proof mechanism of bringing about the State's accession to Pakistan and hence a threat to his power, and therefore something abhorrent, as evidenced by his speech in the Security Council and those made elsewhere, now assumed a new meaning in the context of power-politics and provided a base to beat his tormentors—India. From now on, Pakistan was accepted as a party to the dispute. It is true that he is a popular leader and has time and again demonstrated his magic with the Kashmiri-speaking masses who constitute about 60% of the State's total Muslim population but how can his accession to power mean a popular approval of Hari Singh's accession to India and his ejectment, a popular repudiation of it? The question of accession is a fundamental matter and there is no doubt at all that Sheikh Abdullah or no Sheikh Abdullah, the Muslims would en masse vote for Pakistan. The example of the Frontier Gandhi is an instance. It is unfortunately generally peculiar of Muslim leaders to consider their personal fortunes and misfortunes synonymous with the fortunes or misfortunes of their countries and nations.

Nehru had realized long before his death the imperative need of winning back Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah but it was his daughter, Indira, who brought about the rapprochement. The separation of East Pakistan and other terrible consequences that flowed from the December War, provided the opportunity. On his part, Sheikh Abdullah seems to have thought that India now had a decidedly upper hand and consequently, negotiated a settlement on the basis of Article 370. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also was of the view that the consequences of the December 1971 war, caused frustration in Kashmir and resulted in bridging the gulf between Sheikh Abdullah and New Delhi.[1]

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1. Dinner talk at Muzaffarabad in September 1976.

## BACK TO POWER AFTER 22 YEARS

Syed Mir Qasim, a Communist-oriented politician from Islamabad district was then the Chief Minister of the State. Instead of obstructing the parleys, as politicians of flesh and bone normally do, he was very helpful in making the negotiations successful. After the agreement was signed, Mr. Mubarak Shah from Baramula who was in the confidence of the Indian Prime Minister and had also played some role in bringing about the agreement, was appointed a Minister in the Mir Qasim cabinet as a nominee of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Some time later, Mir Qasim tendered his resignation and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who had the support of only 3 members in a House of 75, was elected leader of the House and sworn in as Chief Minister. He formed a small cabinet and began with a war on corruption in services. Scores of officers, including many high-ups, were suspended or dismissed.

However, all differences between him and the Indian Government could not be resolved. These differences came into open when he refused to dissolve the National Conference and instead demanded the dissolution of the Pradesh Congress. Ultimately it was mutually agreed that the Pradesh Congress may continue as a provincial branch of the Indian National Congress but that Sheikh Abdullah will continue with his party, the National Conference. It seems that Sheikh Abdullah's main argument was that the local Muslims felt suspicious of the Indian National Congress and the dissolution of the National Conference which had a distinct history of its own and was known in every part and every home, would create serious problems. It seems to me that one of the reasons why Sheikh Abdullah insisted on the continuity of the National Conference was that unlike Pradesh Congress, he was subordinated to no body and was free to do as he liked.

Towards early 1977 when Congress opponents formed the Janata Party, the rift was widened and the Congress Parliamentary party withdrew its support. The Indian Janata Party set up a 21 member State Organizing committee under the Chairmanship of Maulana Masudi. The members included Khawaja Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Kara, Comrade Muhammad Shafi, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, Khawaja Abdul Ghani Goni, Sheikh Abdur Rehman, Mr. Om Prakash, Baldev Singh, Sant Sing Tegh, Chaman Lal, Harbans Malhotra, Shamim Ahmed Shamim, Maulvi Iftikhar Hussain Ansari and Abdul Ghani Lone.[1] Some Congressmen from the State led by Karan Singh chose to remain in the Congress party. Karan Singh even contested election to the office of the President

1. Kasheer, 7th May, 1977.

of the Indian National Congress but was defeated as he did not enjoy the support of Shrimati Indira Gandhi. Mirwaiz Maulvi Muhammad Farooq who had been introduced to politics by Maulana Masudi during the Holy relic agitation of which he was appointed Chairman and who had been receiving wide publicity and support in and from Pakistan and was considered as the leader of the pro-Pakistan movement in the State, supported the Janata Party which is totally committed to the State's continuing accession to India.

The agreement had no popular appeal in so far as Muslims were concerned. They kept waiting for the day when the Congress majority in the Assembly threw him out of power. When after the defection of the Congress by Jagjivan Ram and others, the State Congress moved for his removal, Sheikh Abdullah handled the situation deftly and instead of attempting to appease his opponents, courageously advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly and hold fresh elections. It was a superb political move. It not only prevented the Congress from coming into power but also reinforced his image as a popular leader who was not afraid of going to the people for a fresh mandate. Even then, the general belief was that no party would get a clear majority. The Janata Party was also supposed to win 20 to 25 seats but then came to be witnessed the hypnotic influence that Sheikh Abdullah commands over Kashmiris.

## THE POPULAR RIDE TO POWER

He sent for students and told them that he was fighting for the preservation of their national individuality and it mattered to him little at this fag end of life whether or not he was returned to power. The students were thus persuaded to work for him. They spread themselves throughout the State and within a few days, geared up the campaign for his return to power.

At the same time several events took place in quick succession which revived the hero-worshipping Kashmiris dormant love for him and it seemed as if Nature was unravelling a plan for his popular return to power. In the very beginning of the campaign, he suffered a serious heart attack and had to be hospitalised.

The election campaign was then taken over by his convent-educated wife, Akbar Jehan Begum, popularly known as Madar-e-Mehrban. In the matter of political know-how, this English-fathered and Gujar-mothered Kashmiran, can be aptly compared with Madame Jehan, the wife of President Anwar Sadaat of Egypt. Sheikh's enemies spread false rumours of his death. It was also rumoured that like Noor Jehan, Akbar Jehan had sup-

pressed the news of his death on account of impending elections. These rumours were so wide-spread and persistent that despite his serious illness, he was brought to a huge public meeting on a stretcher. His very appearance in such a state of illness generated hatred against his adversaries and when he raised his right hand to signify his being alive, the multitudes broke into loud cries. It brought to focus his supreme importance as their only internationally-known leader who was heard with attention and who alone had in the past and could at the moment stand up against Indian machinations.

Simultaneously, Indian Home Minister, Charan Singh, a hate-Indira personification, and Jagjivan Ram flew in and went round, campaigning for the Janata Party which had provided an umbrella to all personal or political enemies of Sh. Abdullah. The Sheikh had in his early campaigning condemned the Janata Government as anti-Muslim and comprising of parties which were responsible for frequent Muslim killings. The posture of Kashmiri individualism, as represented by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, in ugly contrast to the hegemony of New Delhi, as represented by Janata, had a deep impact on Muslim opinion. The very thought that New Delhi might tighten its hold was repulsive and obnoxious. Sheikh's role as the leader representing national identity of Kashmiris thus came into greater focus. Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram committed a grave blunder by not visiting him to enquire after his health. Kashmiris took it as an insult. There was a common feeling that if it could happen to Abdullah—the Father of their political awakening—what could not happen to them? Suddenly their love and attachment for him, born in the epic days of 1931, gushed forth, shedding away the dust that had naturally settled with the passage of time, with the result that the voice of Janata and Congress got drowned in the popular uproar and adoration of Sh. Abdullah. Thousands of lambs were sacrificed and prayers arranged throughout the State for his health and long-life. It revived the memories of 1931 when it was claimed that leaves of cocoon trees bore his name. Janata even resorted to goondaism but was naturally beaten back because the National Conferencites are past masters in the art. A Pandit Lady Doctor, a Janata candidate from Srinagar, lost a few of her teeth.

To boost up the withering morale of his Party, Morarji Desai, a Patel-protege, embarked upon a whirlwind election tour. He laid too much stress on Kashmir being an integral part of India which, instead of helping his party, provoked Muslims and hardened their anti-Janata thinking. Yet another mistake of equal magnitude, committed by him was that he too did not avail of his presence in Srinagar to visit Sh. Muhammad Abdullah in his illness. Perhaps it was intended to detract from the importance of the Kashmiri leader but in an emotion-charged and suspicion-dominated atmosphere, it had an opposite effect.

However, the fatal mistake that contributed most to his astounding election victory, was the folly committed by Mirwaiz Muhammad Farooq. Practically repudiating the policy of support for accession to Pakistan, which alone provided him strength, he joined the Janata Party which treats Kashmir's accession a closed chapter. He invited Mr. Morarji Desai to a sumptuous feast in the Mirwaiz Manzil and reportedly told him that the chair he was occupying, had once been occupied by the Quaid-e-Azam and the Hall where he was feasting, had once been the venue of a feast given by them to the Quaid-e-Azam. It had sinister implications.

Maulvi Muhammad Farooq not only attended and addressed these meetings but also went to other places in the Valley to campaign for the Janata candidates. For instance, he went to Islamabad at the head of a procession of a hundred trucks and lorries and 50 cars, to address election rallies in the constituency of Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg. On their way, they attacked isolated groups of National Conference workers at Avantipura and Bijbihara, injuring several persons. The procession was thereupon nicknamed as the Bakra Brigade.[1]

The Jamaat-e-Islami also joined hands with the Janata Party and entered into an electoral alliance with it. With an eye on the pro-Pakistan sentiment of the Muslim electorate, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, as an astute politician, condemned the Party as not only having opposed the creation of Pakistan but also held it responsible for the disorders that had then gripped Pakistan after the March elections. The results showed that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had scored a convincing victory against all his opponents. The party position in the new legislature is:—

| Party | Valley | Jammu | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Conference ... ... | 40 | 7 | 47 |
| Janata ... ... | 2 | 11 | 13 |
| Congress ... ... | X | 10 | 10 |
| Independents ... ... | X | 4 | 4 |
| Jamaat-e-Islami ... ... | 1 | X | 1 |
| Grand Total ... ... | 43 | 32 | 75 |

1. Weekly Insaf, 21st July 1977.

Thus in a House of 75, Sheikh Abdullah has won 47 seats.[1] The only seat Jamaat-e-Islami won was in Sopore where its candidate Syed Ali Shah Gilani was returned with a nominal margin. In Budhist Ladakh where Sh. Abdullah did not put up any candidate, the Indira Congress nominee Mr. Sonam Narbo, a Minister in the Abdullah cabinet, was returned but joined the National Conference immediately after the elections. There appears to have been a prior understanding to this effect between the two parties. From Kargil, which is a Muslim seat, NC candidate was returned to the Assembly. Due to joint electorate, there was no constituency in the Valley, which could return a Hindu or a Sikh. No Sikh was returned to the legislature but one Kashmiri Pandit, Piarey Lal Handoo, was returned from the Pahalgam constituency on the National Conference ticket.

Before his heart attack, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had condemned the Janata Party as a combination of anti-Muslim political forces in India and had also threatened that if Muslims were not able to live honourably within the Indian Union and that if there was any effort to further whittle down Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which has in some degree guaranteed the internal autonomy of the State, Kashmiris were free to opt out of India. The Indian Government was quick to contradict rumours to that end and announced that it had no intention of changing the constitutional relationship between the Centre and Srinagar. Although it goes without saying that this posture of opposition to the centre had an important bearing on the trend of elections but to say that the Muslims of Kashmir voted so overwhelmingly in favour of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, merely because of their hatred against Indian domination and that Sheikh Abdullah's position as a popular leader had no contribution to make, is to escape the truth.

As between 1930 and 1977, a long distance of 47 years, so short to mention but so long to pass—his is the unique instance in the world, the only one of its kind, of a politician whose estimation with his people, tested by popular vote—survived for half a century, despite so many forces, powerful, resourceful, revengeful, having always been in hot, relentless pursuit. What are the reasons? The answer is quite simple. Kashmiris are essentially a Hero-worshipping race; they are apt to be grateful and remembering if you do them good or serve their Cause. It is part of their character, ingrained in their blood, generation after generation, as an invoilable part of their national code of conduct.

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1. Kasheer, 5th July, 1977.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## AZAD KASHMIR SCENE (I)

*CHAPTER XXXV*

# Azad Kashmir Scene (I)

## FORMATION OF THE AZAD KASHMIR GOVERNMENT

Towards the beginning of October, I came down to Rawalpindi from Garhi Habibullah. Paris Hotel was then functioning as some sort of a transit camp for the Liberation Movement. As there was a lot of secrecy, I cannot say what was actually going on. A few days later, Sardar Ibrahim asked me to go to Lahore and set up an office to conduct publicity of the Movement. He also told me that he had already spoken to Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmed of the Ahmediya community and I was to go to him to seek his help for the setting up of the office. On reaching Lahore I reported at his residence at Rattan Bagh and told him of my instructions. A conversation revealed that he was pretty thick into the picture with regard to the whole operation and had in fact been doing his own best to further the Cause of liberation. He directed someone to arrange an office for me in the vicinity of the Broome hostel on the McLeod Road. The office which was ready within 24 hours was given the name of "The Muslim Conference Publicity Bureau". Gradually I came in personal contact with late Professor A. S. Bokhari, Mr. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mr. Hamid Nizami, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Mr. Muhammad Shafi (Meem-sheen), Dr. Umar Hayat Malik, Vice Chancellor of the Punjab University, Mian Amir-ud-Din, Allama Allaudin Siddiqi and several other leading men and found them deeply committed to the Cause of our freedom. Those who worked with me during this critical period were Mr. M. A. Qadri who had resigned from service to devote himself whole-heartedly to the Cause and who hails from tehsil Handwara and one Mr. Faiz Ali from Drawa area in Muzaffarabad. Within two weeks we made our own arrangements for a more prominent and easily accessible office on the main McLeod Road, made possible with the personal interest of Mr. Inamur Rahim, then Commissioner Lahore who was probably from Afghan descent; we found both him and his wife sentimentally devoted to the Kashmir Cause.

## WHO WAS ANWAR?

On 5th October, 1947, the Lahore press published a Rawalpindi-date-lined announcement about the setting up of a parallel government with a certain Anwar as President. The news item did not disclose as to who constituted the government, who made the announcement or on whose behalf it was made? A fierce controversy has therefore naturally raged as to who this Anwar was and whether it was not a fictitious, non-existent character? From the claims put forward and the evidence available, the answer lies in determining whether it was Mr. Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, an Ahmedi member of the State Legislature or a fictitious, non-existent character?

It is undisputed that it was Mr. Ghulam Nabi Gilkar who released the announcement to the press through telegrams despatched from Rawalpindi. I tried in vain to trace these in the Telegraph office. It is also established that the draft was on his person when he came to Rawalpindi from Lahore. Again, no one has come forward to claim the authorship of the draft. Mr. Gilkar who was arrested in Srinagar in November, 1947, arrived in Pakistan, along with others, in 1949, in exchange of Indian prisoners. Immediately on his arrival, he advanced his claim of being the first President of the provisional Government.

On 1st October, India set up a provisional Government for Junagarh at Bombay with Mr. Samal Das Gandhi as President. On 2nd October, Mr. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmed convened at Lahore a meeting of some Kashmiris living in the city. Among those present were Mufti Zia-ud-Din of Poonch and Mr. Muhammad Abdullah Qadri from Handwara, both non-Ahmedis. Mr. Ghulam Nabi Gilkar was the only one from outside Lahore to attend it. It is claimed that the meeting resolved to set up a provisional government but the question as to who would Head it, ran into trouble. Mufti Zia-ud-Din, an old worker, declined to take the responsibility. It is also claimed that no non-Ahmedi, not even Mr. Qadri was willing to become, what appeared at the time, the sacrificial lamb. However, Mr. Qadri who was a young man of about 22 years, asserts that he was not only ready to accept nomination but that, in the initial discussion, the meeting seemed to agree, to begin with, upon his appointment, though his being completely a political nonentity, was ultimately considered a vital draw-back. It is claimed that Mr. Ghulam Nabi Gilkar was then appointed to Head the provisional Government. Mr. Qadri being unable to recall now what actually happened, is unable to confirm or repudiate the claim about Mr. Gilkar. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, on the contrary, admitting that the proclamation was with Mr. Gilkar when he arrived from Lahore and that it was Mr. Gilkar who released it to the press, strenuously

urges that Mr. Anwar was a fictitious, non-existing character. There is no evidence to support the further claim that the proclamation was discussed and debated at Rawalpindi in a restricted meeting attended also by Syed Nazir Hussain Shah Advocate who disclaims any such meeting having ever taken place. Even if a decision to appoint Mr. Gilkar, well-known in the State for his courageous and leading role in the 1931 Movement, as Head, was taken in the Lahore meeting, it seems clear that he kept it to himself when he came to Rawalpindi and did not inform Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Maualana Ghulam Haider Jandalvi or others about it, perhaps because of awareness that it would not be acceptable not only because he was an Ahmedi but also because a few municipal-level workers had no business to take such a vital decision and expect to bind the High Command.

This version about Mr. Anwar being Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Gilkar which has been upheld by Lord Birdwood[1] and Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz[2] is contained in the Ahmedis' official publication, Tarikh-e-Ahmediyat and is based on an article published in weekly "Hamara Kashmir", Muzaffarabad by its Editor, Sardar Gul Ahmad Khan Kausar, a non-Ahmedi, who claimed to have been appointed Chief Publicity Officer of the said government in a meeting held at the Paris Hotel, Rawalpindi on 3rd October.[3]

The decision to set up a provisional Government was no doubt right and timely but one cannot approve the fact of its having been taken at such a municipal and limited level, even without the knowledge of the Party's top brass, some of whom like Chaudhry Hameedullah Khan, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah, Professor Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah and Maulana Jandalvi were already in Rawalpindi. Obviously, the conclusion to be drawn is that the individuals who collected at Lahore had no right to take such an all-important and far-reaching decision though there is no evidence that they had any design or ulterior motive.

The Ahmedi publications later gave a long list of supposed cabinet Ministers, some of whom, of course, are Ahmedis. I must state it categorically that according to the intensive research made by me and the personal knowledge that I have, no such Cabinet was either agreed upon at any stage or at any level nor did it ever see the light of day. If such a list had been prepared by Mr. Gilkar, or anyone else, it has no historical significance and must be totally rejected as untenable.

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1. Two Nations and Kashmir.
2. History of Freedom Struggle, p. 621.
3. Tarikh-e-Ahmediyat, Vol. VI, p. 655.

A few days later, Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Maulana Ghalam Haider Jandalvi and the 'Pindi Muslim League leader Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah Khalid Gilani went to Lahore and met Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and some other people connected with the press. Except Mir Waiz Sahib, they also met Mirza Bashir-ud-Din. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah has told this writer that on the evening of 23rd October, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan told him to go to Rawalakot to set up a civil administration and that accompanied by Maulana Jandalvi, (Col.) Muhammad Khan, (Major) Hamid, (Col.) Muhammad Hussain and Dr. Bashir Mahmood, he went there on the next day but that the same evening they heard over Radio Pakistan that Azad Kashmir government had been reconstituted with Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan as its President.

He emphasised that he had no prior knowledge about it. This is not denied by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim who told this writer that on the 23rd October he was awakened almost at the dead of night by Khawaja Abdur Rahim, then Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and Nasim Shah Nawaz, then married to General Akbar Khan who told him that it had become necessary to announce the formation of a reconstituted Government with himself as President and that the announcement could not be delayed. It was under these circumstances, he emphasised, that his name was announced as President. Although one cannot but strongly deplore the fact that the provisional Government should have been constituted at the behest of a civil servant without consultation with the Party High Command which showed the civil servants' incapacity, despite the brilliance of some of them, to appreciate the importance of political consensus, there is also no doubt that no better choice was available at the time. The active liberation war had begun from Poonch and Sardar Ibrahim Khan was not only a member of the State legislature from the district and Chief Whip of the parliamentary party but also the best educated person available at the time. Again, the overwhelming majority of those who were at the time fighting actively on various sectors except Muzaffarabad, were Sudhans, the tribe of Sardar Ibrahim Khan. Because of their intense tribalism, only one of them could have commanded their complete loyalty and Sardar Ibrahim was doubtlessly the only choice. Muslim Conference High Command members did not like the announcement and a whispering campaign got in motion immediately. I vividly remember a public meeting addressed on the 25th of October, 1947 in the Habibia Hall, Islamia College, Lahore by Ch. Hameedullah Khan and this writer. In course of his speech, this writer mentioned the formation of the Government and asked the audience to extend full support to it but after the meeting was over, Ch.

Hameedullah Khan told me that I should have ignored the formation of the Government for the simple reason that the announcement was unauthorised.

A few days later, on 4th November, 1947, a meeting of the Muslim Conference Working Committee was held at Asghar Mall Rawalpindi. This building housed the Headquarter of the Provisional Government till it was shifted to Trarkhel. This writer, not being present, has no first hand knowledge to share with the reader of what actually happened but Syed Nazir Hussain Shah has told me that the Working Committee unanimously proposed the names of Ch. Hameedullah Khan and in the alternative, that of Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah for the office of President and that Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim, it may be said to his credit, extended his full support. According to Shah Sahib, neither was prepared to accept responsibility on the plea that their children were in occupied Kashmir but even the wife and children of Sardar Ibrahim were in Srinagar? If he could take the risk, I see no reason why the two leaders also couldn't do it? One may ask: Afterall, what risk it was? On the contrary, it would have been a perfect guarantee for their safety. It seems that the main reason why the two leaders did not accept responsibility was that they were not sure as to what would happen to the war itself and did not, therefore, want to take the risk of being pinned with the label of being the Chief Rebel. It was under these circumstances that Sardar Ibrahim was confirmed in his position. Before a final decision was taken, Sardar Ibrahim and Ch. Hameedullah had a private meeting wherein, the latter, who was Acting President of the Party, offered to support the former. Subsequently, he was put in overall charge of the vast Kashmir property at Lahore which was already being managed by his erstwhile friend, Chaudhry Rasool Bakhsh, formerly of the Kashmir Customs department.

Another meeting was held on the next day to form a cabinet. There were two claimants for the Jammu seat, one of whom enjoyed the support of Ch. Hameedullah, but after a private talk with the rival candidate Ch. Abdullah Khan Bhalli, he agreed to his appointment. The following were appointed as Ministers: Major Ali Ahmed Shah from Mirpur, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Advocate from Poonch, Khawaja Ghulam Din Wani Advocate from Kashmir Valley and Ch. Abdullah Khan Bhalli from Jammu. About a month later, another seat was allocated to the Valley and Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim, Advocate was added to the list. Each Minister was paid a monthly salary of Rs. 300 which was raised to Rs. 500 in March, 1948. The same amount was paid to Ch. Hameedullah Khan and the dependents of Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and Mr. A. R. Saghar. Mr. M. M. Ahmed who later retired as Economic Adviser to the Pakistan President was then posted

as Deputy Commissioner Sialkot. At the request of the Azad Kashmir Government, he sent lorry-loads of refugee civil servants from Jammu who were immediately recruited in their previous departments; each received at least one promotion. Before partition, Poonch Service was inferior to the State Service and a member of the latter service was, on transfer to Poonch, given at least one promotion.

The government had practically nothing to do as the liberated territory was still in a state of disorder and confusion which was quite natural in the circumstances. I have myself seen ministers weighing grain at their Asghar Mall H.Q.

## CHAUDHRY GHULAM ABBAS COMES TO PAKISTAN

In January, 1948, when Sir Zafrullah Khan and Chaudhry Muhammad Ali had a meeting with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in New York, they canvassed, according to Sardar Ibrahim, for the release of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas both came from Jullundhur and, as the narrative will show, the former always advanced and espoused the latter's political objectives. Sardar Ibrahim claims that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan etc. were getting uneasy over his phenomenal popularity in Pakistan and therefore wanted to eliminate or at least disgrace him and that it was in pursuance of this policy that the Pakistan delegation canvassed for the release of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan. I venture no opinion on the matter except to write that Indians have time and again proved to be cleverer than us. The continued detention of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan was neither justified nor suited their expediency. It served them no purpose.

In Marah 1948, after several meetings in jail, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah released his old friend and colleague who chose to migrate to Pakistan. Although Muslim population had considerably dwindled in the Indian-occupied Jammu province after the 1947 genocide and consequent large-scale migration, lakhs of them were still there. As per 1961 census, they still constitue 38.1% of the province's total population. The pro-Pakistan Movement across the fighting line was in dire need of a leader. No Kashmiri-speaking leader was built by the Muslim Conference which made the need for Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan to remain in the occupied territory all the more necessary. His home-town—Jammu—had not been liberated which provided a strong and valid basis for him to remain there. Had he done so, Agha Shaukat Ali, Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, Khawaja Abdur Rahim, Gilkar and other detenus may have also stayed back which could not only have kept up the morale of the people but also increased the tempo

and intensity of the pro-Pakistan Movement. Begum Abdullah also met him in jail. It is impossible to believe that he and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah could not have discussed politics during their several long meetings,spread over hours. This writer had the opportunity of asking Chaudhry Sahib, while we were together in Montgomery jail, as to whether there was any truth in the generally-held belief that there was some sort of an understanding between them and that it was in pursuit of that understanding that he had been released and allowed to go to Pakistan. Chaudhry Sahib denied these rumours which were that the understanding reached was that all fighting men were to withdraw from the State and for a few years, the State was to remain independent while maintaining equal links with both the Dominions. A plebiscite was then to be held to decide the question of accession. It is also claimed that Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas placed the proposal before the Quaid-e-Azam who lost no time in rejecting it. It must, however, not be lost sight of that in the East, particularly in Pakistan, it is not at all easy to air views which do not have popular appeal. Unpopular opinions are not only not tolerated but the poor man airing them, is instantly condemned either as a traitor or a kafir.

It may be pointed out that soon after his arrival from Jammu, the disgruntled elements, particularly from Jammu, had begun to poison his mind against Sardar Ibrahim and unfortunately he was prone to be receptive. On his triumphant return from Karachi, where he had gone to meet the Quaid-e-Azam, the two leaders had a long meeting at Lahore and temporarily compromised their differences and evolved a formula under which Sardar Ibrahim was to continue as President while Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan was to be the Supreme Head of the Government. It was an unfortunate decision. As the Party Working Committee was not consulted, the decision had no democratic sanction. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas needed no office to be recognised as the leader of the liberation Movement. It was his right, earned through sweat and tears. If the intention was to control the Government, the procedure and the machinery was already there, in that the Government was responsible to the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference of which Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan was President. Thus there was no need to evolve the novel constitutional arrangement of creating a Super President to control the actions of a President. The arrangement had catastrophic results: The Government employees got immediately divided into pro-Ibrahim and pro-Abbas factions with the result that Azad Kashmir had two parallel administrations running at the same time. This division has since persisted as an almost permanent feature of the A. K. administration so much so that even as late as 1970 when first direct elections were held, there were employees who carried

the labels of pro-this or pro-that haughtily pinned to their names. This arrangement was entered into also without any prior consultations with the Central Government. He could be merely President of the Party if he wanted to control the Government, but this course was avoided perhaps because he wanted to avoid being equated with Sardar Ibrahim. It was politically justifiable to avoid such a situation but the way it was sought to be achieved, further sharpened the same equation.

## AGREEMENT WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

In June, 1948, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas demanded the resignation of Chaudhry Abdullah Khan Bhalli and Khawaja Sana-Ullah Shamim, claiming that they were needed for Party work. The excuse was hardly plausible because apart from the fact that several top ranking workers like them were already at his disposal and there was no dearth of such men or talent, the only organisational activity of the Party then and for several years later, was to pass resolutions expressing "complete confidence" in the leadership of Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. It seems that the contention of his adversaries that the resignations were demanded to test his own strength, cannot be easily dismissed as propaganda. So the two men had to be guillotined.

Unfortunately the clash between the followers of the two leaders was daily on the increase, each accusing the other of obstruction, intrigue and false propaganda. It has to be regretfully admitted that there was a large measure of truth in these accusations.

By the beginning of 1949 the clash was too open and too wide-spread. It was at this stage that the Muslim Conference party which was dominated by Ch. Ghulam Abbas group was straining every nerve to deprive the Azad Government of as much power as possible. It also seemed to suit the convenience of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Mr. M. A. Gurmani, Minister without portfolio who was incharge of Kashmir Affairs, had his permanent office at Rawalpindi. Trained in the pre-partition feudal school of politics, he was playing one group against the other and thus wittingly or unwittingly earning the responsibility of a division in the liberation Movement. As a result of these intrigues and counter-intrigues, the Azad Kashmir Government was deprived of important powers and to that end an Agreement was reduced into writing in a meeting also attended by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali. This document is reproduced below:—

## HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITH HON'BLE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO AND THE PRESIDENT ALL J&K MUSLIM CONFERENCE AND THE PRESIDENT AZAD KASHMIR GOVERNMENT

III. Division of functions between the Government of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Government and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.

A. Matters within the purview of the Pakistan Government:

(*i*) Defence (As modified under Council Resolution No. 149/49).

(*ii*) Foreign policy of Azad Kashmir.

(*iii*) Negotiations with U.N.C.I.P.

(*iv*) Publicity in foreign countries and in Pakistan.

(*v*) Co-ordination of arrangements for Relief and Rehabilitation of Refugees.

(*vi*) Co-ordination of Publicity in connection with Plebiscite.

(*vii*) All activities within Pakistan regarding Kashmir such as procurement of food, civil supplies, transport, running of Refugee camps and Medical aid.

(*viii*) All affairs of Gilgit, Ladakh, under control of Political Agent.

B. Matters within the purview of Azad Kashmir Government:

(*i*) Policy with regard to administration of Azad Kashmir territory.

(*ii*) General supervision of Administration in Azad Kashmir territory.

(*iii*) Publicity with regard to the activities of Azad Kashmir Government and Administration.

(*iv*) Advise Hon'ble Minister without portfolio with regard to negotiations with U.N.C.I.P.

(*v*) Development of Economic Resources of Azad Kashmir territory.

C. Matters within the purview of the Muslim Conference:

(*i*) Publicity with regard to plebiscite within Azad Kashmir territory.

(*ii*) Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied area of the State.

(*iii*) Organisation of political activities in the Azad Kashmir territory and Indian occupied area of the State.

(*iv*) Preliminary arrangements in connection with the Plebiscite.

(*v*) Organisation for contesting the Plebiscite.

(*vi*) Political work and publicity among the Kashmir refugees in Pakistan.

(*vii*) Advise the Hon'ble Minister without portfolio with regard to negotiations with U.N.C.I.P.

I agree to this in so far as this concerns with the part regarding the Muslim Conference.

Sd/ Ghulam Abbas, President, All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference.

SD/ Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, President, Azad Kashmir Government.

Sd/—M.A. Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio, Government of Pakistan."[1]

## THE BUREAUCRATS WHO MOTHERED THE INFANT

This new-born baby whom so many of the leading politicians were afraid to own at the time of its birth, has, over the years, got transformed into a huge structure, with all the paraphernalia of a modern State, from a flag down to town committees. The administration is perhaps as good or as bad as we have in any province except that our budget which was hardly a few lakh rupees in 1948 is now about nine crore rupees though the Administrative budget alone is about twenty two crore rupees. When we take into account the fact that the entire budget of the State in 1946-47 was hardly about six crore rupees, including Customs, and Azad Kashmir

1. Weekly Awaz-e-Haq, 7th November 1955.

constitutes hardly 1/5th of the State (minus Northern Areas), that Custom stands abolished and that this area was largely non-productive and backward, an income of rupees eleven crore in 1978 is not unimpressive. Apart from the politicians in power from time to time, among the dedicated civil servants who gave their very best to achieve these good results and whose pioneering hard work is responsible, more than anything else, for the existing Government structure built out of chaos and disorder, the names that rush forth into my mind are those of Sardar Habib Khan, Mr. Abdul Majid Salaria, Khawaja Hameedullah and Raja Lal Hussain from the Forest Department, Khawaja Abdul Ghani, formerly Law Secretary, Chaudhry Fazal Haque, Collector, Excise and Taxation Department, Sheikh Abdul Majid, late Chief Justice of the High Court, Dr. Nazirul Islam, Ex-Director of Education, late Col. Attaullah of the Health Services, Sheikh Muhammad Salim and Khawaja Abdul Karim, Mian Said Ali and Ch. Khudadad of the Police Department, Sh. Abdul Hayee, late Sardar Said Hassan, Mr. A. L. Puri, Mr. A. H. Suhrawardy, Sardar Rehmatullah, Khawaja Abdul Ahad Kanth, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmad Pandit, Col. Adalat Khan, Khawaja Muhammad Sultan Butt, Khawaja Umar Din, Mr. Nabi Ahmed Cheema, Sheikh Zahirudin, M. Yaqub Hashmi, Agha Ashiq Hussain, Khan Abdul Hamid, Raja Hamid Mukhtar, Malik Karamdad, Azizullah Hassan, Mr. H. S. Qureshi, Rao Abdul Rashid, Dr. Rehmatullah, Raja Noor Ali, Ch. Mir Zaman, Malik Maqbool Ahmed, Sardar Muhammad Ayub and a host of others, high and low, but for whose crusading zeal, the foundations would not have been as good and as solid as they are today. It must be remembered that they built out of nothing and almost with empty hands and emptier pockets. Their pays were very meagre; these were seldom paid in time; the service lacked even elementary facilities. These hot-heads, it was subsequently forgotten, chose to serve the territory in such surroundings and with so little to gain, at a time when, due to the migration of non-Muslims, the field was wide open in Pakistan. It was in 1971 that their pays and privileges were brought at par with their counterparts in Punjab. These are now much higher than those of their counter-parts in Indian occupied Kashmir.

## AZAD KASHMIR FLAG

In 1948 the existing Azad Kashmir flag was planned in consultation with a large number of people, chiefly by Lt. Colonel (later) M. A. Haq Mirza who was invested with the gallantry award, Sher-i-Jang, then working in the AKRF HQ Rawalpindi. He claims to have been inspired by the Pakistan national flag and the American Republican flag of the civil war days. It has the same size as the Pakistan flag. The four white lines represent the principal rivers that flow out of the State, Indus, Jhelum, Chenab and Ravi. The yellow colour represents the minorities while the

green colour and the crescent represent Muslims. It is one of the most beautiful flags in the world. The thoughtfulness that went into its making, inspires admiration. The national anthem was written by Hafeez Jullundhuri who also wrote Pakistan's national anthem. This, as well as the national song, also composed by him:

ستم شعاروں سے تجھکو چھڑائینگے ۔ اک دن ۔
میرے وطن تیری جنت میں آئینگے ۔ اک دن ۔

and recorded in the melodious voice of Heemal, has often brought tears into my eyes. Both Hafeez and Dr. Taseer rendered invaluable services to the Kashmir Cause in its early stages.

In 1971 Sardar Abdul Qaiyum substituted it with a new flag, made of a piece of white sheet with dots of red colour sprinkled on the whole of it on both sides. It was publicly displayed for the first time at Neelabut on 23rd August 1971. It was a most unfortunate decision and was rightly, widely criticised. The Legislative Assembly tamely stamped it with approval.

من چہ سرایم و طنبورہ من چہ سراید !

It was restored by the successor regime, the People's Party Government, headed by Khan Abdul Hamid Khan. Quaid-e-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan, Mirwaiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah, President Ayub, a host of national leaders and three generations of Generals of the Pakistan Army had saluted it. It is included in the United Nations record. So many people laid down their lives in 1948, 1965 and 1971, to keep it flying.

If national institutions like flags and anthems are changed with the change of Governments, what institutions will remain there to be honoured, from generation to generation, and treasured as representing a national heritage? The elementary principle of fundamental importance, the President lost sight of, was that a national flag represents, NOT the sufferings of a people but THEIR GLORY. It was not invented to perpetuate misery or sacrifice but as a symbol of greatness and prosperity.

## AZAD KASHMIR RADIO

With the Indian invasion on 27th October, the entry of Pakistan newspapers into the Valley came to an end. This created the problem of taking news of the Movement to across the fighting line. I contacted Mr. Mahmud Nizami, Director, Lahore Station of Radio Pakistan. He was eager to help but it was not within his powers to start a Kashmiri news bulletin. He said it needed the permission of the Central Government. I took the problem to Mirza Bashir-ud Din Mahmood Ahmed who spoke to Sir Zafrullah on phone. Within a few days, Mr. Nizami was instructed

to start the news-bulletin. Mr. Chiragh Hassan Hasrat was put incharge of the programme. Mufti Ziaudin of Poonch was tried as Announcer on the first day but on the next day Mr. Nizami rang me up and asked me to read the bulletin till some other arrangements were made. I continued to do so for two to three months.

By the middle of 1948, the Azad Kashmir Radio started functioning from Murree. The machinery was placed in an Army truck and a few rooms in a dilapidated building housed a make-shift studio and offices. In the beginning Mr. Nizami was incharge of the Station. He was ably assisted by Mr. Anwar Ahmed, now Deputy PIO, Government of Pakistan. The Engineer incharge was Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed Ansari. Almost everyone was helpful. I think generally no payments were made for speeches. Shaukat Thanvi and Mr. Aijaz Hussain Batalvi, now a leading member of the Pakistan Bar, were also associated with it. It was subsequently shifted to Trarkhel but by 1960 a new station was on the air from Muzaffarabad. It started with 1/2 Kw but was commissioned in 1976 by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto as a 10 Kw station while Trarkhel is a 100 Kw station. Both stations have admirably served the Cause of freedom.

## THE CHESS BOARD OF POWER POLITICS

In March, 1949 the Cabinet was re-constituted. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah and Mr. Ghulam Din Wani were replaced by Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim and Captain Mian Nasir-ud-Din. Sometime later, Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah was also appointed a Minister but he largely kept aloof. Meanwhile, the Abbas—Ibrahim polemics were at their height. In mid-1949 under orders from Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Ibrahim formally resigned from the Presidentship and was immediately re-appointed by Ch. Ghulam Abbas. This was done under pressure from Ch. Ghulam Abbas who wanted to establish that the Azad Kashmir President was *his* nominee. Towards the end of 1949, Mr. Gurmani and Malik Ghulam Muhammad had a joint meeting with Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim to iron out their differences but with no positive result. At last on 31st May, 1950, Sardar Ibrahim was compelled to tender his resignation and a new cabinet was formed with Col. Ali Ahmed Shah as President and Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim, Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Jeweller and Col. Sher Ahmed Khan as Ministers. Col. Sher Ahmed Khan resigned a few days later because his community, the Sudhans, were strongly opposed to his appointment in view of the practical dismissal of their Chief, Sardar Ibrahim. Personally a gentleman, Mr. Jeweller's only qualification was that he was the son of Mr. Ghulam Ahmed Jeweller, a wealthy Srinagar merchant. He was on a short visit to Pakistan when Chaudhry Sahib, in keeping with

the Muslim Conference policy of confining party leadership in Kashmir valley to politically unattractive people, offered him the crown. The strongman of the new Cabinet, however, was Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim who held the portfolios of P.W.D. and Police. It may be said in passing that the change of the Head of Government at this stage, had no justification. It was largely vindictive. Sardar Ibrahim had not only risked his life for the sake of the Movement but had also worked very hard to give the liberated territory a new administration. He was internationally known; his tribe had played an important role in the liberation of the territory.

A Major at the time of joining the cabinet, Syed Ali Ahmed Shah was promoted Colonel and now that he was appointed President, he chose the rank of Captain General, unknown in Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. It is a Spanish rank, equivalent to a full General, or rather a Supreme Commander, normally held by the Spanish King himself!

اس ''سادگی'' پہ کیوں نہ قربان جائیے -

## SUDHAN DEFIANCE AND COMPROMISE

The dismissal of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan in May, 1950 came to the Sudhan community as a bomb-shell and defiance of Authority which was already nominal began to grow in strength. Consequently, by the beginning of 1951, there was practically no Government in large areas of Poonch, particularly in the tehsils of Pallandari and Rawalakot. At the same time, there was no dearth of arms for the overwhelming majority of the able-bodied men from the community who were professionally soldiers. This brought about a show-down between the Sudhans and the Army contingents posted in the area which belonged to the Div. commanded by Major General N. M. A. Raza.

About 120 soldiers hailing from Mianwali surrounded a house in which Mr. Amir Muhammad Khan and some other Sudhans were hiding. They were led by Major Usmani who later rose to be a General in the Bangla Desh Army and was a candidate in the Presidential election held in 1978. There had been considerable rains during the preceding days and the Mianwali soldiers got trapped into knee-deep water and mud whereupon, abusing the Sudhans, someone shouted:

انہاں.........دی زمین بھی پکڑ دی اے-

Trans: You are caught even by these......lands.

They were fired at by Amir Muhammad Khan and his men and surrendered along with their arms which comprised 120 303-rifles and a

stengun. Major Usmani threw away his pistol, shouting at the same time, "We are cowards". Amir Muhammad Khan henceforth became known as 'Ghazi'!

How strange influences operate to shape the course of events, may be instanced by the following two incidents:

A Sudhan, who was a distant relative of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, was employed in a unit of the Pakistan Army. He went to his O.C., a Colonel and excitedly gave him a highly exaggerated account of the military "Zulm" in Poonch, pointing out, at the same time, how they had themselves liberated this territory by shedding their own blood. The Colonel was deeply moved and arming him with five stenguns, permitted him to defect. He joined his tribe in Rawalakot along with these arms.

In another instance late Mr. Muhammad Hussain Darre, a political worker from Bagh, then with Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, had known Major General Raza and his wife; perhaps he had been working in their house-hold. He went to the Division Commander's house and gave his wife, "in confidence," a highly exaggerated account of the arms and ammunition in possession of the Sudhans and the strength of their men under arms. He "beseeched" Begum Sahiba, holding her feet, as their "sympathiser", to persuade her husband to avoid confrontation with the tribe and come to peace so that his life as well as future may not be jeopardized. He also requested her, as one who had "eaten their salt," to take care of the Sahib as "these Bastards" were badly after him.

Maulana Ghulam Haider Jandalvi, a leading Sudhan leader, opposed to Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and a supporter of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan was under the protection of the Div. Headquarter to guide them in their operations in the territory. One evening after the above Rawalakot incident, Major General Raza asked him in the Mess in the presence of a large number of officers what he thought of the incident? Jandalvi, a short man with a large, protruding belly bluntly blurted out: "You are cowards". Raza could bear it no longer. He rose from his seat, flattened Jandalvi on the ground, stepped on his large, over-grown belly and gave him a few jerks. He was also severely beaten by other officers.

These developments in Poonch caused great concern to the Central Government and it appears that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan directed Mr. Gurmani to work out a peaceful agreement providing forthe return of the confiscated arms in return for the dismissal of the Muslim Conference

Government at Muzaffarabad. At Rawalpindi, Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani sent for Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan who was unaware of the instructions, the Minister had and feared detention but was nevertheless ready for the same to at least demonstrate his solidarity with his tribe. Gurmani proposed merely the return of arms and for that matter, asked Sardar Ibrahim to take him to Rawalakot. This, Sardar Ibrahim was not prepared to do. A day later, Mr. G. Mueen-ud-Din, one of Pakistan's senior most civil servants, and perhaps a great-grandson of Sikh Governor, Sheikh Imamuddin, accompanied by Mr. Nazir Alam, later I. G. P. Punjab, suddenly called at Sardar Ibrahim at his residence in Rawalpindi and had a private meeting with him. He told Sardar Ibrahim that the Central Government was extremely embarrassed by the surrender of their Mianwali soldiers and he was, therefore, in a better bargaining position. He also told him that in his view the confrontation should come to an end in the greater interests of the country and that in return for the surrendered arms, a neutral government should replace the existing one. He then summoned Mr. Nazir Alam and told him that he had, "after considerable difficulty", persuaded Sardar Ibrahim to forget the bitterness and help in finding out an agreed solution.

Ultimately, Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani was taken to Rawalakot by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan where the surrendered arms as well as the sten-guns mentioned above were returned to the Pakistan authorities. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan came to Rawalpindi on the 16th of October and one of the important items on his agenda was the dismissal of the Muslim Conference Government headed by Col. Ali Ahmed Shah but on account of his assassination on the same day, the day of judgment was postponed until two months later when Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, his successor, on his very first visit to Rawalpindi, dismissed it unceremoniously and brought in Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah. The change of government also completed the parting of ways between the two leaders, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sardar Ibrahim which in the ultimate analysis neither benefited them nor their adherents but on the other hand, caused incalculable harm to the liberation Movement because their energies were wasted in mutual recriminations. It was a tragedy too deep for tears.

## DID THEY KILL A PREGNANT WOMAN ?

In early 1948 at the request of Maulvi Muzaffar Hussain Nadvi to send some volunteers to help in the enforcement of Shariat, Maulana Sayed Abul Aala Maudoodi sent four persons, three of whom returned back soon due to illness but the fourth one, Mr. Mukhtar, a pre-partition convert from Sikhism remained posted on duty with Mr. Nadvi. Before the Court shifted to Bagh, it was somewhat functioning at Dhirkote, actually to

give a semblance of law and order as some anti-social elements were taking undue advantage of the absence of well-organised institutions like Police, Jails and Courts. It was here that a murderer was twice produced for remand. Mukhtar who kept a gun was eager to shoot the culprit. When asked why he was so keen to take away a human life, he replied that he wanted to be the first man here to have carried out a sentence of Qisas.

In 1948, due to the unsettled situation prevailing in the territory, the Government writ did not run effectively which was but natural. Sayed Noor Muhammad Shah, a Prosecution Inspector in Poonch, was posted as Sub-Judge/Magistrate Bagh. Syed Muzaffar Hussain Nadvi, had been working as Chief Qazi in the Bagh area. The police presented a challan in the Court of Sub Judge against a woman from Haveli who was accused of having murdered her husband. She was illegally and without jurisdiction, tried by a four-man Court comprising the Sub-Judge, Maulvi Nadvi, Maulvi Mir Alam and Maulvi Sanaullah (of the same area). The woman made a confession whereupon she was sentenced to death. After pronouncing the illegal judgment which they had no jurisdiction to pass and *without giving her an opportunity to move for an appeal or approach the Government for clemency and without the confirmation of the 'sentence' by the Government,* the woman was sent to Haveli where she was, in accordance with the judgment, shot dead with a gun on the very spot where she had, as per confession, killed her husband. It was subsequently claimed that the woman was pregnant. Mr. Nadvi claims that it was not brought to their notice. Some enquiries were conducted, one by late Sh. Abdul Majid, C. J. but nothing came out except that the Sub Judge who as a law graduate and with the experience of court procedure, was more to be blamed, was transferred back to the police department as A.S.P. About 29 years later, in 1977, his son, a Law graduate but a mental case, killed his mother, wife, a minor daughter, a brother, disabled for life a brother-in-law and fired even on the father who, however, escaped with a leg injury.

## SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE FOR POLITICAL WORKERS

Towards the end of 1948, the Pakistan Government agreed to place at the disposal of Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan a sum of rupees one lakh per month for distribution among unemployed political workers. Unfortunately, it was distributed only among those political workers who were on his own side in the internal power struggle which naturally created bad blood and brought forth the demand that the Government should itself prepare a list of deserving workers and distribute the honorarium through its own agencies. The amount continued to be paid till 1952 although it was gradually reduced. Muslim Conference naturally wanted the patronage

to be continued but the Pakistan Government brushed aside its opposition and took up the responsibility of its distribution in 1949.

Mirwaiz Sahib was leading a hard life since coming to Pakistan, as no one seemed to be aware of his status and the life of ease and abundance he enjoyed in Srinagar. It was only after Mr. Justice Din Muhammad came into picture, that the injustice and neglect was discovered and a sum of Rs. 800 per month began to be paid as an allowance. When the M.K.A. assumed direct responsibility for allowances, Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan was paid an annual honorarium of Rs. 25,000, Mirwaiz Sahib, rupees one thousand a month and Mr. A. R. Saghar, Maulvi Muhammad Nooruddin and Agha Shaukat Ali, a sum of Rs. 500 per month. Then came those who were paid Rs. 300/- a month and so on. The last category workers were paid Rs. 30 /- per month. The Ministry also granted loans for business or resettlement ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 25,000/-. When the allowance scheme was terminated somewhere in late fifties, three-years allowance was paid in advance. Those receiving rupees three hundred, were paid rupees ten thousand per head. I am not aware of anyone, except Professor Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi, and myself, who *declined* to receive any honorarium.

Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Jeweller while Finance Minister AK, also applied for a loan of Rs. 20,000/- for business. The Prime Minister who also held the Finance portfolio, rejected it.[1]

Just as some people, ignoring the human aspect and the state of chaos and confusion then prevailing, criticise the issuing of free rations as destructive of self-reliance, similarly, there are some people who criticise the grant of allowances. I think, to begin with, both steps were inescapable and urgently needed but their perpetuation for such a long time, was destructive of self-respect and did make many of the recipients parasites. Some were already earning hands but continued to receive the allowances, as an unearned source of income. The free-rationing was discontinued in 1960.

As far as Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan is concerned, it must be kept in mind that if all of us could make a comfortable living by legal practice, he could have done it much better. It is easy to hurl stones from the fence. Only a few people know, how in later years, he regretted not having started practice at Lahore. On one of his kind visits to my house in Mirpur, when he looked at my Law Library, he told me that the greatest mistake he committed after coming to Pakistan was not to have resumed legal practice

1. Weekly Awaz-e-Haq, 7th September, 1955.

at Lahore, with a team of juniors including this writer. Had he done so, I have no doubt that he would have earned more than the sum-total of his annual allowance in one month.

It is my experience and I always keep telling political workers that without being economically on their own feet and in a position not merely to travel for political work at their own expense but also be able to dole out, occasionally, some money for their Party, they should not expect any substantial advance in the field.

## HIGH-POWERED REFUGEE COUNCIL

Soon after his arrival in Pakistan, Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan went to Karachi to meet the Quaid-e-Azam who set up a 'Kashmir Refugees' Committee with Ch. Ghulam Abbas as Chairman and the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Frontier and Sind as members. It appears that Ch. Ghulam Abbas was more interested in airing grievances against Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan but that the Quaid-e-Azam was not receptive. Prof. Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi who accompanied him to Karachi and who, apart from hailing from Jammu, has been a supporter of the departed leader, states that when Ch. Ghulam Abbas returned from the Governor-General's House after his first meeting, he regretted that "the Quaid-e-Azam is not the same as he was before."[1] On the next day when he met the Quaid-e-Azam again, he was sent away only after two minutes.[2] Mr. Ishaque claims that he cooled down the departed leader and suggested the membership of the Committee as indicated above which was finally approved by the Quaid-e-Azam. Jammu and Kashmir refugees were scattered in these three provinces and the inclusion of the three Chief Ministers was justified on the ground that it was only with their personal involvement at the decision-making level that quick implementation of these decisions could be ensured. It must be said to the credit of this Committee that it did its human best to rehabilitate and resettle the two to three lakh refugees from the State, most of whom were lying in a pitiable condition in various refugee camps, particularly at Sialkot, Gujranwala, Mansar and Kala. An overwhelming majority is now well-settled. Some of them have risen to high ranks.

The Committee became inactive a year or so after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam and was reconstituted at a much lower level in 1954, again with Ch. Ghulam Abbas as Chairman. Its composition was criticised in a representative Convention of refugees attended by a large number of workers drawn from all parties, including the Muslim Conference, held at

1. Weekly Chattan, 10th September 1973.
2. *Ibid.*

Rawalpindi on 24th January, 1955. As expected, the Council, as it was now called, though helpful in individual cases, was not very effective.

The free-ration system for refugees which had been in existence ever since they entered Pakistan, was discontinued in March, 1960 and steps were taken to rehabilitate them on evacuee lands. These refugees came from the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Reasi and parts of Poonch and Mirpur districts. The number of refugees from Kashmir valley did not exceed four to five thousand. Perhaps that too might be an over-estimate. As almost 95% got married here and raised families, their number has considerably gone up.

The refugees were temporarily camped in Sialkot, Mansar, Gujranwala, Wah and Kala though thousands had directly moved into evacuee houses in Sialkot, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and other places. Some went to Peshawar, Abbottabad, Lahore, Karachi, Lyallpur and a host of other towns but the main body remained confined to Sialkot, Gujrat and Gujranwala. Except for a few thousands here and there, they have been resettled on evacuee lands and other immovable property. During the last 27 years, they have made considerable strides, both economically and educationally. All Governments in Pakistan have been generous and considerate in the matter of their rehabilitation. Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, as Minister Kashmir Affairs, took energetic steps for the rehabilitation of those still unsettled as well as to solve the problems of those treated as resettled. He also secured eighty thousand acres of State land in Jhang, Punjab for their resettlement although since 1971, the Punjab Government had consistently expressed its inability to spare any further lands.

A large number of those, who had between 1949—1952 trekked back to their homes in Mehndar and Rajauri, were pushed back to Azad Kashmir after the September 1965 war. Their total number exceeded one lakh. Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq, Occupied Kashmir Chief Minister claimed the return of fifty thousand[1] but perhaps, the number was far less. The Pakistan Government spent over three crore rupees on their rehabilitation but the amount was a total waste. It was suggested to the Government that instead of distributing rupees two thousand to each refugee family to build a small hut plus the provision of bricks, the amount may be invested in the setting up of a textile mill at Mirpur to

1. Weekly Rahbar, Srinagar, 26th March 1969 quoted by Weekly Kashmir, 19th September 1969.

provide them employment. As so many officers and a section of their own leaders had their eyes on the cash and did, as they had hoped to, reap a rich harvest, the suggestion fell through.

## MIRWAIZ AS PRESIDENT

The Government of Mir Waiz which took oath of office on 5th December 1951 lasted till the 21st of June, 1952—hardly 5½ months. It is known as the Advisers regime. The Advisers were Mr. Yusuf Buchh, Maulvi Nooruddin and Maulvi Abdur Rahim. It has left a mark on the history of Azad Kashmir. The credit must chiefly go to Mr. Yusuf Buchh. Apart from stream-lining the administrative structure, for the first time since its inception, the Government asserted its independence against the officials deputed here as lent officers by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, some of whom unfortunately conducted themselves in an objectionable manner. Petty Magistrates in Pakistan, they tried to treat this government and its officers with contempt. This sense of self-respect was not to the liking of the intrigue-infested Darbar Halls of the Shahzada Kothi; as a reprisal, it threatened to withhold the small monetary aid this Government had then been receiving from the Centre, although the said aid was advanced as loan and was far below the share the Azad Kashmir Government deserved from the Central Revenues. It therefore set up an Economy Committee with AK Chief Justice Sheikh Abdul Majid as Chairman and Mr. Abdul Rab as Secretary. It recast the budget and proved that the government could be run within its own limited resources. A copy of the report was sent to the MKA, never to be heard of again. Another important and far-reaching step was the setting up of a Land Reforms Committee which toured certain parts of the territory. A legislation was enforced putting a moratorium on the creation of fresh occupancies because the landed artistocracy was fast doing so to defeat the anticipated land reforms. It is obvious that this climate of self-reliance became a thorn in the eyes of some officials of the MKA who were looking for an opportune moment to strike, which came handy by the reemployment as Chief Secretary of Mr. Justice Sheikh Abdul Qaiyum, a retired Chief Jutisce of the State and incidentally, the father-in-law of the by now famous Masud Mahmud of the Federal Security Force.

ایسی چنگاری بھی یارب ۔ اپنے خاکستر میں تھی !

## COL. SHER AHMED AS PRESIDENT

We have already noticed Col. Sher Ahmed Khan on the Saria front. His only qualification for selection as a Minister was his being a Sudhan. He was politically unknown but as the law and order situation in Poonch

district since the over-throw of Sardar Ibrahim's government, was uncertain and unhappy, it was considered essential to have a Sudhan as Head of the government. It also seems that the Muslim Conference leadership wanted to create a parallel leadership in the Sudhan tribe against Sardar Ibrahim in order to weaken him by carrying the fight to his home. Such a move cannot be condemned as it is fair in an inter-party political tussle. Where, however, Muslim Conference failed was in the selection of the man because Col. Sher Ahmed, whatever his qualities of heart which undoubtedly were many, was no match for the intelligence, political skill and tribal appeal of Sardar Ibrahim. Col. Sher Ahmed Khan was sworn in on 21st June, 1952. The first to be appointed to his cabinet were Ch. Hameedullah Khan, Pir Zia-ud-Din Andrabi, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum and Ch. Noor Hussain. This cabinet was reconstituted several times. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum who took oath of office as Minister on 6th July, 1952 was soon afterwards arrested on the charge of having planned a coup d'etat. He was removed to Pakistan and remained interned there for more than two years. Ch. Hameedullah was removed in September 1953 for having moved the Direct-Action resolution in the Muslim Conference Convention at Lahore. Chaudhry Noor Hussain was removed in 1954 and replaced by Chaudhry Abdul Karim who took oath on 15th May, 1954. Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad Jeweller and Raja Abdul Hamid Khan were also appointed on the same day.

## CH. NOOR HUSSAIN

Towards the beginning of 1949, a young man from the Jat community in Mirpur, Ch. Noor Hussain, began attracting attention. Economically well of, he could afford to spend large sums of money on political activities. He soon established himself as an astute political operator and by the end of the year was drawing big crowds. He was thus soon recognised as the most influential political leader in Mirpur tehsil. His influence, however, was confined to his own community, the Jats who were in an overwhelming majority in the tehsil. On the whole his political activity remained peaceful. It was on this strength that he was nominated a Minister in the government headed by Col. Sher Ahmed Khan. He was, however, removed in the beginning of 1954 and replaced by Ch. Abdul Karim, a contractor who was a member of the State Legislature for several years before 1947. He belonged to a largely educated but traditionally pro-grovernment family.

## SUDHANS AGAIN UP AGAINST GOVERNMENT

Despite the fact that Col. Sher Ahmed Khan was a Sudhan and did more to benefit his community than was done by Sardar Ibrahim Khan, he

couldn't destroy the latter's hold on the community; he remains, to this day, their uncrowned king. There are elements opposed to him but they have not been able to cause any substantial damage because the tribe is conscious of his being their only internationally known leader. In course of one of his tours, Sher Ahmed was fired at but had a miraculous escape. On 18th February 1955, when the local police entered a mosque at Pallandari to arrest Sher Dil Khan, an absconding accused, there was a scuffle with the congregation. Sher Dil escaped arrest. Two days later there was a clash in his village Baral in which one man was killed. A section of the local people ransacked the jail and after emptying it of prisoners, attacked and took control of the district offices, then located at Pallandari. There were clashes with the Army as well as the Punjab Constabulary. Captain Khan Muhammad Khan whom we have noticed as a brave and daring soldier on the Mirpur sector, actually was the centre of the revolt. When the Pakistan army and the Punjab Constabulary came into the picture, he crossed into Indian occupied part of the State where he remained for about two years. On re-entry into A. K., he was detained for some time and subsequently released. A large number of persons were arrested; they included Lt. Col. Rehmatullah Khan, Hassan Shah Gardezi, Sardar Mukhtar Khan Pleader, Captain Munawar Khan and Lt. Abdul Hussain. Sardar Rehmatullah Khan was arrested in Muzaffarabad. Syed Fayaz Hassan Shah Chief Justice who had been asked to look into the complaints of prisoners, reported in writing that although the jail was meant to accommodate only 32 prisoners, there were 340 of them. The Sudhans set up a 'parallel' government. The trouble lasted several months. Ultimately, the Government set up a Special tribunal consisting of two High Court Judges and the Government Advocate Kh. Muhammad Sharif who later became Chief Justice of AK, and engaged lawyers from here and there. The Defence was conducted by Sardar Ibrahim, Mr. (later Justice) M. A. Zullah, Sardar Muhammad Yasin Khan and Sheikh Abdul Hamid. However, good sense prevailed soon and the case was withdrawn and all the accused were released. It may be said to the credit of Col. Sher Ahmed Khan and this fact is not generally known that the order of withdrawal of prosecution was passed by him without consulting the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army was very angry over the incidents. As a punishment, the pensions of ex-servicemen in the tehsils of Pallandari and Rawalakot were forthwith withheld. This non-payment continued till October, 1960 when during a tour of Azad Kashmir, he also visited Pallandari. It is within my personal knowledge that Mr. K. H. Khurshid, then President, who was for a long time a high favourite with President Ayub had spoken

to him at Muzaffarabad and persuaded him to withdraw the orders to which the President had agreed but the decision was announced at Pallandari in course of a meeting with a deputation of ex-servicemen among whom was an ex-Subedar Feroz Ali, a very old man, who having been an orderly in attendance on his father (in the army), had served the Field Marshal as a child. The President recognised his old servant and asked him how he was, upon which the Subedar told him that like others, his pension had been withheld, that he should take a broader view of the matter, consistent with his greatness and at the same time asked him of what use his milk-feeding had been?

## CONSTRUCTION OF MANGLA DAM

It was also during his regime that the Central Government decided to construct a hundred square mile Dam at Mangla. As about 90,000 people were to be uprooted from their homes, there was considerable resentment in the area. A popular agitation spear-headed by lawyers started from Mirpur. Unfortunately, in a clash between the moderates and the extremists, the latter prevailed, resulting in the agitation taking a destructive shape without bringing any benefit to the affected people. The question of the location of the new Mirpur town was agitating a large number of people. The Government had selected Akalgarh but it was located on the shallow end of the lake and would have also increased the distance between the new town and the Mangla Head-works considerably, thereby depriving the new town of several benefits that nearness to the Head-works alone could attract. So a Citizens' committee with this writer as Chairman was set up in a meeting attended by all sections of people to persuade the government to shift the location to Bala Gala which is 8 miles from Mangla. We campaigned through press and platform and finally had a fruitful meeting with Mr. Ghulam Farooque, then Chairman WAPDA. He was kind enough not only to see the reasonableness of our point of view but also overruled the objections raised by the local Resettlement Organisation that it would mean the loss of 8 to 10 lac rupees which they had already incurred at Akalgarh in levelling part of the area. The new town now stands at the location suggested by us. The dispute unfortunately had assumed a tussle between Jats and the Bains communities. Akalgarh and its surroundings were largely inhabited by the latter while Jats largely inhabited the former. Obviously, we could not look at things from such a narrow angle. Today Akalgarh is about 30 miles from Mangla Head-works while the new town is only 8 miles away. It is refreshing to see an impressive sprawling town having come up on what was once a heap of hills with dense bushes and trees. It has a population of nearly 50,000 drawn from all sections of people and from all stations of life. The government spent five crore rupees while in the private

sector, in my estimation, the people have spent over 25 crores of rupees. The WAPDA authorities did not provide the necessary civic facilities that go with a modern town although its inhabitants paid, during those days when cement was sold at Rs. 7 a bag and a labourer was paid Rs. 3/-, Rs. 2,300/- per kanal as developmental charges. Most of the roads remained unmetalled; the water supply is very scarce and the electric supply is also faulty. The Dam which submerged the old towns of Mirpur and Dadyal, is to irrigate thirty lakh acres of land and generate ten lakh kilowatts of electricity. The compensation paid for the acquisition of immovable property was in accord with law and procedure. It was reasonable. I think it exceeded rupees thirty crores. However, the sacrifice made by the affected people in the interests of Pakistan with which their own fate and fortune is indissolubly linked, shall always remain an enviable example of patriotism.

## LENT OFFICERS' INSTITUTION

Azad Kashmir has a peculiar institution which has come to be known as Lent officers. The term is about a hundred year old and is mentioned in a letter Maharaja Pratap Singh wrote to the Viceroy. It appears that officers of the Political department, posted in Indian States, were known as Lent officers. In Azad Kashmir, except for brief intervals, the important posts of the Chief Secretary, the Finance Secretary, the Accountant General, the Inspector General of Police and the Development Commissioner have been filled by officers from Pakistan. Some of them, especially in fifties, were petty-minded and lived as High-caste Brahmins in what they considered a society of untouchables. Of course, there were honourable exceptions like Sheikh Maqbool, Mr. Masihuz Zaman, Mr. Ijlal Haider Zaidi, Mr. Sarfaraz Hassan, Mr. Hassan Zaheer, Mr. M. Kazim; even the politically controversial Mr. Ijlal Hussain was, undoubtedly, humane and of a most helpful and friendly disposition. Except for Sheikh Maqbool, these came after 1971 when for the first time, a President elected on adult sufferage was saddled in power; the popular character of the Government, both of the President and the legislature plus the personal prestige and admirable dynamism of the President, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, raised the status of the territory as well as of its government. These factors largely contributed to a weakening of the Lent officers power. The institution itself is not bad. Even in India and Pakistan, the Chief Secretaries are appointed by the Centre. The only snag in A. K. is that it is a one-way traffic, with the result that the non-availability of these posts means the saturation of our talent in the Services at a small level.

By 1955 the level of appointees to the post of Secretary General had touched such depths that Mr. Karim Nawaz Khan, Secretary of the Regional

Transport Authority, Rawalpindi which is equivalent to the post of a Magistrate Ist Class, was appointed to the post. There was considerable resentment all over Azad Kashmir for the sending of lent officers on all key posts; the fact that junior officers from Pakistan exercised such extensive powers because Secretary General was the de facto executive head of the government who in practice overruled even the President, was like rubbing salt to injury. It was especially so because people remembered that during Dogra regime, the Heads of the executive used to be men of the highest intellectual attainments such as Sir Albion Banerji, Sir Maharaj Singh, Sir B. N. Rau who later became a Judge of the International Court and even Sir Gopala Swami Ayyengar and Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan. Some of these officers used their posting here for advancement of their service interests in Pakistan.

Col. Sher Ahmed was totally dependent upon the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. It was during his regime that Mr. Afzal, an administrative officer, slightly above the rank of an office superintendent, and Mr. Aftab Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, both of the MKA, were the proud recipients of Guards of Honour at Muzaffarabad, furnished by detachments of the Azad Kashmir Police. On one occasion the Joint Secretary received a telephone call from Karachi and asked Col. Sher Ahmed to sit in the office of his P. A. till he had gone through the call. Personally Mr. Fazili was a well-intentioned man and had no trace of that snobbery which is popularly associated with this Service and which some of the C.S.P. officers have been trying hard to emulate.

On the whole, there have been considerate men on the top—Ministers as well as secretaries. The complaints have been more on the lower level—the ESTABLISHMENT.

It is however only fair to record that there has been a marked improvement since 1972, for a variety of reasons. To begin with, Brigadier Bashir Malik and then his successor, Mr. Chohan, especially the latter, have, by personal example, brought commendable improvement to bear on the situation. Both did admirably well to improve the Ministry's extremely poor image in A.K.

## ALL-PARTIES KASHMIR CONFERENCE

By now Ch. Muhammad Ali had succeeded Mr. Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister. Whether it was true or not, but it needs to be pointed out that Mr. Fazlur Rehman told Parliament, sometime later, that the history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1955 was the story of Ch. Muhammad Ali's rise to power. Ch. Muhammad Ali convened from 26th to 28th November, 1955, an All-Parties Kashmir Conference at Karachi. 76 persons, mostly representing political parties in Pakistan, were invited; except for Sardar



President Muhammad Hayat Khan inaugurating the 3rd Annual Judicial Officers Conference at Muzaffarabad on 29-11-1978



Mr. Z.A. Bhutto being received at the Muzaffarabad helipad in November 1973 by Sh. Manzar Masud, Speaker. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim are also in the picture



Secretaries to the A. K. Government, with President on the occasion of Chief Secretary Mr. Hassan Zaheer's transfer to Pakistan (March 1978)



Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti, on arrival in the Guest House Muzaffarabad to participate as Chief Guest in the annual get-together lunch on the occasion of the 3rd A.K. Judicial Officers Conference on 30-11-1978

Muhammad Ibrahim Khan and Ch. Noor Hussain, only those persons were invited from the State whose names were approved by Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. The Conference recommended to the Central Government to incorporate in the Constitution which was then being drafted, an Article to the effect that relations between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir State will be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It was drafted by a Committee comprising Ch. Muhammad Ali, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy and Justice Din Muhammad. After the Conference, Mr. Justice Din Muhammad was appointed Adviser on Kashmir Affairs with the status of a Minister. He had passionately told the Conference:

> "Please close down the traitor-manufacturing factories and replace them with ordnance factories."

It should be said to the credit of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan that he vigorously campaigned for the setting up of a Legislative Assembly so as to pave way for the establishment of an elected Government. Although Mr. Abdus Salam Yatu and his Kisan Mazdoor Conference was the first to demand a representative Assembly and consistently campaigned for it even when Sardar Ibrahim was prepared to make the Government responsible to a jointly agreed General Council of the Muslim Conference, the truth remains that minor groups like the one represented by Mr. Yatu lacked teeth which are so essential for the acceptance of such radical demands as the demand for an elected legislature for AK was in early fifties.

This campaign got a boost when in 1955 Sudhans rose up against the regime set up by the MKA with the blessings of the Abbas group. At the All-Parties Kashmir Conference, Sardar Ibrahim was approached by Ch. Muhammad Ali through Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, Leader of the Opposition, not to touch upon the Poonch happenings, in the interests of the country. Sardar Ibrahim fell in line after being assured by Mr. Suhrawardy that he would support the demand for the setting up of an Assembly and the dissolution of the MKA. When nothing was said about these matters by the Prime Minister, Sardar Ibrahim, accompanied by Chaudhri Noor Hussain, staged a noisy walk out. He was brought back on the promise that both demands would be accepted. Consequently, he made a highly successful speech. It was because of it and the support attracted by him that Ch. Muhammad Ali reportedly told Ch. Ghulam Abbas that "Ibrahim cannot be buried" and that the only solution was a compromise.

A few days later when Sheikh Din Muhammad became Adviser and came to Pindi, Sardar Ibrahim found him evasive about the dissolution of

the MKA and the setting up of an Assembly; when pressed for a definite answer, Sheikh Sahib told him:

"من طوطئم و گوئم ہرچہ استاد ازل می گوید"

Trans : I am a parrot and repeat what the Higher-ups say.

## MIRWAIZ SAHIB'S SECOND PRESIDENCY

Col. Sher Ahmed was succeeded by Mirwaiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah who took oath of office on 31st May 1956. This time he had no Advisers or Ministers to assist him. It was actually a care taker government because the Political Parties Settlement scheme which envisaged bringing together all factions of Muslim Conference, was about to be launched by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

## RELIEF FOR NON-AGRICULTURISTS

Mirwaiz Sahib was not able to carry on with a transport officer like Mr. Karim Nawaz Khan and, therefore, threatened that if he was not recalled, he would resign the office. The Ministry was, therefore, compelled to recall him back and replaced him by Mr. Aziz-ul-Hassan, a C.S.P. officer, then Administrator of Poonch district. A man of many qualities, he too had his own weaknesses but he was definitely a much better man and more forward looking as well as large-hearted than his immediate predecessor.

The most important piece of legislation introduced this time by Mir Waiz government which brought relief to thousands of families in the length and breadth of Azad Kashmir was the abolition of the distinction of agriculturists and non-agriculturists. During Dogra regime the Land Alienation Act had grouped a large number of castes and sub-castes under the category of non-agriculturists; they were by law disqualified from purchasing any land except for residential purposes. This had been done largely to prevent the passage of agricultural land into the hands of the Mahajans who were fast acquiring lands from the poor indebted peasantry but unfortunately the piece of legislation continued to remain on the Statute book even after 1947 when not only the Mahajans but even their account books disappeared like sand dunes. It also adversely affected the minorities living in villages to such an extent that sometimes they had no place to bury their dead. It was so because the agriculturists were not prepared to sell them land even for non-agricultural purposes and on the other hand, the absence of such land made the minorities almost untouchables in their own villages. The most affected were those listed as

Kashmiris, Kumhars, Jullahas, Mochis, water-carriers etc. in revenue papers. The problem was particularly acute in Mirpur tehsil where certain individuals were deliberately trying to apply the law harshly. Efforts therefore began from Mirpur for the abolition of this distinction with Major M. K. Mirza in the fore-front. A petition signed by thousands was presented to Col. Sher Ahmed Khan at Muzaffarabad but in vain. A deputation met Mr. Justice Din Muhammad at Mirpur while he was Kashmir Affairs Adviser to the Government of Pakistan. Ultimately, it was Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah's government which abolished the distinction and brought relief to thousands of affected families. He is gratefully remembered by them even to this day.

## ALL FACTIONS UNITE BUT TEMPORARILY

Some efforts were afoot since 1952 to bring the warring political groups together. It was known as the Political Settlement Scheme. It is true that the MKA, especially after Mr. Gurmani graced it with his feudal presence and a background of Bahawalpur experience where he was Prime Minister at the time of partition, must share a part of the blame for division in our ranks but it is also true that a larger part of the blame squarely rests on the shoulders of our leaders—one and all. Instead of showing consideration for each other in the interests of the sacred Cause all espoused and even on principles of enlightened self-interest, make a little sacrifice of factional interests or the so-called personal prestige, in order to pull together, each faction tried to enlist the support of the MKA against the other faction, with the result that all got destroyed. Only a few years later, the prestige of the factional leaders was not even a shadow of what it used to be in 1948. Ch. Muhammad Ali was sincerely desirous of bringing about unity though, of course, with Ch. Ghulam Abbas as the over-all leader. Both belonged to Jullundhur; Ch. Muhammad Ali was also a class-fellow of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah at Islamia College, Lahore. As all the three factions of the Muslim Conference stood for the State's accession to Pakistan, there really was no sense in frittering away their strength, but as pointed out earlier, the division was not ideological, nor even on grounds of programmes because none of them had any positive programme either for the liberation of occupied Kashmir or for the betterment of the lot of Azad Kashmir inhabitants. Each one had had the opportunity of ruling this territory but each one had practically no time to attend to its problems because the leg-pulling, as the term is widely known in Azad Kashmir, started immediately after a man was inducted into office.

The Ministry of Kashmir Affairs was then headed by Mr. Azfar who later became Cabinet Secretary and after retirement, brought good name

to the country as a UN representative, perhaps in Somalia. He was by nature averse to intrigues and sincerely pushed through the Political Settlement Scheme. A jointly-agreed list of about 150 political workers, mostly of pre-1947 period, was drawn. They were invited to a Convention held at Muzaffarabad on 6th September, 1956. It elected Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan as President of the united Muslim Conference and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan as President of the AK Government. Obviously, it was previously agreed upon behind the scene and the Convention merely stamped it with a formal, democratic seal. Anyway, it was a good beginning. He was sworn in on 8th September, 1956. The Cabinet comprising Maulvi Noor-ud-Din, Lt. Col. Rehmatullah Khan from Poonch, Professor M. A. Aziz, Raja Haider Khan and Ch. Muhammad Hussain Advocate from Mirpur was sworn in on 7th September. Syed Muhammad Amin Shah Gilani from Muzaffarabad and Major Fazlur Rehman from Bhimber were later added as Ministers of State. The inclusion of Mir Abdul Aziz was not to the liking of Chaudhry Sahib who wanted the inclusion of Kh. Sana Ullah Shamim. Shamim is a political manipulator, par excellence, and would have been a strong-arm Minister. Besides, he had valuable experience of two previous Governments. It was precisely for these reasons, perhaps, that he was excluded !

اے روشنی طبع تو برمن بلا شدی -

## SARDAR QAIYUM'S FIRST PRESIDENCY

It was the misfortune of Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum Khan that in the very beginning of his assuming the reigns of Government, Ch. Muhammad Ali went out of office and was succeeded by Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy who did not have any particular liking for Chaudhry Sahib and his politics. A more important circumstance was that his Principal Secretary Mr. Aftab Ahmed, who had spent years in the M.K.A., was deadly against the faction headed by Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. He was keen to see the regime of Sardar Qaiyum Khan go out of office. At the same time, a strong group inside the Muslim Conference was from the very beginning against the appointment of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum. The formation of the cabinet led to further bitterness as some vocal elements were left out. It seems that Ch. Ghulam Abbas also was not personally happy with the choice of Ministers or at least with some of them. It may be painful to record but it is a fact that after some time, even he was in favour of the over-throw of the government. Unfortunately for Sardar Qaiyum, there were two other factors which went against him. The first was the setting up of an 'Awami League' in Azad Kashmir by Ch. Hamidullah, Professor Ishaque Qureshi, Ch. Noor Hussain and some others. It was aligned with Mr. Suhrawardy.

A very unfortunate incident which happened during the period Sardar Qaiyum was at the helm of affairs was the highly objectionable and arbitrary manner in which three Kashmiri political workers, Mr. Sanaullah Butt, Khawaja Amir-ud-Din and Mr. Wali Muhammad Aadil were pushed across the Cease-fire line, at dead of night.

Mr. Azizullah Hassan had filed a private complaint under Section 500, Penal Code, against Mr. Sanaullah Butt, Editor of a local weekly. This case arose out of a certain allegation levelled by the newspaper against Mr. Hassan in connection with the loss of a carpet during the visit of Mr. Iskandar Mirza who paid an overnight visit to Muzaffarabad while Sardar Qaiyum was in power. He was also to visit Mirpur but had to cut short his programme as certain political developments at Karachi made him rush back soon after his arrival. Mr. Hassan was not accused of having personally misappropriated the carpet. He brought the complaint to vindicate his honour but the law of defamation is such that it amounts to inviting trouble by filing a complaint. The case was in the court of A.D.M. Muzaffarabad who was too small an officer to try the Chief Secretary. There were frequent complaints that the record was tampered with. Prolonged cross-examination involving his general character was so annoying that he told the Chief Justice that the greatest folly of his life was to have filed a complaint for defamation.

While the case was still pending, one dark night, the persons mentioned earlier, together with Khawaja Habib Ullah Lone and Mr. Ghulam Rasool Sopori alias Tara were arrested by the police on the night falling between 8th and 9th March and removed to Poonch; within the next two days, the first three were pushed across the Cease-fire Line. Actually all the five were pre-partition political workers opposed to the National Conference. In Muzaffarabad they were playing the role of an opposition group and whenever a Central Minister, officer, a foreign journalist or guest paid a visit, they would meet him to air their views. Generally, they were critical of the local administration. Those very days two members of the British Parliament, Mr. Bennet of the Conservative Party and Mr. Stacey from the Labour Party, visited Muzaffarabad. They met them as usual and complained about India's failure to hold a plebiscite. It is claimed that they also told the members that in addition to the choice of accession to either Dominion, the people of Kashmir should have the option of independence. They also spoke against the local government, its alleged corruption and regionalism. When the news of their disappearance became known, there was great hue and cry; almost everyone was shocked. Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy was personally contacted on telephone by Mir Waiz Sahib; he ordered an immediate enquiry. The high-handed step had been taken by Mr. Azizullah Hassan to escape the defamation case but he is

claimed to have secured a post-expulsion order in writing from the President that they be pushed back; he was led to believe that as Head of the State, he stood protected while the civil servants had no escape. A few days later the M.Ps visited Srinagar where the three externees met them again and told them how they had been pushed back. This became an international news and put the Pakistan Government in a very awkward position.

Sardar Qaiyum was then not experienced in the art of civil administration and had fantastic ideas about it. He was unduly harsh with Government servants, failing to realise that it is the Services who make or mar a President. President Kennedy was reported to have told a friend, a few months before his death, that it was a misfortune that before becoming President, he had all along been thinking only of men who could help him to become President but did not think of men who could help him *to be* the President. The Services were therefore alienated and since they have deep roots and long, though hidden, hands, they joined hands with his political opponents. Which President doesn't commit irregularities and certainly he was no exception? During his second Presidency, when I asked him what was his achievement during his first 7-month tenure, he told me:

> "The civil servants don't let you know for six months what your powers are ?"

Consequently Sardar Ibrahim was summoned and told to take over but he claims that he declined, stating that the arrangement was the result of a mutual agreement and his position would be jeopardised. Suhrawardy did not like it. A few weeks later when Mr. Chou-En-Lai came to Karachi, on his first visit, Sardar Ibrahim was not invited; Mir Waiz Sahib and Professor Ishaque alone were invited and introduced as Kashmiri leaders. Sardar Ibrahim claims that sometime later when Mr. Suhrawardy came to Rawalpindi, he was again invited and offered the Government but he again declined.

Ultimately when the rift between Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum, worked up and heightened by interested people, increased, the former gave a green light for his removal. Thereupon, Sardar Ibrahim and Mr. Allah Rakha Saghar went to Lahore to meet Mr. Suhrawardy. Mr. Azizullah Hassan Chief Secretary also went there. For two days the two leaders kept waiting for the whole day in a room of the Governor's House where Mr. Suhrawardy was staying but no interview

was granted. On the third day when he was leaving for Karachi and a car was waiting to take him to the airport, he spotted the two and motioned Sardar Ibrahim and the Chief Secretary to go to him. Then he told Sardar Ibrahim:

”ویسے تو آپ لوگوں کے پیچھے پیچھے پھرتے ہیں
کہ حکومت دو مگر جب ہم نے آپ کو کہا کہ حکومت
سنبھالو۔ تو آپ نے نہیں مانا ۔ تم نواب ہو۔ نواب۔۔“

and then addressing the Chief Secretary, instructed him in these words:—

”اس کو تخت پر بٹھاؤ“

Trans : Put him on the throne!

Sardar Ibrahim told him that there was a formal procedure to be adopted by calling in the Working Committee which required at least a week's notice. Suhrawardy raised his eye-brows and said, "Well".

Sardar Qaiyum got an inkling and went to the house of Sardar Ibrahim at the Mackson Road and requested for his support. Sardar Ibrahim says that Sardar Qaiyum is a self-respecting man but he was so rattled at the moment that his wife who was listening to them, in the adjacent room, strongly urged him, after he left, not to help in his exit but he told her that it was too late and that the decision had already been taken by the Central Government. It was under these circumstances that the Muslim Conference Working Committee meeting at Muzaffarabad on 12th April, 1957 decided with an overwhelming vote to change the government and elected Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan as President.

## J&K AWAMI LEAGUE

Somewhere in 1956-57 was floated the Jammu and Kashmir Awami League, aligned with Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy. The founding fathers were Professor Muhammad Ishaque Qureshi, Ch. Hameedullah Khan, Ch. Noor Hussain and Pir Ziauddin Andrabi. Ch. Noor Hussain was appointed Convener on account of his power-base inside Azad Kashmir. A Conference, attended by over 300 delegates, was held at Sialkot in 1957 under the presidentship of Professor Ishaque. It was addressed among others by Qureshi Muhammad Yusuf and Pir Ziauddin Andrabi.

Professor Ishaque ranks among the most intelligent and capable persons from the State. After doing his M.A. in English, he joined the Prince

of Wales College as a Lecturer but resigned soon afterwards to devote himself entirely to politics. He set up a press at Jammu, the biggest owned by any Muslim in the State and with his God-given ability was soon able to establish himself as a leading printer and publisher. It was his misfortune, as that of his several other young educated colleagues, that he aligned himself with Muslim Conference, a party, where ability, initiative and promise are treated as grave disqualifications.

Professor Ishaque who was the driving force behind it, is a politician who practises politics as an art and not as a profession. He could not, therefore, devote his whole attention to the Party. Since political parties need whole-time leaders and since it had yet to build a following when Mr. Suhrawardy went out of office, it could not, despite a good start, make any impact and got forgotten in the wake of the imposition of Martial law in 1958.

## MISS FATIMAH JINNAH IN AZAD KASHMIR

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan was sworn in President for the second time on 13th April, 1957. He formed his Cabinet 16 months later, in July, 1958. It comprised the following:

1. Pir Ali Jan Shah.
2. Hakim Maulvi Muhammad Hussain.
3. Raja Abdul Hamid Khan.
4. Khawaja Ghulam Din Wani.

A few months after Sardar Ibrahim had taken over, Miss Fatimah Jinnah paid her second visit to Azad Kashmir. She had visited Muzaffarabad and Dhirkot in July, 1955. This time she toured all the three districts. She was received by unprecedented crowds and made a deep and lasting impression. In Muzaffarabad she donated a considerable amount for the construction of a female hospital, the only one in Azad Kashmir, since constructed in the immediate neighbourhood of the C.M.H. for 50 indoor patients. In old Mirpur, apart from addressing the largest ever crowd in living memory in the College compound since submerged by Mangla Dam, she also graced a reception jointly hosted by the Municipal Committee and the Bar Association. This writer had the privilege of welcoming her on behalf of both. She gave Rs. 200/- to a young boy from Dadyal who recited a national poem and then went round and spoke to the guests a few appropriate sentences. The Government

gave a State banquet in the evening. She received several deputations. This writer also had the honour of meeting her in a deputation but instead of telling her anything ourselves, we chose to hear her; she had so many things to say against provincialism and tribalism that were fast raising their ugly heads in Pakistan. She stated that we had become Pathans, Punjabis, Bengalis, Sindhis and Baluchis but had ceased to be Pakistanis and Muslims.

An interesting incident that happened in Mirpur which throws some light on her character may be cited here. This I was told by Mr. Azizullah Hassan, the Secretary General. Miss Jinnah visited the local Girls High School where hundreds of women had assembled to have a glimpse of her. It was part of the programme. However, what was not part of the programme and was not known to her before-hand, was that a small purse of a few hundred rupees, hastily collected from a few ladies, was presented to her. When she returned to the Dak bungalow, she sent for Mr. Azizullah Hassan who was incharge of her programme and angrily asked him why she had not been told in advance that a purse was going to be presented to her? Mr. Hassan told me that he could ill-afford entering into a controversy with her and therefore instead of telling her that even he was not aware of such an item, expressed his regrets and told her that he was very sorry, but Miss Jinnah was not satisfied and said: "But you cannot get out of it by merely saying Sorry."

Sometime after Sardar Ibrahim was sworn in, the inter-group strife again became vocal. Ch. Ghulam Abbas therefore had a meeting with Mr. Suhrawardy when he next came to Rawalpindi. A very clever lawyer and not inherently well disposed of towards the former, Mr. Suhrawardy put Chaudhry Sahib in an extremely awkward position by telling him tauntingly that he had expected to hear from him criticism of his Government's handling of the Kashmir issue and tender some useful advice but he was sorry to find that instead, he complained about the attitude of petty officials in the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs!

## LAW REFORMS

Important Law reforms were introduced by the Government in January, 1959 which had a far-reaching effect on the speedy disposal of criminal cases. The warrant trial procedure was totally abolished and summons trial procedure was instead made applicable to all criminal cases. An overwhelming number of crimes in the Penal Code were listed as warrant trial cases. It may be recalled that in Pakistan these reforms were enforced in 1972. Again, commitment proceedings in murder or such other cases in which law provided for it, was also abolished and it was en-

acted that all these cases were to be directly instituted in the Sessions Court. Similarly de novo trial in case of transfers was abolished. These reforms definitely resulted in saving considerable time and expense both of the litigants as well as of the Government and brought great relief to the former. Letters Patent appeals which mean an appeal to two Judges of the High Court against an appellate judgment given by a Single Judge of the said Court, was also made available for the first time. Another important law reform was the Adaptation of Laws Act of 1959, which replaced about 12-dozen Dogra Laws with corresponding laws in force in Punjab. The Dogra laws apart from being obsolete in certain respects, did not incorporate the amendments that had been brought about in the Punjab or elsewhere from time to time in the light of experience. These were not even available on this side of the Cease-fire line. The result was that neither the Courts nor the lawyers could sometimes precisely say what exactly the law on the point was? It is only fair to record with gratitude that these reforms were the result of extreme hard work put in by Khawaja Abdul Ghani, the then Law Secretary, and undoubteldy, one of the most conscientious officers this Government had at any time. Mirpur, the largest town in Azad Kashmir, was put on the electric map for the first time.

## CROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINE MOVEMENT

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who was released from Kud jail in January, 1958, was re-arrested three months later in April. This created an angry reaction in Pakistan. A country-wide demand for strong action followed. On a Mayday, in 1958, I received a telegram from Ch. Ghulam Abbas informing me that he was reaching Mirpur on the next day. Accompanied by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Chaudhry Sahib arrived in the morning and told me that he would speak to local workers while I may have a talk with Sardar Qaiyum. We retired to another room where I was abruptly asked, without being briefed about the circumstances, as to whether I was prepared to go to jail for the sake of Kashmir? I readily agreed. It was the only discussion we had and with this we came down-stairs to join Chaudhry Sahib who was telling local workers that he had decided to launch a mass movement for crossing the Cease-fire line. It came to be known as K. L. M. Malik Firoze Khan Noon was then Prime Minister with Mr. Iskandar Mirza as President. The country was preparing for its first general elections under the Constitution of 1956 passed during the Premiership of Ch. Muhammad Ali. The Muslim League headed by Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan had through extreme hard work, started building up a strong public opinion in the country.

Within a few days, the Kashmir Liberation Movement gained momentum. By the beginning of June, the whole of Punjab was in its grip and

the slogan 'Kashmir Chalo' rented the air. Together, we visited Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Lahore and Sialkot. Unprecedented crowds were attracted to public meetings addressed by Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and his colleagues. This writer was appointed Secretary General of the Movement with Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan as President. Mr. Noon came down to Lahore and had a conference with Opposition leaders, including Mr. Suhrawardy. It should be said to the credit of late Mr. Noon that he sincerely wanted the holding of general elections. All political leaders in the Opposition, particularly Mr. Suhrawardy and Khan Abdul Qaiyum, also wanted the same but President Iskandar Mirza had different plans. There was little doubt that Muslim League in the Western Wing and the Awami League of Mr. Suhrawardy in the Eastern Wing were going to be returned to power. They had no love lost for Mr. Iskandar Mirza who could clearly see that he had no chance, whatsoever, of re-election. It seems that Malik Firoze Khan Noon told them that it was being sponsored by Iskandar Mirza to disrupt the programme for general elections. The result was that we did not get the official backing of the political parties. When I met Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan at Peshawar and requested for his support, he told me that although he was sympathetic to any Movement that advanced the Cause of Kashmir's freedom, he could not support it as it may delay the holding of general elections.

This writer came to Rawalpindi and set up an office in the house of Chaudhry Sahib. Meanwhile the government announced repeatedly that it would not allow us to cross the Cease-fire line because it would create grave international repercussions and also because it may lead to bloodshed on the Indian side of the Cease-fire line. Chaudhry Sahib, one day, asked me to despatch a telegram on his behalf to Mr. Noon calling upon him not to stand in the way of our march. On the second day I was asked to repeat the telegram. A few days later when I was asked to repeat the telegram a third time, I could see no sense in doing so and asked Chaudhry Sahib as to what use it was? Smilingly, he taught me: "Ah ! this is the Gandhian way of politics; *do* as you *like* but in the eyes of the public, shift the blame to the fellow, opposite". We had a hearty laugh and I repeated the telegram several times later.

I owe it to history to unravel the mystery that surrounds the K.L.M., of course, within the limits of my knowledge. When it was still not known as to whether or not, we would be allowed to cross the border, I asked Chaudhry Sahib what his plan was and he told me, very rightly, that if the Pakistan Government ultimately decided not to stand in our way and instead allowed us to cross the line, he would prefer not to go with the first batch in order to watch the consequences. However, when it finally became known that the Government was not going to allow us to proceed

beyond Muzaffarabad, Chaudhry Sahib decided to personally march towards the Ceasefire line. He left for Muzaffarabad but was halted at Kohala, brought back to Rawalpindi and left at his house. I am personally a witness that Mr. Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash, then Chief Minister West Pakistan, rang up his brother late Mr. Zubair, then Superintending Engineer, Rawalpindi, asking him to use his influence to dissuade his brother from marching again. Perhaps Mr. Qizilbash was thinking of Unionist Muslim politicians who could be influenced through their relatives in the service of the government. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas belonged to that hard school of politicians, with whom it mattered little whether they were in jail or amidst their dear and near ones. Mr. Zubair told Mr. Qizilbash immediately that he was the last person who could influence his brother's political decisions.

Mr. K. H. Khurshid, a practising lawyer at Karachi, was on a short visit to Rawalpindi. Of late he had drawn closer to Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. When Mr. Khurshid was co-Editor of the "Weekly Guardian" Lahore in partnership with Mr. Aziz Beg, he wrote several articles, highly critical of Chaudhry Sahib. The reconciliation came at the 1956 Convention. When Sardar Abdul Qaiyum became President, Mr. Khurshid was appointed a Foreign publicity Adviser, stationed at Karachi. This time Chaudhry Sahib took Mr. Khurshid along and again marched towards Muzaffarabad with the declared intention of crossing the Ceasefire line. They were arrested near Kohala and removed to Central jail Rawalpindi.

With the detention of Ch. Ghulam Abbas and the decision of the Central Government not to allow the volunteers to cross the Cease-fire line, the Movement received a serious set-back and frustrated the aims that it was expected to achieve. Had the Government not taken this decision, there is no doubt that thousands of State nationals and their active sympathizers from Pakistan would have crossed the Cease-fire line and courted arrest in occupied Kashmir. It was also likely that some trigger-happy Indian soldiers or the Central Reserve Police may have resorted to firing on the in-coming volunteers; the entry of thousands of un-armed volunteers after the pattern of Gandhian Satyagrah, would have electrified Muslims in occupied Kashmir and thus a gigantic Civil Disobedience Movement would have sprung up against Indian occupation. This, apart from attracting world-wide attention, would have brought home not only to the leaders of India but also to those of the world, the urgency of solving the Kashmir issue in accordance with justice.

The result of Pakistan Government's policy was that the movement lost its inherent appeal and the public anger got diverted against the

Government. Hundreds of workers were arrested in Azad Kashmir but in Pakistan it remained confined to Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Jhelum and Sialkot, though protest meetings were held in Lahore, Karachi and elsewhere too. Among those detained, were two ex-Presidents of Azad Kashmir —Col. Sher Ahmed Khan and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, an ex-Minister of Defence—Raja Haider Khan and top ranking leaders like Mr. A. R. Saghar. Almost all political leaders in Pakistan including Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, Khan Abudl Qaiyum Khan, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Mr. I. I. Chundrigar, Ch. Muhammad Ali and Mr. Isphahani issued public statements condemning the imprisonment of Ch. Ghulam Abbas and his colleagues. Mr. Daultana moved an adjournment motion in the National Assembly to discuss the detention of Ch. Ghulam Abbas, during the discussion of which, apart from paying glowing tributes to the leader, member after member, took the opportunity of reiterating the solidarity of the people of Pakistan with the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Ch. Muhammad Ali poignantly remarked that it was an irony of fate that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah who had initially supported the State's accession to India, was languishing in an Indian jail while Ch. Ghulam Abbas who had been supporting the State's accession to Pakistan, stood detained in a Pakistan jail. Begum Sarwari Irfanullah from Karachi tabled an adjournment motion in the West Pakistan Assembly and the performance of the National Assembly was repeated.

With the arrest of Ch. Ghulam Abbas and the decision of the Government to prevent the march which was to take place from Chinari—the easiest land route connecting Kashmir Valley with the outside world, the Central Committee decided to open alternate fronts at Suchetgarh in Sialkot and Saria in tehsil Kotli. Before the Government could take effective preventive measures, a group of ten volunteers from Mirpur Ashique Hussain, Jamil Ahmad, Muhammad Aslam, Nazar Muhammad, Muhammad Rafique, Abdul Ghafoor, Abdul Rashid, Muhammad Yaqub and Muhammad Amin with Salar Muhammad Latif as their leader, succeeded in crossing the Cease-fire line at Saria. They were arrested by the Indian authorities and subjected to considerable torture. They were later sentenced to 1½ years' imprisonment for illegal entry into occupied Kashmir, at the expiry of which they were pushed back into Azad Kashmir. The Azad Kashmir Government which had by then changed hands, granted them financial assistance of Rs. 500/- each. The Central Government addressed four communications to the President of the Security Council on the 26th June, 4th July, 11th July and 14th July. In these communications, the grave situation resulting from the Council's inability to implement its resolutions on Kashmir, was brought to the notice of the President. These communications form part of the U. N. record and were circulated to members of the Council. The importance of the movement,

if it had been allowed to have its normal course, may be judged from the fact that a few weeks later, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru told Mr. Gibbon, the then Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, who came from the Anglo-Pakistani stock of Christians, that for the first time since 1948 they had been put in a serious situation with regard to Kashmir by the movement launched by Ch. Ghulam Abbas. In New Delhi, a high level conference was held on 27th June under the chairmanship of Pandit Nehru. It was attended among others by Defence Minister Krishna Menon, Secretary Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Desai and Chief of Staff, General Thimayya who had earlier returned from an unscheduled tour of the Cease-fire line. Mr. Krishna Menon flew to Srinagar and had a meeting with Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad on 26th May. Addressing a press conference in New Delhi on 17th June, Pandit Nehru said that the volunteers, he hoped, would not be allowed to enter occupied Kashmir. On 27th June, he said that India was not going to allow crossing of the Cease-fire line, that he could not say what treatment was to be meted out to them but that if they remained peaceful, they would be put into jail, but if they resorted to violence, they were to be treated differently. Pandit Panth said in a public meeting at Ferozepur on 1st July that the Government of Pakistan had done well to prevent the volunteers from entering into occupied Kashmir, otherwise the situation would have deteriorated. Addressing foreign tourists in Srinagar on 26th May, Krishna Menon condemned the movement as mischievous. Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, the Prime Minister of occupied Kashmir, told a public meeting in Srinagar on 1st July that the entry of the volunteers into Kashmir was bound to create great disturbance and seriously affect the economic situation. He also said that the aim of the movement was to frighten away the tourists, most of whom were leaving the State. A special Convention of the National Conference was convened in Srinagar on 7th July which passed a resolution threatening that if the movement was not immediately stopped, Azad Kashmir was going to be "liberated". The movement was also the subject of several statements, motions and questions in the Indian Parliament. The movement received wide publicity abroad and a brochure comprising some of these comments was attached by Mr. Chattari with his letter to the Security Council President dated the 11th of July. The New York Times, in an editorial on 30th July, described the movement as a good example of people seeking freedom.

This writer was arrested on 10th July from the house of Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan, after a meeting of the Central Committee was over and removed to Montgomery Central Jail. Meanwhile, the Government was trying for a compromise and consequently some of us were transferred to Rawalpindi Central jail for a meeting of the High Command. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum, Raja Haider Khan and Ghazi Illahi Bakhsh were brought

from Azad Kashmir. The meeting was held on 17th July. Mr. Qudrat-ullah Shahab, who was then Secretary to the President, attended the meeting for sometime and offered unconditional release of all those who had been detained. It was also understood that the Pakistan Government was prepared to install our party in the seat of power at Muzaffarabad. The offer was rejected and the fact remains that the decision of the High Command was unanimous. This writer was sent back to Montgomery jail where a few days later, he was joined by Chaudhry Sahib. A month later he was transferred to Ghora gali special sub-jail while this writer was transferred to the Central jail Rawalpindi, where Col. Sher Ahmed Khan, Mr. A. R. Saghar and Mr. K. H. Khurshid also stood detained. A few weeks later Mr. Khurshid and myself were also transferred to Ghora-gali. The Forest Rest House had been converted into a sub-jail. Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan on 9th October and on 15th October, all persons detained in connection with the movement were ordered to be released. This writer wanted to utilize the time in writing but, strange as it may seem, the facility of pen and paper, even at my own cost, was refused; otherwise the jail life was comfortable. We were getting good food, had the facility of newspapers and the freedom to move about in all parts of the jail.

## WAS IT ISKANDAR MIRZA INSPIRED ?

It is very often asked and generally believed that the Movement had been launched on the inspiration of President Iskandar Mirza. His greatest weakness was his lust for power, and there is no doubt that if he could, he would have perpetuated his rule as long as he lived. This weakness apart, which no doubt resulted in a lot of misfortune for the country, it must be said to his credit that he was one of the staunchest enemies of India in the country. This is what Ch. Muhammad Ali had told Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan in confidence. It is also borne out from the fact as revealed by Malik Ghulam Jilani, an ex-M.N.A. who was no friend of Iskandar Mirza, that when in September 1965, Indian Information media claimed the capture of Lahore and the same was broadcast by B.B.C., Mr. Iskandar Mirza who was then in London, wept like a child in the presence of Malik Ghulam Jilani and like a widow, mourning the passing away of her beloved husband, cried in anguish, repeatedly wailing for the loss of Lahore. A stone-hearted civil servant who had been trained in the hard school of the political department, it is really very hard to believe that he could have wept so childishly thousands of miles away from Pakistan and at the fag end of his life, except out of sincere and noble sentiments of patriotism.

It is, however, true that elections were scheduled to be held next year under the Constitution of 1956; that the two leading politicians of the

country, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan had no love lost for him; that there was apparently no chance for him to remain in power after the said general elections and that, therefore, he may have been wanting to avoid the elections to perpetuate his rule. Ch. Ghulam Abbas did have a meeting with him at Nathiagali. Mr. Qudratullah Shahab belonged to Jammu; his father was a close friend of Ch. Ghulam Abbas. It was therefore assumed that President Iskandar Mirza was behind the movement and the intention was to create a serious law and order situation in West Pakistan to provide him with an excuse to suspend the Constitution and impose a Revolutionary Council. This was the reason why leading politicians like Khan Qaiyum and Mr. Suhrawardy did not extend their support and this was also why Malik Feroze Khan Noon, who, I believe, sincerely desired the holding of general elections, took stringent steps to prevent the spread of the movement.

As General Secretary of the movement, I must in all fairness to everyone, emphatically record my ignorance about any understanding between Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and President Iskandar Mirza. The fact that we lacked funds and had to meet our minimum requirements by raising a small amount of money from friends and sympathisers, apart from meeting our personal expenses from our own pockets, refutes the allegation of any concrete understanding between the two. This propaganda was let loose to discredit the movement. It was publicly alleged that the movement had been launched to capture power in Azad Kashmir. Anti-Iskandar Mirza politicians were privately told that it had been instigated by him to sabotage the ensuing general elections. The allegation that it was launched to capture power in Azad Kashmir is untrue and was condemned even by Malik Feroze Khan Noon. It is really unfortunate that these canards should have been put also into the ears of foreign missions. A few days before his detention, a high ranking officer from a foreign embassy came to see Chaudhry Sahib at his house. This writer had also been summoned to be present during the interview. The talks remained inconclusive and on the next day when I met the said officer to resume the discussions, I was really shocked when he told me that Mr. So and So who was a few days later appointed a Minister by Sardar Ibrahim, had told him that the movement had been launched to capture the Azad Kashmir Government. Our talks centred round the role of western powers in Asia and the importance of the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir.

A few days after the arrest of Chaudhry Sahib, I went to Lahore. A huge public meeting was held outside Mochi gate attended by over a lac of people. It was addressed, among others, by Mian Amir-ud-Din and Begum Shah Nawaz. A procession started at midnight; it terminated

at the Assembly chambers at early dawn. At the Assembly chamber, the processionists were addressed by Agha Shorish Kashmiri and this writer, the former being the moving spirit behind the massive demonstration. While descending the stairs, someone caught me by the shoulder and looking back, I found Mr. Spengler, the American Deputy Consul General at Lahore. He later headed the Pakistan desk at the State department and was designated as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State. I was surprised to be told by him that he had attended the meeting at Mochi gate and followed the procession right from the beginning till its termination. He also told me that some senior officials of the American Embassy had come from Karachi and would like to have a discussion on the current movement. This meeting lasted for about three hours. They questioned me very closely on all aspects of the movement and explained the difficulties of the American Government in extending active support to Liberation movements in places like Kashmir, Hungary or Algeria. They also told me how difficult it was to risk a war due to the development of atomic weapons. They also said that it was only this risk that prevented the United States from going to war on the question of Hungary which had recently been swept over by the Russian army.

A year or so later, I was told by Rao Abdul Rashid, then Inspector-General of Police, Azad Kashmir, that soon after the start of the movement, he was summoned to Murree by the Inspector-General of Police, West Pakistan, who asked him how the situation at Muzaffarabad was? Mr. Rashid told me that when he told him that "we are on the top of it", he raised his eye-brows and replied that he wondered whether they were expected to be on the top of it. He also told Rao Sahib that he had just returned from Nathiagali after meeting the President, and that the 'Harami' was ready with his plans for enforcing a Revolutionary Council. Another intriguing incident is that a few days before his arrest, Chaudhry Sahib told me that if I felt any difficulty, I may contact Mr. Qudratullah Shahab. When after his arrest, we nominated Col. Sher Ahmed Khan as acting Chief of the Movement and managed to smuggle him into Muzaffarabad in a taxi, we expected that he would be arrested. It was important from our point of view not only because he was an ex-President and his arrest had considerable publicity value but also because he belonged to the tribe of Sardar Ibrahim and we could thus show that even leading members of his tribe were supporting the movement. Sardar Ibrahim did not arrest him but put him in a government jeep which dropped him at Murree. I think it was 10 p. m. when I received information at Rawalpindi that Col. Sher Ahmed had not been arrested and that he was returning to his home the same night. I contacted Shahab Sahib on telephone and told him that Col.

Sher Ahmed had returned from Muzaffarabad and that it was necessary that he should be taken into detention. At early dawn, police surrounded his house at Rawalpindi and removed him to the central jail Rawalpindi. Again, on 17th July, after the High Command meeting had ended and Mr. Shahab was informed of our decision, Chaudhry Sahib asked me to see him off at the jail gate. He also told me to tell him that we needed the company of Mr. A. R. Saghar who had not been arrested and was in Rawalpindi. This I told Shahab Sahib, of course, not telling him that Chaudhry Sahib wanted it because it was understood and lo! early next morning Saghar Sahib joined us in the jail. Another incident I recall is that I accompanied Chaudhry Sahib to Lahore where he addressed a press conference on 22nd June. Before it started, Mr. Kemal Hyder, then News Editor of the Pakistan Times, whom I knew personally since 1951, came to me and said that the photographer accompanying him would take a snap of myself! Flattering though the offer was, I laughed it off telling him that they should confine themselves to Chaudhry Sahib only. Mr. Kemal Hyder was serious and told me that he was not joking because "you people might change the course of history in Pakistan". Pressed to say what he really meant, Mr. Kemal told me that Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, the owner of the Progressive Papers Limited, publishers of the Daily Pakistan Times, had arrived from Karachi a day or two earlier where he had met President Iskandar Mirza. According to Mr. Kemal Hyder, the President had asked Mian Sahib to support the Kashmir Liberation Movement and that on his return to Lahore, Mian Sahib had convened a meeting of the Editorial staff and told them, in the light of this back-ground, to give the widest possible publicity to the Movement in so far as news coverage was concerned, but to refrain from editorial support. It is a fact that the Pakistan Times did give the movement wide publicity and that too on its front pages.

Does this evidence, weak as it is, go to prove that there was any secret understanding between Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan and President Iskandar Mirza? While I have no doubt that the possibility of any deal between the two must be totally ruled out as propaganda, the possibility of Iskandar Mirza's tacit approval of the launching of the Movement, cannot be ruled out. President Iskandar Mirza may have thought that the movement may create a law and order situation enabling him to dismiss the civil government and by promulgating a so-called Revolutionary Council, avoid the holding of general elections and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas may have very rightly, as a leader sincerely dedicated to the cause of freedom, thought of taking advantage of the President's game of power-politics, to further the cause of Kashmir's freedom.

It may be said in fairness to everyone that the performance of the workers was far less than the press reports made it appear to be. As some

cynic rightly pointed out during those very days that even if the number of volunteers demonstrating in any town or leaving for Muzaffarabad was ten or fifteen, the press reports generally put their number at 313. There were lathi charges at Muzaffarabad, Chinari, Rawalpindi, Gujrat and Sialkot but not much damage was caused to anyone. Women also participated in the demonstrations particularly at Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and Rawalpindi. The women's agitation at Muzaffarabad was led by Begum Haider Khan.

The Central Committee consisted of the following: (1) Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan President, (2) this writer, General Secretary, (3) Sardar Abdul Qaiyum, (4) Col. Sher Ahmed, (5) Mr. K. H. Khurshid, (6) Ghazi Illahi Bakhsh, (7) Qazi Khurshid Alam (members) and Dr. Muzaffar Hussain Shah, former Civil Surgeon of the Maharaja's government and a former Deputy Director, Medical Services Azad Kashmir, as Treasurer. Col. Sher Ahmed succeeded Chaudhry Sahib as acting President and Sardar Bashir Ahmed Khan succeeded Col. Sher Ahmed Khan. After his arrest, the office was abolished. This writer was succeeded as acting Secretary General by Mr. A. R. Saghar who was succeeded by Sardar Fateh Muhammad, ex-M.L.A. He was succeeded by Chaudhry Khurshid Ahmed, ex-M. L. A. on whose arrest, Maulana Ghulam Haider Khan Jandalvi succeeded him. Among those who took prominent part in the Movement, first comes the name of Maulvi Abdul Aziz Rajaurvi. Among others were Syed Muhammad Abdullah Shah Azad who later became a Minister, Qazi Hafeez Salib, Sheikh Khalid Mahmood, Sardar Feroze Ali Khan, Pleader, Maulvi Muhammad Ashraf, Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, Advocate, Syed Farid Shah Gilani, Munshi Ali Gohar, Mirza Ghulam Rasool Beg and several others.

Not more than Rs. 20,000/- was collected by the Central Committee to finance the Movement. It was operated by the Treasurer. A major portion of this amount was made available to branches at Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Gujrat, Gujranwala and Sialkot. The rest was spent on the transportation and food for Razakar groups at Rawalpindi. The Government did not give any family allowance to the detenus, but late Sheikh Muhammad Anwar, the Comptroller of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, who had been Assistant Accountant-General of the Maharaja's Government before partition, collected some money from his personal acquaintances at Karachi and sent it to the families of some of the imprisoned leaders and workers. It was a voluntary effort motivated by his desire to associate himself, as a State national, with the Movement.

President Iskandar Mirza had unsuccessfully suggested to Malik Feroze Khan Noon that a camp be opened for the detenus at Tret which is about 29 miles from Rawalpindi towards Murree and is perhaps at a height of 3000' above sea level.

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# CHAPTER INDEX

## AZAD KASHMIR SCENE (II)

## CHAPTER XXXVI

# Azad Kashmir Scene (II)

### "IBRAHIM IS A LUCKY DOG"

The K. L. M. movement had widened the breach between Ch. Ghulam Abbas and Sardar Ibrahim and it was, therefore, quite natural that after the release of the leaders in October, 1958, his Government should have become shaky. A week or so after the promulgation of Martial Law, President Iskandar Mirza was relieved of his duties and flown to London to spend his remaining days in exile. The power now unmistakably passed into the hands of General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who later assumed the rank of Field Marshal. The Army High Command was not well disposed of towards Sardar Ibrahim ever since the Poonch events of 1951. A few months after he took over, Ch. Ghulam Abbas met the President at Abbottabad. The press reported that the meeting lasted for three hours and the impression thus conveyed was that internal administration of Azad Kashmir may have also come up for serious discussion. What actually happened, as Chaudhry Sahib told me, was that while they had just settled down, after customary greetings, he expressed to the President his un-happiness about strained relations between him and his brother Sardar Bahadur Khan. The President brushed aside the topic saying: "Ibrahim is a lucky dog". Within a few minutes, some of his relatives also came in and then they did sit for three hours but no politics was discussed. This shows that the President was in a receptive mood for bringing about a change in the AK administration but Chaudhry Sahib's uninvited concern for the rift in the President's family, was taken by the latter as an unwarranted interference and that is why he uttered the above remarks about Sardar Ibrahim, by which he meant that he was a very lucky man. It is quite true. There is to my knowledge no instance when a man became President of a country for the third time within a period of 28 years, with such a lengthy interval of political wilderness as 16 years.

The intrigues, however, were going on and there is no doubt that the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs was wholly behind Ch. Ghulam Abbas and his faction for bringing about a change. Sardar Ibrahim is responsible for the information that President Ayub was unnecessarily offended by two incidents of protocol impropriety. In the first instance, his seat at the Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam session, addressed by the President, was vacant and in the second instance, he failed to see off the President at Rawalpindi although he was present in the city.

## KHURSHID REPLACES IBRAHIM, WHO IS JAILED

This gave impetus to the move for his removal. It goes without saying that no President of Azad Kashmir can, sanely, even think of keeping himself in saddle if and when the Government of Pakistan wants him to quit. Apart from being a well entrenched practice invariably followed, a violation is not warranted even by the dictates of self-preservation. This time the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs devised a big hoax. The Working Committee of the Muslim Conference which formally elected the President, was largely composed of personal supporters of Sardar Ibrahim. First of all, the choice fell upon Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Buchh who was then incharge of the Free Kashmir Centre at New York, financed by the Central Government. It was due partly to the fact of his being an extremely capable man but also because he had powerful personal friends in Mr. Qudratullah Shahab, Secretary to the President and Mr. Anwar Sheikh, the Comptroller General, Revenues. When contacted for the appointment, Mr. Buchh enquired whether the security of tenure was guaranteed and since there can be no such security in political appointments, his name was dropped. The Ministry then prepared a list of 41 persons comprising all ex-Presidents, ex-Ministers and other eligibles. By a process of elimination, 38 were eliminated. There was reason to believe that a decision to appoint Mr. K. H. Khurshid had already been taken. When the list was placed before a meeting of the Working Committee of which Mr. A. R. Saghar was a member, they decided to propose the name of Mr. Saghar who was also on the list. Consequently, a deputation comprising Mr. A. R. Saghar, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah and Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim met the Chief Adviser at Abbottabad and conveyed the Working Committee decision; they were politely but firmly told that his name was not acceptable.

A correlated incident mentioned to me by Mr. Khurshid which shows how strange are the ways of fate, is that Mr. S. M. Yusuf was then Secretary of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, the Quaid-e-Azam asked Mr. Khurshid to find out an I. C. S.

officer suitable for appointment as his Secretary. Mr. Khurshid proposed the name of Mr. S. M. Yusuf who was then appointed to the post. Now it was Mr. Yusuf's turn to return the debt. The name of Mr. K. H. Khurshid had already been selected but the President wanted to satisfy himself about the antecedents of the man, whom he did not know. So he asked Mr. S. M. Yusuf to ascertain the antecedents of Mr. Khurshid and naturally he gave a favourable report. The Intelligence Directorate made a vain effort to introduce a man of their choice but Ch. Ghulam Abbas ensured that they did not succeed. Did Ch. Ghulam Abbas really make any decisive contribution to the selection of Mr. Khurshid? A year later when tension between them was rapidly increasing, I suggested to Mr. Khurshid that since he had come into power through the efforts of the former, it was his moral duty to accommodate him even if he had to go out of the way. Mr. Khurshid told me that the position was actually different as he had been told by a highly responsible person whose name he did not disclose and said he couldn't disclose so long as he (Mr. Khurshid) was in power, that Ch. Ghulam Abbas had all along tried to advance an ex-Army officer from outside Poonch.

The Working Committee, therefore, elected Mr. Khurshid as President. He took oath of office on 1st May, 1959. He did not form any cabinet. Born in Jammu, Mr. Khurshid was, during student days, politically aligned with the Jammu faction of Kashmir politics. He served as Private Secretary to the Quaid-e-Azam from July, 1944 to September, 1947. He was arrested in Srinagar in October, 1947 and came to Pakistan in February, 1949 in exchange of prisoners. After doing his Bar-at-Law, he started practice at Karachi.

Sardar Ibrahim was arrested from his 'Pindi residence on the night falling between the 13th and 14th of November 1959 under Martial Law Regulation No. 24 which made punishable spreading of hatred against the Martial Law regime. The case was based on a letter he allegedly wrote to I.G.P. AK.[1] His bail plea was rejected by all the Courts, including the concerned Martial Law court. He was released within two to three weeks and the case was also withdrawn.

## KHURSHID'S KITE SOARS HIGH

Soon after taking over office, he came to Mirpur and at a public function praised the 'Kashmir Chalo' Movement launched in 1958 and used pretty strong language against India. The capital of Pakistan was then at Karachi. When President Ayub read the speech in Daily Jang, he walked

1. Weekly Pak Kashmir, 26th November 1959.

in to the adjoining office of Mr. Qudratullah Shahab and indignantly told him how "irresponsibly" Khurshid had behaved. Mr. Shahab not only cooled down the President but persuaded him to give the AK President the freedom of using strong language not only against India but also against the Big powers which, Mr. Shahab argued, could strengthen the hands of the Pakistan Government. This is an instance of what a sympathetic man at a key-post can do. Gradually, Mr. Khurshid won the confidence of the President to such an extent that the latter frequently praised him in his own circles. A few instances may be cited here:

The President who was to address a meeting at the Ayub Hall, also attended by representatives of CENTO and SEATO asked Mr. Khurshid to speak. He lashed out at the United States, Britain and France for their failure to support Pakistan even on legitimate matters. President Ayub then told the meeting that he had nothing more to add. Mr. Khurshid is the only President who met foreign Heads of States on a visit to Pakistan. Apart from a long meeting with the President of Turkey, he had a 15-minute meeting with President Eisen-Hover at Karachi but for reasons of protocol, the same was not publicised. Mr. N. M. Khan, one of the senior most civil servants, met Mr. Khurshid in connection with certain matters and later complained to his President that he was behaving like a President! To his utter surprise, President Ayub asked: "Do you think he should behave like a Section officer?" Mr. Dawood, a top Industrialist, who knew Mr. Khurshid, from his Mount Pleasant days, was asked by President Ayub, in course of a meeting, whether he had met the "Chhota President".

No military parades were held on 24th October, the AK anniversary. At best, the President took salute of a local police force. In 1960 Mr. Khurshid sounded General Musa, whether a Military parade could not be held? "Sir, why not? It is *your* Army", the Commander-in-Chief graciously answered. It was partly due to the known pull Mr. Khurshid had with the President. It is now an annual affair.

It was probably towards the end of 1959 that President Ayub who was staying at Abbottabad and was on way back from Kaghan, paid a surprise, unscheduled visit to Muzaffarabad for a few hours. At Muzaffarabad he took out a prepared statement from his pocket which was released to the press. It praised Khurshid and went so far as to say that the people of AK were fortunate in having such a man at the helm of affairs. It had a very adverse reaction in the Muslim Conference circles who interpreted it as a move to build up Khurshid against Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. The implication was unjustified because Mr. Shahab whose brain-child the statement was, could not even think of such a possibility. Mr. M. Z. Kiani was then

Joint Secretary of the MKA. He was sympathetic to Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan, may be out of the latter's seniority. They were immediate neighbours. Subsequently, Mr. Khurshid was responsible for his transfer.

## A MEMORABLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AYUB

President Ayub paid a memorable visit to Muzaffarabad and Poonch in October, 1960. He stayed overnight at Muzaffarabad and then at Rawalakot. He addressed a mammoth public meeting at the College ground where Mr. Khurshid presented an address of welcome in which he expressed the gratitude of the people of Kashmir to all the Governments of Pakistan, past and present, for the support extended to the people of Kashmir in their struggle for self-determination. Dozens of deputations called on the President, among whom was one comprising Mr. A. R. Saghar and this writer. When at the end of ten minutes, the Military Secretary showed us his wrist watch from behind the President—an indication that the time was over—and we stood up to take leave, the President graciously made us sit down and continued the conversation for about half an hour. He was very informal and used a vulgar abuse about the Editor of a weekly newspaper. He also said as to how did Raja Haider Khan—"that......that Forest contractor", who then headed the MC, expect him to read his frequent, long letters and reply the same". He praised Mr. Khurshid and told us that he needed to be strengthened. In the very beginning of the interview, Mr. Saghar recited the following verse from Iqbal which refers to Prophet Moses:

کہ بے عصا ہے کلیمی بھی کارِ بے بنیاد

Trans : Even Prophethood, without a stick, was a job without a base.

When Mr. Saghar translated it into simple Urdu, the President had a hearty laugh, perhaps because it fitted with his philosophy of political power. It helped to make the interview very congenial and informal. The President later asked Mr. Shahab to offer Mr. Saghar employment in the National Reconstruction Department!

## MUSLIM LEADERS DESTROY THEIR PROMISING SUCCESSORS

Relations between Mr. Khurshid and Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan remained cordial only for a few weeks. May be one of the reasons was the growing closeness of the former with the President of Pakistan, or may be it was in the nature of the departed leader, or a part of his politics not to

allow the advance or consolidation of a political worker. Sardar Ibrahim had resigned from Presidentship of the party and a few more members were nominated to the Working Committee. A meeting of the Working Committee was called at Muzaffarabad on the 27th of August, 1959 to dissolve the party and instead set up a Steering Committee. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum could not attend the meeting. No one had been consulted as to what ought to be done but a direction was given to elect Raja Haider Khan as Chairman and Mr. Khurshid, as a member. The idea obviously was to belittle the importance of the AK President and lay down a foundation for a power-struggle between him and the party. Most of us considered it ill-conceived. A meeting attended by Mr. Khurshid, Mr. Saghar, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah and this writer, to take stock of the situation, preceded the WC meeting. We decided that Mr. Khurshid should not be nominated to the Committee. In the Working Committee meeting which was held under my presidentship,[1] we amended the plan brought by Mr. Wani in accordance with our decisions. From now on, despite the efforts of us all, the breach continued to widen until the Muslim Conference Party began publicly opposing Mr. Khurshid.

It is unfortunately peculiar of leaders in the Muslim world not to provide their people with their successors as all those colleagues and workers who hold promise and have the capacity for initiative, drive, lead and decision-making, are liquidated, destroyed or at least disgraced.

The classic example is of Egypt where the whole group that brought Jamal Nasser to power, was either in jail or in grave before Nasser died, except for Anwar Sadat who being decidedly cleverer than his leader, chose non-speaking posts of Speaker or Editor of the Egyptian Pravada.

Another example: In 1967, two members were to be nominated to the AK Advisery Council, out of a panel of six candidates. At the time of selection, Rear-Admiral A. R. Khan, Kashmir Affairs Minister, told A.K. President Khan Abdul Hamid Khan that the choice was his but advised him "in his own interest", to choose two such persons who may not prove his rivals for another thirty years!

In Kashmir too, the pattern of Muslim politics has been the same. Whether it was Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Khan, Bakhshi or Sardar Ibrahim, Sardar Qaiyum or K. H. Khurshid, they can all be compared to shadeless growth in the countryside—the thor. It is sad, very sad indeed but nevertheless it stands out as an incontrovertible fact. Did they build a single man?

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1. Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, 28th August, 1959.

These leaders don't realise that by the very laws of Nature, they must, some day, cease to live and their own interests as well as that of the country demand a continuity of policy which is possible largely by the continuity of the Party in power and the Party can remain in effective power only if it has an effective leader.

Gandhi had his rivals in Malavia and Moti Lal Nehru. Gandhi and Malavia were both candidates for Congress Presidentship. After his election, Gandhi persuaded the Party to accept Malavia as President. Malavia was deeply touched by the gesture, went to Gandhi, apologised, gave up politics and took up social uplift of his community; ever afterwards, Gandhi, remained his leader. Gandhi next picked up the young Jawaharlal as his "crown prince" and Moti Lal, touched by the gesture, was ever afterwards at the feet of Gandhi. We Muslims have neither Gandhis nor Malavias and Moti Lals among us. Public service with us in Pakistan only means political service and that is why we have had no social reformer, as if we have no social evils to eradicate. This field too offers unique opportunities for making a name even if we look at it from that angle but it does not interest anyone because it does not offer power—the power to be feared and the power to preside over patronage. This could not attract even the old 'Khudai-Khidmatgar' Abdul Ghaffar Khan who could have been our Vinova Bhave and command love from Khyber to Karachi. The 1977 post-election crisis lamentably brought to the surface the absence of even one uninvolved man of national stature.

## THE "PHANSI SHAH"!

With the introduction of Basic Democracies in Pakistan, it was decided to introduce the system in Azad Kashmir also; elected members whose number was fixed at 2400, were also to function as Electoral College for the election of the President. Expecting to secure an overwhelming majority of Kashmiri-speaking votes, Mr. Khurshid hoped to take a lead in Pakistan and utilise it to beat a likely small margin of difference, he expected to be needing in Azad Kashmir. Accordingly, 1200 votes were allocated to A.K. and of the remainder, 600 votes were allotted to refugees from Jammu province and 600 to those from Kashmir province.

In Pakistan the Government had disqualified public office holders from contesting elections, unless they were cleared by a specially constituted tribunal. The same pattern was naturally followed in Azad Kashmir. Mr. Khurshid had no malafide intentions. He was dutifully following the Pakistan pattern, though of course, it as well suited him. A retired Sessions Judge from Punjab, Syed Abdul Latif Shah better known in AK as Ebda Shah, constituted the one-man tribunal. On the very day his

appointment was decided upon in Rawalpindi, Mr. Khurshid told me that he had been told by Mr. Manzoor Qadir that he need not worry because the man was known in the lawyers' circles as" "پھانسی شاہ" (A Judge who usually passed sentences of death).

The tribunal issued notices to all ex-Ministers, ex-Presidents as well as Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan as ex-Supreme Head. Most of them, including Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan, who did not put in an appearance, were disqualified. The disqualification of Ch. Ghulam Abbas sent a wave of indignation through Muslim Conference circles. Mr. Khurshid told me that he came to know of the decision only after it had been announced and that he could not but accept responsibility as Head of the Government. There is no evidence to discredit his statement.

Of those who were cleared, the prominent are Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan. Both had the courage of conviction to vindicate their honour by approaching the tribunal for clearance. That was, by itself, admirable. Upholding the latter's right to contest the ensuing polls which meant clearance of any charges in hitherto held public office, the "پھانسی شاہ", quite sentimentally, added the following verse of Iqbal:

فطرت کے مقاصد کی کرتا ہے نگہبانی
یا بندہ صحرائی یا مرد کوہستانی

The clearance, there is no doubt, was given on merits but the sentimental touch as represented by the verse, was due, in addition to his reputation as a Mujahid and his ability to impress and influence others, perhaps also to brain-washing by old and dedicated Muslim Conference supporters like Dr. Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah of Jhelum where Syed Latif Shah had settled after retirement.

## KHAN ABDUL HAMID REPLACES KHURSHID WHO IS JAILED

As usually happens in Azad Kashmir, an intrigue was already afoot against him. His direct contact with President Ayub, was not to the liking of Khan Habibullah Khan, the Central Home and Kashmir Affairs Minister. His sense of protocol, rather too much of it, had always irritated officials of the MKA. It was his misfortune that both the Kashmir Affairs Minister and the Chief Adviser, Mr. Amanullah Khan Niazi were not only personally close to one another, but were also close to President Ayub Khan. As there must be a saturation point in every eclipse, the relations between Mr. Khurshid and the President also began turning cool. His

slogan for recognition of Azad Kashmir Government was effectively used against him. His unguarded remarks against the President, allegedly uttered in some club, were dinned into the ears of the President. It is widely believed that Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, on his visit to Pakistan in May 1964, in company with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, didn't take kindly to at least part of the conversation Mr. Khurshid had with him and it is said that he hinted this dissatisfaction in course of his marathon private meeting with President Ayub. Mr. Khurshid was, sometimes, rude with officers at Muzaffarabad. His relaticns with Mr. Iqbal Masud, the Secretary General who enjoyed the support of the M.K.A. were so strained that they were hardly on speaking terms with the result that Mr. Masud made it impossible for Mr. Khurshid to function respectably, so much so that he issued instructions in writing that certain orders issued by the President were not to be carried out.

The die had been cast and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs had prepared a charge-sheet against him, which included flimsy charges like the one that Mr. Khurshid had charged T.A. by car while the journey had been performed by rail. But, of course, the main charge was the state of show-down between him and the lent officers. Mr. Amanullah Khan Niazi, who was the principal actor in the conspiracy but who was otherwise, a fine, helpful, straightforward, gentlemanly officer, got the matter put on agenda of the Central cabinet. The meeting was to take place after a week and he and his supporters were afraid lest Mr. Khurshid should be able to meet the President during the interval because they feared that the latter's inherent weakness for Mr. Khurshid, might yet stage a come-back and he might allow him to continue in office. So Mr. Niazi told some leaders of the Muslim Conference to manipulate Mr. Khurshid's remaining in Azad Kashmir for a week. Certainly, they could not manipulate it but it was a stroke of luck for them that Mr. Khurshid proceeded on a tour of Poonch and was summoned to Rawalpindi, ostensibly for a meeting of the Devlopment Board, after the Cabinet had decided to remove and replace him by Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chief Justice of the A.K. High Court. In Rawalpindi, Mr. Niazi came to see him and conveyed the decision of the Central Government! Mr. Khurshid was furious but helpless, as helpless as any A.K. President discovers himself to be in a similar situation. Mr. Khurshid had prided himself in the so-called security of having been elected for five years. The ways of FATE are strange because not only was he removed in the midst of his term but also succeeded by a man whom he didn't want to appoint as Chief Justice.

The following letter issued by the President and circulated to all Secretaries and Heads of departments on 31st October, 1963, is of interest to mention which together with the subsequent letter issued by the Chief

Adviser on 7th November, 1963, will show the state of relations between the two:

"I have noticed that Mr. Iqbal Masud, purporting to act as the Secretary General, has issued certain orders and directions in excess of his authority and in contravention of the provisions of the Rules of Business and the established conventions of the Azad Kashmir Government. All Secretaries to the Government and Heads of Departments are directed that no order purporting to be issued by the Secretary General, which requires the approval of Minister or the Council, will be carried out unless such approval has been obtained and is recorded in the order itself. All Secretaries, Heads of Departments and Section Officers will be held responsible for the consequence of any invalid, illegal and unauthorised order issued without prior approval. If any legal consequences follow, it will be the personal responsibility of the official concerned.

No order or direction can be issued in the name of the Government unless a proper Council order has been obtained. Any order or direction, issued in the name of the Government, which is not in the form of a Council order, is illegal and shall not be given effect to.

No order or direction, issued by a Minister or passed by the Council can be verified, modified or amended, without the prior approval of the issuing authority. If any order, having been issued by a Minister or Council, has not been carried out or has been modified or amended or in any way tampered with, without the approval of the Minister concerned or the Council, as the case may be, all officers responsible for the issuance will render themselves liable to disciplinary action.

All Secretaries to the Government and Heads of Departments are directed to rectify error or errors, if any, and to obtain the necessary approval, where required, without undue delay.

Sd/- President,<br>
Azad Government of the State of<br>
Jammu and Kashmir.

Muzaffarabad,<br>
31st October, 1963.

1. Private Secretary will circulate to Secretaries to the Government and Heads of Department by name.

2. All Secretaries will inform their Section Officers of the contents of this order.

Sd/- President,
Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Muzaffarabad,
31st October, 1963.

**"OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADVISER TO THE AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF J & K.**

**IMMEDIATE**

Discussed with the President, A. K.

The Rules of Business should be strictly followed by all concerned and any contravention thereof may be reported to the undersigned. *After the undersigned has given his decision in a case, the orders should be implemented immediately.*

2. *In view of the above, the President's order No. P/690-714/63, dated 31st October, 1963 may be treated as withdrawn.*

3. This order may be brought to the notice of Secretaries to Government and Heads of Attached Depatments.

Sd/- (AMANULLAH KHAN NIAZI)
Chief Adviser.

*Secretary General*

424/JS(KAD)/63, dated 6th November 1963.

No. PA/SG/496—518/63, dated the 7th November, 1963.

Copy of the bove is forwarded to all Secretaries to the Government and Heads of Departments for information and necessary action.

Sd/- (MUHAMMAD YAQUB)
Deputy Secretary General.

Copy to Private Secretary to the President for information.
Sd/- Deputy Secretary General."

Mr. K. H. Khurshid was arrested on 22nd August 1965 from 'Pindi and put in the Dulai Sub-jail where he spent several months. Several flimsy charges were brought against him and the Government incurred considerable expenditure by way of lawyers' fees etc. but ultimately he was released in February 1966 without being tried.

## KHAN ABDUL HAMID AS PRESIDENT

Mr. Khurshid was succeeded by Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief Justice High Court and a younger brother of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan. He served in several parts of the State including Mirpur and Muzaffarabad as a Sub-Judge. At the time of partition, he was posted as A.D.M. Jammu and a few months after the establishment of the A.K. Government, was appointed District Magistrate Mirpur. The war was going on; there was daily influx of refugees and an entirely new administration had to be set up. He worked very hard to achieve these objectives. The District HQ was then located at Afzalpur, a small village on the right bank of the upper Jhelum canal, in what was previously a police station. Extremely large hearted and essentially a do-gooder, he avoided factionalism and being the senior most civil servant, advanced rapidly and held the posts of Revenue Commissioner and Secretary General; in 1955 he was appointed a Judge of the High Court. On the eve of the retirement of Syed Fayaz Hassan Shah Chief Justice, in October 1963, the question arose as to whether a State national was to be appointed to the post or as the practice was, some officer from Pakistan was to succeed him. Khan Habibullah Khan and Mr. Amanullah Khan Niazi had already agreed among themselves upon the appointment of Khan Sahib. Habibullah Khan and Abdul Hamid Khan were, for some time, in the same college; this acquaintance was renewed by sheer accident in 1960. When the matter came up in a high-level meeting at Rawalpindi, presided over by President Ayub, Mr. Khurshid informed the President that he was a younger brother of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan. Mr. Khurshid claims that he said it to put the President into picture as Khan Abdul Qaiyum was in the Opposition but no sooner had he mentioned this relationship, than Habibullah Khan started scolding Khan Qaiyum but at the same time praising Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, whereupon the President gave his assent. Mr. Khurshid asked me a few days later to tell Khan Sahib that he had been selected not because he was a Kashmiri but because he was a Kashmiri Pathan!

The appointment of Khan Sahib was not a sudden development. At least six months earlier while Mr. Niazi was travelling back from Mangla to Rawalpindi with someone who could not be identified, he mentioned to his companion that Khan Abdul Hamid Khan may replace Mr. Khurshid. The driver over-heard it because they are always all attention to what talk

is going on inside the vehicle and on the next day he passed on the information to Raja Abdul Aziz, a dedicated servant of Khan Sahib, then working in the police department. Khan Abdul Hamid Khan took oath of office as President on 7th August, 1964. The oath was administered by Mr. Amanullah Khan Niazi. He did not form any Council of Ministers. The pattern had been set up by Mr. Khurshid who ruled without a cabinet despite being the Head of a Political party. The pattern was bad because it deprived such workers of the party whom the President could be pleased to appoint as Ministers, of getting introduced on the national level, apart from preparing the second rank leadership of the party for ultimate responsibility. Mr. Khurshid adopted this pattern absolutely on his own. It was a bad precedent and violated democratic norms as practised the world over. Khan Abdul Hamid Khan had no obligation to form a cabinet because he did not represent any Political party.

## BRIGADIER ABDUL REHMAN AS PRESIDENT

President Ayub resigned in the beginning of April, 1969. With the imposition of Martial Law and the dismissal of civil governments in all the provinces, it was apparent that a change was coming in Azad Kashmir too. The new government headed by General Yahya Khan, was, however, as considerate to Khan Sahib as its predecessor. There was no intrigue for his removal nor was there any need for it. Khan Sahib had played his innings to his satisfaction and at the age of 63, having risen from the post of a Munsif to that of a Head of the State, was mentally prepared to go into honourable retirement. General Abdul Hamid, then Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, visited Muzaffarabad in July, 1969 and conveyed to him the decision, in principle, of the Central Government to replace him but he was also told that there was no hurry and that he was to be informed well in advance. Search for a successor began. The Central Government through the new Chief Adviser, Mr. M. Musa Ahmed from East Pakistan conducted lengthy discussions with Sardar Qaiyum, Sardar Ibrahim and Mr. Khurshid. Mr. Ahmed tried in vain to persuade them to nominate a common candidate for the office. The Central Government then selected Brigadier Abdul Rehman who hails from Bhimber. He had retired recently from the Signals and was personally known to the Pakistan President. However, I think late Lt. General Akbar Khan of Bhimber who was then Director General of Intelligence was primarily responsible for his selection. Probably, he wanted a precedent to be set up. Brig. Abdul Rehman was largely unknown in Azad Kashmir. He had instructions to show due respect to Khan Abdul Hamid Khan. Consequently, a farewell State dinner was given to the latter, which was by itself a unique instance in the history of Azad Kashmir.

Khan Abdul Hamid Khan was described by Syed Fayaz Hassan Shah, the retired Chief Justice, as a man with a golden heart. He is above municipal, tribal and sectarian influences that have blurred the tenure of many a President. It is a part of his character not to harm anyone and to help anyone who sought his help, no matter, friend or foe. I have known him help even those who made hay when he was in power but uncharitably condemned him, after he was out of office.

Mr. Abdul Rehman was administered oath of office on 8th October, 1969 by the Chief Justice, Kh. Muhammad Sharif. An honest man, he was extremely hardworking and painstaking. The most striking feature of his rule was his strict adherence to rules and regulations. He was fair to all branches of services and did not resort to intimidation, favour or disfavour. He did not move much outside Muzaffarabad and wholeheartedly devoted himself to the task entrusted to him, the holding of elections; these elections were really fair.

## FIRST ELECTIONS ON ADULT FRANCHISE

Mr. Hassan Zaheer, C.S.P. was appointed Election Commissioner. The election of the President was held on 30th October, 1970 and that of the Legislative Assembly on the next day. The Presidential election was contested by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan as a candidate of the Muslim Conference, Sardar Ibrahim Khan as a candidate of the Azad Muslim Conference, Mr. K. H. Khurshid as a candidate of the Liberation League and Mr. Muhammad Sharif Tariq, Advocate Mirpur as a candidate of the splinter group of the Plebiscite Front. Only the first three candidates were really in the race, the last one having entered the field as an opportunity for introduction on the national stage. Mr. Zaheer had an uphill task and it goes to his credit that though he took office pretty late, he worked extremely hard and was thus able to hold elections on schedule. His was, in every sense, a creditable performance.

## WHY SARDAR QAIYUM SUCCEEDED

It was apparent from the very beginning that Sardar Abdul Qaiyum had a lead over his principal rivals for several reasons. The first and foremost was that his personal image of a Mujahid was still intact and there was a common belief that he was the only politician from Azad Kashmir who was really interested in the liberation of occupied Kashmir. There was also no allegation of personal corruption against him. The other reason was that he had been working extremely hard for this day and had visited, during the last three years, almost every important town and village and had thus set up a well-knit organisation ready to go into the elec-

tion campaign. The third reason was the fact of his being a candidate of the Muslim Conference—a party known throughout the State since 1932 as the symbol of Muslim resistance against Dogras. In every village, however remote, one could still come across men in their sixties who had worked as its members and thus, these men of influence were there to take up the campaign slogan as soon as it was raised. It must, however, be said to the credit of Sardar Qaiyum that the party which was practically dead at the time of the death of Ch. Ghulam Abbas, received new, vigorous life within the short span of a year because of his being almost on the tip of his toes. He moved restlessly, from pole to pillar, establishing contact, bringing in fresh blood and persuading old colleagues who had left the party, to return back to its fold. Again it was now the turn of Mr. Khurshid to suffer because some of those workers and colleagues who had worked for him in the last election and whom he had allegedly ignored, now threw in their weight behind Sardar Qaiyum. Mr. Saghar too was no longer available to campaign for Mr. Khurshid. He chose to remain in his home though he allowed the Muslim Conference to use his name and influence among Jammu refugees. The result was that the bulk of regugee votes went to Sardar Qaiyum. Mr. Khurshid's party was largely confined to urban areas; they had neglected rural areas and they paid for the mistake. It was the first time, women had been given the right of vote on the same basis as enjoyed by men. Mr. Khurshid could have a better appeal for them as compared to Sardar Qaiyum, but the oportunity was not exploited and no effort, at all, was made to bring them out of their homes and get interested in the elections. There is also no doubt that the Central Government was interested in the election of Sardar Qaiyum because he was then ideologically aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan which seemed to be having at least a working understanding with the Government of Yahya Khan. Late Lt. General Akbar who was a member of the military junta stated that the Central Government *invisibly* helped Sardar Qaiyum. Details, however, are not known. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum told this writer about a year before the elections that in his meeting with General Yahya Khan, he had told him that of all the leaders and parties, he and his party alone stood publicly and irrevocably committed to the State's accession to Pakistan and that therefore he saw no reason or justification for the Central Government to be neutral in the internal politics of Azad Kashmir. Sardar Qaiyum gave me to understand that President Yahya was not only impressed but had also expressed his agreement. I think, the elections were free, fair and impartial and Sardar Abdul Qaiyum won it on merit. The number of votes each candidate polled is as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Sardar Qaiyum ... ... | 2,29,512 |
| Sardar Ibrahim ... ... | 1,14,894 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. K. H. Khurshid | ... | ... 1,63,865 |
| Mr. Muhammad Sharif Tariq | ... | ... 12,906 |

Tariq's vote came largely from his Gujar tribe, especially, refugees from his home-district Rajauri.

## THE LEGISLATURE

The election results became known the same evening and therefore on the next day the Muslim Conference candidates for the Assembly were able to show better results. The following persons were elected to the Assembly:

| | |
|---|---|
| I. Poonch ... | 1. Col. Mansha Khan. |
| | 2. Mr. Khan Bahadur. |
| | 3. Mr. Mumtaz Hussain Rathore. |
| | 4. Mr. Muhammad Azad. |
| | 5. Mr. Muhammad Ayub. |
| II. Muzaffarabad ... | 1. Kh. Muhammad Usman. |
| | 2. Raja Muhammad Latif. |
| | 3. Munshi Ali Gauhar. |
| | 4. Mr. Ghulam Rasool. |
| III. Mirpur ... | 1. Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan. |
| | 2. Ch. Muhammad Azam. |
| | 3. Syed Nisar Hussain. |
| | 4. Pir Ali Jan Shah. |
| | 5. Ch. Khadim Hussain. |
| | 6. Ch. Sohbat Ali. |
| | 7. Ch. Niaz Ahmed. |
| IV. Jammu refugees ... | 1. Sh. Manzar Masud. |
| | 2. Mr. Muhammad Shafi Saraf. |
| | 3. Ch. Sultan Ali. |
| | 4. Ch. Wazir Ali. |
| V. Kashmir refugees ... | 1. Mr. Bashir Hussain Khan. |
| | 2. Mr. Ghulam Hassan Punjabi. |
| | 3. Mr. Ghulam Hassan Kirmani. |
| | 4. Mr. Bashir Ahmed Khan. |

Sardar Qaiyum took oath of office on 12th November, 1970 in the College ground before a large gathering. For the first time in the history

of Azad Kashmir it was broadcast live. The oath of office was administered by the Chief Justice. In his speech, Sardar Qaiyum called himself the poorest President in Asia and very rightly also, as the only President in Asia elected directly on the basis of adult franchise. Mr. Justice Cornelius then Law Minister and Secretary Ministry of Kashmir Affairs represented the Central Government.

Mr. Abdul Rehman left Azad Kashmir on 11th November and was given a hearty send off by the Services. He was promoted Major General (honorary) as a recognition of his work. He told this writer that in one of his meetings with President Yahya, the latter had told him:

,,مجھے خدا نے پھنسا یا مگر تمھیں میں نے پھنسا یا''

Trans : While *I* was roped in *by God, you* have been roped in *by me.*

## RECOGNITION OF AK INDIVIDUALITY

The most spectacular achievement of Sardar Qaiyum was his ability to secure recognition of the A. K. individuality, by lifting A. K. from its hitherto municipal level to a Provincial level and bringing home to Pakistanis that we are not a bunch of mountain-dwelling, simple folk who live on Pakistan's bounty but a dynamic people, even capable of giving lead to Pakistan. After 1949 when we ourselves clipped our wings, it was for the first time in early sixties that with Mr. Khurshid as President, the AK Government received some respectability but that was under the patronising wings of President Ayub and once the wings squeezed, the Chief Adviser again ruled through the Chief Secretary. In the case of Sardar Qaiyum, the performance is especially laudable because he achieved these heights in a state of constant confrontation with the Central government.

## THE ISLAMIC LAWS

One of the important measures taken by the Government for which it deserves all credit, was the introduction of some Islamic Penal Laws. In October, 1972 the President kindly sent for me and told me how his efforts since early 1971 to introduce Islamic Laws had remained fruitless and desired my assistance. Consequently, the following Committee was announced in a few days :

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Chairman | ... | Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt, Law Minister. |
| Vice-Chairman | ... | M. Y. Saraf. |
| Members | ... | Maulana Muhammad Yusuf of Pallandari, |

Mufti Abdul Hakeem, Mirpur,
Mufti Sadar Din, Rawalpindi,
Mufti Nazir Hussain, Muzaffarabad,
Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate, Muzaffarabad,
Raja Muhammad Khurshid, Advocate General,
Malik Muhammad Aslam, Law Secretary, etc.

The Committee accepted my suggestion that to begin with, it take up the consideration of the Penal Code. Within three months, we were able to submit our recommendations bringing this branch of law in consonance with Quran and Sunnah. An important feature of the Islmaic Law which distinguishes it from the Western criminal law is that murder as well as all types of hurts are compoundable on payment of compensation; the action can also be given up by an act of forgiveness in the name of God. The Government had its own difficulties in their promulgation as it could not be done in opposition to the Central government. After some discussions, Islamabad agreed to their promulgation to the extent of all kinds of hurt, murder, theft and highway robbery. It was in September, 1974, after the President's return from Saudi Arabia where he had a meeting with King Faisal, that these were enforced in the shape of an Act named as the Islamic Penal Laws Act of 1974.

## EXPANSION IN EDUCATION

There was great expansion in education. Intermediate Colleges were opened at Athmuqam, Dhirkot, Danna, Abbaspur, Kahuta, Garhi Dopatta, Chikar, Chinari, Dadyal, Sehnsa, Nakiyal, Khuiratta and Afzalpur. Inter Colleges for girls were opened at Akalgarh, Dadyal and Kotli. Similarly, many a Middle school were upgraded. 500 primary schools were claimed to have been opened. As the Government could ill-afford to meet the expenditure, two to three lecturers from each existing College were withdrawn and posted in the new Colleges, along with two or three new recruits, to make up for the staff of a newly-opened college! Similarly, teachers were withdrawn from High Schools and Middle Schools and posted to upgraded or newly opened schools. The result was that some High Schools were left with six to seven teachers only who had to perform the miracle of teaching ten classes. Science teachers of experience were posted as Principals of new Colleges where Science subjects were not taught. There was, therefore, rapid deterioration in the standard of teaching. Some cynic remarked that the Government had conspired against the country by thus destroying the coming generation! It may be remarked here that almost all educational institutions were already understaffed. Many of the High Schools and Colleges were still

without science classes or equipment. No High School has more than a hundred books or two in its library. These deficiencies should not have been multiplied. In Pakistan and India at least 7 High Schools are a prerequisite for an Intermediate College in order to ensure an adequate number of students. At Athmuqam there is only one High School, so is the case with the colleges opened at Abbaspur, Kahuta, Nakiyal and Danna. Kahuta and Abbaspur constitute half of what was Haveli tehsil before the war of liberation. At Athmuqam, only one student sought admission in the Ist year in 1973 and both at Kahuta and Abbaspur, the total number did not exceed seven. Same was the case at Chikar and Chinari. The extra funds thus needed were raised by imposing 1% education tax on Government servants and forest lessees. Here are some facts: In 1976 spring exams, 1134 students appeared in the Inter exam from 29 Colleges, out of whom only 230 students cleared it. No student could clear the exam from five Colleges: Athmuqam, Danna, Chikar, Sehnsa and Afzalpur. Out of 29 Colleges, not less than 20 were without laboratories and libraries even in mid 1976.[1] Apart from this general criticism, the fear that some people have is that in a few years when hundreds of Art graduates start coming out, there being no corresponding avenues for their employment their unemployment may ultimately bring Communism to Azad Kashmir. It can, however, be said in support of this policy that it has taken education upto Intermediate level to poorer homes who could not afford to educate their boys outside their small habitations.

## FRIDAY AS WEEKLY OFF DAY

The Government declared Friday instead of Sunday as the weekly holiday and placed a ban on gazetted officials from wearing western dress. The closure of the Courts, the offices and business centres on Fridays has reduced attendance in most of the mosques in urban areas. The Government servants also learnt from experience that the western dress was in the long run cheaper than Shalwar and Kameez. This order with regard to dress has certain other aspects. Firstly, there is nothing like an Islamic or an un-Islamic dress so long as it does not offend our moral values. It is no service to the universality of Islam to confine it to any particular dress. Secondly, it is a matter of one's personal choice and compulsion by law in such matters breeds defiance. Thirdly, it was not applied to the non-gazetted employees, the student community or the public at large because the Government could not compel their compliance. It was thus clearly discriminatory.

## SHADOW CABINET

Sardar Qaiyum formed his first cabinet on 13th February, 1971 comprising, Ghazi Illahi Bakhsh from Mirpur, Raja Abdul Hamid Khan from

1. Daily Nawa-i-Waqt.

Muzaffarabad and Dr. Salam-ud-Din Niaz from Kashmir valley. Sheikh Basharat Ahmed Advocate from Jammu was appointed Presidential Assistant. They were persuaded to resign a year later, and a new cabinet comprising Sardar Sikandar Hayat from Kotli, Khawaja Muhammad Iqbal Butt from Jammu and Mr. Yusuf Khan from Poonch, was sworn in on 15th March, 1972. Ch. Ghulam Ahmed Raza Advocate Mirpur was appointed Presidential Assistant. The selection of Sardar Sikandar, now in the second generation of politics, was commendable because it helped to introduce on the national-stage, yet another politician from the territory, a politician, who knows the intricacies of the field and has the capacity of proving a good, reliable successor.

The tenure of Sardar Qaiyum has been one of fierce controversy. It is too recent to be dealt with in this volume in detail or depth. Of all the political parties, the most difficult to manage is the Muslim Conference. It is not a creature of Sardar Qaiyum as Liberation League is the creature of Mr. Khurshid or the Azad Muslim Conference was of Sardar Ibrahim and hence it is not a rubber stamp. It has in its fold workers and leaders who have to their credit, a long period of service to the party and who, at the same time, have both the courage and the political strength of publicly airing views disliked by the Party leader. It is true that Sardar Qaiyum, like an elephant, doesn't forget but it is also true that he has developed self-confidence and forebearance to listen to even harsh and personal criticism. Both these I think, are a source of strength for the Party. These brave 'hot-heads' included Khawaja Sana Ullah Shamim, Mr. Ghulam Din Wani, Mr. Abdul Bari (now President of the Jamaat-e-Islami), Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Butt, late Ghazi Illahi Bakhsh, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, Maulvi Abdul Aziz Rajaurvi, Maulana Muhammad Ismail Zabih, Khawaja Farid Shah Gilani, Mr. Sayab Khalid, Khawaja Abdus Samad Wani, Sardar Sikandar Hayat, Mr. Yaqub Zafar, ex-Captain Sarfaraz, ex-Captain Azim, and a host of others. In such situations even the tongues of the insignificant or the less significant also wax eloquence.

بنتی نہیں ہے - ساغر و مینا کہے بغیر !

The biggest political mistake Sardar Qaiyum committed, in my analysis, as I also told him, was to have postponed the formation of the cabinet for three month.. Ninety days of expectancy is too long a period for a small territory like Azad Kashmir. The result was that almost every one had the time and opportunity to sponsor his candidature and as the Constitution had limited it to three members only, the result of the stampede was a sense of injury and frustration among the scores of candidates who did not succeed. It is common knowledge that a few officers, close to the President, had immediately on his election, taken him into

their "protective siege" and assumed the role of a "Shadow Cabinet",[1] a term that earned country-wide notoriety during his tenure. These Officers were too frequently found in the President's House and remained closeted with him till late hours at night.

It is really tragic that a man of Sardar Qaiyum's intelligence should have not infrequently, seen through their eyes, decided on the basis of their coloured briefings and at times, even acted through their hands. Sardar Qaiyum indignantly dismisses the charge of being under their influence as incorrect.

Sardar Qaiyum is a very intelligent man and no intelligent man would ever accept the position that he was led by others; yet the fact remains that intelligent men are often led astray by clever people through subtle operation because an intelligent man need not necessarily be clever. For instance, identify a wrong cause with his own so-called interests and the objectives are achieved. Besides, there is a famous Kashmiri proverb: "Don't give me anything but please lend me your ears"!

He succumbed to their intrigues. The extent of their influence and the problems resultantly created for Sardar Abdul Qaiyum makes a sad but long chapter. However, I have decided not to dwell upon the subject in substance and detail in this volume because the events being too recent, I may not be able to place before the reader a balanced and impartial account.

The President as well as the legislature had been elected for a term of four years which expired in November 1974 but the Assembly, by agreement of all parties, extended these terms, by incorporating a provision in the Interim Constitution Act passed on 24th August, 1974, till next elections. Whether a Parliament can extend its own life beyond the period for which it is elected, need not be gone into here. The elections were later fixed for May 1975.

On 16th April 1975, the Assembly passed, prima facie, a vote of no-confidence against the President, in violation of a Stay Order issued two days earlier, by a DB of the High Court including Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Aslam Khan who wrote the said order. At 4.00 p. m. on the same day, Mr. Manzar Masud, Speaker, in accordance with the Constitution, took oath of office as President. The oath was administered by Mr. Justice Chaudhri Rahimdad Khan, then Chief Justice of the High Court! Mr. Justice Aslam also attended the oath-ceremony!

1. Weekly KASHEER, 16-1-1971.

## PRESIDENT MANZAR MASUD

Sheikh Manzar Masud, aged about 55 years, who hails from Jammu city, has been a zealous worker of the Pakistan Movement from his early youth. After partition, he settled at Lahore and was, for a long time, office Secretary, first of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League and then, of the All Pakistan Convention Muslim League when General Ayub was its President. Impressed with his keen insight and broad vision as a political worker, President Ayub rewarded him with two squares of land in Nankana Sahib to provide for his economic rehabilitation. Mr. Manzar had from the very beginning been aligned with the Ch. Ghulam Abbas faction of the Muslim Conference. During the 1970 elections to the A.K. Presidency as well as the Legislature, for which he too was a candidate, he sold this land to partly finance the election campaign of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum and that of his own. His was the biggest of all the constituencies, comprising the whole of the south-west Punjab including Lahore, the provinces of Baluchistan and Sind, including the city of Karachi. He won by a comfortable majority. As Sardar Abdul Qaiyum came from Azad Kashmir, he rightly decided to have the Speaker from amongst the refugees. Mr. Manzar Masud was his first obvious choice. Although the selection of Speaker from the refugee M.L.As created certain problems for the President as one or two M.L.As from A.K. who were candidates for the post, took it ill and subsequently opposed him but there is little doubt that in any case, they would have gone against the President as subsequent events proved. In 1971, 1973 and 1974, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum proceeded on long tours to the Middle East and in his absence Mr. Manzar, in accordance with the constitution, acted as President and performed his duties admirably well.

What was the cause of the ultimate breach between him and the President who were otherwise very close friends, is not known, but one did hear a whispering of their differences from the middle of 1973. It appears that the climate of mutual confidence was absent by the time we enter 1974. Who is to be blamed and to what extent, shall be known only after they speak of their inner minds.

He took oath of office on the 16th of April 1975 and held the office till the 29th of May when Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan took oath of office as President. Six weeks' office is too short and fleeting a period to furnish any material for evaluation of his tenure. It was especially so with him because the election campaign was already in full swing. Even the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers and appeals against their acceptance or rejection was already over.

Mr. Manzar Masud was later elected a member of the AJK Council and subsequently appointed an Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on AJK matters. There were two other Advisers, Pir Ali Jan Shah and Ch. Noor Hussain. They had their offices in the Islamabad Secretariat. The offices were merely ornamental and carried no particular responsibility. They were treated as Deputy Ministers in the Central Government for purposes of pay, allowances and privileges. They ceased to hold offices after the Army took over in July, 1977.

Sheikh Manzar Masud, as I know him intimately, is loyal to his friends, straight-forward and essentially a sound, dedicated worker. If it needed any proof, he unmistakably furnished it in 1977-78 by bearing the trials and tribulations as a leading PP worker with examplary courage, fortitude and perseverance. Himself in Kot Lakhpat Jail, his wife under house-arrest and the eldest son before a military court for alleged conspiracy to dynamite an important official building, his loyalty to principles—perseverance in adversity—remained unaltered. I have heard even his personal enemies praise him for doing so. He has no doubt risen in the estimation of all.

## "TAMMANI ELECTION"

A day or two after the Rara and Muzaffarabad incidents, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum withdrew from the Presidential contest and his party boycotted the legislative polls. He started from 'Pindi for Muzaffarabad in an impressive procession of all sorts of vehicles. It was first stopped at Kohala for some time and then at Rara, about 7 miles behind Muzaffarabad. Some FSF men were allegedly there to prevent his further progress. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum returned to 'Pindi without coming to Muzaffarabad. I think it was a wise decision because there might have been mutual firing resulting in bloodshed and any mischief-monger may have even shot him dead. Meanwhile, the pendal at Muzaffarabad where he was to address the public, was ransacked and put on fire. It is true that a section of the local supporters of the PP took out a small procession and that the number of people MC had collected was also small and that there was an exchange of brickbats between them but it is also true that the ransacking and burning of the pendal was largely Police-managed. It is interesting to point out that some officers from Police, Revenue and Secretariat who had the reputation of being Sardar Abdul Qaiyum's men while he was President and who benefited from him and who included some from his own tribe, were not only hand-in-glove with the Government but acted as its agents.

The elections were actually managed by Mr. Hayat Muhammad Khan Tamman, Political Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He had set up his H.Q. at the Lohar Gali Rest House. It may be a news to his oppo-

nents but it remains a fact that Mr. Ijlal Hussain, the Chief Secretary, was not directly involved in the matter. He merely followed the instructions issued by Mr. Tamman. Some money was made available by the Party's central secretariat which was distributed among party candidates. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim told me that he had been promised more but when after elections, he told Mr. Bhutto that he had spent a large sum from his own pocket, the latter expressed inability to make any further payment. As there was no contest against Sardar Ibrahim, he was declared elected, although he had to go through the process of election. In so far as Assembly members are concerned, except Captain Sarfaraz and Raja Sabeel Khan of the Muslim Conference who probably had a private understanding with Mr. Tamman, the other successful candidates either belonged to the Peoples Party or the Liberation League or Ch. Noor Hussain's party, the Azad Muslim Conference. The returns were largely nominal as it was decided by Mr. Tamman at Muzaffarabad as to who was to be declared elected? On the day following the results, Mr. Manzar hosted a lunch and it was there that I came across Mr. Tamman for the first time. He asked the Chief Secretary, in my presence, as to why not declare A and not B as successful candidate from a certain constituency in the Muzaffarabad district? I was sitting between the two and told Mr. Tamman that since both the candidates were in the official United Front, why not allow the man who really got elected to be declared as such ? Mr. Tamman merely smiled and said nothing. There is no doubt that the so-called elections were not elections as are understood from the term, especially in A.K. In Pakistan, at least in some constituencies, there was not much interference and some of them, especially (Comrade) Mir Noor Muhammad from Rawalpindi and Mr. Muhammad Shafi Saraf from Gujrat were elected on merit and after a hard contest. Late Mir Noor Muhammad was a pre-partition worker who was actively associated in the formation and progress first of the Kashmir Socialist Party and then of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference. He went through long terms of detention, first in Srinagar in 1947-48 and then in Delhi. He worked as the right hand man of Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz when the latter conducted a vigorous and inspiring campaign from Delhi, under the very nose of Imperialist Nehru, for a plebiscite in Kashmir. He was one of the thoughtful political workers. Mr. Muhammad Shafi Saraf hails from the occupied part of Bhimber tehsil and commands considerable influence among the J&K refugees settled in Gujrat district. Elected to the first State Council in 1961 with a lead of thousands of votes, he repeated the experience in the elections to the first Legislative Assembly in 1970. He has rendered valuable services to the refugees in their resettlement. He is one of the few 1975 M.L.As who was acquitted by the Disqualification Tribunal. The only charge against him was the use, in the election, of a jeep allegedly supplied by the Punjab Government.

Mr. Bhutto is stated to have warned a restricted party meeting in Lahore on the eve of general elections in Pakistan that these were not going to be like A.K. "Tammani elections".

## "KASHMIRI PATHAN" AS PREMIER

Sardar Ibrahim was sworn in by me at a largely-attended public function held in the stadium , the precedent of public oath-taking having been set up by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum when he took oath of office on 12th November 1970. A few days later was sworn in Khan Abdul Hamid Khan as Prime Minister. Pir Ali Jan Shah had resigned from the Presidentship of the Peoples Party in 1974 and Khan Abdul Hamid Khan had succeeded him. Pir Ali Jan Shah is a powerful public speaker and one of the leading political workers of Azad Kashmir while Khan Abdul Hamid Khan had not been actively associated with any political party before. Personally he is a middle-of-the-road man who is incapable of taking unpleasant decisions. He is also generally weak of resolve which is more due to a philosophy of life than anything else because he is known to be strong and resolute when he has some reason to do so. Their's were motionless hands.

It was not at all difficult to build a strong parallel platform against the Muslim Conferene, partly because the latter had been in power almost since 1947 and the slogan of change had a psychological appeal but largely because some of the policies and actions of the Qaiyum regime (1970—1975) could be easily and effectively exploited, especially among the refugees in Pakistan, in the districts of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad as well as in large areas of the districts of Kotli and Poonch. Some of the major tribes inhabiting AK., Sudhans, Gujars, Jats, Tezials, Maldayals and the AK minorities-*cum*-refugees whose total vote far exceeds any tribe, could, with clever planning, be brought to the streets against him. Great advantage could also be taken of the almost 45 % women vote. I think, the opponents of MC, still command tremendous potentials but in comparison, where they are beaten by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum, is that they lack a die-hard organiser and a trained political manipulator.

It is not publicly known that the person in the mind of Mr. Bhutto for the office of the Prime Minister was Mr. K. H. Khurshid. Same was the case with Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada. The plan was to appoint Khan Abdul Hamid Khan as Speaker of the Assembly, However, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and Khan Habibullah Khan, Chairman of the Senate appear to have brought friendly pressure on Mr. Bhutto and taken the plea that as

party leaders in other provinces had been appointed Chief Ministers, there was no justification for a departure in the case of Azad Kashmir. At the same time, they instructed Khan Abdul Hamid to take the position that he may either be appointed Chief Minister or nothing else. There was, at the same time, opposition in the AK PP against the appointment of Mr. Khurshid who was not then a member of the party. It was not very material and would have been brushed aside by Mr. Bhutto but for the intervention of the Pathan group at Islamabad. Once again, Khan Abdul Hamid won the honour, not because he was a Kashmiri but because he was a Kashmiri Pathan!

A few weeks later, was constituted a cabinet, comprising the following:

1. Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, Senior Minister.

2. Ch. Sohbat Ali.

3. Mian Ghulam Rasool.

4. Sardar Khan Bahadur.

Colonel Muhammad Mansha Khan SJ, who was also a member of the first Assembly, was elected Speaker. A gentleman, he filled the post with examplary dignity. Mr. Muhammad Amin Mukhtar, a seasoned political worker who had constantly followed Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim in his wilderness, was rightly rewarded with appointment as Senior Adviser to the President.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister, paid two more visits to Azad Kashmir, in April and September 1976. He also visited Rawalakote, Banjosa, Kail and Leepa. He was particularly moved by the warmth of reception at Rawalakote. During his 2nd visit, he also attended a Convention of the AK People's Party. Mr. Khurshid announced the dissolution of his Party, the Liberation League, during this Convention but revived the Party after the Army took over power in July 1977. The dissolution was good because it is in the national interest to dissolve regional parties but its revival, especially when the PPP was under stress and its Leader on trial for alleged murder, is yet to be justified. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum was first interned in his house and then detained at Pallandari under preventive detention laws. His habeas corpus petition was dismissed by a Full Bench of the High Court, presided over by me. The judgment which has since been published, was written by me. His detention has some background which it is still too early to reveal.

With the overthrow of the PP Government in Pakistan by the Army, in the wake of post-election upheaval in the country, resulting from the alleged rigging of elections, efforts began for a change in A.K. Negotiations opened and an agreement was finally signed by leaders of the parties, represented in the Assembly and countersigned by the Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army, for the dissolution of the Government, the Assembly as well as the AJK Council. It provided for interim arrangements as well as new elections. As these matters are sub-judice, they must await comment. It however needs to be pointed out that the PP legislators proved unequal to the crisis and almost dutifully, except for an exception or two, signed their own death warrants. Politically speaking, dissolution through a proclamation, which, I may reveal, was under active consideration, would have suited them, both collectively as well as individually but that needed, not only vision but also, self-confidence. The majority of the hand-picked parliament lacked both.

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan continued as President till 30th of October 1978 when, through a proclamation issued by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as Chairman AJK Council, he was removed and replaced by his fellow-tribesman, Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan. With the dissolution of the Assembly, Major-General Abdul Rehman, *ex*-President, was appointed Chief Executive. He took oath of office on 11th August 1977. He was the unanimous choice of all the parties which shows the measure of confidence he commanded on the strength of his previous tenure. He resigned in the beginning of November, partly for reasons of health but partly for other reasons and was succeeded by Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan, then Commanding the AKRF Centre at Mansar. He hails from Rawalakote area.

Whatever Sardar Muhammad Hayat Khan's failings, he is bound to be remembered for his single-minded pursuit of developmental work. It is always difficult to achieve quick results in such matters but now that he has been in office for over a year and has been in continuous hot pursuit of the objectives, good results *are* coming up here and there. Electricity, roads and Schools are coming on the surface. The results may be judged from the fact that even the 7000 ft. high Leepa Valley, lying across the 11500 ft. high, snow-decked Birthwar pass, now *has* electricity. The project took hardly a hundred days to complete!

It is only fair to record that this amazing progress was possible largely because of the unwavering support the A.K. Government received from General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator. The credit for the speedy allocation of large funds for development, the elimination of red-tape in connected Ministries that shortened procedures

and cut down delays while, at the same time, handling political affairs astutely, must go to Lt. General Faiz Ali Chishti who, as CMLA's man incharge of A.K., whether as Adviser, Minister or Corps Commander, brought his clear-headed, straight-forward and utilitarian, but essentially knowledgeable, approach to bear on our matters.

## SARDAR ABDUL GHAFFAAR

Sardar Qaiyum has a brother, Mr. Abdul Ghaffaar who remains his weakness, but as is customary in our society, a scapegoat must be discovered and this is what happened with him. Which President didn't have weakness for a relative or some one else? Frankly, I can hardly recollect any. That is not very objectionable. This happens the world over. Churchill brought his son-in-law in the cabinet; so did Sh. Abdullah. Kennedy's entry into the White House meant accession to power of his entire clan.

Which one of us is free from weaknesses and how can Abdul Ghaffaar be an exception? I first saw him in April, 1969 in the Guest House. He has captivating, manly looks. With his immaculate stature, trimmed beard and beautiful moustachio, which all together make him look like a prince out of the medieval Tartars, he naturally makes his presence felt and attracts attention. Experience showed that he possesses many an admirable quality. He is very unassuming and courteous; polite, to the extent of unbelief; respectful to all elders, friendly and helpful by nature and above all, a man of word. His friendship is real, sincere and unmitigated. However, the influence he commanded over his brother, has been unduly exaggerated and over-emphasised. Sardar Qaiyum is the family's light, but it is Abdul Ghaffaar who is its sheet-anchor. All of us know how many a pigmy, merely because of closeness with the Ruler, got off their feet, forgot their own worth, for whatever it was. It is in comparison, that Abdul Ghaffaar, shines out as an example of admirable humility. He remains, for his brother, NOT a cause of weakness but a source of strength. Contrary to common belief, his was, in several vital matters, a moderating influence and had his advice been followed, Sardar Qaiyum might have still been in power.

## HABIB HASSAN: FATHER OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

A very important and far-reaching development was the setting up of the Azad Kashmir Mineral and Industrial Development Corporation. The move was initiated by President Abdul Rehman. In our very first meeting, he would bear me out, I had told him that no Industrialist could be expected to invest capital in an area of uneasy peace like Azad Kashmir

and that an effort had to be made on the official level. I had therefore suggested the setting up of a corporation on the pattern of PIDC.

It was Azad Kashmir's sheer good luck that a man of Mr. Habib Hassan's dedication and vast acquaintance came as Chairman of the Corporation. His arrival coincided with the accession to power of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum. It must also be recorded in fairness to history that Mr.Z.A. Bhutto who assumed the reigns of Government in December 1971 was particularly keen for the economic development of smaller provinces, especially the hitherto neglected areas. It was for this reason that development grant during 1972-75 was about three times the total advances made from 1948 to 1971. The latter was also in the shape of loans, amounting to rupees fourteen crores which was also remitted by Mr. Bhutto.

Mr. Habib Hassan, originally came from a leading family from Hyderabad Deccan. He had vast, but at the same time, useful contacts in the industrial domain of Pakistan. The Kashmir Textile Mill and the Resin and Turpentine plant in the private sector, the Chinese built Textile Mill and the Vanaspati Ghee Mill in the public sector, all at Mirpur, the Matches Factory and the Wool-Knitting plant in the public sector at Muzaffarabad, all owe their existence to him. He put AK on the Industrial map of the country. We shall always remember him with gratitude. It is interesting to point out that no new project has since been initiated.

The only other Mills in AK are the Akbar Textile Mill in the private sector and the Logging and Saw Mill, in the public sector, both at Mirpur. The latter was set up with Polish financial as well as technical assistance. The logs are mechanically lifted from the Mangla lake, a few hundred yards away and mechanically transported on wires to the Mill. It took too much time to go into production and is still perhaps being operated on loss.

## THE TYRANNY OF POLITICAL AGENTS

In the Northern regions, the people liberated the territory themselves and joined Pakistan but the way the successive Political Agents treated them, makes one hang one's head in shame. It continued to be ruled through strong-hand medieval methods for another 25 years and Agent after Agent, heading a huge retinue of corrupt political officers, flew in, to satisfy their lust for unbridled power, money and what not. It is a sad chapter. One of my friends, late Mirza Hassan Abbas whose father had migrated to Simla from Skardu and who owned, Metropole Hotel, Simla, told me, sobbing like a child, of the gruesome misrule discovered by him when he visited the area in 1949 in

the company of Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan. The inhabitants were instigated to fight each other and funds earmarked by the Central Government for economic and social betterment, were misused. For almost two decades, no attention was paid to the educational needs of the people, the development of roads, power and irrigation. The Political Agent exercised the powers of a Sessions Judge while the Executive Head sitting at Rawalpindi and known as Resident, exercised the powers of the High Court! The Jagirdari system continued to haunt and hunt the people even years after its abolition in Pakistan. The land revenue continued to be collected in kind and the Jagirdars enjoyed a totally free hand to deal with their tenants in any manner they thought best. Naturally, there was resentment and political agitation which was sternly suppressed in the beginning but as is natural, could not be suppressed for all time and erupted openly on several occasions. In 1954 when the people of Punial started a popular movement against the local Jagirdars for civic rights, many lost their lives. Political workers were stripped naked and thrown into icy cold water with hands tied up; their moustaches and beards were pulled out. In May, 1970, 14 demonstrators were killed in Hunza. In 1971 when in course of a demonstration, a man was killed in a police firing in Gilgit, the mob attacked the local prison and forcibly carried away its leaders. It was in August, 1972 that before flying to Gilgit for a visit, President Bhutto announced the abolition of the Jagirdari system, replacement of the Frontier Crimes Regulations with ordinary criminal laws and procedure, and the recovery of land revenue in cash instead of in kind.

Many a development projects particularly those relating to the construction of roads, generation of hydro-electricity and opening of a network of educational institutions were pushed through, the level of local inhabitants' association with the administration was raised and an elected Council was set up, as a first step towards representative political institutions.

Restrictions on travel were annulled which attracted a large number of tourists. With the construction of the Karakoram Highway, the economic prospects have certainly brightened up. It has not only increased tourist traffic and made consumer goods cheaper but has also enabled its inhabitants to come down to the plains for employment, in larger numbers. The people now look cleaner and therefore prettier.

While people are now thankful for a healthy change in the policy of the Central Government, they rightly clamour for modern representative political institutions. It is their right. It was with this object in view that they liberated the territory in 1947.

A controversy is raging whether the territory should join Azad Kashmir or maintain its separate entity. Geographically, it, no doubt, formed a part of the State in 1947 but the existing arrangement forms a part of the Agreement signed between the Pakistan Government, the Muslim Conference and the Azad Kashmir Government in March, 1949. While as a resident of A.K., I would personally like the territory to return to Azad Kashmir and form a part of our collective existence, it is only fair that the choice should be exercised by the inhabitants of the territory, themselves, and if they decide to maintain their separate entity, we should accept it with grace. After all, in both cases, we both remain a part of Pakistan—our national destination.

## KASHMIRIS HAVE NOTHING TO HIDE FROM PAKISTAN BUT LO!

Justice Abdul Qaiyum whose rejoining the Government as Secretary General during the first Presidency of Mirwaiz Maulana Muhammad Yusuf Shah, had been made an issue by the M.K.A., had in fact been appointed by a previous government but had, after some time, proceeded on leave and left on a private world tour. He was a personal friend of Maharaja Hari Singh. The Pakistan Intelligence had learnt that in New York he had a meeting with Mr. Trygve Lei, Secretary General of the United Nations to whom he had spoken about the "sad plight" of Hari Singh who had by then been banished from Kashmir. This information had not been conveyed to the Azad Kashmir Government and therefore it was clearly unfair to have accused them of impropriety in re-employing Mr. Qaiyum. The government at Karachi had also been prejudiced by MKA about the stance of self reliance, demonstrated by the Mir Waiz Government. Then there were the rival political groups particularly the Muslim Conference which was also active against them and enjoyed the support of Ch. Muhammad Ali who had by now become Finance Minister. Mir Waiz and his Advisers were therefore summoned to Karachi where in a meeting attended by the Premier, Ch. Muhammad Ali and some central Ministers, they were asked to explain their attitude towards the lent officers etc. After the Central Government explained its position to them, they were told that they were free to have a brief recess so that they could privately discuss the matter among themselves before making up their mind. The Premier and his colleagues were visibly surprised when told that no privacy was needed and that they could hold mutual consultations in their very presence! Perhaps, they took them as a bunch of simple, straight-forward, mountain-dwellers, still uninitiated to the sophisticated urbanite civil rule, who didn't mind discussing an embarrassing matter in their very presence but lo ! in a moment or so, the surprise and sarcasm was gone and the Premier and his colleagues found themselves utterly

dumb-founded. They could only exchange bewildered, meaningful glances when the mountain-dwelling, "simple-folk", started mutual consultations in chaste Kashmiri!

During the earlier posting of Mr. Justice Sheikh Abdul Qaiyum as Secretary General, Haji Amin-ul-Hussaini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and one of the most colourful personalities in the Islamic world paid a visit to Muzaffarabad. He was staying in the Government Guest House. A large number of persons from Azad Kashmir, particularly Muzaffarabad, continuously haunted him by pestering him with their presence. The Government was naturally unhappy, not only because the honoured guest and a great supporter of our Cause was not able to find time even for a normal day-to-day rest but largely because the presence of such a large number of uninvited guests at the table, whether it was break-fast or lunch, evening tea or dinner, was becoming almost unbearable.

At a lunch, when a score of uninvited 'guests' dutifully followed him into the dining-hall, Justice Qaiyum could bear it no longer and pointing to the large number of "guests", addressed the Grand Mufti in Arabic :

"یا حضرت - ھذا دارالیتامیٰ والمساکین وبن السبیل - لاریب فیہ"

Translation: Verily, It is an orphanage, a poor house. There is no doubt to it.

# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING

*CHAPTER XXXVII*

# The History of Constitution-Making

When the Azad Kashmir Government was formed on the 24th of October, 1947, no constitutional apparatus was in existence. It was a Presidential form of government but the President enjoyed undefined and unlimited powers. He was the fountain of all authority, although nominally, he was answerable to the WC of the Muslim Conference. When in March 1948, Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan came from occupied Kashmir and was appointed Supreme Head of the Government, the position remained the same except that instead of one, there were now two kings in one kingdom, with the obvious results. Upto 1961 it was the Muslim Conference which formally appointed the President.

The Rules of Business which merely govern the transaction of departmental work, was therefore treated as a Constitution as also held by the High Court in P.L.D. 1957 A.J.K. 33. These Rules which were first enforced on 15th January 1951, provided that the President as well as his Ministers will be nominated by the Supreme Head who was also to determine their portfolios. They were made responsible to him and were to hold office at his pleasure. These were revised in October, 1952, by which time Col. Sher Ahmed had been installed as President. Rule 5, sub-rule (*a*) as amended, provided:

> "The President shall hold office during the pleasure of the General Council of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, *duly recognised as such by the Government of Pakistan and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.*"

What is worth noting is that the M.K.A. was treated as something independent of the Pakistan Government because it did not even trust the Government of Pakistan as represented by the Prime Minister, in so far as A.K. matters were concerned!

Brigadier Bashir Malik Secretary M.K.A. in 1977 frankly admitted in a conversation that the Ministry was based on a concept of mistrust. The second point to be noted is that actually there never existed a General Council since 1942 when the party was revived, to say the least, of one enjoying the privilege of recognition by the Ministry. No draft legislation could even be put before the Council of Ministers without obtaining the advice of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and in case of difference of opinion between itself and the M.K.A., the AJK Government could not give effect to its own point of view without *further prior consultation* with the said Ministry.

نہ تڑپنے کی اجازت نہ ھی فریاد کی ہے۔
گھٹ کے مر جاؤں یہ مرضی میرے صیاد کی ہے۔

These Rules werefurther amended on 29th November 1958 but the above provisions were left intact. With the introduction of the Basic Democracies system in Pakistan and a parting of ways between Mr. K. H. Khurshid and the Muslim Conference faction led by Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan, the Azad Kashmir President was elected in October 1961, on the Pakistan pattern, by an Electoral college of 2400 Basic democrats who were themselves elected on an adult sufferage. It was for the first time that the President was elected by a popular ballot, though indirectly.

Although the Governments were not democratic in the popular sense, nevertheless, as they represented political groups, they were neither oppressive nor totalitarian. At the same time, a struggle for democratic rights or for the redress of economic grievances was simulatenously waged from the very beginning. Raja Haider Khan was detained in 1950, Lt. Akramullah Khan Jaswal was first detained in Montgomery and subsequently interned within the limits of Maghiana in Jhang district, Mufti Ziauddin was interned within the limits of Gujranwala city, Sardar Rehmatullah of Muzaffarabad was detained in 1953, Ali Raza Khan of Pallandari was also detained in 1953, Mr. Abdul Khalique Ansari, Maulvi Abdul Ghani, Zafar Iqbal, Qurban, Said Muhammad, Comrade Maqbool and Soofi Yaqub, all from the Awami Conference, were detained in 1953/54, Syed Muhammad Amin Gilani was detained in 1954, Ch. Noor Hussain was detained in 1951, Khawaja Ghulam Nabi Gilkar and Mir Abdul Aziz, Editor Weekly INSAF were detained for a year in 1959/60. Again, declarations of several newspapers including Daily NAUROZE, the only daily ever published from AK, Weekly AWAZ-E-HAQ, edited and owned by Mir Abdul Aziz, Weeklies AGHAZ and PAK KASHMIR, and Weekly KASHMIR owned and edited by Kh. Sanaullah Butt were arbitrarily cancelled. In Bhimber where the landlord-tenant problem was acute, Ch. Sohbat Ali, the courageous,

spirited son of a poor tenant family, supported by late Ch. Khurshid Ahmed ex-M.L.A., launched a hard struggle to emancipate the landed tenancy.They refused to pay the land owners dues and being in a majority and enjoying the support of all just and progressive elements, successfully withstood their onslaught and the inequalities of the tenancy laws. Mr. Muhammad Amin Gilani led the tenants' struggle in Muzaffarabad where Jagirdars held sway in certain parts.

## 1964 AND 1968 ACTS

Then came the 1964 Act which was a humiliating document. The State Council could not undertake any legislation without the previous consent of the Chief Adviser. Even this was not considered enough because it also provided that no law could take effect unless the Chief Adviser directed so by a Notification. He was also empowered to restrict its application to any part of the territory and make any changes he liked! The Secretary General was designated as Senior Secretary and the IGP as Director of Police. The six members of the State Council elected from Azad Kashmir in 1961 were constituted as State Council which now existed on paper.

In 1968, a new Act known as the Government Act of 1968 was enforced. The above provisions with regard to legislative limitations and nomenclature of Senior Secretary and the Director of Police were retained. It now provided for the setting up of a new State Council consisting of 12 members, with the following distribution:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Azad Kashmir | .. | 8 seats |
| Jammu refugees | ... | 2 seats & |
| Kashmir refugees | ... | 2 seats |

thus restoring the refugees representation, though reducing it from 1/2 to 1/3rd. The members from Azad Kashmir were to be elected by Basic Democrats while the refugees were to be nominated by the Chief Adviser, on the recommendation of the Azad Kashmir President. One of the members was to be elected as Chairman of the Council, who was also to function as ex-officio President of Azad Kashmir.

These Acts sent a wave of indignation throughout as these sought to reduce A.K. to a municipal committee status. Demonstrations were held at Rawalpindi and Karachi for the repeal of the 1968 Act. In Karachi an All-Parties Kashmir Committee took out a procession on 5th December 1968, led by Mr. Amanullah Khan of the Plebiscite Front, Mr. Mumtaz

Abbasi of Albarq and Kh. Ghulam Hassan Punjabi of the Liberation League.

In Muzaffarabad a violent demonstration was staged outside the office of the President demanding its forthwith repeal. In consequence, three workers of the Liberation League, Kh. Ghulam Nabi Pandit, Kh. Abdul Khalique Dar and Kh. Ghulam Muhammad Lala were arrested on 1st January 1969 and banished for a month to 7000 ft. high Leepa valley which was reached by crossing, on foot, 11500 ft. high snow-decked Birthwar pass.

## THE 1970 ACT

Leaders of three political parties, Sardar Qaiyum, Mr. Khurshid and Sardar Ibrahim signed a joint declaration in Rawalpindi on 5th August, 1968. They decided to appoint a joint standing committee for execution and coordination of the joint programme. They addressed a press conference on the same day and released a four point declaration, reiterating faith in the indivisibility of the Jammu and Kashmir State and the solution of Kashmir problem through a plebiscite. It asked for a Constitution, providing effective representation to all elements of the State and pledged support to any movement that may be launched by the leaders of occupied Kashmir for liberation. It also demanded in point No. 3 (*a*) that the reconstituted Azad Kashmir Government be treated as full sovereign government, successor to the Government of Maharaja Hari Singh for the whole State. They addressed a reception given by the Joint Standing Committee at the Rawalpindi Press Club on 18th August. The declaration was endorsed by their respective Working Committees. They set up a joint Steering Committee consisting of Kh. Abdus Samad Wani, Sardar Rehmatullah, Pir Ali Jan Shah, Mr. Amin Mukhtar, Kh. Manzoorul Haq Dar, Raja Muhammad Aslam, Ch. Hussain Ali, Ghulam Rasool Baig, Sh. Khalid Mahmud, Ch. Khadim Hussain and Sardar Latif Khan, to work out details and sponsor joint action. Mr. Musa Ahmed, a Bengali, married to the daughter of Khawaja Shahabuddin, who was Chief Adviser, was sympathetic. Late Lt. General Akbar then a Major General and Head of the Intelligence Directorate who hailed from Mirpur, was also helpful. A discreet attempt was made by some elements to exclude Refugees on the political plane but the Foreign Office, aware of its grave implications, strongly advised against. Major General Akbar who was earlier in favour of the move, promptly withdrew his support and fell in line with the Foreign office view.

While Sardar Ibrahim and smaller groups here and there, like the Kisan Mazdoor Conference led by Kh. Abdus Salam Yatu and Mr. Muhammad Amin Haider were, from time to time, voicing demands for an

elected representative government, the leading faction led by Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan was opposed to the creation of an elected Assembly, largely on the plea that A.K. was a transitory phase. I think that the principal reason of opposition by him was the fear that it may ultimately weaken the commitment of the A.K. inhabitants to the Cause of liberation as the bone of power may derail some of its politicians. It may be said in fairness to the departed leader who died of cancer on the 18th of December 1968 that his fears were not unfounded.

It was in these circumstances that Brigadier Abdul Rehman took oath of office in November 1969. His first task was to give Azad Kashmir a Constitution and in our first meeting, I offered to produce a draft. Within two weeks I placed it in his hand and sent a copy to Sardar Abdur Rashid, Minister Kashmir Affairs. When the Constitution was at last promulgated in September as the Government Act of 1970, it was a matter of personal satisfaction to find that over 70% of my draft had been incorporated in the Act including the number of seats and their distribution not only vis-a-vis Azad Kashmir and refugees but also with regard to their allocation to the three districts of Azad Kashmir. The procedure suggested by me for a 'no-confidence' motion against the President had also been accepted which was a special feature of the Constitution as no such provision exists in Presidential form of governments. However, the draft provisions with regard to Fundamental Rights and Writ jurisdiction were excluded. It goes to the credit of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum that he incorporated these important provisions through an extensive Amendment Act in August 1971. The credit is all the more deserved when it is revealed that some Advisers had strongly advised against the incorporation of writ jurisdiction. A day or two after the incorporation of this provision in the Constitution, when the President invited my reaction, at some function, I told him, "Thank you, Sir, it means transfer of half of your kingship to the High Court".

Apart from providing for the direct election of the President through adult sufferage, the Act also provided for a Council of Ministers to be appointed by the President. The Act did not provide for the appointment of Assembly members as Ministers. This enabling provision was later incorporated through an amendment.

## THE 1974 CONSTITUTION

## AGREEMENT ON PARLIAMENTARY FORM

As the Constitution gradually unfurled itself, it was realised that change of government through a 2/3rd vote was well nigh impossible.

Meanwhile, a new Constitution framed and enforced in Pakistan in 1973 provided for a parliamentary form of government. Consequently, the demand for a similar form of Government here began to be voiced from some political platforms though it was not unanimous. It was in this light and with this background that after prolonged parleys, an agreement was initialled by Party leaders in Islamabad on 10th June 1974 in a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Bhutto. It was also signed by Sardar Abdul Qaiyum in his capacity as President of the A.K. Government. It provided not only for the creation of a Council consisting of the representatives of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan with jurisdiction over matters normally within the jurisdiction of the Central government in Pakistan but also that the President who was to be merely a constitutional figure-head, was to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. When it was placed before the Working Committees of the parties for approval, the Muslim Conference Working Committee withheld its approval. The attitude of the Muslim Conference Working Committee, despite the fact that both the parliamentary leader as well as the political party leader had signed it, is apparently difficult to justify. It is no doubt true that Muslim Conference is not a creature of Sardar Abdul Qaiyum and it is not, therefore, unlikely that despite his backing, a motion may encounter opposition but the question involved here was such which did not clash with any fundamental policy of the party. It was therefore assumed, perhaps not incorrectly, that Sardar Qaiyum was himself responsible for the Working Committee decision. One result of course was that it did not enhance Sardar Qaiyum's prestige with the Central Government. Sardar Qaiyum now demanded that the President should be directly elected by the people. It was naturally opposed by the other parties. Sardar Qaiyum adopted this strategy, firstly, because he thought that on a popular vote, he had a comparatively better chance of returning to the office than through an indirect election restricted to 42 members of the Legislature. The second reason was that he perhaps planned to seek a mandate from the electorate in favour of continuing the Presidential form of government, which gave him absolute power and which he had enjoyed for the last four years with relish. He wanted to use this mandate firstly against bringing in the parliamentary form of government and in the alternative, as a means of playing an effective role in the government. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Sardar Qaiyum were quite friendly with each other. I think they had a working understanding of reasonable mutual support. Mr. Pirzada wanted to achieve PP objectives in A.K., without bringing about confrontation with Sardar Qaiyum. He neither overestimated nor under-estimated him. After some hard bargaining behind the scene, the demand was accepted by the Central Government but opposed by the other parties.

The new Constitution increased the number of Assembly seats to 42 with the following break-up:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| A. K. | ... | 28 seats. |
| A.K. Refugees in Pakistan | | 12 seats. |
| Women | ... | 2 seats (to be elected by the Assembly). |

It was, therefore, decided that the Interim Constitution Act be introduced in the Assembly in accordance with the original Agreement signed on 10th June, 1974 and provide for the election of the President by the Legislature but that Sardar Qaiyum's party may move an amendment, substituting it by popular election and if the House accepted the amendment, the same would be incorporated. As the Muslim Conference and the Peoples Party commanded more than two-third majority, the conclusion was forgone. After this understanding was arrived at, Prime Minister Bhutto addressed leading members of the Muslim Conference in the Intercontinental Hotel Rawalpindi on the 19th of August, 1974. The Constitution draft was introduced on 24th August 1974. As some members of the A.K. P.P. parliamentary group, notably Mr. Rathore and Pir Ali Jan Shah were not mentally reconciled to the new provision, Mr. Pirzada came in person and remained present in the Assembly to ensure that his party voted for the M.C. amendment. The Constitution was signed by the President then and there and it came into force immediately. It is on the pattern of the 1973 Pakistan Constitution. In 1976 it went through certain amendments, the most important being, election of the President by the Assembly, the repeal of the provision providing for Chief Justice of the High Court to succeed to the Presidency in the absence of the Speaker and the investment of power to appoint Supreme Court and High Court Judges in the hands of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The latter two amendments were brought at the request and suggestion of this writer. It is in principle wrong to keep a member of the Judiciary a heir-apparent to kingship because that is more likely to act as an adverse influence in the discharge of his judicial duties. Besides, man is after all prone to be selfish and power hungry. What happened in March/April 1975, was a telling experience and heavily weighed upon my mind while renouncing the heir-ship.

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A. K. ... 28 seats.

A.K. Refugees in Pakistan 12 seats.

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It was, therefore, decided that the Interim Constitution Act be introduced in the Assembly in accordance with the original Agreement signed on 15th June, 1974 and provide for the election of the President by the Legislature but that Sardar Qayyum's Party may move an amendment, substituting it by popular election and if the House accepted the amendment, the same would be incorporated. As the Muslim Conference and the Peoples' Party commanded more than two-third majority, the outcome was foregone. After this understanding was arrived at, Prime Minister Bhutto addressed leading members of the Muslim Conference at the Intercontinental Hotel Rawalpindi on the 19th of August, 1974. The Constitution Bill was introduced on 24th August 1974. As some members of the A.K. P.P. parliamentary group, notably Mr. Rathore and Pir Ali Jan Shah were not mentally reconciled to the new Constitution, Mr. Pirzada came in person and remained present in the Assembly to ensure that the party voted for the M.C. amendment. The Constitution was assented by the President then and there and it came into force immediately. It is on the pattern of the 1973 Pakistan Constitution. In 1976 it was amended through certain amendments, the most important being, election of the President by the Assembly, the repeal of the provision providing for the Judges of the High Court to succeed to the Presidency in the absence of the Speaker and the investment of power to appoint Supreme Court and High Court Judges in the hands of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The latter two amendments were brought at the request of [illegible] of this writer. It is in principle wrong to keep a member of the judiciary in [illegible] because that is more likely to [illegible] influence his discharge of his judicial duties. Besides, [illegible] render him to the selfish and power hungry. What happened in March/April 1978, was a telling experience and [illegible] weighed upon [illegible] while [illegible] the amendments.

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## THE AZAD KASHMIR PLEBISCITE FRONT

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# CHAPTER XXXVIII

## The AK Plebiscite Front

A controversial group, it owes its origin to three tough political workers, Mr. Abdul Khaliq Ansari, Advocate, Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Butt, and Mr. Amanullah Khan, journalists. Mr. Ansari hails from Mirpur while the other two gentlemen are first generation refugees from the Valley. Mr. Ansari, a pre-partition political worker, started practice in Mirpur in 1950. Soon afterwards he founded a local political group, the Awami Conference, which remained confined to Mirpur tehsil. It clashed with the local administration with the result that Mr. Ansari and a few of his colleagues were detained at Pallandari jail where Mr. Ansari spent 9 months. Suppression does not damage political platforms but on the contrary, widens its appeal. This was exactly what happened and gradually Mr. Ansari built a powerful group of dedicated workers. To begin with, it took more interest in local problems, from civil supplies to the problems arising out of the construction of Mangla Dam. It rendered valuable services to the people of Mirpur but since politics in Azad Kashmir is largely tribal and Mr. Ansari hails from a minority, he has not been able to attract any sizable following. Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Butt, who hails from Handwara, came to Pakistan in 1958 at the age of seventeen.

Mr. Butt is a man of very strong nerves and the type of a revolutionary whose zeal for the political Cause, he espouses, transcends every other consideration. Pleasing in appearance, with dark, thoughtful eyes, and a man of few words, Maqbool Butt is a revolutionary of a higher order than Baghat Singh and Ashfaque. A double-graduate, he was News Editor of Daily ANJAM and Daily BANG-E-HARAM as well as Editor of the English Weekly, KHYBER MAIL Peshawar, before plunging into politics—NOT the politics of power but that of service and sacrifice. The Ganga tribunal, headed by Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali, later Chief Justice of Pakistan, has testi-

fied that his family of two wives and three children, lived on a miserable pittance while he was under sentence of death in Srinagar: rupees two hundred a month, made available by a rich co-worker, M. Siddiq Baba.

In 1965, Ansari, Butt, Amanullah, Mannan, GM Mir and Lone, a wealthy carpet exporter, met in Mirpur for several days to form a political party. One day they came to my house to discuss not only the formation of the party but also sought my participation. We could not agree because I insisted that the Party should have, as its political goal, the State's accession to Pakistan. They held, sometime later, a successful Convention at Sialkot and elected Mr. Ansari as their President. They gave their party the name of the 'Plebiscite Front' which has to be distinguished from the party of the same name that existed for a long time across the cease-fire line. The party has since become controversial in Azad Kashmir politics and some people have been frequently accusing them of being foreign agents. While it is not possible to say anything definitely about every individual, one can say categorically that at least the great majority of them are as patriotic as anyone else and stand behind nobody in their hatred against India and love for their country.

In 1965 Butt and some others, including Major Amanullah Khan, set up, what has come to be known, as the National Liberation Front, with the declared object of waging a guerilla war for the liberation of occupied Kashmir. In fact, it was to function as the armed wing of the A K. Plebiscite Front. Butt then secretly crossed into occupied Kashmir in June, 1966 and remained underground for four months, organising secret cells and training locally-enlisted workers for sabotage. In the course of a clash with the occupation forces which resulted in the death of a co-worker, Aurangzeb and an Indian Army officer, Amir Chand, he was arrested on 16th September 1966 along with some of his comrades. Several persons were also arrested from Srinagar, Sopore, Baramula, Handwara and Trehgam. They were tried for sabotage and murder. The case was tried by a Special Court which held its proceedings in the women's jail, Srinagar where the accused were lodged as an extra caution. On 18th August 1968, Mr. Butt and Khawaja Mir Ahmed were sentenced to death while Subedar Kale Khan, who had also crossed with him, was sentenced to transportation for life. Major Amanullah Khan could not be arrested; he returned safely to Azad Kashmir where he was detained for several months for interrogation. Quite naturally, they became house-hold names in the Valley. True to the tradition of revolutionaries the world over, they successfully escaped from the very heavily guarded women's jail, Srinagar, on the night falling between 8th and 9th of December 1968. It created a sensation and the truth remains that it electrified the people who rejoiced on their brilliant escape

and prayed for their safe entry into Azad Kashmir. An Inquiry committee was set up and a number of Jail officers and guards were suspended. A cash reward of Rs. 10,000/ was announced for their arrest. It was also announced that any one giving them shelter was liable to be tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Thousands of posters containing their photographs and repeating the government offer were circulated. Their pictures passed from hand to hand and from house to house. People kissed them and hung these in their bed rooms. People looked out for them desperately, not for the reward money but to give them shelter, food, clothes and money. Essentially a Hero-worshipping people, their feat had stirred almost every Kashmiri's heart.

کسب کمال کن - کہ عزیز جہان شوی

Can there be any better proof of Kashmiri's innate hatred against India than the fact that for one month they were sheltered, transported and guided by their people and safely entered Azad Kashmir in January, 1969? Taken into custody immediately, they were detained for two and a half months.

## HIJACKING OF GANGA


On 30th January 1971 an Indian Airline plane "Ganga", is claimed to have been hijacked by two Kashmiri youth, Ashraf Qureshi, and Hashim Qureshi while on a flight from Srinagar to New Delhi. The plane was diverted towards Lahore where it landed safely with its passengers. Ashraf was a lad of about 17 years and had come to Pakistan for the first time while Hashim was in his late twenties and had been to Pakistan earlier. At Lahore they put forth certain demands, the most important being the release of political prisoners in Jammu and Kashmir. On persuasion by the Central Government, they allowed the exit of the passengers who were very comfortably lodged in a first class hotel and allowed to leave for New Delhi on the next day in a special plane sent from New Delhi. Their demands were communicated to the Government of India which rejected them and the plane, despite efforts to the contrary by the Central and Provincial government officials, was therefore put on fire. The incident, apart from attracting world-wide attention, resulted in a dramatic upsurge of Pakistanis' attachment to the liberation of Kashmir. About 3 to 4 lakhs of people swarmed the airport; some of them came from remote corners of the then Western Wing and Azad Kashmir to demonstrate their solidarity with the two youth. Among those who personally, gave them a "Shabash", on the spot was Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party. On 3rd February the two youth were taken out in a huge procession in Lahore which attracted unprecedented crowds. It was acknowledged as one of the biggest processions ever taken out in the city and the very fact that it was arranged almost impromptu and

without official patronage, showed how deeply the Kashmir issue can stir the hearts of the people of Pakistan. Towards its close, it was joined by Dr. Mubashir Hassan and Sh. Muhammad Rashid, later Finance and Health Ministers respectively, in the Bhutto cabinet.

The two youth claimed to represent the National Liberation Front wing of the A.K. Plebiscite Front and demanded to see Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Butt, Dr. Farooq Haider and other leaders of the party. On the next day, in course of a press conference, Mr. Butt claimed responsibility for the hijacking incident.The two youth were taken out in processions in several other towns in the Punjab and Azad Kashmir. Unfortunately the situation in East Pakistan was deteriorating and in the beginning of March, 1971, the Army had to resort to action to suppress the defiance of Authority, apparently resulting from the postponement of the meeting of the National Assembly which was interpreted by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and his followers as an attempt to deprive them of their right to get into power through peaceful means. India made the hijacking a petext for suspending the flight of the Pakistan aircraft between the two wings of the country over its territory; the Pakistan government thereafter claimed that the hijacking had been planned and executed by India so as to create an excuse for suspension of the air flights. Some Bengalis, not Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman personally, claimed that the incident had been enacted by the Yahya Government in order to sabotage the transfer of power to elected representatives.

A complaint was field by Pakistan against India with the International Civil Aviation Authority against suspension of the air flights and it was in this unfortunate background that the two youth along with several other members of the party were thrown behind bars and condemned as traitors. They were subjected to all sorts of torture and indignity, widely associated with the notorious Lahore fort prison cells. Ultimately, they were put on trial before a Special Tribunal comprising Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali Khan of the Supreme Court and Mr. Justice Abdul Kader Sheikh, then Senior Judge of the Sind-Baluchistan High Court. After a protracted trial, quite natural in such cases, the tribunal acquitted all the accused except Mr. Hashim Qureshi who has since gone in appeal to the Supreme Court. The tribunal held that the Plebiscite Front and the National Liberation Front were both patriotic parties. It also held:

> *"It has been found by us already that the accused other than Muhammad Hashim Qureshi formed the Plebiscite Front in response to the call given by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah whom they claimed to be the sole leader of the Kashmiris on both sides of the cease-*



Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Butt, M.A., awaiting execution in a death-cell in Srinagar Central Jail

*fire line and that they planned, financed and executed the operations of NLF as they had come to believe that armed struggle was the only remedy to liberate Kashmir from the Indian occupation force.*"

"Keeping in view all the material which has been placed on the record by the prosecution and defence, we have arrived at the conclusion that Muhammad Ashraf was not a party to the conspiracy under which Muhammad Hashim had hijacked the Indian Airways plane "Ganga" to Lahore on 30th January 1970 as an agent of the Indian intelligence. He is one of the thousands of young Kashmiris in the Held part of the State who yearn for accession of the State to Pakistan."

"India, did not, at any time, intend to hold the plebiscite and the promises made by it were calculated to gain time and make its forcible occupation of the State as a fait accompli. Simultaneously, forces of tyranny, bribe and political graft were unleashed. Loyalties of staunch supporters of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah like Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad were purchased, elections were rigged with a view to obtain a verdict from a wholly unrepresentative State Assembly that the accession was final and Kashmir was an inseparable part of India. It was inevitable in these conditions for the Kashmiri youth to think in terms of armed struggle to liberate their homeland. They had the recent instances of Algeria, Tunisia and Palestine before them which spurred them to organise armed resistance to the Indian Forces of occupation. The criminal acts done by the accused in breach of the Arms Ordinance and Explosives Act have, therefore, to be judged in the light of these circumstances. The same applies to the conspiracy to hijack an Indian aircraft to Pakistan."

Among those tried in the case were Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Lone and Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Butt. The tribunal paid a visit to Muzaffarabad to look at the explosives that had been recovered from members of the Front in Azad Kashmir. It appears that even some of the lawyers representing the accused initially thought that, after all, the accusation may be true; the credit for exposing the farce of the charges against the accused, other than Hashim Qureshi, goes primarily to a semi-literate but rich Kashmiri-speaking worker, Mr. Siddiq Baba of Rawalpindi whose natural and convincing evidence before the tribunal, in typical Kashmiri-Urdu, convinced all concerned of the bonafides of the accused. Mr. Maqbool Butt recrossed the cease-fire line, organised sabotage groups and was arrested. He is now awaiting execution in a death-cell.

The Indian Airliner, Ganga was hijacked in January, 1971. Despite the fate they suffered, except Hashim whose case is still before the Supreme Court, six Kashmiri-speaking youth again hijacked a 737 Boeing of the Indian Airlines while on a routine flight from Delhi to Jaipur on 10th September, 1976 and forced the pilots to land at Lahore. It was carrying 77 passengers including Mr. Gulab Singh, Minister of State, Rajasthan. Negotiations were conducted with the Hijackers by Mr. Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, Punjab Chief Minister, Dr. Mubashir Hassan, Secretary General P.P., Mr. Nasir Rizvi, a Central Minister and Mr. Shah Nawaz, Additional Foreign Secretary. Mr. Bajpai, the Indian Ambassador to Pakistan rushed from New Delhi and remained in the control room, using French in his conversation with his Home Government. They named the plane as Jamuna, in continuation of the earlier hijacked plane, Ganga. The news was kept secret from Pakistanis who were told that the hijackers were from some African country etc. etc. A contingent of the Pakistan Army commandos was claimed to have over-powered them but the Hijackers assert that they were served with food which contained intoxicants, making some of them unconscious and so on. The plane and its passengers were returned to India safely. These youth led by Khawaja Abdul Hamid Diwani were detained, for some time, in Chilas. They have alleged torture and other maltreatment. They did not belong to any political group. They did it on their own. Their names are:

1. Abdul Hamid Diwani, Bandipura.
2. Ghulam Nabi Yatu, Qazigund.
3. Ghulam Rasul Shahin,
4. Muhammad Ahsan,
5. Muhammad Rafique and
6. Abdul Rashid, all from Shopian.

Who are these people and what are their bonafides? In so far as the AK. Plebiscite Front is concerned, I have known some of them, particularly Mr. Ansari, and a number of their workers from Mirpur, now for more than 25 years. The charge of being pro-India ought to be dismissed as malafide. They are as much anti-India as perhaps anyone else, on this side of the border. However, it is true that until recently, they stood for the State's independence which seems to me to have been due to emotional idealism, divorced from the realities of life. That we don't live in a Utopia had unfortunately not dawned upon them.

Kashmir is also surrounded by India, Russia and China. How can we manage its defence? An international guarantee is idle talk. Who prevented Germany from scrapping the Vienna treaty, guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of Switzerland? What has India done in connection with the implementation of *her* commitments regarding the holding of a plebiscite?

I don't know whether any foreign power is really interested in an Independent Kashmir, but it is possible that the Soviet policy-makers may be looking at it from a distant angle. During the Quaid-e-Azam Centenary Congress held in Islamabad, I got introduced to a Soviet delegate. A day or two later, when we had an opportunity of a brief discussion, I asked him why they were punishing us, the Kashmiris, for Pakistan's military alliance with the United States, as we had no hand at all in the formation of policies in Pakistan, even if, I further told him, Pakistan's geographic and political compulsions for seeking the said aid did not appeal to Moscow? The Professor told me that he was prepared for a discussion provided truth and no politics or expediency pervades our discussion. He then asked me a few questions about the pre-1947 Kashmir history which I answered to the best of my knowledge. I found the Professor well-versed with the history of Kashmir. After kindly acknowledging that my answers were correct, he said abruptly:

> "Leave aside our role. *There is no demand for independence.*"

In course of my reply when I told him, sarcastically,

> "Of course out of our neighbours, we could assume only about Russia that she would respect our independence......",

the Professor had a hearty laugh.

It is my considered opinion that the concept of an Independent Kashmir is merely idealistic, totally divorced from the dictates of power politics that governs the political map of the planet. Each Big power and each neighbour would try to become our conventional Elder brother. It would become the spying under-world of Asia. Independence would not only be a myth but a curse.

Kashmir is always surrounded by India, Russia and China. How can we manage its defence? An international guarantee is idle talk. Who prevented Germany from scrapping the Vienna treaty guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of Switzerland? What has India done in connection with the implementation of her commitments regarding the holding of a plebiscite?

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# CHAPTER INDEX

## THE AUTHOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE TO LORD MOUNTBATTEN AND HIS COMMENTS

*CHAPTER XXXIX*

# The Author's Letter to Lord Mountbatten

MUZAFFARABAD
August 29, 1978.

Respected Lord Mountbatten.

I hope you recollect my letter of 13th October 1973 and your kind reply, declining an interview but inviting questions for answers or the relevant portion, for comments.

The first volume of the book entitled "KASHMIRIS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM" which covers the period between 1819 to 1946, has since been published. A copy of the book was posted to your Lordship's London address yesterday. It must naturally take considerable time to reach your hands. A copy has been already placed in the India Office Library, London.

The second volume, covering the period from 1946 to 1977, is going through composition in the Ferozsons Press, Lahore and if everything goes well, it would, by the grace of God, be in the market within the next six months.

When the first volume went to the press, I was of the view that question-answers may not serve the purpose but I have since changed my opinion. Asia's political map is fast changing and God knows what it will be by the time the 21st century dawns.

My generation is naturally deeply involved in the controversies of its time but not the succeeding generations. They will be in a better frame of mind to judge us—justly and impartially. As a student of history, I am trying to leave for them the record, written and unwritten so far, to the

best of my knowledge and within the limits of my ability. My point of view is naturally that of a Pakistani but despite it, I expect a lot of brimstone and fire, when the book is out. That, however, is a contemporary historian's inevitable lot.

You played a most historic role in the sub-continent's freedom. Many of us in this country, despite our grievances, have profound admiration for you and your epoch-making performance. To bring round Hindus and Muslims—inveterate foes since a thousand years—to an agreement to share power and that also, dividedly, may now look simple but its magnitude and the love's labour that must have gone behind it, can be appreciated only by those who, like myself, lived in those terrible times when each succeeding moment was unpredictable.

It is in the sub-continent that you played the crowning part of your career and it is here that your role is an object of fierce controversy. I have gone through all the books written in England on your role in the sub-continent but they leave many a vital question of controversy untouched. Some have ignored these questions, others have dealt with them only partly. The controversy, therefore, continues to rage and very often articles critical of your role appear in our national press

As a humble historian, I have a strong feeling that your point of view, must be preserved for the coming generations so that they can make their own judgment. I have watched with admiration, your great sense of history and it was primarily this factor which encouraged me in 1973 to approach you and which has again, in the final analysis, propelled me to approach you, with a questionnaire.

I would be deeply grateful if the questionnaire which is herewith attached, could be answered. It is, of course, understood that your comments will, God willing, be published in the book in their entirety.

I must express my apologies for the harshness of some of the questions or the assumptions made therein.

The reply may kindly be sent under registered cover to ensure that it does reach my hands.

## LORD MOUNTBATTEN'S REPLY

**ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA**

**BROADLANDS**

**ROMSEY**

**HAMPSHIRE**
**S05 9ZD**

3rd November, 1978

My dear Chief Justice Muhammad Yusuf Saraf,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th August and the very extensive questionnaire you enclosed with it.

I entirely agree with you as to the importance for future generations of putting to rights the record of the transfer of power and my role in it, and in particular in allaying some of the misconceptions, not to say untruths, about my conduct towards nascent Pakistan, that seem to be current in your country. May I therefore enclose a detailed commentary on your memorandum despite the fact, which as a judge you must appreciate, that much of the evidence cited is so insecure, circumstantial and even irrelevant that even without rebuttal or cross-examination it would not, as we say, be enough to hang a cat.

Finally may I say how glad I am that it is your intention to publish your questionnaire and my reply in full and I sincerely trust you will send me a copy of the publication in which this appears, for my Archives.

I am sending this letter by registered post as you request although it may delay it a bit and I shall look forward to your answer.

### THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND MB'S COMMENTS

*Author:* Lord Mountbatten was Governor-General of the whole of undivided India till 14th August, 1947 and was therefore duty-bound not only to act evenly but also appear to have done so. But given below are instances that have come to light so far which show his undue preference for Hindus and the resultant loss, Muslims suffered.

*Lord Mountbatten*: The allegation of my 'undue preference for Hindus' is totally false. In all my actions I sought to deal even-handedly

with the two communities and the two successor states. On certain matters (e.g. the apportionment of assets) I was accused by Indians of 'undue preference' for Muslims and for Pakistan.

*Question* I: When British Government's amended version of Lord Mountbatten's partition plan arrived from London, the Viceroy showed it to Pandit Nehru and it was in consultation with him and V.P. Menon (no less involved in the Hindu-Muslim question) that it was re-shaped; *it was the 3rd June plan.*[1] Thus the anti-Pakistan influence of the two Hindus did operate in its preparation. To what extent it did so, can be judged only if the said revised plan as arrived from Britain and the one initially sent by the Viceroy, are released to the press.

Nehru was no neutral. He was a partisan. Muslim League was not taken into confidence. All this happened behind its back.

*Comments:* I showed the original plan to Nehru because he was staying with me in Simla. There was no point in my showing it to Jinnah when I had decided to scrap it in view of Nehru's reaction. I took the greatest care to see that no alteration of the plan, eventually incorporated in the statement of 3rd June, could have affected Pakistan adversely. Nehru's objection to the original plan was that it would have 'balkanised' India; avoiding this by the 'twin Dominion status' device was certainly not to the disadvantage of Pakistan.

*Question* 2: Lord Ismay says that the plan showed Calcutta as part of India. The actual plan released on 3rd June left its fate to be decided by the Radcliffe Commission. Subsequently, Radcliffe did award it to India. The impression here is that it was secretly settled to be given to India and its fate being handed over to the Boundary Commission, was a drama to fool the League leadership.[2]

*Comments:* As you point out, the original plan allotted Calcutta to India. The remission of that issue to the Boundary Commission in the revised plan gave the Muslims another chance to make their case for Calcutta. The allegation that this was a 'drama to fool the League Leadership' is too absurd to call for refutation.

*Question* 3: Lord Mountbaten took the revised plan to London *personally*.

Pakistanis believe that it was:

(I) to use his influence to get it accepted by the Labour Government as against its own revised version which may have been favourable to Pakistan.

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1. John Terraine, pp. 153-154.
2. Lord Ismay, Memoirs, p. 499.

(2) To bring about a secret understanding between the British Government and the Congress on the basis of India remaining in the Commonwealth, in reward for concessions in the partition scheme.

*Comments*: I went to London personally to explain the revised plan because I was summoned by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State to do so; they offered the alternative of sending a Cabinet Minister to India, but that could only have led to further delay and possible Ministerial dispute. The Cabinet's 'revised version' as Lord Ismay wrote, 'was identical in essentials with the paper I had brought home' ('The Memoirs of Lord Ismay', p. 421). Only they had fiddled with a few details of the first plan ('The Great Divide', p. 309). There was no 'secret understanding' between the British Government and the Congress. The British Government had no dealings with the Congress except through me, and I had no 'secret understanding' with the Congress other than the draft Heads of Agreement which Sir Eric Mieville, V. P. Menon and I negotiated *equally and simultaneously* with the Muslim League and the Sikhs.

*Question* 4: Lord Mountbatten said in his broadcast on 3rd June:

"the ultimate boundaries will be settled by a Boundary Commission *and will almost certainly not be identical with those* which had been provisionally adopted."[1]

On 4th June when asked at a press conference why he had said so, Lord Mountbatten answered:

"I put that in for the simple reason that in the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab, the population is 50.4 percent Muslims, I think, and 49.6% non-Muslims. With a difference of 0.8 percent, you will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will *throw* the whole of the district into the Muslim majority areas."[2]

This raises the following questions:—

1. Why did not Mountbatten mention any other area either in Bengal or Punjab and just confined himself to Gurdaspur?

2. After all, why had he studied the population figures of this district in such minute detail?

1 & 2. Muhammad Ali, p. 215.

3. Even before the Boundary Commission was set up, why did he commit himself publicly to the partition of the district by emphatically saying that it was unlikely for the Commission to throw the whole of the district into Pakistan, let alone the use of the unfortunate word 'throw' and its implicatons ?

4. Did he also, by being deliberately so indiscreet, intend to give a public assurance to Maharaja Hari Singh that the district of Gurdaspur was going to be partitioned in a way so as to provide him with a direct and easy access to the Union of India? or

5. Was it a veiled threat to the Muslim League leadership to agree to his appointment as Common Governor-General?

*Comments:* The quotation from my broadcast of 3rd June is a glimpse of the obvious. There would have been no point in having a Boundary Commission if it would only endorse the boundaries provisionally adopted for administrative reasons.

My mention of Gurdaspur at my press conference was meant as an example of the sort of problem that might arise, on which I had been briefed by my staff, whose business it was to look up details which otherwise I would not have known. Like everyone else concerned, I was well aware that controversy over the boundary would probably be focussed on two areas, apart from Calcutta, the northern Punjab, in which Gurdaspur was obviously a critical district, and the border between Assam and East Bengal. I might have quoted the latter example as readily as the former. In the event, incidentally, the Assam award went in favour of Pakistan.

I do not understand your apparent distaste for the word 'throw'. It seems to me quite neutral. Your insinuation about the Maharaja of Kashmir is without any foundation whatever, as is your still more far-fetched allegation of a link with the question of a common Governor-General, which did not come into the arena of dispute until a month later. Lord Radcliffe himself testified that the question of access to Kashmir was not in his mind at all when he determined the Punjab boundary (see 'The Great Divide', p. 354).

*Question* 5: In July, 1947 when Mr. Jinnah informed Lord Mountbatten that he himself would be the Governor-General of Pakistan, the conversation that passed between them is:

"Do you realise what this will cost you ?"

"It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets."

"It may well cost you the whole of your assets *and the future of* Pakistan."[1]

Pakistanis trace the award of the Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala as well the other alleged anti-Pakistan actions of the Viceroy to this threat. They argue that it is only in relation to the loss of Kashmir that the future of Pakistan could be jeopardized. It has, to my knowledge, nowhere been explained what else was meant by the threat ?

*Comments:* You will appreciate that my immediate reaction to Mr. Jinnah's decision to become Governor-General of Pakistan was one of consternation, which may have sharpened my retort. For, it had been assumed up to that moment that a common Governor-Generalship for a transitional period was acceptable to both sides, and the Indian Independence Bill had been explicitly drafted to allow for it. Pakistan, I felt, 'would gain the most from it, since she was the weaker party in many respects, the more in need of an impartial figure at the top watching the process of partition' ('The Great Divide', p. 330). That is what lay behind my warning remark to Jinnah. Pakistan was relatively weak in numbers, in military force, in economic strength, in administrative experience; if its future depended upon its bargaining muscle in face of the much more powerful Indian Government, in a settlement of disputed issues of partition, then that future was indeed in jeopardy. As it was, it took all my powers to settle in Pakistan's favour, although I was Governor-General of India only, the vitally important questions of the 55 crores of cash assets and the West Punjab canal waters (see 'The Great Divide', pp. 504—507). Actions speak louder than words!

I will return to the question of Kashmir in my comments on para 7.

*Question 6:* On the 24th of July after the decision not to have him as the joint Governor-General had been conveyed, Lord Mountbatten convened a meeting of the high powered Partition Council and secured signatures of the Quaid-e-Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel to a joint statement pledging *advance acceptance* of the Boundary Commission's award whatever form it might take. Campbell Johnson records that Lord Mountbatten was greatly elated and excited over *this coup.*

Boundary Commission was in the nature of an arbitration tribunal whose award was otherwise binding. Pakistanis say that this move by Lord Mountbatten shows that by this date, he was fully aware that the

1. The Great Divide, p. 331.

award would attract *legitimate* criticism. They also think that this very argument may have been given by Radcliffe to Viceroy's suggestion to fashion it according to his wishes or that he wanted to strengthen his own hands in 'dealing' with Radcliffe and for that reason, adopted this unusual course.

*Comments:* My gaining advance acceptance of the Boundary Commission's award by both sides was indeed an essential coup in the process of establishing Pakistan through the partition of India. Consider what would have happened if, when the award was announced at the very moment of independence, it had been exposed to revision by a fresh struggle between the two successor states. Pakistan, the weaker party, would certainly not have been the gainer. Sir Cyril Radcliffe (as he then was) and I were both well aware that any award in so complex an issue would attract legitimate criticism, legitimate in the sense that it could not be equally legitimately countered. At no time did I exert any influence on Radcliffe as to the nature of his award, except for my very broad suggestion that he should have in mind some kind of balance between different parts of the award that might be regarded as objectionable by the Indians and Pakistanis respectively—a suggestion, you will observe, equally favourable to India and Pakistan (see 'The Great Divide', p. 354).

*Question* 7: It was *after consultations with Congress leaders* that Lord Mountbattan flew to Srinagar on 21st June 1947. Immediately on his return on the 24th of June, Lord Mountbatten explained in detail to Pandit Nehru the talks he had with Hari Singh and Kak. *Muslim League was not taken into confidence.* The Pakistanis hold that the mission was undertaken to ensure that Kashmir did not accede to Pakistan. After all, they argue, there were 562 States. Why didn't Lord Mountbatten visit any other Prince?

Kashmir was the most vocal point of dispute between India and Pakistan. The population was 77.1 percent Muslim, it was contiguous with Pakistan and all its existing road, rail and river links were with Pakistan. However, it had a Hindu ruler who was clothed with the right of accession under the Indian Independence Act. Therefore the questions that arise, are:

(*i*) Why did Lord Mountbatten deem it a part of his duty to proceed to Srinagar to discuss the matter with the Hindu ruler after he had discussed it with Congress leaders, while keeping the whole matter secret from the Muslim League?

(*ii*) Why did Lord Mountbatten on his return from Kashmir give

Pandit Nehru the details of his talks with Hari Singh but withheld the same from the Muslim League?

(*iii*) Why had there been an understanding between Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Nehru that Lady Mountbatten would establish a diplomatic liaison with Begum Abdullah, incidentally the only instance of its kind? That an extremely cautious man like Lord Mountbatten should have done so, adds to the Pakistanis suspicion.

*Comments:* I visited Kashmir between 18th and 23rd June in order to head off Nehru and Gandhi from their intention to go to the state, where they could have fomented trouble injurious to Pakistan's interests. Where is your evidence that this visit, openly undertaken, was kept secret from the Muslim League? Although Nehru was my Prime Minister and I naturally saw more of him, I was in daily touch with Ministers of the Interim Government, including Liaqat Ali Khan. My chief concern at that time, however, was to persuade the Maharaja that he should decide which Dominion Kashmir should join, after consulting the wishes of his people and without undue pressure from either side, especially the Congress Leaders. I was able to assure him, from conversations with Nehru and Patel, that if he decided to join Pakistan, this action would not be regarded as unfriendly by the Government of India (see 'The Great Divide', pp. 383 and 441). My wife's personal contact with Begum Abdullah—which was aborted—was intended to pacify Nehru, who was much concerned about the Sheikh's imprisonment.

*Question* 8: On the 29th of July, 1947, a meeting was held at the Birla House, Delhi, attended by Lord Mountbatten, Gandhi, Nehru and Patel. It was decided that Gandhi should visit Srinagar. Obviously, Gandhi, the Apostle, was more likely to succeed than Nehru. How can the Viceroy's presence in meetings of one political party—obviously aimed at planning its strategy for securing the Kashmir State, despite its Muslim majority and geographic compulsions, be reasonably explained away?

*Comments:* At the meeting to which you refer, I agreed that Gandhi should go to Srinagar as by far the preferable alternative to Nehru's going, which could only excite trouble and moreover implicate the Government of India. I obtained a promise from Gandhi that he would make no political speeches. To my knowledge, there was no 'Congress strategy' to secure the adherence of Kashmir to India; on the contrary, Sardar Patel himself, the Minister of States and generally regarded as 'the strong man of the Congress', told me that the Indian Government would not take it

amiss if Kashmir joined Pakistan. Gandhi also publicly urged that Kashmir should join either Dominion according to the will of its people.

*Question 9:* According to Campbell Johnson, Lord Mountbatten urged the Maharaja to make up his mind about accession *before the transfer* of power. This book was published in 1951. In the book written by Mr. Hodson and published in 1969, it is stated on the contrary that the advice Lord Mountbatten gave to the Maharaja was that *Kashmir should not decide about joining any Constituent Assembly until the Pakistan Assembly had been set up and situation was clear.* Freedom at Midnight again repeats the 1951 claim.

How can the two positions be reconciled? Pakistanis believe that the advice to decide the issue of accession before the 14th of August meant a decision in favour of India because of the non-existence of Pakistan then and hence the absence of any spontaneous reprisal. This belief is strengthened from the following:—

Mountbatten, Hodson further claims, told Pandit Nehru on return:

"The Maharaja and Pandit Kak have both stated that on account *of the balance of population and Kashmir's geographical position, any premature decision might have a serious effect on their internal stability.*"

It can only mean that the Maharaja declined to fall in line on the excuse or genuine fear of trouble in the State by the Muslim majority and the reaction of Muslims from the border districts of Punjab because Lord Mountbatten is also on record to have offered to lift an Indian Division and station it in Kashmir, obviously to re-assure Maharaja of Indian military support and to put, as well, teeth in his decision of accession.

*Comments:* There is no conflict between Campbell Johnson's and Hodson's accounts. The former recalls that I urged the Maharaja and Pandit Kak 'to find out in one way or another the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible, and to announce their intention by 14th August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other' (Mission with Mountbatten', p. 120). Obviously that choice could not be made until the Pakistan Assembly was set up. You must remember that we were working on a very compressed time-table. Eight weeks between my visit to Kashmir and Independence Day seemed a very long time, plenty of time for the Pakistan Assembly to be set up, the position to become clearer, the will of the people of Kashmir to be ascertained, and the Maharaja to make his decision.

Your interpretation of the Maharaja's and Pandit Kak's attitude may be taken as correct as far as it goes but it only goes half-way. No doubt they were equally fearful of trouble in the state from the Hindu Sikh minority, which held most of the positions of power, if the decision was to join Pakistan.

You add at the end that I was on record to have offered to lift an Indian Division and station it in Kashmir. This is only half the story. What I actually told the Maharaja was that if he decided at the consent of his people, to accede to Pakistan, his position was absolutely secure because the Government of India had already announced that they would not regard this in any sense as an unfriendly action. They would therefore not intervene and Pakistan would have no difficulty in supplying troops to reinforce their power in Kashmir. I went on to say that if he decided on the contrary with the will of his people to accede to India then there would be a grave risk of military pressure from Kashmir (Pakistan: author) which might end in fighting. To avoid this I offered to lift an Indian division and station it in Kashmir so as to preclude any possibility of Pakistan thinking they could change the decision of the Maharaja by military force.

It seems to me that this proviso was a commonsense one and as much in the interest of Pakistan as of India.

*Question* 10: It is stated by Mr. Justice Monir, retired Chief Justice of Pakistan who was a member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, that he was the last member of the Commission to be interviewed by Mr. Radcliffe; that when he began arguing Muslim claim to the three tehsils of Ferozpur, Mr. Radcliffe stopped him, saying that these were going to Pakistan. A similar claim was advanced by Sh. Din Muhammad. Both were Judges of the High Court and no Pakistani would disbelieve them. On 7th August, when he invited the Commission members to a lunch at the Services Club, Lahore, Mr. Mahajan asked Sir Radcliffe that since everything had been discussed, could he give members his own opinion? To this the latter replied apologetically that he had yet to discuss it with Lord Mountbatten.[1]

Radcliffe left for Delhi on 7th. On 8th August Sir George Abbel, Private Secretary to Lord Mountbatten wrote a letter to Mr. Abbot, P.S. to the Governor of Punjab which said:

> "I *enclose a map* showing roughly the boundary which *Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes* to demarcate in his award and a note by Christopher Beaumont (Private Secretary to Radcliffe) describing it. *There*

1. Pakistan Times, 14-8.1978.

*will not be any great change from the boundary, but it will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and zail boundaries* in the Lahore district.

The award itself is expected within the next 48 hours and I will let you know later about the probable time of announcement."[1]

It is inconceivable that Beaumont could have supplied the map and the explanatory note which seems missing, without prior clearance from Sir Radcliffe. The words of Sir Abbel that "there will not be any great change from the boundary (conveyed)" except accurate demarcation with reference to village and Zail (a term used for a group of villages in the Punjab, headed by a hereditary man of influence known as Zaildar, just as each village had a Lambardar) and the further information that it was expected to be announced within 48 hours, leaves no doubt that it was already ready —in so far as Radcliffe was concerned.

It came to light for the first time in 1969 that on the 9th of August Lord Mountbatten had a disastrous meeting with Radcliffe, also attended by Lord Ismay, at the latter's house.[2] It was at Ismay's house on the same day that Ch. Muhammad Ali met him and saw a map with a pencil line showing Gurdaspur and Batala as part of India! Caught red-handed, under his own roof, Ismay turned pale and could only say: "Who has been fooling with this map?" Chief Justice Monir, a member of the Boundary Commission, calls it a childish reply.[3]

Mr. Hodson has no effective, convincing answer to this incriminating evidence. He has merely tried to beat about the bush. Sir Radcliffe's admission to Sir Firoze Khan Noon that the Award with regard to Gurdaspur *was* changed after he went to India,[4] the meeting in the said house, probably in the same room, on 9th August between Mr. Radcliffe and Lord Mountbatten and an unscheduled call by Ch. Muhammad Ali while the map was still there, the fact that Radcliffe and Ismay were closeted in the same room, *immediately before the entry of Ch. Muhammad Ali*, leaves no doubt that the pencil lining was the outcome of their meeting. It also means that the change of the allocation of the tehsils of Ferozpur and Zira was effected, subsequent to these meetings.

*Comments:* The whole of this paragraph is answered by my assurance that at no time did I, or anyone on my behalf, seek to influence

1. Hodson, p. 352.
2. Hodson, p. 354.
3. The Pakistan Times, 14.8.1978.
4. From Memory, p. 217.

Radcliffe as to the nature of his award, with the exception of the passing suggestion about balance that I have already mentioned. Lord Ismay, before his death, repeatedly gave the same assurance on his behalf and mine. The recollections of Chief Justice Munir, Sh. Din Muhammad and Mr. Mahajan stand for what they are worth. What was the point on which Sir Cyril declined to give Mr. Mahajan his opinion before he had discussed it with me? It could only have been the timing and method of the announcemnt of the awards, since this is the only point that he discussed with me; we never discussed their content.

As far the affair of Beaumont's map, I thought this had been disposed of by Hodson's fair and factual account ('The Great Divide', pp. 352—353). He tells me that he was not aware, when writing his book, of Chaudhry Muhammad Ali's story, but this is perfectly consistent with his account, indeed bears it out. No doubt inadvertently, you have taken that story out of context. It is recounted in Muhammad Ali's 'The Emergence of Pakistan', pp. 218—19, where he records:—

Ismay professed complete ignorance of Radcliffe's ideas about the boundary and stated categorically that neither Mountbatten nor he himself had ever discussed it with him. It was entirely for Radcliffe to decide; and no suggestion has been or would ever be made to him.

Muhammad Ali then turned to a map on the wall, and Ismay exclaimed as you say. His words are clear evidence that he knew nothing of the forecast line, which had presumably been pencilled in by some official. If he had been privy to some sort of conspiracy, which is unthinkable, the last thing he would have done was to expose such a map to the gaze of visitors, or else, had they seen it, he would have been ready with some plausible explanation. As it was, he observed to his dismay that 'someone had been fooling' with the map. The interpretation you put on the incident is, if I may say so, very far-fetched.

Lord Ismay and Lord Radcliffe were men of the highest integrity whose truthfulness cannot be impugned. It astonishes me that their word has not been accepted, rather than all this tittle-tattle and highly strained inference.

*Question* 11: According to an article written by General Muhammad Musa Khan and published in Dawn Karachi on 1st September 1970, Mountbatten paid a secret visit to the Walton airport in connection with Kashmir developments and had a conference with senior British Army officers serving in Pakistan. I place this visit between the 23rd and 30th of October, 1947, with the purpose of securing full information about the

character and composition of the people who entered Kashmir via Muzaffarabad on 22nd October and the nature of their arms so as to be of assistance in taking personal command of Indian troops being despatched to Kashmir.

*Comments:* I am absolutely astonished that a personal friend such as General Musa should have published such an extraordinary fabrication in Dawn on the 1st September, 1970.

I have no recollection whatever of visiting Walton Airport in connection with Kashmir developments or of having a conference with senior British Army Officers serving in Pakistan.

My Private Secretary and my Archivist and I have all three checked my movements during the 23rd and 30th October 1947 as suggested by you. My programme was so incredibly full during this time that there wouldn't have been space in it in which I could have flown off for such an improper and ludicrous visit.

I didn't learn about the tribal invasion until the evening of the 24th October and was very preoccupied with meetings of the Defence Committee and my other day to day duties.

I had no need to pay a secret visit to an airport in order to gain such intelligence. Who were these senior British Army Officers serving in Pakistan who would answer the call of the Governor-General in India behind the back of the Government they were serving? All together, this seems to be the most biased, ludicrous and pathetic invention not worthy of a man of General Musa's stature.

As to the suggestion that I was about to take personal command of Indian troops being despatched to Kashmir, this is absolutely ludicrous. I was a constitutional Governor-General and although I was a member of the Defence Committee, at no time did I ever institute any form of personal action and it would have been highly improper of me even in the days when I was Viceroy, to take military command of anything over the head of the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff or Commander-in-Chief in those days.

*Question* 12: It is alleged in Cunningham's diaries that you personally directed military operations in Kashmir in the initial stages. Is it correct? If so, did you consider it merely an extension of your duties as G. G?

*Comments*: My role in relation to the military operations in Kashmir was exclusively that of chairman (by my Cabinet's request) of the Defence

Committee of the Government of India and of the Joint Defence Council of India and Pakistan. My actions in those capacities are related in detail by Hodson, who had access to the Indian Cabinet papers of the time ('The Great Divide', pp. 448—465). At no time did I personally direct military operations, which were the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. (I cannot trace the reference to Sir George Cunningham's diaries, as summarised in Norval Mutchell's biography but that is of no importance; he was in no position to know what went on in Delhi). On the contrary, after the initial moves to stabilise the situation, my whole endeavour was to stop the fighting and get a settlement by way of a plebiscite.

*Question* 13: Don't you, Lord Mountbatten, think that in the light of this background, the decision of the Quaid-e-Azam not to have you as common Governor-General was, after all, correct though it may have been inexpedient from the point of view of Pakistan?

*Comments*: Since I have demolished the background, this question does not arise.

*Question* 14: In view of your threat that not to have you as common Governor-General "may well cost you the whole of your assets *and the future of Pakistan*", how else then, did you quench your thirst for revenge?

*Comments*: Your imputation of my 'thirst for revenge' is, to put it mildly, an invention. I harboured no such emotion; on the contrary, I retained my affection and admiration for Mr. Jinnah to the end, and, as my actions show, I worked indefatigably for the welfare of Pakistan as well as India, and for peace and concord between the two countries.

*Question* 15: In your opinion, what mistakes did we commit in Kashmir or in relation to Kashmir?

*Comments*: In my view, the basic mistake of the Pakistan Government in relation to Kashmir was to countenance and assist the invasion by the tribesmen. While as a rule it is futile to re-write history on the basis of 'ifs and buts', I believe that if that invasion had not occurred and precipitated the imperative reaction of the Indian Government, Kashmir might well have eventually acceded to Pakistan, either with or without a plebiscite, or might conceivably have been peacefully partitioned between India and Pakistan.

*Question* 16: What future do you predict for Kashmir?

*Comments*: I am not in the business of telling fortunes. It is a matter for India and Pakistan and the people of Kashmir and Jammu to settle.

*Question* 17: What is your general appraisal of the contrasting national characters of Hindus and Muslims?

*Comments*: There is no such thing as a 'national character' typical of all in a given country or community, least of all in terms of Hindus and Muslims in the sub-continent, who are drawn from many racial stocks while inheriting a great deal of the same cultural tradition. Both in personal relations and in political opinion and action, I have made no distinction whatever between persons or groups or nations on account of their religion.

*Conclusion*: Finally, it baffles me to discover what is the motive of the exercise in aspersion and innuendo to which you appear to have lent your hand. If it is to denigrate me personally, I am content to leave my reputation in the hands of historians who genuinely seek and publish the truth. If it is to find a scapegoat for mishaps which afflicted Pakistan in its early days, not only is it misdirected but it can obscure historical facts from which more useful lessons could be drawn. If, as a reflection of the same object, it is an effort at self-justification by others who were involved, again the verdict will be given by history. If it has some connection with the internal politics and personalities of Pakistan, that is not my affair. My object in commenting at such length on your memorandum has been not merely to put the record straight but also, in doing so, to dispel some of the false myths that have gained acceptance in Pakistan about the events of 1947 and that have served to damage relations between your country and mine.

Mountbatten of Burma.

Dear Reader! It is now your turn to judge.

THE END

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